LANDMINE MONITOR
2016
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2016

Monitoring and Research Committee, ICBL-CMC Governance Board
DanChurchAid • Handicap International
Human Rights Watch • Mines Action Canada
Research team leaders • ICBL-CMC staff experts
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.

The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all, including:

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
- More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW);
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.
LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR

Peace agreements may be signed and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. This includes improvised explosive devices (IEDs), also known as improvised landmines, with those same victim-activated characteristics. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive items are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) are explosive weapons that have not been used during armed conflict but have been left behind and are no longer effectively controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers’ fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement. They endanger the initial flight and prevent the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, but that they are also a lethal barrier to development and post-conflict reconstruction.
There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine incidents.

This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy, and communities don’t bear the social and economic impact of mines or ERW presence for decades to come.

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The ICBL is a global network in some 100 countries, working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty.

The campaign is a loose, flexible network whose members share the common goal of working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working with in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, and saw how mines hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel mines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues, and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them to be effective advocates in their respective countries.

Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional, and global level to encourage their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today there are campaigns in some 100 countries.

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. It was due to the sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.

Part of the ICBL’s success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States Parties' implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community's response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Monitor represents the first time that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and problems, thereby successfully putting into practice the concept of civil society-based verification.

In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as "the Monitor") to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster munition issue. Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The ICBL-CMC produces and publishes Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor as separate publications.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor is not designed to send researchers into harm's way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

Monitor reporting complements the transparency reporting by states required under international treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine-, cluster munition-, and ERW-related issues, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.
The Monitor system features a global reporting network and an annual report. A network of more than 30 researchers and a 13-person Editorial Team gathered information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the CMC and ICBL’s campaigning coalitions and from other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and research institutions.

Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done by the Monitor.

As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

This is the 18th annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010. Landmine Monitor 2016 provides a global overview of the landmine situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries and other areas are available in online Country Profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.

Landmine Monitor covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling, and also includes information on contamination, clearance, casualties, victim assistance, and support for mine action. The report focuses on calendar year 2015, with information included up to November 2016 when possible.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations produced this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of research coordinators and editors, with the support of a significant number of donors.

Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.org. The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for their review of the content of the report, and their crucial assistance in the release, distribution, publication, and promotion of Monitor reports.

Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board comprised of four NGOs as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. The committee’s members include: DanChurchAid (Richard MacCormac), Handicap International (Alma Taslidžan Al-Osta), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon), Loren Persi Vicentic (casualty and victim assistance team coordinator), Amelie Chayer (ICBL-CMC government liaison and policy manager), and Jeff Abramson (Monitor program manager). Megan Burke (ICBL-CMC director) is an ex-officio member. From January to November 2016, the Monitor’s Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and produced thematic overviews for Landmine Monitor 2016. The Editorial Team included:

- Ban policy: Mark Hiznay, Stephen Goose, Marta Kosmyna, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, and Mary Wareham, with assistance from Christopher Diamond.
- Contamination, clearance, and support for mine action: Jennifer Reeves, Amelie Chayer, and Marion Loddo; and
- Casualties and victim assistance: Loren Persi Vicentic, Erin Hunt, Clémence Caraux-Pelletan, Marie-Josée Hamel, Michael Moore, and Marianne Schulze.

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid, which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

Jeff Abramson of ICBL-CMC provided final editing in October and November 2016 with assistance from Morgan McKenna (publications consultant).

Report formatting was undertaken by Lixar I.T. Inc. B & B Impresores printed the report in Chile. This report was also published digitally at www.the-monitor.org.

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- UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

The Monitor’s supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material contained in this report. We also thank the donors who have contributed to the organizational members of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other participating organizations.

* List accurate as of November 2016.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AXO</td>
<td>abandoned explosive ordnance</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>battle area clearance</td>
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<td>CCW</td>
<td>1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons</td>
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<td>CHA</td>
<td>confirmed hazardous area</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Cluster Munition Coalition</td>
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<td>ERW</td>
<td>explosive remnants of war</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
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<td>HI</td>
<td>Handicap International</td>
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<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
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<td>ISU</td>
<td>Implementation Support Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSAG</td>
<td>non-state armed group</td>
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<td>SHA</td>
<td>suspected hazardous area</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded ordnance</td>
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<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>victim assistance</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
GLOSSARY

**Abandoned explosive ordnance** – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

**Accession** – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

**Adherence** – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.

**Antihandling device** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

**Antipersonnel mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

**Antivehicle mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

**Area cancellation** – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

**Area reduction** – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

**Battle area clearance** – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

**Casualty** – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

**Clearance** – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

**Cleared land** – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or destruction of all specified mine and ERW hazards to a specified depth.

**Cluster munition** – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is a “conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (bomblets) over a wide area. Bomblets are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

**Confirmed hazardous area** – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination
has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

**Demining** – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

**Explosive remnants of war** – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

**Explosive ordnance disposal** – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

**Improvised explosive device** – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device (IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. Victim-activated IEDs are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

**Improvised mine, also improvised landmine and improvised antipersonnel landmine** – An IED acting as a mine, landmine or antipersonnel landmine.

**International Mine Action Standards** – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

**Land release** – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of land with actual mine/ERW contamination.

**Mine action center** – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action centers also implement mine action activities.

**Mine/ERW risk education** – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.

**Non-state armed groups** – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

**Non-technical survey** – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

**Reduced land** – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.

**Residual risk** – In the context of humanitarian demining, the term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

**Submunition** – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition).

**Survivors** – People who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.

**Suspected hazardous area** – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.
**Technical survey** – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

**Unexploded cluster submunitions** – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

**Unexploded ordnance** – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

**Victim** – The individual killed or injured by a mine/ERW explosion (casualty), his or her family, and community.

**Victim assistance** – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families, and communities in society.
Table Key

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<th>States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of 10 November 2016</th>
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Europe, the Caucasus & Central Asia

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## SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

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Landmine Monitor 2016
A deminer in Lebanon.
MAJOR FINDINGS

Landmine Monitor 2016 continues to detail progress toward the goal of a mine-free world, but also reports a decade-high number of casualties at a time when support for mine action fell to its lowest levels in 10 years. Rejection of antipersonnel mines remains the global norm even as non-state armed groups and a small number of states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty use the weapons. Many countries continue to clear mine contamination, however global clearance declined in 2015 and very few States Parties appear to be on track to meet clearance deadlines.

TREATY STATUS

There are 162 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and one signatory—Marshall Islands—that has yet to ratify.

- There were no new ratifications or accessions in the reporting period. The last country to accede was Oman in August 2014.
- In March 2016, it was announced that Sri Lanka’s cabinet of ministers had approved accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, but the instrument of accession had not been deposited as of 1 November 2016.

USE

The use of antipersonnel mines by states remains a relatively rare phenomenon.

- There was no confirmed new use of the weapons by States Parties from October 2015 through October 2016.
- The government forces of Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria—all states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty—again used antipersonnel landmines in the past year.

Over the past year, non-state armed groups have used antipersonnel landmines in 10 countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

- Non-state armed groups mostly used improvised mines, also known as victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and booby traps—rather than factory-
made landmines. Such devices are banned by the Mine Ban Treaty as they explode due to the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. The Monitor recorded but could not independently verify allegations of new mine use in States Parties Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Philippines, and Tunisia, or in states not party Iran and Saudi Arabia.

CASUALTIES

In 2015, there was a sharp rise in the number of people killed and injured by mines, victim-activated IEDs that mostly act as antipersonnel mines (also called improvised mines), cluster munition remnants, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).

- In 2015, the Monitor recorded 6,461 mine/ERW casualties, of which at least 1,672 people were killed, marking a 75% increase from casualties recorded for 2014. A revised total of 3,695 casualties was recorded in 2014.
- The sharp increase in casualties in 2015 was due to more casualties recorded in armed conflicts in Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen. The increase also reflects greater availability of casualty data, particularly from unique systematic surveys of persons injured in Libya and Syria in 2015.
- The casualty total in 2015 marked the most annual recorded casualties since 2006.
- 2015 also marked the highest number of annual casualties by improvised mines recorded by the Monitor.

Casualties were identified in 56 states and five other areas in 2015, of which 37 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.

- The vast majority of recorded landmine/ERW casualties were civilians (78%) where their status was known, which is similar to the past two years.
- In 2015, children accounted for 38% of all civilian casualties where the age was known.
- Women and girls made up 14% of all casualties where the sex was known, a slight increase compared to recent years.
- Some 60% of recorded global casualties occurred in States Parties, down from 70% in 2014.
- The Monitor has recorded more than 100,000 mine/ERW casualties for the period since its global tracking in began in 1999, including some 73,000 new survivors.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

Donors and affected states contributed approximately US$471.3 million in international and national support for mine action in 2015, a decrease of $139 million (23%) from 2014, the third year in a row of declining support, and lowest level since 2005.

Thirty-five donors contributed $340.1 million in international support for mine action to 41 states and three other areas. This represents a decrease of almost $77 million from 2014, and the first time since 2005 that international support fell below $400 million.

- The top five mine action donors—the United States, Japan, the European Union (EU), Norway, and the Netherlands—contributed 71% of all international funding, with a combined total of $240 million.
- Thirteen donors decreased their funding in 2015, with the EU and Norway accounting for $57 million (74%) of the global decline.
- The top five recipient states—Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Syria—received $161.9 million, or 48% of all international support in 2015.
- Afghanistan received more funding than any other country for the thirteenth consecutive year.
- In 2016, donors hosted three international pledging conferences, during which they committed resources to support mine action activities as well as the treaty’s
implementation support unit. While this was an unprecedented number of events of this kind, it is not yet possible to determine how these conferences will impact overall support for mine action in 2016 and future years.

Fourteen affected states reported providing $131.2 million in national support for their own mine action programs, a decrease of $62 million compared with 2014.

CONTAMINATION AND CLEARANCE

Sixty-four states and areas are contaminated by antipersonnel mines as of October 2016.

- This includes 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 24 states not party, and four other areas. This is an increase from 61 states and areas in 2015.
- The increase is due to new use of antipersonnel mines, including improvised mines, in Nigeria, and to the acquisition of new data on pre-existing contamination in Palau and Mozambique.
- Massive antipersonnel mine contamination (more than 100 km² total per country) is believed to exist in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, and in the area of Western Sahara.

About 171 km² of land was reported to be cleared of landmines in 2015, a decrease from an estimated 201 km² in 2014.

- In 2015, nearly 158,000 antipersonnel mines and some 14,000 antivehicle mines were destroyed in the context of mine clearance.
- As in 2014, the largest total clearance of mined areas in 2015 was achieved in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Croatia, which together accounted for more than 70% of recorded clearance.
- It is not possible to attribute the 2015 decrease in clearance to a single cause, but the severe reduction in funding available for mine action probably played a major role.
- Over the past five years, approximately 960 km² of mined areas have been cleared. Some 1.3 million antipersonnel and more than 66,000 antivehicle mines have been destroyed in the context of mine clearance.

Twenty-six States Parties, one state not party, and one other area have completed clearance of all mined areas on their territory since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999.

- One state, Ukraine, is in violation of Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty due to missing its 1 June 2016 clearance deadline without being granted an extension.
- Only four States Parties appear to be on track to meet their treaty-mandated clearance deadlines: Algeria, Chile, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ecuador.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Most States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine victims suffered from a lack of adequate resources to fulfill the commitments of the 2014–2019 Maputo Action Plan. Findings below relate to the 31 States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims.

- Localized surveys to improve understanding of the needs of mine victims continued in most States Parties.
- Approximately two-thirds of the States Parties had active coordination mechanisms or relevant national plans in place to advance efforts to assist mine victims and uphold their rights. However, victim assistance plans expired in Burundi, Croatia, Senegal, and Uganda without having been revised or renewed in 2015, while expired action plans for assistance in Afghanistan and Sudan have not yet been updated since 2011.
• In most States Parties, assistance efforts have been integrated into other disability rights and development efforts, through collaborative coordination, combined planning, and survivor participation. Unfortunately, such integration has not resulted in mobilizing the funding and resources required to fill the growing gap between assistance available and the obligations that states have to victims.
• In nearly all the States Parties, survivors were joining in coordination processes that affect their lives, although in many countries their participation must be better supported, especially in decision-making roles. Many States Parties still need to demonstrate that they are doing their utmost to increase survivors’ participation in all relevant matters.
• More than half of the States Parties included some information on victim assistance activities and progress in their transparency reports covering calendar year 2015. However, the States Parties still needed to start reporting concretely on time-bound and measurable objectives and progress toward victim assistance goals.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION
Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 51 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 2.1 million destroyed in 2015.

Four States Parties possess more than seven million antipersonnel mines remaining to be destroyed: Ukraine (5.4 million), Belarus (1.5 million), Greece (643,265), and Oman (15,734). Ukraine, Belarus, and Greece all missed their treaty-mandated destruction deadlines.
• The Monitor estimates that as many as 31 of the 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile landmines. In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpile about 160 million antipersonnel mines, but today the global total may be less than 50 million.

TRANSFER AND PRODUCTION
The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of antipersonnel mines, unchanged from the previous report: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.
• Most of these countries are not believed to be actively producing mines but reserve the right to do so. Those most likely to be actively producing are India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.
• Non-state armed groups in countries including Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria make antipersonnel mines, including victim-activated IEDs (improvised mines).

A de facto global ban on the state-to-state transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s.
• Use of factory-produced antipersonnel mines in States Parties Yemen and Ukraine, where declared stockpiles had been destroyed, indicates that some illicit transfers have occurred either internally among actors or from sources external to the country.

TRANSPARENCY REPORTING
As of 15 October 2016, only 45% of States Parties had submitted their required annual transparency reports for calendar year 2015, a slight increase from the previous year (41%).
• A total of 89 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2015.
Writing on the wall in the yard of the main hospital in Manbij, Syria, warning of the presence of mines.

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BAN POLICY

BANNING ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

October 2016 marked 20 years since Canada’s then-foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy challenged states to negotiate and sign an instrument banning antipersonnel landmines by the end of 1997. After a whirlwind process that forged a new model of citizen diplomacy, the Mine Ban Treaty opened for signature on 3 December 1997 and entered into force on 1 March 1999.

The Mine Ban Treaty now has 162 States Parties. It provides the framework for eradicating antipersonnel landmines through its comprehensive prohibitions and requirements that States Parties clear mined areas within 10 years, destroy stockpiles within four years, and provide victim assistance.

The Mine Ban Treaty has created a humanitarian disarmament standard that other instruments have followed, particularly its sister instrument the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, Mine Ban Treaty States Parties are being tested by new use of the weapon and a significant rise in casualties.

Over the past year, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used antipersonnel landmines in 10 countries.1 The new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in conflicts in Ukraine and Yemen and continued large-scale use of victim-activated improvised mines across Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries is particularly disturbing. These victim-activated mines are often referred to as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or booby-traps. If they can be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, they meet the definition of an antipersonnel mine in the Mine Ban Treaty, and therefore are banned.2

1 See below for details on use in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.
2 An antipersonnel mine is a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure, or kill one or more persons. A mine is a munition designed to be placed under or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 2. See the Casualties and Victim Assistance chapter for further definitional clarifications.
Yet mine-laying by states remains a relatively rare phenomenon, with use only by the government forces of Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria in the past year. States Parties are steadily implementing the Mine Ban Treaty. Most of the 35 nations that remain outside of the treaty also abide by its key provisions despite not acceding.

Several States Parties are still facing serious compliance issues, particularly with respect to missed stockpile destruction deadlines and repeated mine clearance deadline extensions. However, governments and international organizations—such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)—continue to work together to support those facing challenges. Since its creation in 2014, the Mine Ban Treaty's Committee on Cooperative Compliance has diligently followed up on allegations of landmine use by States Parties.

**USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES**

In this reporting period—October 2015 through October 2016—Landmine Monitor has confirmed new use of antipersonnel mines by the government forces of Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria, and by NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen. Additionally, Landmine Monitor has also recorded but has been unable to confirm allegations of new mine use by NSAGs in Cameroon, Chad, Iran, Niger, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.

In the reporting period, there were also reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yemen.

**US BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS IN STATES PARTIES**

**Afghanistan**

The use of victim-activated improvised mines continued in Afghanistan by armed groups, mainly the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami, that oppose the government. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that anti-government forces used victim-activated improvised mines in decreasing numbers during early 2016. Victim-activated (pressure plate) improvised mines were responsible for almost half of all casualties recorded from IEDs during the first half of 2016, down 17% from 2015.

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3 For details on extension requests, please see the Contamination and Clearance chapter.


Colombia

Every year since 1999, Landmine Monitor has reported new mine use by armed opposition groups, mainly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo, FARC), but new use of victim-activated devices appears to have dropped dramatically beginning in the second half of 2015 and through 2016. The 2016 peace accord, narrowly rejected by voters in October 2016, requires the FARC to cease all armed conflict, demobilize, and turn in all weapons, including mines and components. Previously, in March 2015, the peace talks agreed to begin limited joint clearance activities as a confidence-building measure. That agreement did not require the FARC to halt new use or production, although FARC did pledge not to re-lay mines in any areas cleared.

