EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS MONITOR

The Explosive Weapons Monitor is a civil society initiative that conducts research and analysis on harms from and practices of explosive weapon use in populated areas for the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW).

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EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS MONITOR 2025

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The Explosive Weapons Monitor is a civil society initiative that conducts research and analysis on harms from and practices of explosive weapon use and monitors the universalisation and implementation of the *Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas.* This research aims to:

- Advance the global recognition and understanding of the impact on civilians of the use of explosive weapons;
- Strengthen research and monitoring on civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons;
- Promote endorsement and support implementation of the Political Declaration; and
- Strengthen collaboration and information sharing between all stakeholders to the Political Declaration process of work.

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Cover photo:

Flames and smoke rise from a residential building following Israeli army strikes on the al-Ruya Tower in Gaza City, Gaza, on 7 September 2025.

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KEY FINDINGS

1. **Harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure from the use of explosive weapons remained widespread and severe in 2025.**
    - Harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure from the use of explosive weapons occurred in at least 65 countries, territories and maritime locations around the world in 2025, 13 of which were heavily impacted – Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Myanmar, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen.

2. **State armed forces were responsible for the majority of incidents in which civilians and civilian infrastructure were affected by the use of explosive weapons in 2025.**
    - Armed forces of 29 states were responsible for 85 percent of all incidents that reportedly affected civilians or civilian infrastructure in 2025. More than 17,180 such incidents were attributed to state armed forces, compared to 3,090 incidents attributed to non-state actors.

3. **The use of explosive weapons that affected civilians and civilian infrastructure by armed forces of states that have endorsed the Political Declaration increased in 2025.**
    - The number of armed forces of states that have endorsed the Political Declaration that reportedly used explosive weapons that caused civilian harm increased to eight in 2025 from five in 2024. These states included Cambodia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Somalia, Türkiye and the United States.
    - The number of countries, territories and maritime locations impacted by the use of explosive weapons by the armed forces of endorsing states increased to 13 in 2025 from only five in 2024. These include Colombia (Eastern Pacific Ocean), Dominican Republic (Caribbean Sea), Iraq, Kenya, Mexico (Eastern Pacific Ocean), Morocco, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Somalia, Syria, Thailand, Venezuela (Caribbean Sea) and Yemen.

4. **The use of explosive weapons continued to cause alarming numbers of civilian deaths in 2025.**
    - More than 22,600 civilian fatalities occurred from the use of explosive weapons across the world in 2025, a 21 percent decrease from 2024, according to analysis of data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).
    - Numbers of civilian fatalities decreased largely due to ceasefire agreements in Palestine and Lebanon and decreased use of explosive weapons by Israeli armed forces in these contexts. Still, the majority – 56 percent – of all global civilian fatalities in 2025 could be attributed to Israeli armed forces, most of which occurred in Palestine.
    - All civilian fatalities attributed to explosive weapons use by other actors increased across the globe by about 7 percent in 2025 from 2024. In addition to Palestine, civilian fatalities from explosive weapons in 13 countries – Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Iran, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen – contributed to the high numbers of deaths recorded globally.

5. **The use of explosive weapons in attacks on humanitarian aid continued to increase in 2025.**
    - The number of attacks in which explosive weapons affected humanitarian aid operations, aid workers and camps increased by 52 percent, from 1,688 attacks recorded by Insecurity Insight in 2024 to 2,541 in 2025.[1]
    - Attacks on humanitarian aid with explosive weapons were recorded in 17 countries and territories in 2025. About 90 percent of all incidents were recorded in Palestine.

6. **The use of explosive weapons in attacks on education continued to increase in 2025.**
    - The number of attacks in which explosive weapons damaged or destroyed education facilities or killed teachers or students increased by 64 percent, from 865 attacks recorded by Insecurity Insight in 2024 to 1,416 in 2025.
    - Attacks on education with explosive weapons were recorded in 27 countries and territories in 2025. The highest numbers of incidents were recorded in Myanmar, Palestine and Ukraine.

7. **The use of explosive weapons in attacks on healthcare continued to disrupt health services in 2025.**
    - At least 1,272 incidents in which explosive weapons damaged or destroyed health facilities and ambulances or killed health workers were recorded by Insecurity Insight in 2025. The number of attacks decreased by 40 percent in Lebanon and Palestine and increased by 20 percent in Ukraine.
    - Attacks on healthcare with explosive weapons were recorded in 22 countries and territories in 2025. About 84 percent of all incidents were recorded in Myanmar, Palestine and Ukraine.

8. **The use of explosive weapons in attacks on food and water systems continued in at least 15 countries and territories in 2025.**
    - Insecurity Insight documented at least 1,082 incidents in which explosive weapons affected communities' ability to produce and access food in 15 countries and territories in 2025.
    - Insecurity Insight documented at least 87 incidents in which the use of explosive weapons damaged and destroyed water distribution networks, desalination facilities, water storage infrastructure and water transportation vehicles in 15 countries and territories in 2025.

9. **Air-launched explosive weapons were most frequently used in incidents affecting civilians and civilian infrastructure in 2025.**
    - About 67 percent of all incidents that affected civilians and civilian infrastructure in 2025 involved the use of air-launched explosive weapons, while 20 percent involved the use of ground-launched explosive weapons and 13 percent involved the use of directly-emplaced explosive weapons.

10. **It remains a critical humanitarian priority to bring the *Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences of the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas* into effect to prevent and reduce harm to civilians.**

1 The Explosive Weapon Monitor 2024 annual report cited 1,631 incidents of explosive weapon use affecting humanitarian operations in 2024. Data is continuously updated and numbers can change if new information is made publicly available.

INTRODUCTION

"The explosion was deafening... Dozens of tents had been blown away. Bodies of the dead, many of them children, were torn into pieces, as wounded people were desperately calling for help. It was apocalyptic." – A 46-year-old father to Amnesty International after his eldest daughter was seriously injured in an attack in Democratic Republic of Congo.[2]

In towns and cities across the world in 2025, civilians continued to experience widespread and elevated levels of harm from the use of explosive weapons. Since such harm reached unprecedented levels in 2023, civilians have continued to suffer on a massive scale through 2025. For three years, the daily bombing and shelling of populated areas continued in many conflicts where civilian suffering is now commonplace and no longer an exception. At the same time, new conflicts and patterns of harm from explosive weapons use have emerged. In sum, 2025 marks the continuation of worsening harm to civilians across many contexts and an urgency with which the international community should act to prevent and address this harm.

IN TOWNS AND CITIES ACROSS THE WORLD IN 2025, CIVILIANS CONTINUED TO EXPERIENCE WIDESPREAD AND ELEVATED LEVELS OF HARM FROM THE USE OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS. SINCE SUCH HARM REACHED UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS IN 2023, CIVILIANS HAVE CONTINUED TO SUFFER ON A MASSIVE SCALE THROUGH 2025. FOR THREE YEARS, THE DAILY BOMBING AND SHELLING OF POPULATED AREAS CONTINUED IN MANY CONFLICTS WHERE CIVILIAN SUFFERING IS NOW COMMONPLACE AND NO LONGER AN EXCEPTION.

This urgency is heightened by intensified geopolitical tensions across the globe, evidence of increasing violations of international humanitarian law (IHL),[3] and the threat of eroding norms around the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Acceptance and normalization of harm to civilians threaten to weaken the frameworks that save lives, including the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences of the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas.

As the Explosive Weapons Monitor 2025 takes stock of harm to civilians from the use of explosive weapons across the globe in 2025 and identifies state and non-state actors reportedly responsible for this use, it also underscores the increasingly critical humanitarian priority to bring the Political Declaration into effect. This not only includes placing limits on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas but also taking action to reinforce and defend the Declaration's norms and principles.

2 Amnesty International (2025). 'DR Congo: Rwandan-backed armed group and Congolese army must stop using explosive weapons in densely populated areas '. January 2025. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/01/dr-congo-rwandan-backed-armed-group-and-congolese-army-must-stop-using-explosive-weapons-in-densely-populated-areas/.

3 Geneva Academy (2025). 'IHL in Focus: Annual Report Assessing Compliance in Contemporary Armed Conflicts, July 2023 - June 2024'. 26 February 2025. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/ihl-focus-annual-report-assessing-compliance-contemporary-armed-conflicts-july-2023-june-2024.

HARM TO CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE USE OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN 2024

1. Methodology Note

The Explosive Weapons Monitor reports on civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons across four thematic areas using data shared by partner organisations. These include incidents in which civilian casualties were reported, as recorded by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), as well as incidents that affected civilian access to healthcare, education, and humanitarian aid, as recorded by Insecurity Insight. For a select number of countries and territories for which data is available, the Explosive Weapons Monitor also reports on food and water systems, as recorded by Insecurity Insight.

This report includes data on civilian fatalities recorded by ACLED, and in the instance of deaths of health, education and aid workers, also by Insecurity Insight. Data on damage and destruction of civilian infrastructure, particularly health, education, camps for internally displaced persons and refugees, and food and water systems were also recorded by Insecurity Insight. This includes incidents that have occurred on both land and sea. In the case that incidents were recorded in international or territorial waters, the Explosive Weapons Monitor has presented data here as was coded by both ACLED and Insecurity Insight. For full methodologies used by these organisations, please see Annex 1. All data was shared or downloaded by 31 March 2026.

The Explosive Weapons Monitor defines populated areas as "any concentration of civilians, be it permanent or temporary, such as in inhabited parts of cities, or inhabited towns or villages, or as in camps or columns of refugees or evacuees, or groups of nomads," synonymous with the term "concentration of civilians" which appears in existing international humanitarian law (IHL). The references to refugees, evacuees and nomads and the use of the term "inhabited" suggest that the presence of civilians and civilian objects – which need not be in great numbers – is a defining characteristic of populated areas.

While the data presented here do not distinguish between the use of explosive weapons in populated and unpopulated areas, the indicators of harm – civilian casualties, damage and destruction of civilian infrastructure, and impeded access to essential services – suggest that the majority of incidents recorded by each data source above likely occurred in populated areas.

4 See Article 1(2), Protocol on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (1980). See also ICRC (2016). 'Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas – Factsheet'; Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic (2022). 'Safeguarding Civilians: A Humanitarian Interpretation of the Political Declaration on the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas', pp.8-9.

Methodology for estimating civilian injuries from recorded fatality counts

The Explosive Weapons Monitor uses a standardized methodology to estimate the number of civilians injured from fatality data available from ACLED. This methodology supports a transparent and standardized approach to reporting civilian casualties from explosive weapons, especially where injury data is incomplete or unavailable.

While there is some under-reporting of fatalities, in most contexts there is a general approximation.[5] In the case of injuries, however, injury in many conflict settings is not reported or information is incomplete or inconsistent due to constraints on access, ongoing hostilities, reporting delays, and source discrepancies. As a result, such reporting fluctuates. Civilians injured by explosive weapons are often underreported or not reported at all, even where fatalities are recorded.

By using ACLED fatality counts as the basis for estimation, the Explosive Weapons Monitor is able to provide a more consistent indication of likely civilian injuries as an aspect of harm, while acknowledging the uncertainty inherent in conflict casualty data.