In this reporting period (October 2015 through October 2016), the Monitor found no evidence of new use of antipersonnel mines by the FARC, including no use of victim-activated IEDs (improvised mines). A review of media reporting during the period found two incidents of new mine use that were attributed to the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) and two more incidents blamed on “criminals.”

The Colombian army attributed one mine incident in Santander department in August 2015 to the Capt. Paremino Company of the ELN. In October 2015, media reported that the ELN allegedly planted explosive devices near the bodies of dead soldiers.

Iraq

Forces of the so-called Islamic State (IS, also called ISIS or ISIL) fighting the government of Iraq have used victim-activated improvised mines, including explosive booby-traps, extensively since 2014. Numerous media reports in 2015 and 2016 suggest widespread use of victim-activated devices by IS forces continues unabated. Iraq stated in its annual transparency report for 2015 that the large IS-controlled areas in Nineveh and Al Anbar, and parts of Babil and Diyala, governorates are where they are “planting landmines, booby traps, and explosives devices.” On 23 October 2016, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that casualties among people fleeing the fighting during the government campaign on Mosul were caused by victim-activated IEDs (improvised mines).

6 Acuerdo sobre limpieza y descontaminación del territorio de la presencia de minas antipersonal (MAP), artefactos explosivos improvisados (AEI) y municiones sin explotar (MUSE) o restos explosivos de guerra (REG) en general. Comunicado conjunto #52 entre el Gobierno colombiano y la guerrilla Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), La Habana, 7 March 2015, www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/comunicados/comunicado-conjunto-52-la-habana-7-de-marzo-de-2015.

7 July 2015–July 2016 media tracking in Colombia by Camilo Serna, Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM), 12 July 2016. Media database of new use, unknown use, and seizures. The database contained 149 incidents. Seventy-nine were attributed to the FARC, 36 to the ELN, one to Los Urabenos, and 33 unattributable. Reports were collected from the following Colombian media sources: El Tiempo, Meridiano, Ejército Nacional, RCN Radio, Caracol Radio, Radio Santa Fe, El País, El Espectador, El Pais, La FM, El Heraldo, La Voz del Cinaruco, La Nación, Pasto Extra, HSB Noticias, and Vanguardia.

8 Ibid.


12 “Mohammed” told HRW that to leave Hawija, his family paid smugglers US$500 to avoid the explosive devices that IS had planted surrounding the city. The smugglers charged $250 each for him and his wife, and nothing for their two children. He said that as they walked through the mine-infested area, “we saw at least three bodies on the ground, killed by mines.” Brahan Hussein, who was part of the same group and had paid the same price to smugglers, said that he saw at least two dead children and a woman on the ground and presumed they had been killed by mines. HRW, “Iraq: ISIS Endangering Civilians in Mosul and Hawija,” 23 October 2016, www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/23/iraq-isis-endangering-civilians-mosul-and-hawija.
The scale and complexity of IS’s use of improvised mines, including booby-traps, has been the subject of many media reports. According to Lt. Gen. Michael Shields, the director of the United State (US) Joint IED Defeat Organization, “ISIL does an incredible job of booby-trapping urban terrain as either they are still fighting in it or departing it, as has been proven in Fallujah and other places.”13 During a January 2016 operational update from Baghdad, Army Colonel Steve Warren said that while clearing Ramadi is progressing, it’s “slow and it’s painstaking” because clearance teams have “literally found thousands of booby-traps, IEDs, buried explosives [and] houses rigged to explode with a single trip-wire.”14 According to Zwer Mohammed, an officer from the Peshmerga bomb disposal teams in Kirkuk, “Since the beginning of the ISIS war in 2014, we have defused 10,000 bombs and booby traps left by ISIS. We defuse around 100 bombs on a daily basis in the liberated areas.”15

**Nigeria**

Boko Haram militants have allegedly been laying unspecified types of landmines in Nigeria since mid-2014. A technical expert working for the Norwegian Refugee Council provided the Monitor with photographs and technical characteristics of victim-activated IEDs made by Boko Haram that are triggered by a pressure plate. He said Al Shabaab in Somalia may have shared its technical knowledge in making such devices with Boko Haram.16

In August 2015, Colonel Sani Usman, the spokesperson of the Nigerian Army, reportedly stated that the army cleared landmines planted by Boko Haram from a major road in Borno state. He said that after the militants seized the town, they converted chemistry laboratories at the Dikwa School of Agriculture into bomb-making factories.17 The Nigerian Army released a series of photos showing its engineers removing improvised mines planted along the Gwoza-Yamteke highway.18 In August 2016, Nigerian media reported that the army was clearing Boko Haram-laid landmines in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states.19

**Ukraine**

Since 2014, the government of Ukraine stated that it had not used antipersonnel landmines in the conflict and accused Russian forces of laying landmines in Ukraine.20 In December 2014, Ukrainian government officials stated that “no banned weapons” had been used in the “Anti-Terrorist Operations Zone” by Ukrainian armed forces or forces associated with them, such as volunteer battalions.21

15 “Peshmerga experts have defused 10,000 ISIS bombs, booby traps in two years,” Rudaw (Kirkuk), 1 September 2016, rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/01092016.
21 The Military Prosecutor confirmed that an assessment had been undertaken to ensure that stockpiled KSF-1 and KSF-1S cartridges containing PFM-1 antipersonnel mines, BKF-PFM-1 cartridges with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines, and 9M27K3 rockets with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines are not operational, but rather destined for destruction in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty.
In February 2016, Ukraine informed the Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Cooperative Compliance that “its Armed Forces are authorized to use mines in command-detonate mode, which is not prohibited under the Convention. All mines planted in command-detonate mode are recorded, secured and access is restricted.”

Ukrainian civilian and military officials have accused separatist NSAGs of using antipersonnel mines, including improvised mines. At the Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2015, Ukraine stated that there were mined areas in territory under its jurisdiction but not under its control. In addition to those areas, it said that "sabotage acts are carried out on its territory which is under the control of Ukraine, including mining territory and infrastructure.”

In November 2015, an officer from the General Staff informed soldiers that separatist NSAGs were using landmines attached to fish hooks and fishing lines to snag the clothing of soldiers as they moved through wooded areas, thereby detonating nearby mines. In May 2016, two Ukrainian army engineers in Donetsk region were injured by an improvised mine as they were checking the area for explosives.

In September 2016, Ukraine’s Department of Defense Intelligence reported that pro-Russian separatists had laid POM-2 antipersonnel mines. Later that month, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine reported the presence of antivehicle and antipersonnel mines that it said were preventing the SMM representatives from traveling from Pervomaisk toward Zolote, between Mykolaiv province and Luhansk province.

Yemen

HRW has reported numerous instances of antipersonnel mine use by Ansar Allah, also called Houthis, and their allied forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2015 and 2016. Another NSAG, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, also appears to be using antipersonnel mines.

Areas in and near the city of Taizz in Taizz governorate that Houthis and allied forces occupied from March 2015 until March 2016 were subsequently discovered to have been mined, including with PPM-2 mines manufactured in the former East Germany. Houthi officials denied using antipersonnel mines in

25 "In the past day, three soldiers were killed and two wounded," Ukraine Crisis Media Center, Kiev, 5 May 2016, http://uacrisis.org/ua/42788-oleksandr-motuzyanik-91.
Taizz. A September response by Yemen’s foreign ministry affirmed Yemen’s commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty and said that when the conflict ends a committee will be created to investigate the landmine use in Taizz.

In November 2015, HRW reported numerous casualties from landmines, including PPM-2 and Hungarian-made GYATA-64 antipersonnel mines that Houthi forces laid before retreating from Abyan governorate and Aden governorate in July 2015. New use of landmines by Houthi forces was also reported in Marib and Lahj governorates, but the areas remain inaccessible to independent researchers.

In September 2015, the Mine Ban Treaty’s Cooperative Compliance Committee requested to meet with Yemen to discuss continuing mine use. According to the committee’s report, Yemen replied that due to the difficult circumstances faced by the government “it is not able to conduct an investigation for the moment on these new allegations and that due to the lack of adequate information it was unable to attend the meeting.”

Officials reported in May 2016 that large stocks of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines had been recovered from the port city of Mukalla in Hadramout governorate that were allegedly used by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula until it was forced out in April 2016. The governor of Hadramout told a regional media outlet that Al-Qaeda forces extensively mined the Dhabah oil terminal.

There has been no evidence to suggest that members of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition have used landmines in their military operations in Yemen.

USE BY AND IN STATES NOT PARTY

**Libya**

There have been some indications that improvised landmines and other devices are being used in Libya, particularly in Sirte. Further evidence of landmine use has likely gone unrecorded due to a lack of media and independent reporting from the ground.

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29 Officials at the Ministry of Human Rights in Sanaa, controlled by the Houthis and Saleh’s General People’s Congress party, told HRW in late July that the Houthis and allied forces did not use antipersonnel mines. An official with the office of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee, a Houthi body, said in early August that the group did not plant antipersonnel mines in the city of Taizz. He acknowledged Houthi use of antivehicle mines, but said the use was “in military areas” only and claimed that civilian casualties from antivehicle mines were rare. The official alleged that other, unnamed, armed groups in Yemen had used antipersonnel mines.


32 Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Cooperative Compliance (Algeria, Canada, Peru, Sweden), “Report and preliminary observations for 2016 intersessional meetings,” May 2016, bit.ly/MBTCOmpiance16May2016. On 19 February 2016, the treaty’s compliance committee met with a representative of Yemen, who informed it that in Yemen “the situation remains unchanged and that no new investigations into the alleged use of anti-personnel mines have been conducted. The last investigation took place in 2011 but had to be halted due to the political and security situation, and has not been resumed.”

In June 2016, Reuters reported that Libyan forces, mainly composed of fighters from nearby Misrata, were encountering "mines and concealed explosives" as they fought to capture Sirte from IS militants besieged in the center of the city.34 Several international media representatives visited the city in September 2016, when IS forces left parts of the city. Fabio Bucciarelli, an Italian photojournalist who documented fighting in Sirte in 2011 and returned in 2016, told TIME that his second visit was different because "today's war is an even dirtier one" as "ISIS militants used booby-traps, IEDs and car bombs in its attempt to hold onto the city."35 In September 2016, a visiting Russia Today (RT) reporter described booby-traps or "explosive devices masked as innocent-looking objects" throughout the city.36 One Twitter user has posted several examples of improvised antipersonnel mines this year.37

Until 2016, the last recorded landmine use in Libya was 20 T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines discovered at Tripoli International Airport in August 2014 by the Libya Dawn alliance, led by militias from the coastal city of Misrata. A coalition of militias from the inland mountain town of Zintan controlled the airport from the end of 2011 until Libya Dawn seized it in 2014.

Myanmar

Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, Landmine Monitor has consistently documented the use of antipersonnel mines by government forces and NSAGs in Myanmar (Burma). During this reporting period, information available to the Monitor indicates a continuation of the trend of a significantly lower level of new mine use.

In September 2016, Deputy Minister of Defence Major General Myint Nwe informed the Myanmar parliament that the army continues to use landmines in the internal armed conflict.38 At the same session, a Member of Parliament from Shan State said that "it can't be denied that non-state armed groups are also using landmines...particularly since 2012."39 There have been numerous reports from various credible local sources that antipersonnel mines or devices have been used in Kachin, Kayin, and Shan states between October 2015 and October 2016.40 It is often not possible to determine if the army or a NSAG laid the mines. NSAGs operating in those provinces include the Democratic Karen Benevolence Army, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance

37 A video uploaded in August reportedly shows a Libyan army officer clearing a victim-activated improvised explosive device consisting of a 155mm artillery shell main charge and a pressure plate trigger that he described as a "very common design of IED found in Benghazi." Photographs posted online by the same account on 1 March and reportedly taken in Benghazi show a grenade with a silk wire "booby-trap" discovered by civilians returning home after the Libya National Army liberated the area. See: "Libya Army EOD renders safe an IED in Benghazi - August 2016," YouTube.com, 25 August 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8H5BKRwkuU; @JanusThe2, "#Libya Large, blue pressure plate with #artillery shell main charge found at foot of a stairwell inside a building. The location is not identified. Photographs posted online by the same account on 1 March and reportedly taken in Benghazi show a grenade with a silk wire "booby-trap" discovered by civilians returning home after the Libya National Army liberated the area. See: "Libya Army EOD renders safe an IED in Benghazi - August 2016," YouTube.com, 25 August 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8H5BKRwkuU; @JanusThe2, "#Libya Large, blue pressure plate with #artillery shell main charge found at foot of a stairwell and rendered safe," 3 August 2016, 5:05 AM, Tweet, https://twitter.com/JanusThe2/status/76080847632203776; and @JanusThe2, "Civilian returning home to #Benghazi after LNA liberated the area found this: grenade with silk wire 'booby-trap'," 1 March 2016, 12:24 AM, Tweet, https://twitter.com/JanusThe2/status/704582980442923008.
39 Ibid.
Army, the Shan State Army-South, the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).

In January 2016, China protested after a Chinese official was injured on the China-Myanmar border by a landmine that was apparently laid during fighting between the Myanmar military and an armed group, however it is unknown which side laid the landmine.41 Local residents of Kutkai township in Shan State accused the KIA and the TNLA of planting landmines in the town in January 2016.42 The TNLA had previously stated it would refrain from mine use.43

North Korea

In July 2016, South Korea's Yonhap News Agency published allegations of mine use by North Korea in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the two countries.44 In August 2016, the US military, citing the United Nations Command (UNC), reported that North Korea was using landmines, and that the UNC condemned the new mine laying as a violation of the 1953 armistice.45 Previously, two South Korean soldiers on patrol on the South Korean side of the DMZ at Yeonchon in Gyeonggi province were maimed on 4 August 2015 by antipersonnel mines. The South Korean military accused North Korea of laying PMD-6 wooden box mines, made in North Korea.

North Korea denied the use.46 In August 2015, the North Korean ambassador asserted that the South Korean military had identified the mine as its own, a round M-14, on 4 August and then changed it to a square North Korean box mine on 10 August for political purposes.47

Pakistan

In April 2016, a representative of Pakistan told the Monitor that 14% of recovered IEDs used by militants in Pakistan are victim-activated. The explosive devices are victim-activated through pressure plate and infra-red initiation. Sometimes these improvised antipersonnel mines are used as detonators for larger explosive devices, or one initiator will set off multiple explosive devices.48 NSAGs in Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

Over the past year, non-state armed groups have used antipersonnel landmines in 10 countries

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43 The TNLA is the armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) which signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment banning antipersonnel landmines in 2007. Since 2014, Geneva Call has been pursuing inquiries about allegations of mine use made against the TNLA. See, “Burma/Myanmar: Geneva Call urges an end to mine use in northern Shan State,” Geneva Call, 14 July 2016, genevacall.org/burmamyanmar-geneva-call-urges-end-mine-use-northern-shan-state/.
44 “N.K. seen doubling landmines in DMZ this year: S. Korean military,” *Yonhap News Agency*, 3 July 2016, english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/07/03/0200000000AEN20160703004000315.html
used antipersonnel landmines and victim-activated explosive devices during the reporting period. Use was attributed to Tehrik Taliban Pakistan and Balochistan insurgent groups.49

Syria

In late 2011, the first reports emerged of Syrian government use of antipersonnel mines in the country’s border areas.50 A Syrian official acknowledged the government had “undertaken many measures to control the borders, including planting mines.”51

In 2016, reports of mine use by IS and Syrian government forces increased. The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) reported several incidents from mines that IS fighters likely laid as the group controlled the territory for prolonged periods of time. For example, in Aleppo governate alone, SNHR reported civilian casualties in August, September, and October 2016 from landmines that IS apparently laid in the villages of Najm,52 Abu Qalqal,53 Al Humar,54 and Al Dadat.55

In January 2016, Doctors Without Borders (Medecins sans Frontieres, MSF) reported that Syrian government forces laid landmines around the town of Madaya in Rif Dimashq governate, 10 kilometers from the Lebanon border. According to MSF, civilians trying to flee the city have been killed and injured by “bullets and landmines.”56 In October 2016, residents of Madaya claimed that the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah, operating together with government forces, laid antipersonnel mines around the town. A medical group and a media organization reported that “landmines” have been laid around the edge of the town.57

In March 2016, Syrian government forces in the city of Palmyra reported that they were finding “landmines” planted by IS fighters.58

During a five-day investigation in Manbij in early October 2016, HRW collected the names of 69 civilians, including 19 children, killed by improvised mines, including booby-traps, laid in schools, homes, and on roads during and after the fighting for control for the city, involving

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49 Email from Raza Shah Khan, Executive Director, Sustainable Peace And Development Organization (SPADO), 28 July 2016; and Tariq Saeed, “Landmine blast in KA killed two FC men,” Pakistan Observer, 23 April 2016, pakobserver.net/landmine-blast-in-ka-killed-two-fc-men/.
IS and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—a coalition of Kurdish, Arab, and other forces supported by the US government. Nearly all the incidents HRW documented appeared to have been caused by victim-activated IEDs, rather than by explosives detonated by a vehicle or by remote-control.

**ALLEGATIONS AND OTHER REPORTS**

Landmine Monitor has also recorded allegations and other reports of new mine use by NSAGs in States Parties Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Philippines, and Tunisia, as well as states not party Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Monitor cannot confirm use in any of these instances.

Various media outlets have continued to report new "landmine" use by Boko Haram militants in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Landmine Monitor has not confirmed the nature of the devices used or the circumstances of the allegations.

In March 2016, the Philippines Campaign to Ban Landmines called on the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), a breakaway faction of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, to stop using victim-activated explosive devices at Barangay Tee in Datu Salibo municipality in Maguindanao province and to respect international humanitarian law. In June 2016, government troops were killed and injured by explosive devices left by Islamist armed groups fleeing their camp.

In Tunisia, government forces engaged in operations against militants in Jebel Al-Cha’anby in Qsrein Wilaya/Kasserine governnorate near the Algerian border suffered casualties from victim-activated explosive devices in 2015 and 2016. The Monitor cannot confirm when the improvised mines were emplaced, but due to the ongoing nature of the conflict, it is likely that they were recently laid.

In October 2015, several newspapers reported that Iranian Revolutionary Guards were laying antipersonnel mines on Iran's border with northern Iraq. Eyewitnesses reportedly observed the mine-laying operation and media reports state that the Kurdish authorities warned the inhabitants of the Penjwen area of Sulaymaniyyah governorate not to approach

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62 The device appears to have been victim-activated, but details of the mechanism were not available to the Monitor. The use was attributed to Dawlah Islamiya, comprised of rogue Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and foreign combatants led by Abdullah Maute. "2 soldiers killed, 5 hurt in landmine blast in Lanao Sur," Philippine Inquirer, 2 June 2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/788322/2-soldiers-killed-5-hurt-in-landmine-blast-in-lanao-sur.

the border due to new mine use. The mines were reportedly laid to prevent incursion by Kurdish militants and smugglers. 64

Saudi Arabia has reported that soldiers have been injured by landmines on its border with Yemen, however it is not clear from the reports on which side of the border the mines were laid or who had laid them. 65

STOCKPILES OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES POSSESSED
BY STATES NOT PARTY AND NON-STATE ARMED
GROUPS

The Monitor estimates that as many as 31 of the 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile landmines. Previously, in 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpile about 160 million antipersonnel mines, but today the global total may be less than 50 million. 66

It is unclear if all 31 states are currently stockpiling antipersonnel mines. Officials from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they have only small stockpiles used solely for training purposes.

Three states not party, all Pacific states, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Tonga. It is unclear if Palestine possesses stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.

States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, the US, and Vietnam.

Largest stockpilers of antipersonnel mines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Stockpile (百万)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>estimated 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>estimated 4–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>“less than” 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

States not party that likely have stockpiled antipersonnel mines

| Armenia          | Korea, North   |
| Azerbaijan       | Korea, South   |
| Bahrain          | Kyrgyzstan     |
| China            | Lao PDR        |
| Cuba             | Lebanon        |
| Egypt            | Libya          |
| Georgia          | Mongolia       |
| India            | Morocco        |
| Iran             | Myanmar        |
| Israel           | Nepal          |
| Kazakhstan       | Pakistan       |
| Russia           | Saudi Arabia   |
| Singapore        | Sri Lanka      |
| Syria            | UAE            |
| Saudi Arabia     | US             |
| Singapore        | Uzbekistan     |
| Sri Lanka        | Vietnam        |


66 In 2014, China informed Landmine Monitor that its stockpile is “less than” five million, but there is an amount of uncertainty about the method China uses to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, China was estimated to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in stockpile.
NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

Fewer NSAGs appear to be able to access factory-made antipersonnel mines now that production and transfers have halted under the Mine Ban Treaty, and stockpiles have largely been destroyed. Some NSAGs have acquired mine stocks, at times stolen from arsenals or purchased from corrupt officials in states not party, or removed them from minefields, but most appear to make their own improvised mines, also known as IEDs and as booby-traps, from locally available materials.

During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen were reported to possess stocks of factory-made antipersonnel mines or components to manufacture victim-activated IEDs (improvised mines). The Monitor largely relies on reports of seizures by government forces or verified photographic evidence from journalists to identify NSAGs possessing mine stockpiles.

PRODUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past. Forty-one states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and the US.

In November 2015, Singapore Technologies Engineering announced that it had ceased production of antipersonnel mines and published the decision on its website in a section entitled “Sustainability Governance.” In a letter to PAX, a Dutch NGO, the company's president Tan Pheng Hock stated, “ST Engineering is now no longer in the business of designing, producing and selling of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions or any related key components.” The Monitor will continue to list Singapore as a producer until the government formally commits to no future production. Singapore already observes an indefinite export moratorium.

The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of antipersonnel mines, unchanged from the previous report: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not believed to be actively producing mines but reserve the right to do so. Those most likely to be actively producing are India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.

NSAGs in countries including Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria fabricate antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs. The NGO Conflict Armament Research reported in April 2015 that IS is producing and deploying IEDs on a large scale.

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67 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has produced antipersonnel mines.

68 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the UK, and Zimbabwe.


70 Letter to PAX from Tan Pheng Hock, President and Chief Executive Officer, Singapore Technologies Engineering Ltd, 11 November 2015.

TRANSFERS OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma attached to the weapon. The Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing annually in 1999. However, the use of factory-produced antipersonnel mines in conflicts in Yemen and Ukraine, where declared stockpiles had been destroyed, indicates that some transfers, either internally among actors or from sources external to the country, are occurring.

Three types of antipersonnel mines produced in the 1980s have been used in Yemen since 2013: PPM-2 mines, GYATA-64 mines, and a Bulgarian-made PSM-1 bounding fragmentation mine, found in its 1980s-vintage factory packaging in an arms bazaar in the town of Marib in 2015. None of these mines were among the four types of antipersonnel mines that Yemen reported stockpiling in the past, including for training mine clearance personnel. The evidence of further use of these specific types of antipersonnel mines in 2015 and 2016 suggests either that Yemen’s 2002 declaration to the UN Secretary-General on the completion of landmine stockpile destruction was incorrect, or that these mines were acquired from another source after 2002. In a September 2016 letter, Yemen’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sanaa, controlled by the Houthis and the General People’s Congress, said that individuals had smuggled weapons, including landmines, into Yemen in recent years, noting that the current government had not been able to control its land or sea borders due to instability and fighting.

The State Security Service of Ukraine has reported seizing and recovering antipersonnel mines from Russian-backed separatists in 2016, including 24 MON-series directional fragmentation munitions, five OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines, one PMN-2 blast mine, and 24 TM-62 antivehicle mines. Ukraine finished destroying stockpiles of PMN mines in 2003; other mine types are possessed by Russia, Ukraine, and any number of successor states of the Soviet Union.

At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including six landmine producers, have enacted formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they have stopped exporting, including Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.

UNIVERSALIZING THE LANDMINE BAN

Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states that had not signed it by then may no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. Of the 162 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 30 acceded.
The last country to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty was Oman on 20 August 2014.

The 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the last signatory yet to ratify.

On 2 March 2016, Ambassador Ravinatha Pandukabhaya Aryasinha announced that Sri Lanka’s cabinet of ministers has approved accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, but the instrument of ratification had not been deposited as of 15 October 2016.76

The US government announced policy measures in June and September 2014 banning US production and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines, accelerating stockpile destruction, and banning mine use, except on the Korean Peninsula.77 The Obama administration also indicated its “aspiration” for the US to “eventually accede to the Ottawa Convention,” but there have been few signs of new steps toward that goal.78

**ANNUAL UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION**

Since 1997, the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states outside the Mine Ban Treaty with an important opportunity to indicate their support for the humanitarian rationale of the treaty and the objective of its universalization. A dozen of the countries that have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999 did so after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.79

On 7 December 2015, UNGA Resolution 70/55 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 168 states in favor, none against, and 17 abstentions.80 This is the highest number of affirmative votes for the annual resolution.81

A core of 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions, most of them since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, the US, and Vietnam.82

**NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS**

Some NSAGs have expressed a willingness to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines, which reflects the strength of the growing international norm and stigmatization of the weapon. In June 2015, the Kurdistan Freedom Party of Iran signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment pledging not to use antipersonnel mines.83 At least 65 NSAGs have committed...

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79 This includes: Belarus, Bhutan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, FYR Macedonia, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, and Turkey.
80 The 17 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.
81 Previously, the resolution’s highest number of affirmative votes was 165 in favor in 2013 and 2010, while the lowest number of votes in support was 138 in 2001.
82 Uzbekistan voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997.
83 Geneva Call, “Iran: a Kurdish armed movement takes official commitments to reinforce the protection of civilian,” Press Release, 28 June 2015, genevacall.org/iran-kurdish-armed-movement-takes-official-commitments-reinforce-protection-civilian/. Geneva Call states that the group is not currently using antipersonnel landmines. It is not known if the group possesses a stockpile or was a past user. While created by Iranian Kurds, the group is carrying out its armed activities in Iraq alongside Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces.
to halt using antipersonnel mines since 1997.\textsuperscript{84} The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs have no permanence, frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures.

\textbf{CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS}

Amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) entered into force on 3 December 1998 and regulates the production, transfer, and use of mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices. Weaknesses of the original protocol and inadequate measures to improve it through Amended Protocol II gave impetus to the Ottawa Process that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. As of October 2016, a total of 102 states were party to Amended Protocol II.

Only 10 states that are party to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Georgia, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the US. Therefore, for antipersonnel mines, the protocol is only relevant for those 10 countries as the rest are bound by the much higher standards of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The original Protocol II on mines, booby-traps, and other devices entered into force on 2 December 1983. It has largely been superseded by the 1996 Amended Protocol II, but 13 states that are party to the original protocol have yet to ratify the amended protocol: Cuba, Lao PDR, Mongolia, and Uzbekistan, and Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Burundi, Djibouti, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Togo, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.

A total of 17 states that stockpile antipersonnel mines are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II, or CCW Protocol II. Five of these states are also landmine producers.

\textbf{STATUS AND OPERATION OF THE MINE BAN TREATY}

In general, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and when ambiguities have arisen they have been dealt with in a satisfactory matter. However, there are serious compliance concerns regarding a small number of States Parties with respect to use of antipersonnel mines and missed stockpile destruction deadlines. In addition, some States Parties are not doing nearly enough to implement key provisions of the treaty, including those concerning mine clearance and victim assistance, which are detailed in other chapters of this report.

\textbf{COMPLIANCE}

At the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in June 2014, States Parties created a new Committee on Cooperative Compliance to consider whether a concern about compliance

\textsuperscript{84} As of October 2015, 45 through the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, 19 by self-declaration, and four by the Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment). See, Geneva Call, “Deed of Commitment,” undated, www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/. Prior to 2000, several declarations were issued regarding the mine ban by NSAGs, some of whom later signed the Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.
with the prohibitions contained in Article 1.1 is potentially credible and, if so, to consider any follow-up that might be appropriate for States Parties.85

The chair of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on Cooperative Compliance delivered a report to the May 2016 intersessional meetings, detailing its work and preliminary observations concerning allegations or reports of landmine use in States Parties. According to the report, beginning in January 2016, “the Committee met regularly to consider past instances of alleged use of antipersonnel mines and assess the credibility of these allegations and the value of follow-up on them.”86 The committee met with the representatives of concerned States Parties Sudan, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen to engage each in a cooperative dialogue regarding allegations of use of antipersonnel mines. The committee did not recommend specific actions be taken by States Parties, but will continue its work to further follow-up on these and other allegations of use.

USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES BY STATES PARTIES

In this reporting period, commencing in October 2015, there has been no confirmed use of antipersonnel mines by government forces of States Parties. Prior to Landmine Monitor Report 2013, there had never been a confirmed case of use of antipersonnel mines by the armed forces of a State Party since the Mine Ban Treaty became binding international law in 1999. That is no longer the case since the confirmation by Yemen that a violation of the convention by its forces occurred in 2011.

A number of allegations of mine use in previous years by the armed forces of South Sudan (in 2013 and 2011) and Sudan (in 2011) were addressed by the Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Cooperative Compliance in its report to the May 2016 intersessional meetings.87

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION

A total of 156 of the 162 States Parties do not stockpile antipersonnel mines, of which 89 have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction and 65 have declared never possessing antipersonnel mines (except in some cases for training purposes). Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines. Somalia acknowledged that “large stocks are in the hands of former militias and private individuals,” and that Somalia is “putting forth efforts to verify if in fact it holds antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.”88 No stockpiled mines have been destroyed since the treaty came into force for Somalia, which has a destruction deadline of 1 October 2016. It has not provided an annual update to its transparency report since 2014.

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 51 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 2.1 million destroyed in 2015.

85 The committee will also, “When appropriate, in close consultation with the States Parties concerned, clarify the situation, and if as a result it assesses that the concern is credible, make suggestions on steps that the States Parties concerned could take to ensure that the Convention remains strong and effective; For cases where the concern is credible, present preliminary observations at intersessional meetings if need be, and conclusions and recommendations at Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences; Remain transparent and accountable, including by reporting on activities at both intersessional and Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences.” “Decisions on the Convention’s Machinery and Meetings,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 5, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Decisions-Machinery-27Jun2014.pdf.


Four States Parties possess more than seven million antipersonnel mines remaining to be destroyed: Ukraine (5.4 million), Belarus (1.5 million), Greece (643,265), and Oman (15,734).

Poland reported informally to Landmine Monitor that it had completed the destruction of its stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in the second half of 2016, well ahead of its 1 June 2017 deadline, and that it intended to make a formal announcement at the Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2016.89

Oman destroyed 1,526 antipersonnel mines in two destruction events in September 2015.90 It has committed to destroy its stockpile by the deadline of 1 February 2019.

Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 after failing to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline.91 The inability of Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine to complete their stockpile destruction is a matter of deep concern for States Parties, the ICBL, and the ICRC. The Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014 called on States Parties that missed their deadline to comply without delay and also to communicate their plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to provide an expected completion date. The Maputo Action Plan added a call for these states to provide a plan for the destruction of their remaining stockpiles by 31 December 2014.

Belarus reported destroying 1,862,080 PFM-1 mines in 2015 in its transparency report submitted on 30 April 2016.92 At the Fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties in December 2015, Belarus said the project to destroy stockpiles of PFM-type mines was extended until August 2020 and the contract between the European Commission and the company in charge of carrying out destruction, EXPAL, until February 2018.93 In a May 2016 progress report, Belarus stated that this project is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2017.94 Belarus also stated that it will destroy any residual stocks of PFM mines that were in an "unsafe" condition to be destroyed by EXPAL.95

Complicated legal and contractual issues surrounding the destruction of Greece’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines continue to stall any physical destruction. This situation is further complicated by the stockpiles being located in both Greece and Bulgaria.96 Greece reported in May 2016 that an amended contract between the Ministry of National Defence and the Hellenic Defence Systems will be signed at some unspecified point to set a timetable for the destruction of the remaining stockpiles.97

At the May 2016 intersessional meetings, Ukraine stated that on 19 October 2015 an additional agreement was reached among the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, NATO Support and Procurement Agency, and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant for the resumption of the destruction of stockpiles of PFM-type antipersonnel mines. Within the context of this agreement, a total of 642,960 PFM-1 mines are slated to be destroyed between 2015 and

89 Email from Zbigniew Ciolek, Counselor (Disarmament), Permanent Mission of Poland to the UN in Geneva, 25 October 2016.
91 Belarus and Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.
the end of 2016; 233,496 had been destroyed by 1 May 2016.98 Ukraine has not detailed any plans to destroy stockpiled POM-2 antipersonnel mines.

MINES RETAINED FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH (ARTICLE 3)

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of antipersonnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques...The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 71 States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 40 have retained more than 1,000 mines and three (Finland, Turkey, and Bangladesh) have each retained more than 12,000 mines. Eighty-six States Parties have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 33 states that stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past.

In addition to those listed below, another 32 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines and together possess a total of 13,267 retained mines.99 This amount is 1,952 fewer retained mines than reported for the previous year.

While laudable for transparency, several States Parties are still reporting as retained antipersonnel mines devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine, including by the destruction of the fuzes. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty; a total of at least 12 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines in this condition.100

The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that are retaining mines but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities. No other details have been provided about how the mines are being used. Nine States Parties have never reported consuming any mines retained for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Finland, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo.

TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

Only one State Party has not submitted an initial report: Tuvalu (due 28 August 2012).