This approach allows Explosive Weapons Monitor to present a minimum and maximum estimated injury range. The upper estimate may be closer to reported injury figures where sources reliably record and report both injuries and fatalities. However, injury-to-fatality ratios can also fluctuate significantly over limited periods of time, including within the same country and conflict context. Estimated figures should be understood as indicative of the scale of harm to civilians in this aspect, and not as definitive figures.

To support consistent and comparable reporting, the Explosive Weapons Monitor applies a formula-based approach to estimate injuries from reported fatalities. The methodology is based on injury ratios derived from previous years of the Explosive Weapons Monitor's reporting on civilian casualties as recorded by ACLED. This methodology applies lower- and upper-bound estimates for injuries based on the range observed in previous data as reported monthly, in which injuries accounted for between 41 percent and 79 percent of total civilian casualties.

The range is calculated as follows:

- Minimum estimated injuries are calculated by multiplying recorded fatalities by 41/59 (0.695), reflecting a historical distribution where 59 percent of casualties are killed and 41 percent injured. For example, for 100 fatalities: 69 minimum estimated injuries.
- Maximum estimated injuries are calculated by multiplying recorded fatalities by 79/2 (3.762), reflecting a historical distribution where 21 percent of casualties are killed and 79 percent injured. For example, for 100 fatalities: 376 maximum estimated injuries.

The data presented in this report do not capture every incident of explosive weapons use or related or every casualty related to incidents of explosive weapons use that occurred in 2025. They also do not capture the many additional ways in which civilians are impacted by the use of explosive weapons, such as displacement, psychosocial trauma and impeded economic development. The impact of explosive weapons use is much greater than is presented here. Instead, this report aims to identify patterns of harm from the use of explosive weapons around the globe and to demonstrate a clear need to mitigate risk to civilians, take steps to prevent the harm to civilians caused by the use of explosive weapons, and to provide necessary, lifesaving and longer-term assistance to victims and survivors.

5 ACLED. 'FAQs: ACLED Fatality Methodology'. https://acleddata.com/sites/default/files/wp-content-archive/uploads/dlm_uploads/2020/02/FAQs_-ACLED-Fatality-Methodology_2020.pdf.

Identifying the number of civilian fatalities from explosive weapons presents numerous challenges, including data availability, verification and accuracy. In conflict situations, there is often limited media access and a lack of infrastructure and resources for data collection, hindering the ability to gather comprehensive information. Underreporting of casualties can be due to a combination of factors, such as changing media focus on conflicts and inaccessible areas. Data or reporting can be biased according to specific aims, narratives or outlooks. Distinguishing civilian deaths from available information can also be challenging, especially when reporting sources use unclear terminology and terms to identify civilians, such as 'people' rather than specifying 'civilians'. As such, numbers of fatalities presented here are almost certainly an underrepresentation of civilian casualties in 2025. Additionally, civilian casualties caused by explosive weapons may have occurred in countries and territories not identified in this report.

2. Global Overview

Harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure from the use of explosive weapons remained widespread across the globe and occurred in at least 65 countries and territories in 2025. This includes five contexts of explosive weapons use that occurred in international and/or territorial waters, identified below as recorded by ACLED and Insecurity Insight.

This harm occurred in incidents that caused civilian death or injury, or affected access to healthcare, education, humanitarian aid, food security or water services, including the damage and destruction of the civilian infrastructure necessary to deliver these essential services.

Of these 65 affected countries and territories, 25 have endorsed the Political Declaration:[6]

- Brazil, Central African Republic, Colombia (Eastern Pacific Ocean), Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Dominican Republic (Caribbean Sea), Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Malta , Mexico (Eastern Pacific Ocean), Morocco, Nigeria, Palestine, Peru, Philippines, Somalia, Thailand, Togo and the United States

Civilians in 13 countries and territories were heavily impacted by the use of explosive weapons, as they experienced harm across all reported areas in which global data was available:

- Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Myanmar, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen

6 This includes incidents that caused civilian death or injury, or affected access to healthcare, education, or humanitarian aid. Incidents affecting food security or water systems are also indicators of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure, though at present this data is not recorded for all countries and territories across the globe by Insecurity Insight.

Countries, territories and maritime locations in which civilians were affected by the use of explosive weapons in 2025

Affected countries and territories

Afghanistan
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Benin
Bolivia
Brazil
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Colombia (Eastern Pacific Ocean)
Côte d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cyprus
Democratic Republic of Congo
Dominican Republic (Caribbean Sea)
Ecuador
Estonia
Ethiopia
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Kenya
Kyrgyzstan
Lebanon
Libya
Mali
Malta (territorial waters)
Mexico (Eastern Pacific Ocean)
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Palestine
Peru
Philippines
Russia
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Somalia
South Korea
South Sudan
Sudan
Syria
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Ukraine
United States
Venezuela (Caribbean Sea)
Yemen

Areas of harm in countries, territories and maritime locations in which civilians were affected by the use of explosive weapons in 2025[7]

Country	Casualties	Healthcare	Aid access	Education	Food Security	Water
Afghanistan	●					
Armenia	●					
Azerbaijan	●					
Bangladesh	●					
Benin	●					
Bolivia	●					
Brazil	●					
Burkina Faso	●	●	●	●	●	
Burundi	●					
Cameroon	●				●	
Central African Republic	●					
Chad	●		●			
Colombia (Eastern Pacific Ocean)	●	●		●		
Côte d'Ivoire	●					
Croatia	●					
Cyprus	●					
Democratic Republic of Congo	●	●	●		●	
Dominican Republic (Caribbean Sea)	●					
Ecuador	●	●		●		
Estonia	●					
Ethiopia	●	●	●	●		
Ghana	●					
Greece	●					
Guatemala	●					
Guyana	●					
Haiti				●		
India	●	●		●		
Indonesia	●					
Iran	●	●	●	●		
Iraq	●		●	●	●	●
Israel	●	●		●		
Jordan	●					
Kenya	●			●		
Kyrgyzstan	●					
Lebanon	●	●	●	●	●	●
Libya	●					
Mali	●				●	●
Malta (territorial waters)			●			
Mexico (Eastern Pacific Ocean)	●	●		●		
Morocco	●					

● Casualties ● Healthcare ● Aid access ● Education ● Food Security ● Water

7 Insecurity Insight monitored incidents of explosive weapons use that affected food and water systems in 15 countries and territories in 2025. As a result, the absence of data does not imply that civilians in other countries and territories were not impacted in this way in 2025.

Areas of harm in countries, territories and maritime locations in which civilians were affected by the use of explosive weapons in 2025 (continued)

Country	Casualties	Healthcare	Aid access	Education	Food Security	Water
Mozambique	●					
Myanmar	●	●	●	●	●	●
Nepal	●					
Niger	●			●	●	
Nigeria	●			●		
Pakistan	●	●		●		
Palestine	●	●	●	●	●	●
Peru	●					
Philippines	●					
Russia	●	●		●		
Rwanda	●					
Saudi Arabia				●		
Somalia	●	●	●	●	●	●

Country	Casualties	Healthcare	Aid access	Education	Food Security	Water
South Korea	●					
South Sudan	●	●	●	●	●	●
Sudan	●	●	●	●	●	●
Syria	●	●	●	●	●	●
Thailand	●	●				
Togo	●					
Tunisia	●					
Uganda	●					
Ukraine	●	●	●	●	●	●
United States	●					
Venezuela (Caribbean Sea)	●					
Yemen	●	●	●	●	●	●

Casualties Healthcare Aid access Education Food Security Water

3. Fatalities: Civilian deaths from the use of explosive weapons

Civilian deaths caused by the use of explosive weapons remained alarmingly high across the globe in 2025. More than 22,600 civilian fatalities occurred as a result of the use of explosive weapons across the world in 2025, according to analysis of data from ACLED, reported in over 14,100 incidents in which civilians were either killed or injured by explosive weapons. Though a decrease from 2024, in which more than 28,600 civilian deaths occurred, this figure remains staggeringly high.

High fatality figures were recorded in:

- Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Russia, Somalia and Sudan[8]

Global civilian fatalities from the use of explosive weapons in 2023, 2024, 2025



8 At least 100 civilian fatalities were recorded by ACLED in each of these countries and territories in 2025.

Countries and territories that experienced high numbers of civilian fatalities from explosive weapons in 2025 compared to 2024

Country	2024	2025	Increase / Decrease
Palestine	19561	12136	↓
Ukraine	1742	2519	↑
Myanmar	2372	2450	↑
Syria	727	1015	↑
Sudan[9]	2160	956	↓
Yemen	158	360	↑
Russia	325	334	↑
Pakistan	187	226	↑
Iran	124	223	↑
Ethiopia	303	197	↓
Mali	287	192	↓
Nigeria	179	130	↓
Democratic Republic of Congo	165	128	↓
Somalia	155	109	↓

Estimating civilian injuries in 2025

The Explosive Weapons Monitor estimates that about 16,000 - 85,900 civilians were injured by explosive weapons in 2025. This range is meant to provide an indication of likely civilian injuries as an aspect of harm, while acknowledging the uncertainty inherent in conflict casualty data. The upper estimate – 85,900 – is most likely closest to those reported injury figures where sources reliably record and report both injuries and fatalities. However, injury-to-fatality ratios can also fluctuate significantly over limited periods of time, including within the same country and conflict context. As such, these estimates should be understood as indicative of the scale of harm to civilians in this aspect, and not as definitive figures (see full methodology for injury estimates above).

The proportion of civilian fatalities attributed to Israeli armed forces in relation to other fatalities across the globe has remained high since the beginning of hostilities in Gaza in October 2023. The scale of civilian harm in this context, as well as in Lebanon in 2024, has been a key driver in the unprecedented scale of harm that continued into 2025. As a result, overall global patterns in civilian fatalities are disproportionately influenced by the use of explosive weapons by Israeli armed forces, relative to other actors.

9 Recording civilian deaths in Sudan has been especially challenging, as ACLED has noted in specific methodology notes for its figures in Sudan. As a result, the fatality figures above are likely an undercount and may differ from other estimations. See more at ACLED (2026). 'How to interpret ACLED's fatality records in Sudan'. April 2026. https://acleddata.com/methodology/how-interpret-acleds-fatality-records-sudan.

In 2025, Israeli armed forces were reportedly responsible for more than 55 percent of all civilian fatalities from explosive weapons across the globe, more than 12,500. This marks a decrease from previous years, in which Israeli armed forces were responsible for 71 percent of global fatalities in 2024 and 76 percent in 2023. This decrease can be attributed to ceasefire agreements that entered into effect in Gaza in 2025 and in Lebanon in 2024, as the rate at which civilian fatalities occurred slowed considerably but did not stop entirely.[10]

Percentages of civilian fatalities reportedly caused by Israeli armed forces compared with all other state and non-state actors worldwide in 2023, 2024, 2025



The ceasefire agreements and decrease in use of explosive weapons by Israeli armed forces are key drivers of a 21 percent decrease in civilian fatalities globally in 2025, relative to 2024. Despite this, civilian deaths that reportedly occurred as a result of the use of explosive weapons by all actors other than Israeli armed forces increased marginally in 2025, by 7 percent. This was due in large part to continued and/or renewed conflict in:

- Iran, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen

In these and other contexts, the use of explosive weapons by other state actors contributed to high fatality figures in 2025 in addition to Israeli forces. This included, in approximate figures:

- Myanmar Armed Forces (2,300 fatalities)
- Russian Armed Forces (2,200 fatalities)
- Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) (580 fatalities)
- Armed Forces of Ukraine (600 fatalities)

Additionally, non-state actors were reportedly responsible for nearly 3,400 fatalities from explosive weapons across the globe in 2025.