99 Angola (972), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Jordan (850), Honduras (826), Mauritania (728), United Kingdom (724), Portugal (694), Italy (620), Germany (590), South Africa (576), Cyprus (500), Bhutan (490), Zimbabwe (450), Togo (436), Nicaragua (435), Slovenia (350), Congo (322), Ethiopia (303), Cote d’Ivoire (290), Uruguay (260), Argentina (212), Lithuania (209), Cape Verde (120), Eritrea (101), Gambia (100), Ecuador (90), Rwanda (63), Senegal (50), Benin (30), Guinea-Bissau (9), Burundi (4).
100 Afghanistan, Australia, BiH, Canada, Eritrea, France, Gambia, Germany, Lithuania, Mozambique, Senegal, and Serbia.
### States retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Last declared total (for year)</th>
<th>Initial declaration</th>
<th>Consumed during 2015</th>
<th>Year of last declared consumption</th>
<th>Total quantity reduced as excess to need</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>16,500 (2015)</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>14,800 (2015)</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>12,050 (2015)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6,115 (2015)</td>
<td>13,948</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>5,997 (2015)</td>
<td>7,530</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5,970 (2015)</td>
<td>15,030</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5,682 (2015)</td>
<td>7,224</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>5,584 (2015)</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>4,875 (2011)</td>
<td>4,960</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4,570 (2015)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3,955 (2015)</td>
<td>4,539</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>3,760 (2013)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3,416 (2015)</td>
<td>10,466</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>6,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3,364 (2011)</td>
<td>3,364</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>3,149 (2014)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2,996 (2004)</td>
<td>2,996</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2,454 (2015)</td>
<td>4,978</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2,437 (2015)</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2,395 (2013)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2,288 (2015)</td>
<td>5,980</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>2,218 (2015)</td>
<td>4,859</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>2,134 (2015)</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2,015 (2015)</td>
<td>9,526</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>7,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>2,000 (2015)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1,938 (2015)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,897 (2015)</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1,783 (2015)</td>
<td>4,991</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1,780 (2008)</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1,764 (2011)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1,634 (2009)</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,613 (2015)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,557 (2014)</td>
<td>4,076</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,488 (2015)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1,265 (2015)</td>
<td>1,427</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1,147 (2015)</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</td>
<td>1,031 (2015)</td>
<td>2,405</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,020 (2007)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1,019 (2011)</td>
<td>1,019</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Partial total** | 145,509 | 316,595 | 2,125 | 62,798

*Note: N/R = not reported*
As of 15 October 2016, only 45% of States Parties had submitted annual reports for calendar year 2015, a slight increase from the previous year (41%). A total of 89 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2015.\footnote{101}

Of this group, 80 States Parties have failed to submit an annual transparency report for two or more years.\footnote{102}


\footnote{101} Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central Africa Republic, Comoros, DRC, Congo (Rep of), Cook Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé & Príncipe, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.

\footnote{102} A total of nine States Parties submitted reports for 2014 but have not submitted reports for 2015: Burundi, Indonesia, Ireland, Mozambique, Netherlands, Moldova, Serbia, Tajikistan, and Zambia.
A technician heads to work in a minefield near Zouarke, Chad.
© Sean Sutton/MAG, December 2015
## Contamination and Clearance

### States and other areas with antipersonnel mine contamination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Korea, North</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina (BiH)</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus**</td>
<td>Palau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Georgia***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia***</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)*</td>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh****</td>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated by *italics*. *Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.*

**Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.***

***The known area in Georgia is small, but there also may be mined areas in South Ossetia.****

****The known area in Nagorno-Karabakh is small, but that estimate is believed to only include contamination within the Soviet-era boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh and not mine contamination in the adjacent territories.

Six States Parties have residual or suspected contamination: Cameroon, Djibouti, Moldova, Namibia, the Philippines, and Tunisia.
 STATUS AND KEY DEVELOPMENTS 2015–2016

- Sixty-four states and areas have an identified threat of antipersonnel mine contamination: 36 States Parties, 24 states not party, and four other areas. This is an increase from 61 states and areas in 2015, as Palau has been added to the list, and Mozambique and Nigeria returned to it. A further six States Parties have either suspected or residual mine contamination.
- A total of 171km² was reported to be cleared of landmines in 2015, a decrease from an estimated 201km² in 2014. The total number of antipersonnel mines reported to be destroyed was nearly 158,000, a decrease from 232,000 in 2014.
- Twenty-six States Parties have completed implementation of Article 5 since 1999.
- In 2015, five States Parties submitted extensions that were granted at the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties: Cyprus, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. Two states requested extended deadlines in 2016: Niger and Peru.
- Ukraine is in violation of Article 5 due to missing its 1 June 2016 clearance deadline without having been granted an extension.
- Jordan, Mozambique, and Nigeria should declare that they have obligations under Article 5 and request a new deadline to complete clearance.
- Only four States Parties appear to be on track to meet their Article 5 clearance deadline: Algeria, Chile, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Ecuador.

MINE CONTAMINATION IN 2015

It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the total area contaminated by landmines due to a lack of data. The understanding of the scale of the problem is generally improving, however, particularly among States Parties as countries make increased use of land release methodologies to cancel suspected hazardous areas by non-technical survey, and reduce confirmed hazardous areas through technical survey. However, in some states the extent of mine contamination became less clear in 2015 and 2016 due to reports of new contamination. There was new contamination in 2015 and/or 2016 in States Parties Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Yemen; and states not party North Korea, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria. There are also reports and allegations of new contamination in States Parties Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Philippines, South Sudan, and Tunisia; and in states not party Egypt and Iran.

Nigeria returned to the list of contaminated states as a result of reports of new contamination. Mozambique also returned to the list because of the discovery of pre-existing contamination. However, both states have yet to make a formal declaration of Article 5 obligations. Palau was added to the list as World War II-era emplaced antipersonnel mines were found and destroyed in 2015. Palau needs to confirm if it has any further antipersonnel contamination.

No estimate of the size of contamination exists for eight States Parties, 18 states not party, and one other area, which are known to be contaminated.3

1 The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.
2 In addition, El Salvador completed clearance in 1994, before the Mine Ban Treaty was created. Three states (Jordan, Nigeria, and Mozambique) that had declared completion in the past are still finding antipersonnel mine contamination, including victim-activated improvised mines (Nigeria)—they are not included in the total figure of 26 States Parties.
3 Email to the Palau Authorities from Steve Ballinger, Operations Director, General Demining Command (CGD), 1 December 2015.
4 For further details of the estimated extent of antipersonnel mine contamination, see the Mine Action country profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.
The table below is based on information provided by states. Some states currently report exceedingly large suspected hazardous areas. Over time, as they develop a more accurate understanding through survey, the category into which the state has been placed may change.

### Estimated extent of mine contamination at end of 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>East and South Asia, and the Pacific</th>
<th>Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Massive (More than 100 km²)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Afghanistan Cambodia Thailand</td>
<td>Azerbaijan BiH Croatia Turkey</td>
<td>Iraq Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Heavy (20–99 km²)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea South Sudan Sudan Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Korea, South Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Algeria Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium (5–19 km²)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>Argentina* Chile</td>
<td>Armenia Tajikistan UK*</td>
<td>Jordan Palestine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Light (Less than 5 km²)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC Mozambique Niger Senegal</td>
<td>Ecuador Peru</td>
<td>Cyprus** Serbia Kosovo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No estimate provided</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia Mauritania Nigeria Somalia</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>China India Korea, North Lao PDR Myanmar Pakistan Palau Vietnam</td>
<td>Georgia*** Kyrgyzstan Russia Ukraine Uzbekistan Nagorno-Karabakh****</td>
<td>Egypt Iran Israel Libya Morocco Oman Syria Yemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics.*

* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.

** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.

*** The known area in Georgia is small, but there also may be mined areas in South Ossetia.

**** The known area in Nagorno-Karabakh is small, but that estimate is believed to only include contamination within the Soviet-era boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh and not mine contamination in the adjacent territories.
Six States Parties have residual or suspected contamination: Cameroon, Djibouti, Moldova, Namibia, the Philippines, and Tunisia. These states have an obligation to make “every effort” to identify mined areas under their jurisdiction or control that contain antipersonnel mines and then to clear any that they find. They must report publicly on any contamination and on clearance efforts. In cases where they are unable to complete clearance within their Article 5 deadline, they must request an extension in order to remain in compliance with the treaty.

**MINE CLEARANCE IN 2015**

Total global clearance of landmines in 2015 was estimated to be 171km², with nearly 158,000 antipersonnel mines destroyed. This represents a decrease from 201km² of total area cleared in 2014 and a decrease from the destruction of approximately 232,000 antipersonnel mines.

Programs clearing the largest amount of mined area in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>8,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>2,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>4,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>55,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>27,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>158.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>116,517</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other programs combined</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>41,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total global clearance</strong></td>
<td><strong>170.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>157,672</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold** and other area in *italics*.

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5 Various media outlets have reported “landmine” use by Boko Haram militants. Cameroon should publicly address these reports, and immediately inform States Parties of any newly discovered antipersonnel mine contamination.

6 Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict in June 2008. Djibouti has not made a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

7 Moldova, which had an Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, made a statement in June 2008 that suggested it had acknowledged its legal responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction. However, this statement was later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, bit.ly/MoldovaNSA2008.

8 Despite a statement by Namibia made at the Second Review Conference that it was in full compliance with Article 5, questions remain as to whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for example, in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.

9 The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups over recent years, has not formally reported the presence of mined areas.

10 There have been casualties from victim-activated improvised explosive devices in Tunisia in 2015 and 2016. Due to the ongoing nature of the conflict, it is likely that these devices were recently laid.
Four of the 10 most contaminated states (Azerbaijan, BiH, Chad, and Turkey) are not among those that cleared the largest amount of mined area in 2015, but instead are accounted for in “other programs combined” along with other states. No mine clearance was conducted in State Party Turkey in 2015, although 1,531 antipersonnel mines were destroyed “due to explosions caused by various reasons.”11 States Parties BiH and Chad and state not party Azerbaijan reported low rates of clearance, between 0.26km² and 1.64km² each.

No mine clearance or survey occurred in States Parties Ethiopia, Turkey, Senegal, and Yemen;12 and in states not party Cuba, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. No data was available for survey and clearance results in States Parties Eritrea, Nigeria, and Ukraine; and states not party China, Egypt, India, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, and Uzbekistan.

MINE BAN TREATY ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties are required to clear all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. States Parties that consider themselves unable to complete their mine clearance obligations within the deadline may submit a request for a deadline extension of up to 10 years.

COMPLETION OF ARTICLE 5 IMPLEMENTATION

Twenty-six States Parties, one state not party, and one other area have completed clearance since the treaty entered into force in 1999.

States Parties that have completed Article 5 implementation since 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Montenegro still has to formally report completion of Article 5 implementation, but is not believed to have any antipersonnel mine contamination left.

In addition, state not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined areas since 1999. El Salvador, a State Party, completed clearance in 1994, before the Mine Ban Treaty was created.

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11 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form G.
12 Antipersonnel mines were destroyed during spot clearance only.
Both Jordan\textsuperscript{13} and Mozambique\textsuperscript{14} have declared completion of clearance under the Mine Ban Treaty (in 2012 and 2015 respectively), but they are still finding antipersonnel mine contamination and therefore do not appear in the table above. Nigeria\textsuperscript{15} declared completion of clearance in 2011, however there have been reports of new contamination resulting from recent use of antipersonnel mines, including victim-activated improvised explosive devices (also called improvised mines) by a non-state armed group. It therefore does not appear in the table above.

**PROGRESS ON MEETING DEADLINES**

As of October 2016, only four States Parties are on track to meet their clearance deadlines, while 18 are not on track, and the status of six is unclear. Two States Parties are awaiting approval of their extension requests submitted in 2016. One State Party has missed its deadline and is in violation of the treaty. Three States Parties that have declared completion in the past are still finding antipersonnel mine contamination and should request new deadlines.

The assessments of the status of each State Party regarding the fulfilment of Article 5 obligations are made through consideration of several factors, including the deadline date, the remaining challenge and the extent to which it is known, clearance rates, mine action capacity and assets, funding prospects, and the existence of any conflict and insecurity problems.

Five States Parties submitted requests for extended deadlines to complete their Article 5 obligations that were granted at the Fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties, in December 2015:

- **Cyprus** was granted a three-year extension for a remaining contaminated area over which it does not have effective control.\textsuperscript{16} This was Cyprus’s second extension.
- **Ethiopia** requested five years to complete survey and clearance of all remaining mined areas. States Parties expressed “serious concern” that Ethiopia was in non-compliance with Article 5, having missed its 1 June 2015 clearance deadline. In granting the request, States Parties asked Ethiopia to better disaggregate suspected hazardous areas and confirmed hazardous areas, to report annually, and to submit an updated plan by April 2017.\textsuperscript{17}
- **Mauritania** was granted five years because of suspected contamination on its border with the area of Western Sahara, in locations where border demarcation needs to be clarified. States Parties asked Mauritania to provide regular updates on the dialogue with stakeholders aimed at acquiring information about border location.\textsuperscript{18} This was Mauritania’s second extension.
- **Niger** requested five years to complete survey and clearance of all mined areas. However, its request was submitted in November 2015, while the procedure agreed by

\textsuperscript{13} Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Production, Stockpiling and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, APLC/MSP12/2012/Misc.3, Geneva, 4 December 2012.

\textsuperscript{14} Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Production, Stockpiling and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, APLC/MSP14/2015/MISC.2, Geneva, 16 December 2015.

\textsuperscript{15} Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 29 November 2011.

\textsuperscript{16} Final Report, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, 15 December 2015, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., pp. 5–6.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 7.
### States Parties with antipersonnel mine contamination, their deadlines, and status of any deadline extensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>Original deadline</th>
<th>Extension period</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1 March 2013</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1 April 2012</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 April 2017</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1 January 2013</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 January 2018</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1 March 2010</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 January 2020</td>
<td>No change since extension granted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1 January 2010</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 January 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1 November 2009</td>
<td>14 months (1st extn.)  3 years (2nd extn.)  6 years (3rd extn.)</td>
<td>1 January 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1 March 2012</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 March 2011</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1 July 2013</td>
<td>3 years (1st extn.)  3 years (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>1 July 2019</td>
<td>No change since extension granted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1 November 2012</td>
<td>26 months (1st extn.)  6 years (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>1 January 2021</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1 October 2009</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>1 October 2017</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1 February 2012</td>
<td>3 years (1st extn.)  5 years (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>1 February 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 June 2015</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 June 2020</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 February 2018</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1 May 2009</td>
<td>3 years Declared completion in 2012</td>
<td>1 May 2012</td>
<td>Should submit extension request*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1 January 2011</td>
<td>5 years (1st extn.)  5 years (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>1 January 2021</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>5 years (1st extn.)  10 months (2nd extn.) Declared completion in 2015</td>
<td>1 January 2015</td>
<td>Should declare any antipersonnel mine contamination and submit extension request*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1 September 2009</td>
<td>N/A** (1st extn.)  1 year (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>31 December 2016</td>
<td>Extension requested to 31 December 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1 March 2012</td>
<td>Declared completion in 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>Should declare any antipersonnel mine contamination and submit extension request*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1 February 2025</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>1 May 2018</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
States Parties required a submission by March 2015. Niger was granted one year and was asked to submit another request by March 2016 in order to allow the necessary time "for a cooperative exchange between the requesting State and the Committee on Article 5 Implementation to take place." This was Niger’s second extension.

- **Senegal** was granted five years to complete survey and clearance. In granting the request, States Parties regretted that “a detailed annual work plan for survey and clearance leading to completion and based on accurate and coherent data [was] still missing.” They asked Senegal to report annually and to submit an updated workplan by April 2017, with annual projections and a detailed budget. This was Senegal’s second extension.

The Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties recorded Ukraine’s intention to submit an extension request. It noted that “[t]he official, duly compiled, request would be soon submitted to the States Parties for their consideration.” Ukraine is in violation of Article 5 for missing its 1 June 2016 mine clearance deadline, a situation that was foreseen already in December 2015 when Ukraine expressed its intention to submit an extension request. As of 15 October 2016, Ukraine had still not submitted a request.

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**Note:** N/A = not applicable

* Jordan and Mozambique are still finding antipersonnel mine contamination, while there are reports of contamination due to the use of improvised mines by a non-state armed group in Nigeria: those three states therefore have outstanding Article 5 obligations to fulfil, and should submit an extension request.