10 Civilian deaths and injuries have also been recorded in other contexts of explosive weapons use by Israeli armed forces in 2023, 2024 and 2025, including Iran, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.

Increased use of armed drones and civilian casualties in Latin America: Colombia, Haiti and Mexico

In 2025, armed drones reportedly caused civilian casualties in Haiti, Colombia, and Mexico, though the circumstances of the use of these drones differed significantly. For example, drones can fire missiles or other explosive munitions, or they can carry and drop explosives onto targets. Similarly, drones can be crashed into targets to detonate explosives.[11]

Armed drones can also be used for a variety of purposes. According to Human Rights Watch, Haiti saw the first documented repeated use of explosive drones as a law enforcement tool used by state security forces, including the use of quadcopter drones.[12] In Colombia and Mexico, non-state armed groups, including Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents, National Liberation Army (ELN), and Mexican cartels, deployed commercially adapted drones against civilian populations, health workers, and rival actors.

In Haiti, Human Rights Watch documented at least 141 armed drone operations between 1 March 2025 and 21 January 2026, spread across nine communes in the West Department of Port-au-Prince. In these operations, at least 1,243 people were killed and 738 were injured. The pace of strikes increased toward the end of the year, when 57 operations were recorded between November 2025 and 21 January 2026. In one incident on 20 September, a strike near a sports complex in the Simon Pelé neighbourhood of Cité Soleil killed at least 10 civilians, among them nine children aged between three and twelve. Children had gathered at the site for a gift distribution, while others played nearby or accompanied adults running errands. Médecins Sans Frontières reported that at least 17 people were injured in the attack, nine of whom subsequently died. For those who survived, traumatic amputations while receiving medical care were among the most common injuries reported. A woman who lost her three-year-old daughter and her husband told Human Rights Watch: *"I heard the sound of the explosion... My husband and daughter were together at the place where my husband makes his crafts... I didn't see [their bodies] at the scene. I saw blood in the areas where they had been."*[14] Residents of neighbourhoods subject to regular strikes described the drones as a persistent source of fear, and some kept their children indoors whenever they heard one overhead.[15]

In Colombia, analysis of ACLED and Insecurity Insight data detailed 17 drone incidents in 2025, in which at least eight people were reportedly killed and 16 injured, concentrated in Cauca and Norte de Santander. In February 2025, the Carlos Patiño FARC dissident front carried out at least three drone attacks within a single week in El Plateado, Cauca. In one strike, a drone dropped a grenade onto a tented field hospital set up by Médecins Sans Frontières, injuring health workers. The following day, three drones dropped explosives into a residential area of the same town, injuring two civilians, including an 80-year-old woman. Médecins Sans Frontières described the attacks as putting *"the civilian population and the medical mission at risk [.]"*[16] Around 1,000 people were subsequently displaced from the surrounding rural area. In Norte de Santander, where the ELN launched a major offensive in Catatumbo that displaced more than 56,000 people, drone strikes on civilian homes occurred repeatedly from March through December, killing farmers, a teenager, and others caught in contested territory.[17]

In Mexico, ACLED data indicated that five drone incidents resulted in three civilian deaths and at least 14 injuries across Michoacán, Veracruz, Jalisco, and Sinaloa. Those killed included a boy struck while working in an orchard, and among the injured were a two-year-old in Michoacán and five children hit at a family celebration in Sinaloa.[18]

11 Insecurity Insight (2025). 'Sudden Threats from the Sky: Security Measures against Drone Strikes'. May 2025. https://insecurityinsight.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Sudden-Threats-from-the-Sky-Security-Measures-against-Drone-Strikes.pdf.

12 Human Rights Watch (2026). 'Haiti: Drone Strikes Put Residents at Risk'. 10 March 2026. https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/03/10/haiti-drone-strikes-put-residents-at-risk.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Hide, S. (2025). 'Drone attacks increasingly affect civilians in Colombia's conflict'. Latin America Reports. 5 March 2025. https://latinamericareports.com/drone-attacks-increasingly-affect-civilians-in-colombias-conflict/10839/.

17 UN OHCHR (2025). 'Colombia: UN experts call for protection of civilians caught up in Catatumbo conflict'. 20 March 2025. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/03/colombia-un-experts-call-protection-civilians-caught-catatumbo-conflict.

18 Analysis is from ACLED data.

A woman walks down the street next to a house destroyed by gang violence in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on 27 February 2025.

4. Humanitarian Aid: Incidents of explosive weapons use affecting civilian access to aid services

At least 2,541 incidents of attacks in which explosive weapons affected aid operations were recorded in 17 countries and territories by Insecurity Insight in 2025, marking a continued increase in both numbers of incidents and affected countries and territories. The use of explosive weapons in 2025 disrupted the delivery of lifesaving, critical assistance, which in turn reduced civilians' access to food, water, shelter, healthcare and protection services. Additionally, it increased risks for aid workers and affected communities.

The number of reported incidents where the use of explosive weapons affected aid operations increased by 52 percent in 2025 compared to 2024, in which 1,668 incidents were recorded. This was due to increased incidents in Palestine, which represented almost 90 percent of all attacks on humanitarian aid recorded by Insecurity Insight in 2025. Incidents also increased three-fold in Myanmar and by about 80 percent in Sudan.

Incidents of explosive weapons use affecting aid access reported by Insecurity Insight in 2025 compared to 2024

Country	Number of aid access incidents in 2024	Number of aid access incidents in 2025
Palestine	1470	2271
Sudan	80	145
Ukraine	40	49
Myanmar	12	36
Democratic Republic of Congo	6	12
Syria	17	8
Lebanon	19	5
Yemen	2	3
Libya	0	2

Country	Number of aid access incidents in 2024	Number of aid access incidents in 2025
Somalia	9	2
South Sudan	0	2
Burkina Faso	1	1
Chad	1	1
Ethiopia	2	1
Iraq	2	1
Malta	0	1
Russia	0	1

Attacks on humanitarian aid with explosive weapons reported by Insecurity Insight by month in 2024 and 2025



In Russia and Maltese territorial waters, boats carrying humanitarian supplies were hit by drone strikes, damaging humanitarian supplies and delaying the distribution of aid. Amidst increased hostilities in Libya and South Sudan, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya's headquarters in Tripoli was attacked, threatening their operations, and at least one aid worker from a local non-governmental organisation in South Sudan was killed.

Sustained and repeated use of explosive weapons undermines humanitarian access, as humanitarian agencies have to consider duty of care towards employees and volunteers, often forcing the suspension or limiting of operations due to high risk, unaffordable insurance costs, weakening communities' resilience and recovery capacity in conflict-affected areas.

4.1. Use of drones in attacks on aid services

The use of drones affecting humanitarian operations also increased significantly in 2025. Incidents with drones occurred more than four times more frequently in 2025 than in 2024, particularly in Palestine where the use of drones affecting camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Gaza and the West Bank increased from 64 incidents in 2024 to 303 incidents in 2025. These incidents damaged and destroyed public and private infrastructure, including homes of displaced persons, as well as makeshift tents in Gaza, and killed and injured aid workers and displaced Palestinians.

Drone-delivered explosive munitions also affected aid convoys delivering humanitarian assistance in:

- Chad, Palestine, Sudan, and Ukraine

In these incidents, aid workers were killed and injured and critical aid supplies for communities in need were damaged or destroyed. These incidents placed additional strain on already vulnerable communities by disrupting the delivery of life-saving assistance while also creating significant financial and security burdens for aid organisations, which were forced to replace destroyed supplies and implement additional security measures to protect staff and operations. In some cases, humanitarian operations were temporarily suspended following such incidents, further restricting civilians' access to essential aid and services.

4.2. Impact on aid infrastructure

In 2025, aid offices, vehicles and accommodations were damaged or destroyed by air- and ground-launched explosive weapons in:

- Burkina Faso, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Palestine, Sudan and Ukraine

In addition, aid supplies were also damaged or destroyed by airstrikes in Palestine and Ukraine, and by ground-launched explosive weapons in Sudan.

4.3. Attacks on aid workers and distribution sites

In 2025, at least 108 aid workers were reportedly killed by explosive weapons in 2025, the majority of whom were killed by explosive munitions delivered by drones or other air-launched explosive weapons in Chad, Palestine, Myanmar, South Sudan, Sudan and Ukraine. Gaza continued to be the most dangerous environment for aid workers, as they were killed whilst travelling in aid convoys, inside warehouses and in displacement camps, as well as whilst distributing aid.

These incidents had compounding effects on the civilian population and likely affected aid agencies' ability to distribute relief to communities. In 2025, Insecurity Insight recorded at least 78 incidents of the use of explosive weapons against distribution sites in:

- Myanmar, Palestine, Sudan, Syria and Ukraine

These incidents killed and severely injured both civilians receiving aid and aid workers. Attacks on distribution sites also forced the closures or suspensions of aid operations due to safety concerns, as a result depriving communities from accessing lifesaving assistance.

4.4. Attacks on camps for internally displaced persons and refugees

IDP camps were reportedly damaged, and programmes related to IDPs were suspended, due to the use of explosive weapons in:

- Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Lebanon, Myanmar, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen

Duty of care responsibilities increasingly forced aid agencies not to send international staff into areas affected by explosive weapons. Risk transfer from international aid agencies to local partner agencies is particularly common in areas where explosive weapons use affects aid operations.

Attacks on humanitarian aid with explosive weapons in 2025

108
Aid workers killed by explosive weapons

54
Incidents affecting aid infrastructure

2284
Incidents affecting IDP/Refugee camps

Attacks on humanitarian aid in Gaza and their reverberating effects

Two years into Israel's military campaign in the Gaza strip, launched following the Hamas-led attack on southern Israeli on 07 October 2023, extensive aerial bombardments, shelling, and ground operations by Israeli forces have caused widespread damage to and destruction of critical civilian infrastructure across Gaza, including infrastructure essential to humanitarian relief efforts, food production, storage and distribution. Agricultural lands, bakeries, markets, warehouse, water infrastructure and food distribution sites were repeatedly damaged or destroyed by explosive weapons, severely undermining Palestinians' ability to locally produce or access food and increasing dependence on humanitarian assistance, community kitchens, and emergency food distribution. However, humanitarian operations themselves repeatedly came under attack, further disrupting the delivery of life-saving aid.

In 2025, Insecurity Insight recorded at least 156 incidents in which explosive weapons affected aid operations in Gaza, representing a 155 percent increase compared to the 61 incidents documented in 2024. Air-delivered explosive weapons, including drone strikes, as well as artillery shelling, missiles and rockets damaged or destroyed warehouses, aid offices, residential compounds housing aid workers, humanitarian vehicles, and distribution points. Explosive weapons also repeatedly affected aid distribution sites, despite the civilian populations' heavy reliance on these locations.

The risk associated with the use of explosive weapons in a context of repeated attacks affected humanitarian personnel and infrastructure and limited aid agencies' access. Coupled with bureaucratic obstacles, the widespread use of explosive weapons significantly undermined civilians' access to food, water, shelter, health care, and education.

These impacts contributed to mass displacement, with almost the entire population of Gaza displaced, often multiple times, and many people forced to live in overcrowded and makeshift shelters exposing them to further risk.[19] The destruction of food systems and disruptions to humanitarian aid operations contributed to severe food insecurity, with many Palestinians reportedly surviving on only one meal every 24 hours.[20]

The reverberating effects of the use of explosive weapons in areas with heightened humanitarian needs have been immediate and long-term. Damage to roads, warehouses, fuel supplies, water systems, and communications infrastructure has repeatedly disrupted humanitarian supply chains and reduced the ability of aid organisations to safely transport and distribute assistance. Repeated use and risks associated with the use of explosive weapons in populated areas have also forced the suspension or reduction of humanitarian operations in some areas, further limiting civilians' access to essential goods and services.

The destruction and contamination of agricultural lands, fishing infrastructure, bakeries and threat of attacks at markets have undermined local food production and livelihoods, increasing dependency on external aid while reducing communities' capacity for self-sufficiency and recovery. The damage to the water and sanitation systems have heightened the risks of disease outbreaks, malnutrition, and long-term public health deterioration. The fear of the severe impacts of the use of explosive weapons and the cumulative destruction of civilian infrastructure have therefore not only deepened the immediate humanitarian crisis, but also significantly weakened the long-term resilience and recovery capacity of Gaza's population.

19 Human Rights Watch (2024). 'Hopeless, Starving, and Besieged: Israel's forced displacement of Palestinians in Gaza'. https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/11/14/hopeless-starving-and-besieged/israels-forced-displacement-palestinians-gaza.

20 United Nations (2025). 'Our kids cry for food: Most Gaza families survive on one meal a day'. June 2025. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/06/1164951.

An aerial view of Palestinians shopping at a market set up among the rubble in Jabalia Refugee Camp, northern Gaza, during Ramadan on 5 March 2025.

5. Education: Incidents of explosive weapons use affecting civilian access to education

At least 1,416 incidents of attacks in which explosive weapons damaged or destroyed education facilities or killed teachers or students were recorded by Insecurity Insight in 27 countries and territories in 2025, marking a continued increase in both the number of incidents and affected countries and territories. The use of explosive weapons disrupted access to learning by damaging or destroying schools and universities, forcing the suspension of classes, school closures, and shifts to online learning.

The number of reported incidents where the use of explosive weapons affected access to education increased by 64 percent in 2025 compared to 2024, in which 865 incidents were recorded. The geographical spread of the use of explosive weapons with impact on education also continued to increase in 2025, with incidents recorded in 27 countries and territories compared to 22 in the previous year.

Incidents of explosive weapons use affecting education reported by Insecurity Insight in 2025 compared to 2024

Country	Number of education incidents in 2024	Number of education incidents in 2025
Ukraine	297	723
Palestine	249	262
Myanmar	169	260
Russia	16	37
Ethiopia	29	28
Sudan	24	22
Pakistan	12	17
Lebanon	10	12
Yemen	6	8
Syria	28	8
Democratic Republic of Congo	1	8
Israel	9	5
Nigeria	1	3
Iran	0	3
Ecuador	0	3
Colombia	1	3

Country	Number of education incidents in 2024	Number of education incidents in 2025
South Sudan	0	2
Mexico	1	2
Iraq	1	2
Burkina Faso	1	1
Haiti	0	1
India	4	1
Kenya	0	1
Rwanda	0	1
Niger	0	1
Saudi Arabia	0	1
Somalia	0	1
Afghanistan	2	0
Bangladesh	2	0
Côte d'Ivoire	1	0
Mali	1	0

Incidents where the use of explosive weapons affected education reported by Insecurity Insight by month in 2024 and 2025



The highest numbers of incidents were documented in:

- Ukraine, Palestine and Myanmar

In Ukraine, recorded incidents in which explosive weapons affected educational facilities more than doubled compared to the previous year, 92 percent of which continued to be attributed to Russian armed forces who reportedly struck schools with drones and other air-launched explosive weapons, as well as artillery shelling. The use of drones in attacks impacting schools by Russian armed forces increased dramatically – by 358 percent – relative to 2024. As a result of these strikes, schools in affected areas were forced to switch to remote learning. Damage to energy infrastructure from the use of explosive weapons also prevented schools and universities from providing in-person and online classes in some parts of the country.[21]

21 Vinck, P., Mysiv, L., Marston, J., Pham, PN. (2026). 'Household Survey of Effects of Attacks on Energy Infrastructure (2022-2025)'. Kobo Inc. https://www.kobo.ngo/publications/ukraine%3A-household-survey-of-effects-of-attacks-on-energy-infrastructure-(2022-2025).

In 2025, incidents of explosive weapons impacting schools attributed to Ukrainian armed forces increased. Ukrainian drones, missiles and shelling impacted schools in both Russia and Ukraine. In Russia, schools close to the Ukraine-Russia border were damaged by debris from intercepted Ukrainian explosive munitions whilst in Ukraine, schools, mainly in Russian controlled areas, were damaged by Ukrainian shelling and drone strikes, according to data from Insecurity Insight.

Incidents affecting education were also recorded by Insecurity Insight in countries and territories that were not affected in 2024, including:

- Ecuador, Haiti, Iran, Kenya, Niger, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and South Sudan

The use of explosive weapons creates a climate of fear among students, teachers, and families, while long-term disruption to education poses risks to children's well-being and development.[22]

5.1. Impact on education facilities

In 2025, at least 146 kindergartens, 50 primary schools, 78 secondary schools and 69 universities were reportedly damaged or destroyed by explosive weapons. Like previous years, air-launched explosives were more likely to impact schools. Specifically, the use of drones continued in attacks on education facilities, increasing to 551 incidents in 2025 from 164 incidents in 2024, as more armed actors used these weapons, including FARC dissidents in Colombia, the Haitian Police in Haiti, the Islamic State in Iraq and Sudanese Armed Forces in Sudan.

Impact of the use of explosive weapons on education in 2025

1323

Incidents affecting schools

17

Incidents affecting teachers

22 UNICEF. 'Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas'. https://www.unicef.org/take-action/campaigns/children-under-attack/explosive-weapons-populated-areas.

An interior view of a damaged kindergarten following a Russian attack with Shahed-type drones in Kharkiv region of Ukraine on 22 October 2025.

The impact of explosive weapons use on education in Ukraine and their reverberating effects

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the use of explosive weapons has featured prominently throughout the conflict, with most incidents that have caused civilian harm largely attributed to Russian armed forces.[23] These incidents have had a devastating impact on Ukrainian civilians and critical civilian infrastructure, including the education system.

From the start of Russia's invasion until December 2025, Insecurity Insight has documented at least 1,250 incidents in which explosive weapons affected access to education in Ukraine. In these incidents, at least 1,251 education facilities, including kindergartens, primary and secondary schools and universities, were struck by air-delivered explosives, drone strikes, missiles, artillery shelling and rockets. These incidents not only damaged or destroyed the facilities, but also killed or injured teachers and students. On 13 April 2025, in Sumy Oblast, a Russian Iskander missile struck the conference centre of a university and killed at least two medical students, a college lecturer, a schoolteacher and two children. A second missile strike also killed at least one nurse who was providing care to civilians injured in the first strike, in a possible sequential strike. At least nine educators were killed by explosive weapons inside educational facilities or in their homes since February 2022.

Since the start of the conflict, over 3,800 schools have been impacted causing a severe strain on Ukraine's educational system. The damage goes beyond physical infrastructure and has severely impacted Ukrainian children's access to education. As a result of repeated attacks, schools have been forced to relocate, build bunkers, switch to remote learning, or have children attend classes in shifts. Schools, especially those located near the frontlines, have been forced to remain closed because of a lack of adequate shelters on site that would effectively protect children from the effects of attacks.[24]

While air raid alarms disrupt classes, the long-term effects of explosive weapons use around schools has a profound effect on the mental health of children and prolonged exposure to conflict may lead to children suffering from chronic lack of sleep, distracted attention, difficulties concentrating, and fatigue.[25]

23 INEW (2023). 'Ukraine – A year of civilian suffering from bombing and shelling in towns and cities'. 24 February 2023. https://www.inew.org/ukraine-a-year-of-civilian-suffering-from-bombing-and-shelling-in-towns-and-cities/.

24 See Norwegian Refugee Council (2024). 'The hidden casualties of war: How attacks on schools in Ukraine are affecting children'. 14 October 2024. https://www.nrc.no/feature/2024/the-hidden-casualties-of-war-how-attacks-on-schools-in-ukraine-are-affecting-children; and Save the Children (2025). 'Children on Ukraine's Frontlines Lose More Days of School than the World's Longest COVID-19 Closures'. September 2025. https://www.savethechildren.net/news/children-ukraines-frontlines-lose-more-days-school-worlds-longest-covid-19-school-closures.

25 Norwegian Refugee Council (2024). 'The hidden casualties of war: How attacks on schools in Ukraine are affecting children'. 14 October 2024. https://www.nrc.no/feature/2024/the-hidden-casualties-of-war-how-attacks-on-schools-in-ukraine-are-affecting-children.

6. Healthcare: Incidents of explosive weapons use affecting civilian access to healthcare

Insecurity Insight recorded at least 1,272 incidents in which explosive weapons damaged or destroyed health facilities and ambulances or killed health workers in 22 countries and territories in 2025. In these contexts, the use of explosive weapons reduced the availability and quality of health services and disrupted access to emergency and specialist care.

About 84 percent of all incidents were reported in three countries and territories that continued to be most affected by explosive weapons use impacting healthcare:

- Myanmar, Palestine and Ukraine

In 2025, the use of explosive weapons affecting healthcare continued to spread geographically, with new incidents reported in:

- Ecuador, South Sudan and Thailand

Incidents of explosive weapons use affecting healthcare reported by Insecurity Insight in 2025 compared to 2024

Country	Number of healthcare incidents in 2024	Number of healthcare incidents in 2025
Ukraine	528	635
Palestine	579	314
Myanmar	129	121
Sudan	90	58
Iran	2	27
Democratic Republic of Congo	5	18
Syria	40	15
Yemen	2	15
Russia	7	13
Pakistan	7	8
Lebanon	477	7
South Sudan	0	5
Ethiopia	6	5

Country	Number of healthcare incidents in 2024	Number of healthcare incidents in 2025
Somalia	1	4
Colombia	2	3
Israel	11	3
Ecuador	0	2
Nigeria	1	2
Burkina Faso	2	1
India	2	1
Mexico	1	1
Cameroon	1	0
Cyprus	1	0
Kenya	1	0
Mali	5	0
Niger	1	0

Attacks on healthcare with explosive weapons reported by Insecurity Insight by month in 2024 and 2025



In Ukraine, the number of incidents recorded by Insecurity Insight increased by 20 percent in 2025, primarily due to a significant rise in the use of drone-launched explosive weapons by Russian armed forces. In Myanmar, Myanmar armed forces increasingly used different types of air-launched explosive weapons – including gyrocopters and paramotors as launch platforms – that caused damage to healthcare facilities and killed and injured personnel. Repeated attacks in both of these contexts contributed to cumulative damage to healthcare infrastructure, shortages of medicines and medical equipment, the displacement and loss of skilled health workers, and long-term deterioration of already weakened health systems.