**Niger’s first extension request was granted until 31 December 2015 in accordance with a procedure for mined areas discovered after the expiration of a state’s Article 5 deadline.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>Original deadline</th>
<th>Extension period</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>1 March 2017</td>
<td>Extension requested to 31 December 2024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>7 years (1st extn.) 5 years (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1 March 2014</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1 October 2022</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>9 July 2021</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1 April 2014</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 April 2019</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1 April 2010</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 April 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1 May 2009</td>
<td>9.5 years</td>
<td>1 November 2018</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 March 2014</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>1 March 2022</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1 June 2016</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Should submit extension request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>6 years (1st extn.) 5 years (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>22 months (1st extn.) 2 years (2nd extn.) 2 years (3rd extn.) 3 years (4th extn.)</td>
<td>1 January 2018</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 8.
21 Ibid., p. 9.
22 Ibid.
In 2016, two States Parties submitted requests for extended deadlines to complete their Article 5 obligations for approval at the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in November:

- **Niger** requested until 31 December 2020 to complete survey and clearance of all mined areas, noting that “without the support of partners, Niger could not guarantee [completion].”²³ The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) noted that Niger’s acceptance of an existing offer of support from an international mine clearance organization would contribute to greatly reducing the amount of time necessary.²⁴
- **Peru** requested until 31 December 2024 to complete survey and clearance, noting the difficulties of the terrain and the acquisition of data on additional contaminated areas through information exchanges with Ecuador.²⁵ The Committee on Article 5 Implementation encouraged Peru to make the best possible use of the amended International Mine Action Standards on land release “to further enhance efficient and expedient implementation.”²⁶

**MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF STATES PARTIES AGAINST THEIR ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS AND THE MAPUTO ACTION PLAN**

In the Maputo Action Plan, States Parties agreed to “commit to intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency that the completion work requires.”²⁷ Actions 8, 9, and 11 relate to clearance.

The Committee on Article 5 Implementation presented preliminary observations at the Intersessional Meetings on 19–20 May 2016, reporting on 17 States Parties that had submitted information by that date.²⁸

This assessment of progress under the Maputo Action Plan is drawn from both the Committee’s observations and Landmine Monitor’s review of the progress of States Parties.

**MAPUTO ACTION PLAN #8: QUANTIFICATION AND QUALIFICATION OF REMAINING CONTAMINATION CHALLENGE**

Almost all States Parties need to improve the quantification and qualification of the remaining contamination challenge. Eleven States Parties have a good knowledge of the locations of confirmed and suspected contamination but need to clarify the actual extent of contamination within those areas: BiH, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Jordan, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Turkey. Fifteen States Parties have reported on known contaminated areas, but do not have a complete picture of the extent of contamination, as there are unrecorded areas: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Three States Parties have not formally recorded the locations of any mined areas: Nigeria, Oman, and Ukraine. Two States Parties need to verify that they have no remaining mine contamination: Mauritania and Palau. Three States Parties have a very clear understanding of the remaining contamination.

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²⁸ Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 23 June 2015, bit.ly/MBTArt5Prelim2015. States Parties reported on are Afghanistan, Algeria, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Cyprus, Ecuador, Mauritania, Niger, Peru, Serbia, Sudan, Thailand, the UK, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
contamination: DRC, Ecuador, and the UK. Algeria has a good understanding of the extent of contamination but has not provided details of the size and locations.

The committee assessed the degree of clarity of the remaining challenge, finding that only seven of the 17 States Parties assessed had provided a high degree of clarity in their reporting: Afghanistan, Chile, Ecuador, Serbia, Sudan, Thailand, and the UK.

MAPUTO ACTION PLAN ACTION #9: APPLICATION OF LAND RELEASE METHODOLOGIES

Almost all States Parties that implemented systematic mine clearance programs in 2015 used land release methodologies (survey and clearance), although the degree to which they are aligned with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) varies. The committee called on States Parties to align their national mine action standards with the revised IMAS if they have not already done so.

MAPUTO ACTION PLAN ACTION #11: CALL FOR ON-TIME SUBMISSION OF HIGH-QUALITY REQUESTS

In 2016, two states submitted requests on time (Niger and Peru). Ukraine’s intention to submit a request was recorded at the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2015, but the request had still not been submitted as of 15 October 2016. Niger’s request lacks the action plan with annual benchmarks that is essential to any good-quality request. Peru’s revised request can generally be considered of good quality: it contains consistent data and outlines relevant activities with the appropriate bodies in charge of carrying them out. Jordan, Mozambique, and Nigeria should submit an extension request to address the contamination that has been identified after they declared completion of clearance.

MAPUTO ACTION PLAN ACTION #25: CALL FOR THE ANNUAL SUBMISSION OF HIGH-QUALITY AND UPDATED INFORMATION

As of 15 October 2016, Article 7 transparency reports for 2015 were still outstanding for 12 states with contamination: Angola, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Palau, Serbia, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Yemen.

OTHER ISSUES AFFECTING CLEARANCE OPERATIONS

FUNDING

Mine action experienced a severe reduction in funding in 2015, negatively affecting land release results. Inadequate funding was cited as a challenge to achieving Article 5 implementation deadlines by the following States Parties: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and the UK.

29 Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.
30 See details in Niger and Peru’s respective country profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.
31 Email from the Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA), 1 May 2016.
32 Statement of Angola, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 19 May 2016; and “CNIDAH says the complete elimination of mines and remnants of war will take a long time,” Agencia Angola Press (ANGOP), 13 March 2015.
Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Iraq, Niger, Senegal, and Yemen. In Afghanistan, the amount of land released in 2015 almost halved from the previous year, due to the downturn in funding. In South Sudan, despite the fact that 2015 was one of the most productive years for land release, operators expressed concern over decreased funding for mine action in 2015, with donors prioritizing other humanitarian sectors or refusing to fund mine action activities while the conflict is ongoing. Although DRC and Serbia can achieve their Article 5 deadlines, both States Parties reported funding difficulties. In BiH, it was reported that the slow pace of clearance had resulted in a lack of confidence in the mine action program from donors.

**NATIONAL OWNERSHIP**

Almost all Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with contamination have national mine action programs or institutions that are assigned to fulfil the state’s clearance obligations. Palau, Turkey, and Ukraine are in the process of establishing mine action programs. In Nigeria, explosive ordnance disposal is conducted by the army and police.

In contrast, fewer than half of the states not party have functioning mine action programs. The following 11 states not party do not have mine action programs: China, Cuba, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, and Uzbekistan. In India, the army decides on clearance based on reports from district commanders. Egypt’s mine action program is not functional and the status of Iran’s mine action center is not clear. The understanding of the extent of contamination, and the scale of land release efforts, is much lower in states not party than in States Parties. This underlines the importance of striving for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, in order to address the threat posed by antipersonnel mines.

**CLEARANCE IN CONFLICT**

In 2015 and 2016, conflict affected land release operations in nine States Parties (Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen) and five states not party (Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Palestine, and Syria.)

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34 Chad, Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 May 2013; email from Julien Kempeneers, Handicap International (HI), 2 May 2016.
35 Ethiopia, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 40–41.
37 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), 22 May 2016.
38 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 July 2013; Executive summary of Niger’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015, p. 2; and Revised Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016, p. 14.
39 Senegal, Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2015, p. 22.
40 Yemen, Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 December 2013, p. 15.
41 Email from MACCA, 1 May 2016.
42 Responses to questionnaire by Ismael Frioud, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 9 April 2015; from Augustino Seja, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 2 June 2015; and from Rickard Hartmann, Danish Demining Group (DDG), 22 May 2015.
In 2015, eight personnel from the Mine Action Program of Afghanistan were killed and 34 injured in security incidents, and 63 were abducted and then released.47 In South Sudan, two Danish Demining Group (DDG) staff were killed by gunmen.48

Insecurity has also restricted access to some antipersonnel mine-affected areas in Ethiopia, Jordan, Senegal, and Turkey.49

Cyprus does not have effective control of antipersonnel mine-contaminated areas.50 In Palestine, Israel will not authorize clearance by Palestinians, and most mined areas are in zones controlled by Israel or under joint control.51 Ukraine has noted that it does not currently have access to some mined areas.52

In Colombia, the peace process between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) gave momentum to demining planning in 2015. However, it remains to be seen what will happen after a plebiscite rejected the September 2016 Peace Agreement.

In Myanmar, the government said that concluding a National Ceasefire Agreement with non-state actors was a precondition for proceeding with survey and clearance.53

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47 Email from the MACCA, 1 May 2016.
49 “Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its Article 5 deadline Extension Request,” submitted 26 September 2015; Analysis of Ethiopia’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 November 2015, p. 3; Jordan’s Article 5 Declaration of Completion 2012; email from Mohammad Breikat, National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR), 25 August 2016; Senegal, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 June 2015; and Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.
50 Email from the Planning Department, Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC), 9 May 2016.
The Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines' Camilo Serna Villegas delivers certificates for beneficiaries of an economic support project at the survivor rehabilitation farm "Granja" in Bucaramanga.

CASUALTIES AND VICTIM ASSISTANCE

CASUALTIES

OVERVIEW

In 2015, there was a sharp rise in the number of casualties caused by landmines, including victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (also called victim-activated improvised landmines), as well as cluster munition remnants, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—henceforth mines/ERW. For 2015, the Monitor recorded 6,461 mine/ERW casualties, marking a 75% increase from 3,695 casualties recorded for 2014. Casualties, the people killed and injured by mines/ERW, were identified in a total of 61 states and other areas in 2015.

This sharp increase was due to more mine/ERW casualties recorded in armed conflicts in Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen in 2015, as compared with previous years. In 2015, there was also increased availability of casualty data for persons injured in some countries, particularly Libya and Syria. The casualty total in 2015 marked the highest number of annual casualties by victim-activated IEDs (also called improvised mines) recorded by the Monitor.

Despite the overall increase, declining casualty rates were recorded in the majority of states and other impacted areas. Recorded casualties decreased in 34 countries and areas.

1 Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor global mine/ERW casualty data. Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are reported in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information on casualties caused by cluster munitions, see ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2016, the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2016/cluster-munition-monitor-2016/casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx.

2 Landmine Monitor 2015 cited a figure of 3,678 casualties for 2014, but the number of casualties for 2014 and past years has been adjusted with newly available data.

3 Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Georgia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Korea, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe, and other areas Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.
(726 total decrease) compared to 2014, while the number of casualties recorded in 2015 increased in 31 (3,492 total increase). The group of 34 includes Cambodia and Colombia, two States Parties that remain among those with the highest casualties, but for which rates have been declining over the past years. Together just four countries—Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen—account for an increase of 3,218 casualties from 2014, representing the majority of the total annual increase of 3,492 casualties in the group of 31.

Number of mine/ERW casualties per year (2006–2015)

The spike represented the highest annual total of mine/ERW casualties recorded in a decade (since 2006). The 2015 casualty increase of 2,766 more people killed and injured than recorded in 2014 also marks the most serious disturbance in an overall trend of progressively fewer annually recorded mine/ERW casualties for the period since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999. This reflects an average incidence rate of almost 18 mine/ERW casualties per day in 2015, compared to 10 casualties per day in 2014. However, in 1999 there were 25 mine/ERW casualties per day on average.

The Monitor has recorded more than 100,000 mine/ERW casualties for the 17-year period since its global tracking began in 1999, including some 73,000 new survivors. Mine/ERW incidents impact not only the direct casualties—the boys, girls, women, and men who were killed, as well as the survivors—but also members of their families struggling under new physical, psychological, and economic pressures. As in previous years, there was no substantial data available on the numbers of those people indirectly impacted as a result of mine/ERW casualties.

4 Decreases were recorded in Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lao PDR, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and three other areas, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Somaliland.

5 Casualties increased in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Poland, South Korea, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, and Yemen, and two other areas, Abkhazia and Western Sahara. The number in the Philippines and Albania remained the same.

6 In 1999, the Monitor identified 9,220 mine/ERW casualties.

7 From 1999 through 2015, 102,970 mine/ERW casualties were recorded, including 26,230 people killed, 72,739 injured, and 4,001 for whom their survival or the deadly outcome of the explosive incident was not known.

8 A survivor is a person who was injured by mines/ERW and lived.
Of the total of 6,461 mine/ERW casualties the Monitor recorded for 2015, at least 1,670 people were killed and another 4,785 people were injured; for six casualties, it was not known if the injured person survived. This was the lowest figure for unknown outcome of injury or death for annual mine/ERW casualties since Monitor recording began in 1999.

Civilians represented the vast majority of casualties as compared to military and security forces, where the civilian status was known, continuing a clear trend of civilian harm over time: 78% in 2015—similar to the 80% of civilian casualties recorded in 2014 and almost identical to the 79% recorded for 2013. Some three-quarters (74%, or 4,755) of all mine/ERW casualties recorded for 2015 occurred in five states, all of which are conflict-affected: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Yemen, as well as states not party Syria and Libya.

Of the total casualties, 61% (3,935) occurred among 51 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, compared to 71% (2,610) in 37 States Parties recorded for 2014. Afghanistan continued to record the highest number of casualties in 2015, although the annual total for the country remained almost the same, with just 14 casualties more than in 2014.

Several significant country-level increases in annual casualty totals in 2015 were influenced in part by progress, albeit likely temporary advances, in data collection despite conflict and insecurity.

Of the 1,004 total mine/ERW casualties for Libya in 2015, 982 were recorded in the Libyan Mine Action Center (LibMAC) database. The vast majority of these casualties—935 persons reported injured by ERW—were recorded during surveys at two hospitals in Tripoli. Those hospitals do not have reliable and updated databases, therefore casualty numbers were likely under-reported.

In Syria, a significant increase in mine/ERW casualties in 2015 was influenced by the availability of data from an extensive survey project of conflict-injured persons, including refugees. Syria had 864 recorded casualties in 2015, compared to 174 in 2014. The majority of mine/ERW casualties for 2015 (551) were from records of persons injured compiled and recorded as casualties of unspecified mines by Handicap International (HI) in data on the needs of conflict survivors. This marked the first time since the beginning of the conflict that a substantial dataset on persons injured by mines/ERW in Syria was available. Data on injured persons was collected through interviews with displaced people and refugees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Number of casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.

Security forces can include police as well members of non-state armed groups and militia.

In 2015, the civilian status was not recorded in data for 41% of the reported casualties (2,652). For 2014, in comparison, the number of casualties without reported civilian status was just 3% (118 casualties).

Casualties were identified in the following States Parties in 2015: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, BIH, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Djibouti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Another 22 casualties were identified through Monitor media scanning for calendar year 2015. LibMAC data listed an additional 340 IED casualties that were not included in Monitor records: 66 emplaced IED casualties that did not indicate if the devices were command-detonated or victim-activated; and casualties caused by person-detonated (suicide bombers) and vehicle-borne IEDs (car/truck bombs).

Monitor analysis of casualty data provided by Abdullatif H.M. Abujarida, IMSMA Manager, LibMAC, 23 May 2016; and Monitor media scanning for 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015.

Hospitals made the identification of the cause of injury. Some casualties recorded as due to ERW may have been casualties of IEDs. Email from Anne Barthes, Handicap International (HI), 26 May 2016.

in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Detailed data on fatalities was collected and disaggregated according to the weapons involved by the Violation Documentation Center in Syria (VDC) and the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR).

In Yemen, there were 988 mines/ERW casualties identified in 2015, the majority (812) reported by the ICRC as having been admitted to healthcare facilities in the calendar year. ICRC data was not disaggregated by age or gender; however, the ICRC noted that most casualties were male. In 2014, the Monitor identified 24 casualties from mines/ERW. The ICRC reported just five mine/ERW casualties receiving treatment in 2014.

Due to ongoing conflict in Iraq, the number of mine/ERW casualties continued to be significantly under-recorded. Only 58 mine/ERW casualties were recorded in Iraq, and as in past years, the number is thought to be much higher. Unlike in Afghanistan where the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) records data more completely, a complete lack of disaggregation between command-detonated IEDs, including emplaced, body-borne, and vehicle-borne devices, and presumably victim-activated IEDs meant that the number of mine casualties remained obscured in Iraq. In south and central Iraq, data for 2015 cluster munition casualties were not disaggregated due to the difficulties caused by continuing military operations against the so-called Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS or ISIL) preventing mine action casualty data recording coordination with relevant authorities in order to classify and complete the data.

As in previous years, the mine/ERW casualties identified in 2015 only include recorded casualties, not estimates. Based on the Monitor research methodology in place since 2009, it has been estimated that there are up to approximately 25–30% additional casualties each year that are not captured in the Monitor’s global mine/ERW casualty statistics, with most occurring in severely affected countries and those experiencing conflict.

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17 The SNHR also documented a number of people injured by cluster munitions when that information was available. SNHR, “Four Years Harvest: The Use of Cluster Ammunition...That is Still Going,” 30 March 2015, http://sn4hr.org/blog/2015/03/30/5346/; and casualty data sent by email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, Director, SNHR, 8 June 2016.


21 For Afghanistan UNAMA categorizes IEDs by the basic method used to initiate detonation, including victim-activated IEDs, remote control/radio/command-operated IEDs, and suicide IEDs. The most common victim-activated IEDs in Afghanistan are pressure plate IEDs, which are improvised landmines.