In Thailand, hospitals near the Cambodian border were struck by artillery shelling, whilst others were forced to evacuate patients or suspend operations following an escalation of hostilities with explosive weapons between Thailand and Cambodia in December 2025. Incidents involving explosive weapons affecting healthcare also increased in the Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly in the eastern part of the country, due to increased fighting between the March 23 Movement (M23) and the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Increased numbers of incidents also occurred in Iran during the 12-day conflict with Israel, Russia and Yemen.

In Lebanon and Palestine, incidents involving explosive weapons affecting healthcare decreased by 40 percent, largely due to ceasefire agreements reached in Lebanon in November 2024 and in Gaza in October 2025, which contributed to an overall reduction in attacks on healthcare in these contexts and in global figures. Following the 28 November 2024 ceasefire in Lebanon, incidents decreased to seven in 2025, compared to 477 incidents recorded in the previous year.

In Palestine, incidents decreased from 579 incidents in 2024, to 314 incidents in 2025. Almost all incidents (93 percent) occurred between January and September 2025, prior to the ceasefire agreement reached on 10 October 2025. Though numbers of incidents in which explosive weapons affected healthcare decreased significantly following the ceasefire, attacks continued, with at least 21 incidents reported between October and December 2025.

In Syia, incidents involving explosive weapons affecting healthcare also decreased by 63 percent during the first year of the new interim government. Despite this reduction in incidents, years of conflict and repeated attacks on medical facilities continue to undermine the ability of health systems to recover and provide consistent access to essential medical services.

Repeated use of explosive weapons has cumulative and long-term impacts on healthcare systems that often continue long after active hostilities end. Damaged or destroyed medical facilities can take years to repair or replace, particularly in contexts affected by ongoing insecurity, financial constraints, or restricted access to reconstruction materials, while some facilities may be forced to permanently relocate elsewhere. The use of explosive weapons has also impacted water and electricity supplies to hospitals. Reduced staffing capacity due to the high risk of working in health services under bombardment erode the ability of healthcare systems to provide even basic and life-saving services.[26]

6.1. Impact on health facilities

In 2025, in at least 806 health facilities, including health centres, hospitals, children's hospitals, pharmacies and mobile health units, were impacted by explosive weapon use which damaged or destroyed the facilities and killed or injured health workers and patients. In some instances, explosive weapons used in the vicinity of the facilities also caused damage and destruction.

In 2025, health facilities were increasingly affected by drone strikes, with incidents involving drone use more than doubling compared to the previous year. This trend occurs within a broader increase in the use of drones impacting humanitarian operations, healthcare and education programmes.[27]

26 Insecurity Insight (2024). 'The Effects on Health Care of the Use of Explosive Weapons in 2023'. July 2024. https://insecurityinsight.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/The-Effects-on-Health-Care-of-the-Use-of-Explosive-Weapons-July-2024.pdf.

27 Insecurity Insight (2025). 'Hovering Threats: The challenges of armed drones in humanitarian contexts'. January 2025. https://bit.ly/DronesGlobalJan2025.

6.2. Impact on ambulances

Impacts on ambulances from the use of explosive weapons continued in 2025, with more than two-thirds of all documented global incidents occurring in Ukraine. At least 82 incidents were reportedly linked to Russian armed forces who damaged or destroyed ambulances during drone strikes on towns in oblasts close to the frontlines (Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhia). Incidents were also reported in:

- Iran, Israel, Kenya, Lebanon, Myanmar, Palestine, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen

6.3. Health workers killed

In 2025, health workers were killed by explosive weapons in at least 180 incidents in:

- Burkina Faso, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Iran, Lebanon, Myanmar, Palestine, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen

In these countries and territories, health workers were killed inside health facilities, while travelling in ambulances and whilst assisting wounded individuals. 'Double tap' airstrikes, such as those reportedly undertaken in Gaza, include a strike that targets health and rescue workers attending to civilian casualties from a previous strike.[28] Health workers were also killed inside their homes, sometimes alongside their families.

Impact of explosive weapons use on healthcare in 2025

806
Incidents affecting health facilities

140
Incidents affecting ambulances

267
Health workers killed by explosive weapons

28 Abraham, Y. (2025). "Double tap' airstrikes: How Israel targets Gaza rescue efforts'. +972 Magazine. July 2025. https://www.972mag.com/double-tap-israel-gaza-airstrikes-rescue/.

Social media reactions to hospital bombings

Since the UN Security Council Resolution 2286 on the protection of health care in conflict in 2016, Insecurity Insight has documented at least 4,411 incidents in which hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies were damaged or destroyed by explosive weapons across 40 countries and territories. These attacks kill and severely injury medical staff, patients and their companions and destroy or severely damage medical equipment and medication. These attacks also have a long-term impact on the healthcare system as they disrupt life-saving medical care, reduce the availability and quality of services, heighten fear among patients and health workers, and contribute to preventable deaths and excess mortality.[29]

Social media may present additional challenges that undermine the protection guaranteed to health services in conflict. Insecurity Insight analysed social media reactions to four attacks on hospitals in Gaza, Sudan, Myanmar, and Ukraine between October 2024 and October 2025 to examine how online narratives influence the protection of health care from the impact of weapons use in conflict.[30] The report found that while social media users generally accepted that attacks on hospitals had occurred, online discussions frequently reframed or interpreted these incidents in ways that undermined IHL protections afforded to hospitals and health workers. As social media now plays an important role in how conflict events of all sorts are interpreted by an 'ever-expanding global audience', new opportunities have emerged for a range of actors to influence and frame narratives that may intensify polarization or lead to distorted understandings of conflict dynamics.[31]

It was found that three dominant narratives emerged that contributed to undermining the protection afforded to hospitals during conflict in these contexts. First, repeated questioning of whether hospitals were functioning civilian facilities, or allegations that hospitals were being used by armed actors, contributed to the gradual normalization of attacks on health facilities and undermined public understanding of the special protection afforded to hospitals under IHL. Second, frustration with the international community's perceived inability to prevent attacks or enforce accountability frequently translated into hostility towards humanitarian organisations, the UN, World Health Organisation (WHO) and international legal mechanisms, weakening trust in the institutions intended to uphold civilian protection. Third, attacks on hospitals often triggered hate speech, collective blame, and dehumanizing rhetoric directed at entire national, ethnic, or political groups associated with conflict parties, contributing to increased polarization and social fragmentation.

Social media has become an increasingly important factor in shaping public perceptions of the impact of explosive weapons use and in influencing the broader humanitarian environment during conflict. Rather than spreading fabricated incidents, harmful online narratives more commonly emerged through selective interpretation and politicisation of real attacks, gradually eroding respect for civilian protection norms and the humanitarian principles underpinning the protection of hospitals during armed conflict.

29 Insecurity Insight (2024). 'The Effects on Health Care of the Use of Explosive Weapons in 2023'. July 2024. https://insecurityinsight.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/The-Effects-on-Health-Care-of-the-Use-of-Explosive-Weapons-July-2024.pdf. See also, for example, PAX and International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School (2016). 'Operating under Fire: The Effects of Explosive Weapons on Health Care in the East of Ukraine'. September 2016. https://www.inew.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/FULL-REPORT-Operating-under-Fire-2017b-secured.pdf.

30 Insecurity Insight (2026). 'Social media reactions to hospital bombings: Lessons from incidents in four conflict-affected contexts for safeguarding the humanitarian space and medical protection'. https://bit.ly/EWIPASMM2025.

31 Ibid.

The ruins of an abandoned hospital destroyed by 500-pound bombs dropped by the Myanmar air force in Kayah Karenni State, Myanmar on 13 February 2025.

7. Food Security: Incidents of explosive weapons use affecting civilian access to food

Insecurity Insight recorded at least 1082 incidents in which explosive weapons affected food systems across 15 countries and territories monitored by Insecurity Insight in 2025.[32] These incidents involved the damage and destruction of critical food systems and infrastructure, including agricultural lands, irrigation systems, livestock facilities, markets, bakeries, food warehouses, aid convoys, and humanitarian distribution points used to alleviate food insecurity in conflict-affected communities.

Attacks affecting food systems disrupted food production, transport, storage and distribution, reducing food availability, increasing prices, and undermining livelihoods and local economies. In many contexts, repeated attacks on food-related infrastructure increased communities' dependence on humanitarian assistance while simultaneously disrupting the ability of aid organisations to safely deliver food and essential supplies.[33]

Incidents of explosive weapons use affecting food systems reported by Insecurity Insight in 2025

Country	Number of food insecurity incidents in 2025
Ukraine	394
Palestine	164
Syria	160
Myanmar	99
Lebanon	64
Yemen	55
Iraq	44
Sudan	33
Somalia	26
Mali	15
Democratic Republic of Congo	10
South Sudan	8
Niger	5
Burkina Faso	3
Cameroon	2

32 Insecurity Insight collects data on conflict-related incidents affecting food and water systems in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen. Since last year's report, Insecurity Insight has expanded its monitoring of conflict-related incidents affecting food systems to include an additional six countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Iraq, Myanmar, South Sudan and Ukraine. The absence of documented data does not imply that food systems in other countries were not affected.

33 For example, see Insecurity Insight (2025). 'Chronic Insecurity: How Armed Groups Undermine Food Security in Ituri and North Kivu Provinces, Democratic Republic of the Congo'. February 2025. https://insecurityinsight.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Chronic-Insecurity-How-Armed-Groups-Undermine-Food-Security-in-Ituri-and-North-Kivu-Provinces-DR-January-2025.pdf.

Impact of explosive weapons use on food systems in 2025

190
Attacks on markets and supermarkets

240
Attacks on food production sites

154
Agricultural land

The impact of explosive weapons use on food systems

Insecurity Insight documented widespread damage to markets and agricultural lands caused by the use of explosive weapons across multiple conflict-affected countries and territories since the adoption of UN Resolution 2417 on the links of armed conflict and hunger.[34] Increasingly, air-launched explosive weapons, including drone strikes, as well as ground-launched and directly-emplaced explosive weapons have damaged and destroyed markets and agricultural lands globally. These incidents disrupted food production, storage, transportation, and access to markets, undermining both immediate food availability and the long-term resilience of affected communities.

Between 2018 and 2025, Insecurity Insight documented over 1,000 incidents affecting markets across 36 countries and territories. Markets were frequently damaged or destroyed by explosive weapons, causing mass civilian casualties, damaging surrounding civilian infrastructure, and disrupting local economic activity. Beyond the immediate physical destruction, attacks on markets had significant reverberating effects on food systems. Damage to roads, transport routes, electricity infrastructure, and storage facilities disrupted the supply and distribution of food, reduced the availability of essential goods, and contributed to rising food prices. In many affected communities, markets served not only as places to purchase food but also as essential hubs for livelihoods, trade, and humanitarian access. Their destruction therefore undermined both food security both food security and household income generation simultaneously.[35]

Incidents affecting agricultural land are often significantly underreported, particularly compared to attacks occurring in densely populated urban areas. Damage to farmland, irrigation infrastructure, grazing areas, orchards, and rural food production sites is less likely to be captured by mainstream media reporting, especially where incidents do not result in immediate civilian casualties. Such attacks often occur in remote or rural areas with limited media presence, lower connectivity, and reduced visibility on social media platforms, despite their potentially severe long-term impacts on civilian populations and food systems.

These attacks had devastating immediate and long-term impacts on food security in affected communities. Damage to markets disrupted civilians' ability to physically and economically access food, while attacks on agricultural lands undermined local food production and long-term livelihood sustainability. Communities affected by repeated attacks often became increasingly dependent on humanitarian assistance, expensive imported foods, or on unstable supply routes, Reverberating effects included food shortages, rising food prices, reduced agricultural output, loss of income for farmers and traders, displacement of rural populations, and the long-term degradation of local food systems. In some contexts, explosive remnants of war continue to prevent safe access to agricultural land years after active hostilities had subsided, prolonging food insecurity and delaying economic recovery.

34 UN Security Council (2018). Resolution 2417. S/RES/2417 (2018). https://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2417/.

35 Insecurity Insight (2025). 'Shattered Stalls, Shattered Lives: The human cost of bombing marketplaces. The use of explosive weapons in populated areas and their impact on food security'. November 2025. https://bit.ly/EWIPAMarkets2025.

People walk along a busy market street in Syria's northern city of Aleppo on the first day of Ramadan on 1 March 2025.

8. Water Systems: Incidents of explosive weapons use affecting civilian access to water

Insecurity Insight recorded at least 87 incidents in which explosive weapons impacted water systems across 15 countries and territories that were monitored in 2025.[36] In these incidents, air- and ground-launched explosive weapons damaged and destroyed water tanks, pipelines, water towers, pumping stations, and other infrastructure essential to the distribution and supply of water to civilian communities.

In Gaza, airstrikes by Israeli armed forces damaged desalination facilities critical to the territory's water supply, increasing dependence on limited external water deliveries and the few remaining functioning wells. However, drone strikes also reportedly targeted water trucks delivering water and civilians queuing to collect water.

Damage to water infrastructure significantly disrupted access to safe drinking water, sanitation, and irrigation, increasing communities' reliance on unsafe or expensive alternative water sources and increasing risks of dehydration, waterborne disease outbreaks and public health deterioration.

The destruction of water infrastructure also has significant reverberating effects on food production, healthcare services and livelihoods, particularly in communities already experiencing displacement and humanitarian crisis.

Incidents of explosive weapons use affecting water systems reported by Insecurity Insight in 2025

Country	Number of food insecurity incidents in 2025
Ukraine	40
Syria	17
Palestine	10
Myanmar	5
Yemen	4
Lebanon	3
Sudan	3
Mali	2
Iraq	1
Somalia	1
South Sudan	1

36 Insecurity Insight collects data on conflict-related incidents affecting food and water systems in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen.

Impact of explosive weapons use on water systems in 2025

87

Attack on water systems

Impact from explosive weapons use on water systems in Lebanon

Since October 2023, hostilities between Israeli forces and Hezbollah in Lebanon have escalated significantly. In September 2024, Israeli forces launched a ground invasion into southern Lebanon, during which critical civilian infrastructure, including water systems, were severely damaged or destroyed from the use of air-launched explosive weapons, including drone strikes, as well as artillery shelling, and other ground-launched weapons. Despite a fragile ceasefire in November 2024, the use of explosive weapons continued, albeit at a decreased rate.

Between 07 October 2023 and 31 December 2025, Insecurity Insight documented at least 36 incidents involving explosive weapons that damaged or destroyed water infrastructure, particularly in Nabatiyeh and South governorates and areas close to the Israeli border. Air-launched explosive weapons, including drone strikes, as well as artillery fire and shelling by Israeli forces caused significant damage and destruction to water networks, tanks, pumping stations, reservoirs, and other key components of the water supply system.

Energy infrastructure used to power water pumping systems was also damaged or destroyed by explosive weapons, further disrupting access to water. These attacks significantly disrupted the distribution of fresh water to affected communities, with repairs expected to take years due to the high financial costs and extent of the damage. As a result, many residents became dependent on purchasing expensive water supplies or transporting water from distant locations using water trucks. In some cases, vehicles attempting to transport water to affected communities were also struck by Israeli drones, further disrupting access to safe water. Satellite imagery obtained by Insecurity Insight indicates that, in several documented incidents, damaged or destroyed facilities were in open areas without clearly identifiable military targets nearby, suggesting that some water infrastructure may have been specifically targeted.[37]

The effects of explosive weapons use had devasting immediate and long-term impacts on Lebanon's water infrastructure, disrupting the sustained distribution of fresh water and leaving some villages without access to running water altogether. While the full effects of attacks on water infrastructure are often not immediately visible, at least four major reverberating effects had already been identified. For example, damage to water infrastructure caused prolonged disruptions to running water supplies, leaving some communities without reliable access to water for months after the initial attacks. Also, farmers experienced difficulties accessing sufficient water to irrigate crops and provide drinking water for livestock, undermining agricultural production and livelihoods. Finally, the high costs associated with repairing damaged water infrastructure further strains Lebanon's already fragile public finances which have been severely weakened since the onset of the 2019 socio-economic crisis. According to the World Bank, the conflict in Lebanon caused an estimated US$171 million in damage across the water, wastewater, and irrigation sectors.[38]

37 Insecurity Insight, Action Against Hunger and Oxfam (2025). 'When bombs turn the taps off. The impact of conflict on water infrastructure in Lebanon, October-April 2025'. https://bit.ly/LBNWaterAug2025.

38 Ibid.

Damage to the main town square, following Israeli airstrikes a week earlier, in the town of Nabi Chit on 25 March 2026 in Bekaa Valley, Lebanon.

USE OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS BY STATE ARMED FORCES AND NON-STATE ARMED ACTORS

1. Methodology Note

The Explosive Weapons Monitor reports on harm to civilians from incidents in which the use of explosive weapons caused civilian deaths and injuries, as reported the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), as well as damage and destruction of civilian infrastructure in incidents that affected civilian access to healthcare, education, humanitarian aid, food and water systems, as reported by Insecurity Insight. For full methodologies, see Annex 1.

Identification of responsible state armed forces and non-state armed actors, and all additional information provided in this chapter, is from these organisations unless otherwise indicated. The Explosive Weapons Monitor cannot determine with certainty which actors are responsible for the use of explosive weapons in specific incidents, as much of the recorded data are unverified. Each organisation has similar but varied methodologies for the attribution of incidents to particular state and non-state actors.[39] In all cases, non-state armed actors, referenced below, include all non-state actors that reportedly perpetrated explosive violence, including criminal organizations and individual perpetrators, rather than being limited to non-state armed groups that are party to armed conflicts.

Numbers of incidents are meant to be indicative of contexts and patterns of use, as the complexity of the information environment does not allow for the determination of a precise number of incidents that can be attributed to use by each actor. To identify these contexts and patterns, the Explosive Weapons Monitor developed ranges of numbers of incidents, as below:

Numbers of incidents in which explosive weapons use reportedly caused harm to civilians	1 - 9
	10 - 99
	100 - 199
	200 - 499
	500 - 999
	1,000 +

39 For full methodologies on attribution of responsibility to state and non-state actors by each organization, see ACLED (2024). 'ACLED Codebook'. Available at: https://acleddata.com/knowledge-base/codebook/; and Insecurity Insight (2022). 'Definitions and Methodologies'. Available at: https://insecurityinsight.org/methodology-and-definitions.

2. Global Overview

Across all recorded incidents of explosive weapons use, state actors were responsible for the majority of incidents that reportedly caused harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure. There were more than 17,180 such incidents attributed to state armed forces by ACLED and Insecurity Insight in 2025, compared to 3,090 incidents attributed to non-state actors.[40]

Percentages of civilian harm incidents attributed to state and non-state actors in 2025



Air-launched explosive weapons were most frequently used in incidents of civilian harm reportedly attributed to all actors in 2025. About 67 percent of incidents involved the use of air-launched explosive weapons, which includes any weapon fired or dropped from a rotary of fixed-wing aircraft, while also including unmanned aerial vehicles or drones. These include air-dropped bombs (bombs reported as being delivered by air), airstrikes (attacks from a helicopter, drone, or plane), and missiles or rockets launched from an aircraft, while also including attacks by drones that themselves contain an explosive charge, as in the case of loitering munitions.

About 20 percent involved the use of ground-launched explosive weapons, which includes munitions launched from any surface-level platform, including weapons thrown by a person, or fired from warships or vehicles. These include artillery shells (projectiles fired from a gun, cannon, howitzer, or recoilless rifle), tank shells, ground-launched missiles, mortars, rockets (typically missiles which do not contain guidance systems), non-specific shelling, rocket-propelled grenades, and hand grenades.

About 13 percent involved the use of directly-emplaced explosive weapons, which encompass weapons that are physically placed in the location at which they detonate. These include anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, landmines, non-specific IEDs (including so-called 'suicide vests'), car bombs and roadside bombs.

Percentages of civilian harm incidents attributed to different explosive weapons categories in 2025



40 This analysis does not include incidents attributed to mixed forces or coalitions of armed forces.

State and non-state actors most frequently used different types of explosive weapons. State actors, for example, used air-launched explosive weapons in 77 percent of civilian harm incidents recorded by ACLED and Insecurity Insight, while directly-emplaced weapons were used in only four percent of incidents. For non-state actors, directly-emplaced explosive weapons were used in the majority of civilian harm incidents – 67 percent – while air-launched explosive weapons, including drones, accounted for only 11 percent of incidents. Ground-launched explosive weapons were used in similar proportions of civilian harm incidents reportedly caused by both state and non-state actors, accounting for 19 percent of incidents attributed to state actors and 22 percent attributed to non-state actors.

State and non-state actors use of different categories of explosive weapons in 2025



A disabled Sudanese armed forces tank in the Khartoum downtown market area, Khartoum, Sudan, on 24 April 2025.
© Giles Clarke / Avaaz via Getty Images

3. State Armed Forces: Use of explosive weapons by state armed forces that reportedly caused harm to civilians in 2025

State forces were responsible for the majority of incidents that reportedly caused harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure. The table below identifies the use of explosive weapons by the armed forces of 29 states that reportedly caused harm to civilians in 32 countries and territories in 2025.