22 According to a UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) report, all types of IEDs collectively were reported to have caused 7,086 civilian casualties (1,717 killed and 5,369 injured) in Iraq during the period 1 May to 31 October 2015, but none of these casualties are included in Monitor reporting because they are not disaggregated by IED type. See UNAMI monthly reports on protection of civilians; and UNAMI/OCHA, “Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,” January 2016, bit.ly/UNAMIMayOct2015. iMMAP (an independent organization once part of the former Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation’s Information Management and Mine Action Programs) reported that IEDs killed 7,525 and injured 12,751 from January 2014 to January 2016, but victim-activated IEDs were not disaggregated in the data. Action on Armed Violence (AAV) recorded 1,190 IED casualties in Iraq for 2015; 23 military and security forces and eight civilian casualties were caused by booby-traps but these were not marked specifically as victim-activated IED incidents. Another two were killed by a device that was recorded as victim-activated, while laying the IED, and were therefore not included in the Monitor total. The Monitor has requested disaggregated data on IED casualties from relevant UN agencies, mine action centers, and iMMAP.

23 Email from Riyad Nasir, Community Liaison Department, Directorate of Mine Action, 26 June 2016.
The level of under-reporting of casualties has declined over time, as many countries have initiated and improved casualty data-collection mechanisms and the sharing of this data. In 2015, the number of casualties missed in national annual reporting was likely reduced in some countries experiencing conflict, thus contributing to a higher global casualty total. Nonetheless, in many states and areas, numerous casualties go unrecorded; therefore the true casualty figure is likely significantly higher in some countries.

CASUALTY DEMOGRAPHICS

There were at least 1,072 child casualties in 2015. Child casualties in 2015 accounted for 38% of all civilian casualties for whom the age was known. This was similar to the 39% recorded for 2014 and for 2012, but a significant decrease from many past years, including 2013 with 46%. Children were killed (343) and injured (704) by mines/ERW in 36 countries and other areas in 2015.

As in previous years, in 2015 the vast majority of child casualties where the sex was known were boys (82%).

ERW caused the most child casualties (456, or 43%), followed by victim-activated improvised mines (319, or 30%). For more information on child casualties and assistance see the annual Monitor fact sheet on landmines/ERW and children.

In 2015, female casualties made up 14% of all casualties for which the sex was known (546 of 3,986).

In 2015, there were 46 casualties identified among deminers (six deminers were killed and 40 injured) in 10 states. This represented a similar finding as for 2014, when 53 deminer casualties were recorded in 10 states. It was, however, about half of the average of 105 casualties among deminers per year since 1999.

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24 The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status of mine/ERW casualties to the extent that data is available and disaggregated.
25 Child casualties are defined as all casualties where the victim is less than 18-years of age at the time of the incident.
26 Child casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe, and two other areas, Somaliland and Western Sahara.
27 There were 829 boys and 180 girls recorded as casualties in 2015; the sex of 63 child casualties was not recorded.
28 For 2,435 casualties the sex was not known.
29 In 2015, casualties among deminers occurred in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Tajikistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
Between 1999 and 2015, the Monitor identified more than 1,600 deminers who were killed or injured while undertaking clearance operations.30

Civilian casualties represented 78% of casualties in 2015 where the civilian/military status was known (2,990 of 3,809).

The countries with the most military casualties in 2015 were Ukraine (273) and Colombia (158). Mali, with 72 military casualties (including peacekeeping forces), was the third highest. The next highest numbers of military casualties in 2015 were in Syria (64) and Pakistan (57).

MINES/ERW CAUSING CASUALTIES

In 2015, landmines—including factory-made antipersonnel mines (509, or 8%), victim-activated improvised mines (1,331, or 21%), antivehicle mines (468, or 7%), and unspecified mine types (934, or 14%)—caused the majority of all casualties (3,233, or 50% combined). Unexploded submunitions caused 76 casualties (or 1%) and other ERW 1,791 casualties (or 28%). Unknown mine/ERW items caused 1,352 casualties, or 21% of the annual total.

Casualties by type of explosive device in 2014 and 201531

30 There were 1,675 casualties among deminers from 1999 through 2015. Since 1999, the annual number of demining casualties identified has fluctuated greatly, making it difficult to discern trends. Most major fluctuations have been related to the exceptional availability or unavailability of deminer casualty data from a particular country in any given year and therefore cannot be correlated to substantive changes in operating procedures, international demining standards, or demining equipment.

31 The explosive device type was not known for 1,352 casualties (21% of the total) in 2015, and for 279 casualties (8%) in 2014: see analysis in this section. The number of recorded cluster submunition casualties (76, including two in South Sudan not yet counted when Cluster Munition Monitor 2016 was published) is likely much lower (or the actual number because ERW data often does not differentiate by weapon type. See, ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2016, the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2016/cluster-munition-monitor-2016/casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx.
### Mine/ERW types causing casualties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of mine/ERW</th>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mines, including victim-activated IEDs*</td>
<td>Antipersonnel mine</td>
<td>A munition designed to exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, and therefore prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antivehicle mine</td>
<td>Also referred to as &quot;antitank mines,&quot; and included among mines other than antipersonnel mines (MOTAPM), are designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to that of a person and tend to contain a larger explosive charge than antipersonnel mines. Antivehicle mines are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty unless they are fitted with fuses that can be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victim-activated IEDs</td>
<td>Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are “homemade” explosive weapons that are designed to cause death or injury. Victim-activated IEDs are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle. Victim-activated IEDs are landmines and are sometimes referred to as homemade mines, victim-operated IEDs (VO-IEDs), or by the type of construction, such as pressure plate IEDs (PP-IEDs). In Monitor casualty reporting, the terms &quot;victim-activated improvised mine&quot; or &quot;improvised mines&quot; are synonyms for victim-activated IEDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Antipersonnel victim-activated IEDs, including booby-traps; also known as improvised antipersonnel mines (sometimes included among &quot;improvised mines&quot;)**</td>
<td>Antipersonnel victim-activated IEDs, including booby-traps that can be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, fit the definition of antipersonnel landmines and are therefore prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. A booby-trap is an antipersonnel explosive device deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is performed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unspecified mine types</td>
<td>When reported as a “mine” or &quot;landmine&quot; incident, but the information to distinguish if it was an antipersonnel or an antivehicle mine or victim-activated IED was lacking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unexploded submunitions and bomblets</td>
<td>Unexploded cluster submunition</td>
<td>Submunitions or bomblets dispersed or released by, or otherwise separated from, a cluster munition and failed to explode or that have not been used and that have been left behind or dumped; may include casualties of other cluster munition remnants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Category of mine/ERW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(other) ERW</td>
<td>Unexploded ordnance (UXO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abandoned ordnance (AXO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown mine/ERW item</td>
<td>Victim-activated explosive items, type unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** * The use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of victim-activated antipersonnel IEDs are prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. According to the Mine Ban Treaty definition, a mine is “placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area” and an antipersonnel mine is a munition “designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person...” Antivehicle mines are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty unless the fuzing allows them to be activated by a person.

**In most cases, it is not possible to distinguish between antivehicle and antipersonnel victim-activated IEDs because reporting, which occurs after an explosion, does not provide a clear means of determining the sensitivity of fuzes in the overwhelming majority of cases. The information that is available indicates that the fuzing of most victim-activated IEDs causing casualties allows them to be activated by a person (as well as a vehicle), and therefore banned by the Treaty. As a shorthand, the Monitor at times simply uses the term “improvised mine” to encompass any improvised victim-activated IED because they are likely to function as antipersonnel mines, rather than meeting the fuzing sensitivity to be strictly antivehicle.**

The 1,331 victim-activated IED/improvised mine casualties recorded for 2015 was the highest annual total of such casualties recorded since 1999; the next highest number recorded was 1,169 in 2012. Casualties from victim-activated IEDs were identified in 13 states in 2015. Historically, the number of victim-activated IED casualties was under-reported because such casualties were included in data as caused by unspecified mine types and unknown mine/ERW items. Starting in 2008, the Monitor began identifying more casualties from these improvised antipersonnel mines, likely due in part to an increase in their use and also to improved data collection that made it possible to better discern between factory-made antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs, and between command-detonated IEDs and victim-activated IEDs in some countries. However, casualties of improvised antipersonnel mines in Colombia are recorded as antipersonnel landmine casualties by the mine action authorities and for consistency this definition is retained in Monitor reporting, there being no functional need for reclassification. Casualties of improvised antipersonnel

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32 Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, and Ukraine.

33 All antipersonnel mine casualties in 2015 in Colombia were reported to be improvised/homemade.
Casualties recorded as due to unspecified mine types increased significantly from 329 in 2014 to 934 in 2015. This was mostly attributable to 719 casualties in the data for Syria, making up 77% of the category in 2015, likely due to nonspecific default categorization of different types of mine/ERW casualties as “landmine casualties.” The remaining 219 casualties of unspecified mine types were recorded in 10 states.  

Casualties recorded as caused by antipersonnel mines decreased from 640 in 2014 to 509 in 2015, with the greatest decreases reported in Colombia, from 251 in 2014 to 208 (down 17%); Myanmar, from 100 in 2014 to 66 (down 34%); Afghanistan, from 52 to 13 (down 75%); and Cambodia, from 37 in 2014 to 13 (down 65%). At least 40 antipersonnel mine casualties were reported for Ukraine.

In 2015, antivehicle mines caused at least 468 casualties in 18 states and other areas.  The states with the greatest numbers of casualties reported from antivehicle mines were Ukraine (147), Pakistan (73), and Syria (68). In 2014, antivehicle mines caused 218 casualties.

In 2015, the number of casualties of unknown mine/ERW items in the Monitor global total jumped to 1,352, compared to just 279 in 2014. For 2015, 69% (932) of all casualties of unknown mine/ERW items were recorded in Yemen, where most such injured persons were documented under a general default category of mine/ERW casualties in injury surveillance data. The remaining 420 casualties of unknown mine/ERW items occurred in 14 countries and one other area. In 2015, 28% of all casualties (1,791) were caused by ERW in 40 states and areas. Although there may have been some default categorization of mine/ERW casualties as ERW casualties in Libya (as noted above) in 2014, similarly 27% of all casualties were caused by ERW. Children (453) made up 59% of ERW casualties in 2015, when the age group was recorded.

From media reporting it was often not possible to distinguish between tripwire mines and improvised antipersonnel mines made from a tripwire and hand grenade, which were prolifically causing casualties. In many cases, the Monitor recorded these casualties as caused by antipersonnel landmines.

In 2015, unspecified mine casualties were recorded in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Niger, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, and Yemen.

In 2015, casualties from antivehicle mines were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Cyprus, Egypt, Georgia, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Pakistan, South Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, and Yemen, and three other areas, Abkhazia, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

The Monitor shares, cross-references, and compares data with the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHDD) and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Anti-vehicle mines (AVM) project. That project recorded 598 casualties from both confirmed (388) and suspected (210) antivehicle mines in 25 countries in 2015. While much of the data matches with the Monitor data, each of the methodologies used to enter data differ, resulting in the discrepancies in annual casualties reported. For example, Monitor data does not include casualties that occur while engaged in laying mines. Monitor reporting does include politically disputed geographic “other areas” in reporting, and tends to use the definitions employed in original whole data sets when possible. Casualty data provided by email from Ursign Hofmann, Policy Advisor, GICHDD, 11 July 2016. See also, GICHDD-SIPRI, “Anti-Vehicle Mine Incidents Map,” undated, www.gichd.org/avm - ch18738.

Those also made up the vast majority of the 988 casualties recorded for Yemen in 2015.

Unknown device casualties were recorded in Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Palestine, Philippines, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, and Yemen, and one other area, Western Sahara.

In 2015, casualties from ERW were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lao PDR, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Pakistan, Palestine, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, and Vietnam, and four other areas, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara. In addition to other types of ERW, casualties of unexploded submunitions were identified in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, and two other areas, Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara. For more information on casualties caused by unexploded submunitions and the annual increase in those casualties recorded for the year 2015, see ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2016, the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2016/cluster-munition-monitor-2016/casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx.

Of the total ERW casualties in 2015, 326 were adults and 970 were without a reported age group.
## States/areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>East and South Asia, and Pacific</th>
<th>Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
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<td>Myanmar</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Syria</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Abkhazia</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties indicated in **bold**; other areas in *italics*.

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## VICTIM ASSISTANCE

### INTRODUCTION

The Mine Ban Treaty has made progress, but has not yet attained its ultimate goal of alleviating human suffering caused by landmines. Importantly, it is the first disarmament or humanitarian law treaty in which States Parties commit to provide “assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration” of those people harmed by a specific type of weapon.⁴²

Victim assistance aims to achieve comprehensive rehabilitation of survivors and the full inclusion of survivors and their families in wider society, as well as ensuring that the same assistance is available to affected communities. That assistance includes: data collection and needs assessment with referral to emergency and continuing medical care; physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics and other assistive devices; psychological support; social and economic inclusion; and the adoption or adjustment of relevant laws and public policies. Preferably, such assistance is to be provided through a comprehensive approach comprised of all of the above elements.

Victim assistance, in practice, addresses the overlapping and interconnected needs of persons with disabilities, including survivors⁴³ of landmines, cluster munitions, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and other weapons, as well as people in their communities with similar requirements for assistance. In addition, some victim assistance efforts reach family members of casualties or those who have suffered trauma, loss, or other harm due to mines/ERW. All of these people are considered “mine victims” according to the accepted definition of the term, which includes survivors as well as affected families and communities⁴⁴—

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⁴³ A “survivor” is a person who was injured by mines/ERW and lived.

although to date most victim assistance efforts have targeted survivors and other persons with disabilities.

In June 2014, at the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, States Parties adopted and committed to the Maputo Action Plan, which includes a set of actions that would advance victim assistance through to 2019. States Parties recognized that completion of mine clearance obligations “is within reach.” They also formally declared that they remain very much aware of their “enduring obligations to mine victims.” Victim assistance is an ongoing responsibility in all states with survivors and affected communities, including those countries that are mine-affected and those that have been declared mine-free.

While specific victim assistance efforts have been demonstrated to benefit survivors and other persons with disabilities, it has been noted that “there is little evidence that broader development, human rights and humanitarian efforts also reach victims.” The Maputo Action Plan and provisions of the Convention on Cluster Munitions indicate that a long-term solution to addressing the needs of victims involves “an integrated approach to victim assistance” whereby:

- Specific victim assistance efforts act as a catalyst to advance the inclusion and well-being of survivors, other persons with disabilities, indirect victims and other vulnerable groups; and
- Broader efforts reach victims amongst overall beneficiaries.

This dual approach is to be implemented until such time as “mainstream efforts” are demonstrated to be inclusive of, and fulfill the obligations that states have to, survivors and indirect victims.

As shown by the many successful practices and activities over time, victim assistance is not inherently complicated. However, many challenges do remain to ensure access to sustainable services, to remove the barriers to the full participation of survivors and indirect victims in their societies, and to create tangible improvements in their wellbeing and quality of life.

The Monitor has tracked the progress of programs and
activities that benefit mine/ERW survivors, families, and communities under the Mine Ban Treaty and its subsequent five-year action plans since 1999. This overview reports on the year 2015, with relevant updates into October 2016 when available. It covers the activities and achievements in 31 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine/ERW victims in need of assistance.51

Monitor reporting demonstrates that it will require active cooperation and stronger determination to overcome challenges and allocate the resources necessary to address the enduring obligations of victim assistance. Dedicated funding for victim assistance, which has, in practice, contributed to fulfilling the rights of survivors and other persons with disabilities, has been declining. Other frameworks that could address the rights and needs of victims, including disability-inclusive development and poverty reduction efforts, have not yet been able to ensure the sustainability of such assistance or mitigate the impact of shrinking resources. As stated by Thailand, Chair of the Mine Ban Treaty's Committee on Victim Assistance, "Victim assistance requires long-term and continual efforts on the part of States to support all victims."52

Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with significant numbers of survivors and needs53

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>East and South Asia, and Pacific</th>
<th>Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Afghanistan Thailand</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
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TREATY MACHINERY AND VICTIM ASSISTANCE

According to Action #16 of the Maputo Action Plan, all States Parties will seize every opportunity to raise awareness of the imperative to address the needs and guarantee the rights of mine victims. A Committee on Victim Assistance was formed at the Mine Ban Treaty's Third Review Conference in Maputo with the purpose to "support States Parties in their national efforts to strengthen and advance victim assistance." The committee is mandated to ensure a balance between ongoing discussions on victim assistance within the framework of the Mine Ban Treaty itself. It is also tasked with taking the discussion on meeting the

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51 This corresponds with Actions #12 to #18 of the Maputo Action Plan. The Monitor reports on the following 31 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties in which there are significant numbers of survivors: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This list includes 29 States Parties that have indicated that they have significant numbers of survivors for which they must provide care, as well as Algeria and Turkey, which have both reported hundreds or thousands of survivors in their official landmine clearance deadline (Mine Ban Treaty Article 5) extension request submissions. Algeria, Mine Ban Treaty Revised Article 5 Extension Request, 31 March 2011, bit.ly/AlgeriaExtension2011; and Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, 28 March 2013, bit.ly/TurkeyExtension2013.