In some instances, the scale of use by state armed forces was elevated and severe. For example, there were five contexts of use in which state armed forces reportedly caused harm to civilians from the use of explosive weapons in more than 1,000 incidents. This includes explosive weapons use by:

- Israeli armed forces in Palestine
- Myanmar armed forces in Myanmar
- Russian armed forces in Ukraine
- Ukrainian armed forces in Russia
- Ukrainian armed forces in Ukraine

Additionally, the armed forces of five states were reportedly responsible for harm to civilians in more than 100 incidents in 2025:

- Israel, Myanmar, Russia, Sudan, and Ukraine

Armed forces from 13 states were reportedly responsible for civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons in multiple countries and territories, representing 45 percent of all states that reportedly caused civilian harm in 2025:

- Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Türkiye, Ukraine and the United States

Two states reportedly used explosive weapons that caused harm to civilians or civilian infrastructure in five or more countries and territories. This includes civilian harm from:

- Israeli armed forces in Iran, Lebanon, Malta, Palestine, Syria and Yemen

United States armed forces in Colombia (Eastern Pacific Ocean), Dominican Republic (Caribbean Sea), Mexico (Eastern Pacific Ocean), Nigeria, Somalia, Venezuela (Caribbean Sea) and Yemen

3.1. Increased use of explosive weapons by armed forces of states that have endorsed the Political Declaration

The use of explosive weapons by armed forces of eight states that have endorsed the Political Declaration reportedly caused harm to civilians in 2025:

- Cambodia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Somalia, Türkiye and the United States

This marks an increase in the number of endorsing states of the Political Declaration that have reportedly used explosive weapons that caused harm to civilians, from five in 2024. The number of countries and territories impacted by this use also increased from five in 2024 to 13 in 2025, including:

- Colombia (Eastern Pacific Ocean), Dominican Republic (Caribbean Sea), Iraq, Kenya, Mexico (Eastern Pacific Ocean), Morocco, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Somalia, Syria, Thailand, Venezuela (Caribbean Sea) and Yemen

Use of explosive weapons that caused harm to civilians by state armed forces in 2025

State armed forces	Countries in which explosive weapons were reportedly used	Incident range	Weapons categories	Source(s)
Armenia	Azerbaijan	10 - 99	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Afghanistan	Afghanistan	1 - 9	Ground-launched	ACLED
	Pakistan	1 - 9	Ground-launched	ACLED
Burkina Faso	Burkina Faso	1 - 9	Air-launched	ACLED
Cambodia	Thailand	1 - 9	Ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED
Democratic Republic of Congo	Democratic Republic of Congo	1 - 9	Air-launched, ground-launched	ACLED
	Rwanda	1 - 9	Ground-launched	ACLED
Djibouti	Ethiopia	1 – 9	Air-launched	ACLED
Ethiopia	Ethiopia	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
	Somalia	1 - 9	Air-launched	Insecurity Insight
India	India	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
	Pakistan	1 - 9	Air-launched	Insecurity Insight
Iran	Iran	10 - 99	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
	Israel	10 - 99	Ground-launched	ACLED
	Jordan	1 - 9	Air-launched	ACLED
	Syria	1 - 9	Ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED
Israel	Iraq	1 - 9	Air-launched, ground-launched	Insecurity Insight
	Iran	10 - 99	Air-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
	Lebanon	200 - 499	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
	Malta (territorial waters)	1 - 9	Air-launched	Insecurity Insight
	Palestine	1,000 +	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
	Syria	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
	Yemen	10 - 99	Air-launched	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Kenya	Kenya	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Lebanon	Lebanon	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Libya	Libya	1 - 9	Air-launched	ACLED
Mali	Mali	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Morocco	Morocco	1 - 9	Air-launched, ground-launched	ACLED
Myanmar	Myanmar	1,000 +	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
	Thailand	1 - 9	Ground-launched	ACLED

State armed forces	Countries in which explosive weapons were reportedly used	Incident range	Weapons categories	Source(s)
Niger	Niger	1 - 9	Air-launched	ACLED
Nigeria	Nigeria	1 - 9	Air-launched, ground-launched	ACLED
Pakistan	Afghanistan	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched	ACLED
	India	1 - 9	Air-launched, ground-launched	Insecurity Insight
	Pakistan	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED
Republic of Korea	Republic of Korea	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Russia	Russia	1 - 9	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
	Ukraine	1,000 +	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Somalia	Kenya	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
South Sudan	South Sudan	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED
Sudan	Chad	1 - 9	Air-launched	Insecurity Insight
	South Sudan	1 - 9	Air-launched	Insecurity Insight
	Sudan	100 - 199	Air-launched, ground-launched	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Syria	Lebanon	1 - 9	Air-launched, ground-launched	ACLED
	Syria	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Türkiye	Iraq	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
	Syria	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Ukraine	Russia	1,000 +	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
	Ukraine	1,000 +	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
United Arab Emirates	Somalia	1 - 9	Air-launched	ACLED
United States	Colombia (Eastern Pacific Ocean)	10 - 99	Air-launched	ACLED
	Dominican Republic (Caribbean Sea)	1 - 9	Air-launched	ACLED
	Mexico (Eastern Pacific Ocean)	1 - 9	Air-launched	ACLED
	Nigeria	1 - 9	Air-launched	ACLED
	Somalia	1 - 9	Air-launched	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
	Venezuela (Eastern Pacific Ocean)	1 - 9	Air-launched	ACLED
	Yemen	10 - 99	Air-launched	ACLED, Insecurity Insight

Increased use of air-launched explosive weapons by the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean

In September 2025, the United States launched a military campaign with strikes on what it designated as "narco-terrorists" traveling in small boats in the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific Ocean.[41] These strikes account for all incidents of explosive weapons use by the United States in waters recorded by ACLED off the coasts of Colombia (Eastern Pacific Ocean), Dominican Republic (Caribbean Sea), Mexico (Eastern Pacific Ocean) and Venezuela (Caribbean Sea). As of May 2026, the United States has declared at least 157 deaths across 57 incidents in which boats were attacked with air-launched explosive weapons.[42]

The United States has argued that military action in this context is part of counter-terrorism operations in an ongoing armed conflict and that the targets of the airstrikes are therefore legitimate armed actors under IHL. Legal experts and UN agencies, however, have argued that action taken to counter illicit drug trafficking is a law-enforcement matter for which other applicable counter-narcotics treaties apply. As such, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has designated these strikes as "extrajudicial killing[s] of people board these boats."[43] Human Rights Watch has similarly assessed that there is no armed conflict in the Caribbean that involves the United States and drug-trafficking organisations, and that law enforcement activities can only include the deliberate use of lethal force "when strictly unavoidable to protect lives."[44]

These strikes mark a shift in US military policy and practice in which explosive weapons are used outside of situations of armed conflict, including law enforcement activities. The military campaign also significantly widens the United States' scope of civilian harm from the use of explosive weapons across the globe.

41 Airwars (2026). 'U.S. Military in Latin America and the Caribbean'. https://airwars.org/conflict/u-s-military-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/.

42 Ibid.

43 UN OHCHR (2025). 'US attacks in Caribbean and Pacific violate international human rights law – UN Human Rights Chief'. 31 October 2025. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/10/us-attacks-caribbean-and-pacific-violate-international-human-rights-law-un.

44 Human Rights Watch (2025). 'Q&A: US Military Operations in the Caribbean, Pacific'. 16 December 2025. https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/12/16/qa-us-military-operations-in-the-caribbean-pacific#_5._What_rules.

A screen capture from a video shows U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces carrying out airstrikes during a series of operations against Houthi forces across Yemen, according to CENTCOM, on 16 March 2025.

4. Non-State Actors: Countries and territories in which the use of explosive weapons by non-state armed actors reportedly caused harm to civilians in 2025

The table below identifies the 58 countries and territories in which non-state armed actors reportedly used explosive weapons that caused harm to civilians in 2025.

Five countries were affected by explosive weapons use by non-state armed actors that reportedly caused harm to civilians in more than 100 incidents:

- Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen

Though the numbers of countries and territories reportedly affected by explosive weapons use by non-state armed actors is greater than those affected by use by state actors, the numbers of incidents are fewer and the intensity of use lower.

Use of explosive weapons that caused harm to civilians by non-state armed actors in 2025

Countries in which explosive weapons were reportedly used by non-state armed actors	Incident range	Weapons categories	Source(s)
Afghanistan	1 - 9	Ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED
Armenia	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Azerbaijan	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Bangladesh	1 - 9	Ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED
Benin	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Bolivia	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Burkina Faso	10 - 99	Air-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Burundi	1 - 9	Ground-launched	ACLED
Cameroon	10 - 99	Air-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Central African Republic	1 - 9	Ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED
Chad	1 - 9	Air-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Colombia	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Côte d'Ivoire	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Croatia	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Cyprus	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED

Countries in which explosive weapons were reportedly used by non-state armed actors	Incident range	Weapons categories	Source(s)
Democratic Republic of Congo	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Ecuador	10 - 99	Ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Estonia	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Ethiopia	10 - 99	Ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Ghana	1 - 9	Ground-launched	ACLED
Greece	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Guatemala	1 - 9	Ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED
Guyana	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Haiti	1 – 9	Air-launched	Insecurity Insight
India	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Indonesia	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Iran	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Iraq	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Israel	1 - 9	Air-launched, ground-launched	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Kenya	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Kyrgyzstan	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Lebanon	1 - 9	Ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Libya	1 - 9	Ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED
Mali	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Mexico	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Morocco	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Mozambique	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Myanmar	200 - 499	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Nepal	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Niger	10 - 99	Ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight

Use of explosive weapons that caused harm to civilians by non-state armed actors in 2025 (continued)

Countries in which explosive weapons were reportedly used by non-state armed actors	Incident range	Weapons categories	Source(s)
Nigeria	10 - 99	Ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Pakistan	100 - 199	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Palestine	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Peru	1 - 9	Ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED
Philippines	1 - 9	Ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED
Russia	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Saudi Arabia	1 - 9	Air-launched	Insecurity Insight
Somalia	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
South Sudan	10 - 99	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Sudan	200 - 499	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Syria	1,000 +	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Thailand	1 - 9	Ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight
Togo	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Tunisia	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Uganda	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
United States	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Venezuela	1 - 9	Directly-emplaced	ACLED
Yemen	100 - 199	Air-launched, ground-launched, directly-emplaced	ACLED, Insecurity Insight

CONCLUSION

In 2025, civilians across the globe continued to experience widespread and persistently elevated levels of harm from the use of explosive weapons. Daily bombing and shelling of populated areas continued in many conflicts where civilian suffering is now commonplace and no longer an exception. At the same time, new contexts of explosive weapons use have emerged. As such, 2025 marks the continuation of elevated harm to civilians across many contexts and an urgency with which the international community should act to prevent and address this harm.

Harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure from the use of explosive weapons remained widespread and severe, and civilian deaths remained alarmingly high across the globe. The use of explosive weapons in attacks on humanitarian aid and education continued to increase, while attacks on healthcare continued to disrupt healthcare systems in at least 22 countries and territories. The use of explosive weapons in attacks on food systems continued in at least 15 countries and territories in 2025, as did attacks on water systems.

HARM TO CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE FROM THE USE OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS REMAINED WIDESPREAD AND SEVERE, AND CIVILIAN DEATHS REMAINED ALARMINGLY HIGH ACROSS THE GLOBE. THE USE OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN ATTACKS ON HUMANITARIAN AID AND EDUCATION CONTINUED TO INCREASE, WHILE ATTACKS ON HEALTHCARE CONTINUED TO DISRUPT HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS IN AT LEAST 22 COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES. THE USE OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS IN ATTACKS ON FOOD SYSTEMS CONTINUED IN AT LEAST 15 COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES IN 2025, AS DID ATTACKS ON WATER SYSTEMS.

The 2022 Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas[45] is an international political commitment developed to address these humanitarian consequences and to strengthen the protection of civilians in armed conflict. It is the first formal international recognition that the use of explosive weapons in populated areas has severe humanitarian consequences that must be addressed by states, and it serves as a framework for action through its commitments.

It remains a critical humanitarian priority to bring the Political Declaration into greater effect to prevent and reduce harm to civilians by placing limits on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and by facilitating assistance to conflict-affected communities. The Declaration is a practical tool that, to reach its potential and be effective in its goal to reduce harm and strengthen the protection of civilians, relies upon effective national-level implementation of the commitments by endorser states.

Policy review, development and adoption across all areas of the Declaration – including, most critically, military policies aimed at changing current practice – is crucial. Universalisation of the Declaration is also necessary to promote the norms and standards under the Declaration in order to promote adherence by the highest possible number of states.