53 In addition, States Parties Mali and Ukraine, both of which have had hundreds of mine/ERW casualties in the past two years, may be considered to have significant numbers of survivors with great needs for assistance that remain unreported.
needs and guaranteeing the rights of mine victims to fora of other frameworks that address relevant issues, including those related to disarmament and disability rights. 54

The committee, and Thailand in particular, took an active role in promoting victim assistance inside and outside the treaty. For example, the Bangkok Symposium on Landmine Victim Assistance: Enhancing a Comprehensive and Sustainable Mine Action, held on 15–17 June 2015 in Bangkok, was organized in collaboration with the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit. A side event on the margins of the intersessional meetings in Geneva in May 2016 explored “gold standards” in assistance. In September 2016, the Committee on Victim Assistance held a side event during the 33rd session of the Human Rights Council entitled “Promoting mine victims’ rights: making their rights real,” to encourage the sharing of experiences and challenges in integrating victim assistance into broader human rights and disability frameworks and across relevant conventions.

COLLABORATIVE APPROACHES

In 2015–2016, collaboration between the Mine Ban Treaty and relevant disarmament conventions was strengthened. The Chair of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on Victim Assistance told Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties that it “would be pleased to work with Coordinators on Victim Assistance under [the] Convention on Cluster Munitions to bridge the gap between the two conventions by exchanging information and updating work plans with each other.” 55

In February 2016, the Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on Victim Assistance held a meeting with the Victim Assistance Coordinators of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to share information and to strengthen collaboration. In May 2016, the Convention on Cluster Munitions Coordinators on Victim Assistance and Coordinators on Cooperation and Assistance invited Mine Ban Treaty Victim Assistance Coordinators and States Parties to participate in the development of guidance for states by states on an “integrated approach to victim assistance,” being undertaken with technical support from Handicap International. 56

Further reflecting the improving orientation toward rights-based assistance, in 2015 the ICRC, for the first time, issued a Special Appeal on Disability and Mine Action. Whereas previously related ICRC special appeals had particularly focused on preventative activities in mine action, the appeal for 2016 acknowledges the increased international attention on issues of disability inclusion attributable to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). It draws on the ICRC’s adjusted operational framework orientation of 2014 that is specifically inclusive of the needs of all persons with disabilities. 57

Also, in 2016, the UN issued an expanded policy on victim assistance in mine action. 58 This policy, which “intends to generate a renewed impetus and commitment from the United Nations in support of mine and ERW victims,” draws on the expertise of UN agencies and programs, the ICBL, NGOs, mine action program managers, experts, and donor countries. 59

In September 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were agreed at a UN summit. The SDGs are a set of 17 goals with targets and indicators that all UN member states are expected to use to frame policies and stimulate action for positive change over the period from 2015 to 2030. They are designed to address the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. With an emphasis on poverty reduction, equality, and inclusion, the SDGs also recognize the need for the “achievement of durable peace and sustainable development in countries in conflict and post-conflict situations.” Therefore, the SDGs are generally complementary to the abovementioned aims of the CRPD, the Mine Ban Treaty, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and offer opportunities for bridging between the relevant frameworks as outlined by the Maputo Action Plan.

Persons with disabilities are referred to directly in several goals: education (Goal 4), employment (Goal 8), reducing inequality (Goal 10), and accessibility of human settlements (Goal 11), in addition to including persons with disabilities in data collection and monitoring (Goal 17). Pragmatically, victim assistance is fully compatible with the SDGs and thus scarce resources for victim assistance should be maintained and can be considered an effective contribution to the achievement of the SDGs.

Much remains to be done, of course. Speaking at a special high-level victim assistance session during the Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2015, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities pointed out potential future challenges to the success of development goals:

The Sustainable Development Goals offer a great opportunity for all, including for persons with disabilities. However, the limited capacity to implement and measure the level of impact of the SDGs is a risk that must be addressed in order to avoid another failure of the development agenda in relation to persons with disabilities.60

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MAPUTO ACTION PLAN BY STATES PARTIES

The Maputo Action Plan provides a framework that allows States Parties to qualitatively assess progress in victim assistance, which they can attribute to the relevant actions that they take, even in the absence of existing measurable baselines. It calls for activities addressing the specific needs of victims while also emphasizing the necessity of simultaneously integrating victim assistance into other frameworks by incorporating relevant actions into the appropriate sectors, including disability, health, social welfare, education, employment, development, and poverty reduction.61 States Parties commit to addressing victim assistance objectives “with the same precision and intensity as for other aims of the Convention.”62

The actions of the Maputo Action Plan can be summarized as follows:

- Assess the needs; evaluate the availability and gaps in services; support efforts to make referrals to existing services.
- Enhance plans, policies, and legal frameworks.
- Ensure the inclusion and full and active participation of mine victims and their representative organizations in all matters that affect them; enhance capacity.
- Increase the availability of and accessibility to services, opportunities, and social protection measures; strengthen local capacities and enhance coordination.
- Address the needs and guarantee rights in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.
- Communicate time-bound and measurable objectives annually.
- Report on measurable improvements in advance of the next review conference.

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61 Actions #12 to #18 of the Maputo Action Plan.

The Maputo Action Plan also affirms the need for States Parties to continue carrying out the actions of the previous Cartagena Action Plan, which sought to make assistance available, affordable, accessible, and sustainable. 63

ASSESSING THE NEEDS

States Parties should assess needs for victim assistance—including through sex- and age-disaggregated data—and gauge the availability of services required, including though barrier assessments. They should also use this assessment activity as an opportunity to make referrals to existing services. 64 No nationwide victim or survivor needs assessments were reported in 2015.

Some specific survey activities and assessments of needs of survivors or victims in 2015–2016 included the following. In Albania, an assessment of socio-economic and medical needs of marginalized ERW survivors carried out during 2013–2016 was completed. In Cambodia, village-level quality of life assessments for survivors and other persons with disabilities continued. In Colombia, data collection on the needs of mine/ERW victims was ongoing, and in June 2015, the deadline expired for the registration of persons victimized between 1 January 1985 and 10 June 2011 into the national database on conflict victims who can receive state assistance. Croatia continued to make progress in the development of a unified database on casualties of mine/ERW survivors and their families. In Serbia, the ministry responsible for victim assistance worked with other government institutions to improve coordination on data and needs assessment. In Darfur, Sudan, work continued with disabled peoples’ organizations (DPOs) to identify, through individual case studies, the needs of landmine and ERW survivors. In Tajikistan, ICRC needs assessment continued and information was entered into the national database to be shared with relevant stakeholders. Thailand reported that data collection on mine/ERW survivors was relatively advanced and that survivors are included in disability assessments. In Yemen, more mine/ERW victims were registered with the mine action center through ongoing survey conducted jointly with the national survivor association.

ENHANCING PLANS, POLICIES, AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

Coordination

States Parties committed to enhancing coordination activities in order to increase the availability and accessibility of services that are relevant to mine victims. 65 In 2015 and into 2016, 21 of the 31 States Parties had active victim assistance coordination mechanisms or disability coordination mechanisms that considered the issues relating to the needs of mine/ERW survivors. 66 (See infographic at the end of this chapter.)

Among the States Parties with active victim assistance coordination in 2015, almost all the national coordination mechanisms were reported to have either collaborated with, or been included as part of, an active disability coordination mechanism.

In the following 13 States Parties, the national bodies in charge of coordinating victim assistance 67 collaborated with those in charge of coordinating disability rights: Afghanistan, Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Yemen (largely inactive due to conflict).

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64 According to Action #12 of the Maputo Action Plan.

65 According to the ongoing Cartagena Action Plan victim assistance commitments and supported by Action #15 of the Maputo Action Plan.

66 The states with coordination mechanisms were: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Yemen (largely inactive due to conflict).

67 Including coordination bodies for war victims more broadly.
Albania, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Jordan, Peru, Serbia, Sudan, and Thailand. Such coordination mechanisms were also in place in Algeria and Yemen, but they did not hold any meetings in 2015. *Ad hoc* meetings were held in BiH. Victim assistance coordination continued in Yei county in South Sudan.

Victim assistance was included in mechanisms for coordination of disability issues, without a separate victim assistance coordination body, in five States Parties: Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Tajikistan. In DRC and Uganda, the disability mechanisms with responsibility for victim assistance coordination did not meet in 2015.

No active coordination mechanism was reported in Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Nicaragua, Senegal, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, or Zimbabwe. Turkey had a National Mine Center with a mandate for coordinating victim assistance that existed from January 2015 until mid-2016, but no activities or collaboration with national disability coordination mechanisms were reported.

**Plans and objectives**

Actions #13 and #14 of the Maputo Action Plan call on States Parties to have time-bound and measurable objectives to implement national policies and plans that will tangibly contribute to the main goals of victim assistance.

In 2015, of the States Parties with significant numbers of survivors, 16 had current and ongoing plans with objectives that address the needs and promote the rights of mine survivors. Plans for Burundi, Croatia, Senegal, and Uganda expired in 2014 without yet having been renewed. A new National Disability Action Plan for Afghanistan remained pending, but was under development. Algeria had developed a victim assistance plan that was pending official approval in 2016. A revision of the victim assistance plan for Chad, which was extended due to a lack of resources and inactivity, was slated to take place in 2016. In Yemen, implementation of the plan remained on hold due to armed conflict.

Actions responding to some needs of mine survivors have been incorporated into the national disability plans in Cambodia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Serbia, and South Sudan. These states did not have a distinct victim assistance plan.

Colombia, Mozambique, Peru, and Tajikistan had both a national victim assistance plan and disability plans and policies that take into account the needs and rights of mine/ERW survivors. Mozambique adopted its victim assistance strategy, as an addition to its disability strategy, in December 2015. In August 2016, a Workshop for Development of National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework was held in Sudan.

**AVAILABILITY OF AND ACCESSIBILITY TO SERVICES**

Action #15 of the Maputo Action Plan commits States Parties to “increase availability of and accessibility to appropriate comprehensive rehabilitation services, economic inclusion opportunities and social protection measures...including expanding quality services in rural and remote areas and paying particular attention to vulnerable groups.”

Updates on the availability and accessibility of comprehensive rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities are included in separate reporting produced by the Monitor. This Monitor reporting on access, inclusion, and rights in 33

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68 Albania, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Yemen. States with no plan or expired plans: Afghanistan, DRC, Croatia, Eritrea, Iraq, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. No plans were reported for the remaining States Parties.

69 In Colombia and El Salvador, planning of mine/ERW victim assistance was also integrated into efforts to address the needs of armed conflict victims more generally.

countries, organized under the sub-thematic title “Equal Basis” presents progress in the relevant States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions in the context of the CRPD.

The Monitor website includes detailed country profiles examining progress in victim assistance in some 70 countries, including both States Parties and states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. A collection of thematic overviews, briefing papers, fact sheets, and infographics related to victim assistance produced since 1999, as well as the latest key country profiles, is available through the victim assistance portal on the Monitor website.

COMMUNICATING OBJECTIVES AND REPORTING IMPROVEMENTS

According to Action #13 of the Maputo Action Plan, victim objectives should be updated, their implementation monitored, and progress reported annually. Each year, “enhancements” to plans, policies, legal frameworks, and budgets for the implementation of those plans, policies, and legal frameworks should also be reported. More precise reporting is called for, and in 2016, a representative of Colombia, a member of the Mine Ban Treaty Victim Assistance Committee, noted that states need to listen to needs and show progress, but not exaggerate their victim assistance accomplishments.

As in the previous year, more than half of the most-affected 31 States Parties included some information on victim assistance activities in their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports covering calendar year 2015. States Parties that reported on plans, policies, or legislative frameworks in Form J of their Article 7 reporting for 2015, primarily addressed existing plans with a few references to enhancements or adaptations made to plans or policies.

However, time-bound and measurable objectives and progress toward goals went almost unreported. Only Thailand reported directly on national time-bound and measurable objectives. Few States Parties reported on the challenges to implementation of victim assistance in their countries as suggested by the 2015 Mine Ban Treaty guide to reporting; Sudan and Zimbabwe were notable exceptions where information on challenges was noted. States Parties rarely shared good practices in their reports. Key principles of victim assistance such as non-discrimination, age and gender sensitivity, accessibility, and inclusion were seldom included in the reporting.

Mine Ban Treaty States Parties are encouraged to use Form J of the Article 7 reporting format “in particular to report on assistance provided for the care and rehabilitation, and

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71 A core principle of the CRPD, the term “on equal basis with others” is used 31 times throughout the CRPD text. However, no definition of the term is included.
72 The 31 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties detailed here, plus Lao PDR and Lebanon that are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
75 Ambassador Beatriz Londono Soto, Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Victim Assistance, “Creating understanding and awareness of victim assistance actions in accordance with the Maputo Action Plan at all levels,” side event panel, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 May 2016.
76 The States Parties that provided some updates on victim assistance were: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Iraq, Jordan, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. As of 15 October 2016, 12 of the most affected 31 States Parties had not submitted Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports for calendar year 2015: Angola, Burundi, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Serbia, Somalia, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Yemen.
social and economic reintegration, of mine victims.” There is no detailed or specific format for reporting on victim assistance under the Mine Ban Treaty, however suggestions and guidelines have been presented over time.

Monitor research has shown that annual updates in reporting are most useful for assessment purposes when they clearly indicate when changes occurred against specific key indicators or concrete points of progress.

In 2015, a guide for reporting under the Mine Ban Treaty suggested that States Parties that are also parties to the CRPD could “draw from efforts that have been undertaken in the context of fulfilling CRPD reporting requirements and from the conclusions and recommendations made on these reports by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.” However, due to challenges in CRPD reporting—owing to its level of complexity, backlog in reviewing, and relative infrequency—the CRPD has been insufficient thus far to replace annual Mine Ban Treaty reporting on progress and challenges to addressing the needs of victims.

Regular reporting by States Parties on implementation of the CRPD is required by Article 35 of that convention. Reporting on the CRPD is less frequent that Mine Ban Treaty reporting. The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities examines each report and provides suggestions and recommendations to the State Party. However, despite the adoption of a simplified reporting procedure in 2013, in 2015 the committee actually registered an increase in the extensive backlog of State Party reports pending review.

Given the overlap in context and objectives between the CRPD and victim assistance, Mine Ban Treaty reporting offers an opportunity for states to specifically address progress against recommendations and concerns raised in the CRPD framework. Mine Ban Treaty States Parties have not taken that opportunity. Monitor reporting on victim assistance does, however, draw specifically from states’ CRPD reporting, alternative reporting, and recommendations as they become available.

In its initial CRPD report submitted in 2015, Algeria made a short reference to landmine survivors. Previously, BiH, Colombia, Croatia, and Uganda submitted reports on their implementation of the CRPD (Article 35) that had references to landmine victims, mostly short notes or references to CRPD Article 11 on humanitarian emergencies and conflict.

FULL AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

Action #16 of the Maputo Action Plan commits States Parties to ensure the “full and active participation of mine victims and their representative organizations in all matters that affect them.”

During the reporting period, among the States Parties with victim assistance coordination activities during 2015, all had some form of survivor participation or consultation; sometimes directly, or through survivors’ representative organizations or DPOs. Nonetheless there remains a long way to go for survivors to be effectively included in coordination roles in a way that ensures that their input is listened to, understood, and acted upon. In Ethiopia, survivors were not directly involved in coordination meetings, but were consulted in the development of relevant plans and strategies. In Tajikistan, survivors attended a range of relevant meetings.

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77 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, Reporting Format.
Few States Parties endeavored to demonstrate that they are doing their utmost to enhance the capacity of survivors for their effective participation, or to specify the methods that they are using to build that capacity. Cambodia, Tajikistan, and Thailand reported activities in regard to building such capacity.

Mine/ERW survivors also continued to participate actively in Mine Ban Treaty and other disarmament and disability rights coordination and campaigning, as well as in matters of peacemaking and peace-building in many countries, including in Albania, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Serbia, Senegal, Thailand, and Uganda.

In the majority of the 31 States Parties, survivors continued to be involved in implementing many aspects of victim assistance, including physical rehabilitation, peer support and referral, income-generating projects, and needs assessment data collection. However, the extent of these essential community services was severely reduced due to cuts in the small amounts of funding that had previously been available for these activities (see section on funding below).

GENDER AND AGE CONSIDERATIONS

The Maputo Action Plan speaks of “the imperative to address the needs and guarantee the rights of mine victims, in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.” While men and boys are the majority of reported casualties, women and girls may be disproportionally disadvantaged as a result of mine/ERW incidents and suffer multiple forms of discrimination as survivors. To guide a rights-based approach to victim assistance for women and girls, States Parties can apply the principles of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Implementation of CEDAW by States Parties to that convention should ensure the rights of women and girls and protect them from discrimination and exploitation.