45 For the full text of the declaration, see Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs (2022). Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas.

RECOMMEND-ATIONS

To address and mitigate harm to civilians from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas and to promote universalisation and implementation of the Political Declaration, the Explosive Weapons Monitor recommends that states:

- **Publicly acknowledge and call for action to address the harm to civilians and communities resulting from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.** This use remains widespread and has severe and devastating consequences on civilians and across the world – to an alarming degree. All stakeholders should commit to promoting the principles and norms of the Political Declaration and call for states to avoid the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, particularly those with wide area effects.
- **Endorse the Declaration and encourage endorsement by other states.** Various opportunities exist and should be taken by states to promote and call for endorsement and implementation of the Declaration by other states, including in the context of statements made at key diplomatic meetings throughout the year, regional and bilateral meetings with non-endorser states, partnerships with civil society, and military cooperation, partnerships and security assistance programmes involving the armed forces of non-endorser states.
- **Review, revise or develop new national policy and practice.** States and their armed forces should not assume that their existing policies and practices are sufficient to implement the Declaration and should review, revise, or develop new policy and practice which establishes clear limits on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas in order to avoid civilian harm. Such policies should include a process for determining when it is appropriate to either restrict or refrain from such use.
- **Promote, support and utilise the diversity of stakeholders engaged in work around the Declaration.** Working in a partnership of states, armed forces, civil society and other international organisations engages a diversity of approaches that is beneficial to improving understandings and developing responses that will reduce harm to civilians – whether in the military or the humanitarian space. This approach can also help to foster a culture of collaboration and mutual support, including sharing of good policies and practices, reviewing and continuously working to strengthen the protection of civilians.

The Explosive Weapons Monitor aims to continue efforts to document harm to civilians from the use of explosive weapons through data collection, research and analysis. In doing so, it looks forward to working with all stakeholders to strengthen the protection of civilians and support universalisation and implementation of the Declaration's commitments.

ANNEXES – Methodology

ANNEX 1 – Harm to Civilians from the Use of Explosive Weapons

The Explosive Weapons Monitor is a civil society initiative that conducts research and analysis on harms from and practices of explosive weapons use in populated areas for the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW). It works with partner organisations to collect and publish data on incidents of explosive weapons use around the world as reported in open sources, including data from Insecurity Insight (incidents of explosive weapons use affecting aid access, education, healthcare and food security), and the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project on incidents of explosive weapons use and casualties, including deaths and injuries.

Insecurity Insight

Insecurity Insight has been documenting a wide range of violence affecting the aid sector since 2008. Datasets on violence against healthcare and education go back to 2016 and 2017, respectively. For the Explosive Weapons Monitor, Insecurity Insight contributes information on global incidents of explosive weapons use affecting aid access, education or healthcare services. Information is compiled from Arabic, Burmese, English, French and Spanish media reports. The following elements are recorded: the date and location of the reported incident, weapon type, reported user and target, detonation method and whether the incident affected aid, education or health by specifying whether health facilities, schools or project sites were damaged or destroyed and/or whether medical, teaching or aid staff were injured or killed.

Data also includes some incidents where the explosive weapon device did not detonate and when there were no civilian casualties, but when the presence of explosive weapons affected access to health, education or food aid, usually because areas are cordoned off and access to services is interrupted. This includes incidents where historical items such as unexploded ordnance were found, and which affected the provision of these services.

Reported incidents are neither complete nor a representative list of all incidents and are subject to the limitations inherent in the data sources. In some countries, the media frequently reports a wide range of incidents, while in others, hardly any incidents are reported by media outlets. In some countries, there are active networks of organisations that report information, while in others, no such networks exist. In some areas, important and trusted interest groups have an active social media presence, while in other contexts, social media is deliberately used to promote false information. The content of other data collection processes that are made available via databases is also influenced by the nature of public discourse and the networks the data collector maintains. In some cases, incidents can overlap and impact more than one sector (for example, both 'aid access' and 'education'). This occurs when the health or education service is delivered by a humanitarian or development aid agency. Most incidents have not been independently verified and have not undergone verification by Insecurity Insight.

For more information about Insecurity Insight's methodologies, please see https://bit.ly/EWDataExplainer.

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project

ACLED collects reported information on the type, agents, location, date, and other characteristics of political violence events, demonstration events, and other select non-violent, politically relevant developments in every country and territory in the world. ACLED focuses on tracking a range of violent and non-violent actions by or affecting political agents, including governments, rebels, militias, identity groups, political parties, external forces, rioters, protesters, and civilians.

All data was downloaded from ACLED and incorporated into the analysis presented in this report from 16 March 2024. For this report, the Explosive Weapons Monitor accessed all ACLED data relevant to Explosions/Remote violence events recorded for calendar years 2022 and 2023. This included only subevents in which the incidents were coded to the following: air/drone strike, suicide bomb, shelling/artillery/missile attack, remote explosive/landmine/IED, and grenades. All subevents, in the case of analysis involving the use of weapon types, were categorised in line with the Explosive Weapons Monitor definitions of air-launched, ground-launched and directly-emplaced explosive weapons (these definitions are provided below). Incidents involving unexploded ordnance identified (UXO) were removed when analysing the use of explosive weapons by state and non-state actors.

The Explosive Weapons Monitor identified incidents in which fatalities and injuries involving civilians were recorded were primarily determined through filters and analysis of the field 'actor2,' filtering of events in which civilians were the main or only target of an event in the field 'civilian_targeting', and analysis of 'notes'. Incidents indicating the use of explosive weapons by states were primarily determined through filters and analysis of the field 'actor1,' and analysis of 'notes'.

For more information about ACLED's methodologies, please see: https://acleddata.com/knowledge-base/codebook/.

ANNEX 2 – Use of Explosive Weapons by State and Non-State Actors

The Explosive Weapons Monitor reports on harm to civilians from incidents in which the use of explosive weapons caused civilian deaths and injuries, as reported by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), as well as incidents that affected civilian access to healthcare, education, humanitarian aid, food insecurity and water systems, as reported by Insecurity Insight. This section marks the first efforts by the Explosive Weapons Monitor to combine and synthesise multiple data sources to show a more nuanced picture of the frequency and severity of the use of explosive weapons around the globe.

Identification of responsible state armed forces and non-state armed actors and all additional information provided in this section is as recorded by these three organisations with the following exceptions:

- Country and territory names may have been adapted by the Explosive Weapons Monitor according to names designated by the UN Statistics Division.
- The Explosive Weapons Monitor excluded events recorded by ACLED that involved unexploded ordnance (UXO) attributed to both state armed forces and non-state armed actors.
- When use of explosive weapons was attributed to coalition forces by ACLED, the Explosive Weapons Monitor did not use these incidents to identify reported use of explosive weapons by individual state armed forces.
- ACLED records the use of explosive weapons by Houthi forces in Yemen as those of the armed forces of Yemen. For this report, the Explosive Weapons Monitor has instead designated the use of explosive weapons by Houthi forces to be that of non-state armed actors, in line with Insecurity Insight methodology and its ongoing reporting on civilian harm.

The Explosive Weapons Monitor cannot determine with total certainty which actors are responsible for the use of explosive weapons in specific incidents, as much of the recorded data are unverified. Each organisation has similar but varied methodologies for attribution of incidents to state and non-state actors.[46] In all cases, non-state armed actors referenced below include all non-state actors that reportedly perpetrated explosive violence and are not limited to non-state armed groups.

As above, the Explosive Weapons Monitor defines populated areas as "any concentration of civilians, be it permanent or temporary, such as in inhabited parts of cities, or inhabited towns or villages, or as in camps or columns of refugees or evacuees, or groups of nomads," synonymous with the term "concentration of civilians" which appears in existing international humanitarian law (IHL). The references to refugees, evacuees and nomads and the use of the term "inhabited" suggest that the presence of civilians and civilian objects – which need not be in great numbers – is a defining characteristic of populated areas.[47] While the data presented here does not distinguish between the use of explosive weapons in populated and unpopulated areas, the indicators of harm – civilian casualties and civilian infrastructure and services – suggest that the majority of incidents recorded by each data source above likely occurred in populated areas.

46 For full methodologies on attribution of responsibility to state and non-state actors by each organization, see 'ACLED Codebook'. Available at: https://acleddata.com/knowledge-base/codebook/; and Insecurity Insight (2022). 'Definitions and Methodologies'. Available at: https://insecurityinsight.org/methodology-and-definitions.

47 See Article 1(2), Protocol on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (1980). See also ICRC (2016). 'Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas – Factsheet'; Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic (2022). 'Safeguarding Civilians: A Humanitarian Interpretation of the Political Declaration on the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas', pp.8-9.

Identifying ranges of incidents

Numbers of incidents are meant to be indicative of contexts and patterns of use as the complexity of the information environment does not allow for the determination of a precise number of incidents that can be attributed to use by each actor. To identify these contexts and patterns, the Explosive Weapons Monitor developed ranges of numbers of incidents, as below:

Ranges of numbers of incidents in which explosive weapons use reportedly caused harm to civilian casualties	1 - 9
	10 - 99
	100 - 199
	200 - 499
	500 - 999
	1,000 +

To determine which range is relevant for each actor and/or country in which explosive weapons use was reported, the Explosive Weapons Monitor first determined the numbers of incidents in which civilian deaths or injuries were recorded by ACLED. When incidents recorded by ACLED were less than ten, the Explosive Weapons Monitor cross-checked the data sources to remove duplicate incidents and determined the total number of incidents of reported use.

The Explosive Weapons Monitor then determined the numbers of incidents in which civilian access to healthcare, education and humanitarian aid were recorded by Insecurity Insight. To ensure incidents recorded by Insecurity Insight were not duplicates of incidents recorded by ACLED, the Explosive Weapons Monitor disregarded incidents in which health, medical or aid workers were killed or injured and determined only the numbers of incidents in which health, education and aid infrastructure were damaged or destroyed. These numbers were then added to the relevant numbers of incidents in which casualties occurred in order to develop the figure used to determine the correct ranges, as above.

Identifying categories of explosive weapons

ACLED and Insecurity Insight record the use of explosive weapons across a range of weapons categories that correspond with weapons categories used in the Explosive Weapons Monitor's analysis. These definitions include:

Ground-launched explosive weapons – Ground-launched explosive weapons are launched from any surface-level platform, including weapons thrown by a person or fired from warships or vehicles. These include artillery shells (projectiles fired from a gun, cannon, howitzer, or recoilless rifle), tank shells, ground-launched missiles, mortars, rockets (typically missiles which do not contain guidance systems), non-specific shelling, rocket-propelled grenades, and hand grenades.

Air-launched explosive weapons – Air-launched explosive weapons include any weapon fired or dropped from a rotary of fixed-wing aircraft, while also including unmanned aerial vehicles or drones. These include air-dropped bombs (bombs reported as being delivered by air), airstrikes (attacks from a helicopter, drone, or plane), and missiles or rockets launched from an aircraft, while also including attacks by drones that themselves contain an explosive charge, as in the case of loitering munitions.

Directly-emplaced explosive weapons – Directly-emplaced explosive weapons encompass weapons that are physically placed in the location at which they detonate. These include anti-personnel mines, anti-vehicle mines, landmines, non-specific IEDs (including so-called 'suicide vests'), car bombs and roadside bombs.

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