Some States Parties have begun to address gender issues, often with assistance from the Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP). GMAP assessments of national mine action programs always include victim assistance as a component. Since 2013, GMAP has assessed the following Mine Ban Treaty States Parties’ programs: Afghanistan, DRC, Mali, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan (Darfur), and Tajikistan. The DRC assessment was carried out in 2015. The national victim assistance working group in Serbia also proposed the integration of victim assistance for women into the National Action Plan for UN Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

Age considerations

Child survivors have specific and additional needs in all aspects of assistance. During the reporting period, some progress in addressing the specific needs of child survivors was reported in some domains of assistance, particularly psychosocial support and education. In this regard, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is particularly relevant to the implementation of victim assistance with a rights-based approach. The annually updated Monitor fact sheet on the Impact of Mines/ERW on Children contains more details on issues pertaining to children, youth, and adolescents.

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81 Participation in service and program implementation was reported in at least the following 25 States Parties: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BIH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.

82 Maputo Action Plan Action #17.

83 Of the 31 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, all except Somalia and Sudan are also States Parties to CEDAW.

84 The Committee of CEDAW General Recommendation 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and post-conflict situations, and General Recommendation 27 on older women and protection of their human rights are also particularly applicable.

85 As well as Mine Ban Treaty states not party Lao PDR and Vietnam. Email from Calza Bini Arianna, GMAP, 12 October 2016.

86 These fact sheets can be accessed at the Monitor, “Victim Assistance Resources,” the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/victim-assistance.aspx.
SPECIAL ISSUES OF CONCERN: FRAGILE STATES, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES

States Parties facing conflict and deteriorating security situations often report interruption of victim assistance activities and services, and a lack of accessibility to existing services. At least 15 (about half) of the Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with significant numbers of landmine victims are listed in the 2015 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report, “States of Fragility.” States with fragile situations may require more capacity or support in order to compile and submit updates on victim assistance. Further to the difficulties faced in fragile states, conflict situations and natural disasters also influence the prevalence of disability, both by creating impairments and by creating barriers to access in the physical environment.

Several activities were underway to raise awareness of, or improve, responses to the needs and rights of persons with disabilities in armed conflicts and fragile situations that could potentially benefit mine survivors and their communities.

A special session of the World Humanitarian Summit in Turkey in May 2016 on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities into Humanitarian Action resulted in the adoption of a charter that is open for endorsement by states and NGOs alike. The session, chaired by the Special Rapporteur on Disabilities, saw relevant interventions by UNMAS, Handicap International, and several others. No mine/ERW survivors were reported to have participated in the session.

A 2015 thematic study of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) notes that under the Maputo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty States Parties committed to integrate landmine victims with disabilities into the broader legal frameworks related to the rights of persons with disabilities, thus reflecting “a more updated understanding of the issue.” The issues related to the rights of persons with disabilities in situations of conflict and humanitarian emergencies were further discussed and considered by the Human Rights Council in March 2016.

Overall, these states likely face challenging barriers to fulfilling their commitments under the Maputo Action Plan and to reporting progress and gaps in assistance. With specific international support and well-directed cooperation, as well as increased national focus at all levels of governance, States Parties in fragile situations would be better able to address victim assistance commitments.

COOPERATION, SUPPORT, AND FUNDING FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Action #20 of the Maputo Action Plan calls on States Parties to “effectively use all possible avenues to support States Parties seeking to receive assistance.” Concerning victim assistance, this includes “providing targeted assistance and supporting broader efforts to

88 Afghanistan, BiH, Burundi, Chad, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
enhance frameworks.” In 2016, Australia summarized this twin-track approach—also referred to as an integrated approach—to victim assistance with regard to donors across conventions as follows:

...development assistance needs to include specific programs for survivors, which are also accessible to other people with disabilities. Our development assistance also needs to include programs to ensure the needs of survivors as well as all other people with disabilities are addressed in national level policies and programs.94

Even with the efforts of states to find pathways for suitable sustainable resource allocation, in 2015 inadequate funding and resources in many states contributed to a reduction in activities to deliver most direct assistance and services to survivors, including those of international organizations, national and international NGOs, and DPOs. Thus, in May 2016, the ICBL expressed concern that in many countries local-level resources available for victim assistance are “reaching the point of catastrophic deficiency.” At the same time the UN stated that “victim assistance is a mine action pillar that remains grossly underfunded.”95

Cases from States Parties with significant numbers of survivors that experienced severe funding shortages for victim assistance, thus disrupting the implementation of activities or otherwise impeding progress in improving the quality of life of survivors in 2015–2016, can be seen in the following examples:

• In Angola, the economic crisis due to reduced oil prices slashed funds available for government-supported assistance and resulted in a near shutdown of most victim assistance programs. The government refurbished some rehabilitation and orthopedic clinics, but failed to provide the supplies and materials needed to deliver services.

• In BiH, a lack of resources continued to erode victim assistance efforts by NGOs as donor funding declined. After more than 18 years of continuous operation, the NGO Landmine Survivors Initiatives (once a branch office of the United States-based NGO Landmine Survivors Network/Survivor Corps) closed down permanently.96

• In Burundi, there was a reduction in the number of victim assistance service providers due to lack of funding in 2015.97 Implementation of the National Victim Assistance Action Plan remained largely on hold due to deficient resources.98

• In Chad, the timeframe of the National Plan of Action on Victim Assistance 2012–2014 had been extended to 2017 because of a lack of resources for its implementation. However, in 2015, further budget cuts did not allow for implementation of the plan.

• In DRC, international funding for victim assistance provided through UNMAS and other donors remained worryingly low in 2015.99 This led to a stagnation in


97 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Eric Niragira, Training Centre for Development of Ex-Combatants (CEDAC), 6 October 2015.

98 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Méthode Niyungeko, DAHMI, 1 August 2016.

99 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Francy Miantuala, President, National Committee of Organizations for Persons with Disabilities and on Mine Victim Assistance (Collectif National des Organisations des Personnes Handicapées et d’Assistance aux Victimes de Mines, CNOPHAVM), Kinshasa, 11 April 2016; by Baudouin Asubeti Milongo, Centre Congolais de la Lutte Antimines (CCLAM), 11 July 2016; and by Valentin Tshitenge, Head of Medico-Social Care for Persons with Disabilities at the National Programme for Community-Based Rehabilitation (Programme National de Réhabilitation à Base Communautaire, PNRBC), Kinshasa, 18 July 2016.
the availability of services, the number of actors, and geographical coverage of assistance.100

- In Croatia, there was an overall decrease in the number of people that could get assistance due to the “omnipresent lack of financial resources.”101 The government reduced overall funding for programs for persons with disabilities as part of budget cuts.102 Austerity measures had already reduced the previously achieved standard supply of orthopedic devices.103

- In Ethiopia, a major rehabilitation provider reported a significant decrease in victim assistance services and limited the range of mobile outreach teams due to a reduction of funds.104

- Iraq suffers from a financial crisis, while the focus of donors and international NGOs is on the massive needs of internally displaced persons. This has diverted financial support away from victim assistance and minimized the scale of service provision to mine/ERW survivors across the country.105

- In Mozambique, insufficient financial resources was one of the main challenges to implementation of victim assistance activities.106 Donors were reported to be losing interest in victim assistance as a result of the completion of landmine clearance in the country.107

- In Tajikistan, the main obstacle to the implementation of victim assistance- and disability-related projects and programs was the lack of sustainable funding from both the government and donors.108

- In Uganda, a significant reduction in the overall level of survivor participation in 2015 was attributed to a lack of funding for victim assistance programs in general.109

Similarly, a lack of funding was reported to have reduced services in Afghanistan, El Salvador, and Yemen—States Parties also experiencing conflict or security concerns. In Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan, resources as well as the impact of conflict were also impediments to the provision of assistance.

Analysis of victim assistance funding in detailed data available since 2007 shows a decline in total funding over time. The number of donor-reported contributions110 made annually also decreased in real terms and as compared to the total annual earmarked funding. Of the total annual funding earmarked for victim assistance, generally some US$10–13 million per year was allocated to the ICRC and $2–5 million to Handicap International; these figures remained fairly constant. Funding to a diversity of other organizations and projects, particularly to survivors’ representative organizations, decreased significantly.

100 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Francky Miantuala, CNOPHAVM, Kinshasa, 11 April 2016; and by Valentin Tshitenge, PNRBC, 18 July 2016.
104 Email from Fasil Ayele, CSE, Addis Ababa, 13 April 2016.
106 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for the calendar year 2015), Form H.
109 Response to Monitor questionnaire from Margaret Arach Orech, Director, Uganda Landmine Survivors Association, 12 July 2015.
110 Each such contribution to an implementing organization, intermediary organization, or project is reported separately by donor countries for funding that includes grants, project and organization support, or other allocations earmarked for victim assistance.
Despite an earlier “prediction that in the coming years we will see a downward trend in funds identified as dedicated to assisting victims…but that more and more states, including donors...will strive to ensure that their development cooperation is inclusive of all persons with disabilities,” to date funding through other frameworks such as disability-inclusive development has not been demonstrated to have replaced victim assistance-earmarked funding nor general funding shortages.

There may be a general misconception that victim assistance-earmarked funding necessarily assists only or even mostly mine/ERW victims. Rather, victim assistance contributions are directed at projects and sectors that include mine victims amongst beneficiaries and are most often labelled as such because they are among those financial contributions designated through or authorized by the government aid humanitarian agencies that also allocate mine action funding. Consequently, earmarked victim assistance funding is equally important to survivors and indirect victims as well as other persons with similar needs. The ICBL-CMC has recommended that donors support targeted victim assistance where needed and effective, and fund the implementation of national victim assistance plans, as well as disability action plans and other plans and policies, that have been shown to positively impact victims. Donors can thus dedicate victim assistance funding to fill gaps in service delivery that are needed by mine/ERW victims and ensure access to existing services available to a broader population.

Thailand and Belgium, as co-chairs of the Victim Assistance Standing Committee in 2009—as they were again on the Victim Assistance Committee in 2015—presented a set of guidance recommendations for implementation of victim assistance. What they recommended then, regarding resource mobilization, remains as true today: Addressing the rights and needs of mine victims...

...requires sustained political, financial and material commitments, provided both through national commitments and international, regional and bilateral cooperation and assistance, in accordance with the obligations under Article 6.3. No progress in improving the quality of daily life of mine victims and other persons with disabilities will be possible without adequate resources to implement policies and programmes.

In October 2016, ICBL Ambassador, Landmine Monitor researcher, and landmine survivor Margaret Arach Orech described the dire situation regarding support for victim assistance and the need to resolve it through close consultation with survivors, which is consistent with these Monitor findings. Drawing from her own experience and that of other survivors, she said in a presentation:

Spending on victim assistance has consistently declined in the recent past. Despite the good policies, legal environment and the accompanying strategies for disability issues...the amount of public resources directly allocated for disability programs or for making mainstream programs, whether schools or work places, accessible, is insufficient.

There is considerable discrepancy between what is promised through government policies and what is provided for in the budgets. Generally, limited or lack of funds targeted to specific issues related to persons with disabilities further contribute to the discrimination and marginalization of persons with disabilities, as policies and programs geared towards promoting equal opportunities for vulnerable populations including persons with disabilities are meagerly funded.

Listening and taking into account survivors’ voices is imperative for effective planning of programs or activities that benefit them...Continue to make victim assistance earmarked funds available, and step up efforts to ensure that broader, mainstream policies and programs also respond to the reality faced by survivors and other persons with disabilities. 114

IN MEMORIAM

On 13 September 2016, a landmine survivor known to friends as Pa (Aunty) Tang passed away. Pa Tang (Taeng Changade) carried on the spirit of the grassroots movement behind the Mine Ban Treaty. Even in hard times she participated in saying what the situation was on the ground, giving her time and energy, and while she physically could, coming to meet campaigners, researchers, and others to give her view and add to the fight against mines and for victims’ rights.

Pa Tang lived in the Sa Kaeo Province of Thailand, at the border with Cambodia. She lost her leg to a landmine while collecting tamarinds to sell at market circa 2003. Her husband left because of her impairment and disability. She lived by herself and supported herself in the years afterwards, until one day she had a terrible accident, lost her balance, and fell into the cooking fire at her home. With severe burns she moved to live with her sister and her children. The family struggled to meet its basic needs. During her last years in her sixties, Pa Tang received some support such as rice and small home adjustments from community-based organizations, with help from the local survivor leader and campaigner.

Pa Tang’s passing reminds us that the promise of victim assistance obligations must be realized within the lifetime of survivors. Survivors are active participants and not statistics.

2015-2016
Mine Ban Treaty
Victim Assistance

PLAN FOR ASSISTANCE
There is a national victim assistance or disability plan

SURVIVOR PARTICIPATION
Survivors participate in coordination mechanisms

COORDINATION
Victim assistance coordination linked with disability coordination

陆地雷监控2016
LANDMINE, EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR (ERW), AND CLUSTER SUBMUNITION CASUALTIES IN 2015

Number of recorded casualties in 2015
- 1-9
- 10-49
- 50-199
- 200-499
- 500 or more

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are bold; OTHER AREAS are upper case italics.
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the March 2016 pledging conference for the Mine Ban Treaty. Annan is also pictured in the banner at the signing ceremony for the treaty in 1997.

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SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty on international cooperation and assistance recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in order to fulfill its treaty obligations. This chapter focuses on financial support for mine action provided for calendar year 2015 by affected countries and international donors. Cooperation and assistance, however, is not only limited to financial assistance. Other forms of assistance can include the provision of equipment, expertise, and personnel as well as the exchange of experience, know-how, and best-practice sharing.

2015 FIGURES AND TRENDS

- **Total contributions (international and national):** Thirty-five donors and 14 affected states contributed US$471.3 million in international and national support for mine action in 2015; this is $139 million less than in 2014 (a 23% decrease).
- **International contributions** accounted for 72% of overall support for mine action in 2015, while states’ contributions to their own national mine action programs accounted for the remaining 28% of global funding.
- **Donors** contributed $340.1 million in international support for mine action to 41 affected states and three other areas. This represents a decrease of nearly $77 million from 2014 (an 18% decrease).
- **National contributions:** The Monitor identified 14 affected states that provided $131.2 million in contributions to their own national mine action programs, $62.4 million less than in 2014 (a 32% decrease), when 13 affected countries reported contributing $193.6 million.
- Contributions from the top five donors—the United States (US), Japan, the European Union (EU), Norway, and the Netherlands—amounted to more than $240 million and accounted for 71% of all international funding.

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1 This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs for calendar year 2015, as of October 2016. All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed in current dollars. Mine action support includes funding related to landmines, cluster munitions, and unexploded ordnance, but is rarely disaggregated. State reporting on contributions is varied in the level of detail and some utilize a fiscal year other than the calendar year.
• The top five recipient states—Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Syria—received a combined total of $162 million, representing 48% of all international contributions.

• International funding was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education (64% of all funding), victim assistance (7%), capacity-building (1%), advocacy (0.5%), and stockpile destruction (0.5%). The remaining 27% was not disaggregated by the donors.

INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2015

In 2015, 35 donors contributed $340.1 million in international support for mine action in 41 affected states and three other areas (down from 42 states and three areas in 2014), a decline of $76.7 million from the $416.8 million reported in 2014.2

This is the third year running that donors decreased their international mine action assistance, and the first time since 2005 that international support dropped below $400 million. In 2015, international support fell more sharply (18% decrease) than in 2014 (5% decrease) or 2013 (12% decrease).

International support for mine action: 2005–2015

In 2016, donors hosted three international pledging conferences during which they committed resources to support mine action activities as well as the treaty’s implementation support unit:

• In March, Chile hosted in Geneva the first International Pledging Conference for the Implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, which aimed at renewing and strengthening donors’ commitment to mine action. Sixty-nine delegations participated in the pledging conference, including 52 States Parties, two states not party, and 15 other organizations. In total, 20 States Parties made pledges to the treaty implementation support unit, and three States Parties added details regarding their future commitments for support to mine action;

• In July, Canada, Germany, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, and the US co-hosted in Washington, DC a Pledging Conference in support of Iraq. Funding for demining was one of four issues addressed during the conference, with eight donors pledging financial and technical support;

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In September, Norway and the US co-hosted in New York City a Global Demining Initiative for Colombia ministerial-level meeting in order to secure commitments from donors to support demining activities in Colombia. Nineteen donor countries and the EU participated in the meeting with 15 donors pledging financial and technical support.

At present it is not possible to determine how these conferences will impact overall support for mine action in 2016.

**DONORS IN 2015**

In 2015, 27 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, two states not party, the EU, and five international institutions\(^3\) contributed a total of $340.1 million to mine action.

**Contributions by donors: 2011–2015\(^4\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Contribution (US$ million)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>119.2</td>
<td>118.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors*</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>340.1</td>
<td>416.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Other donors in 2015 included: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the OPEC Fund for International Development, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the UN Development Programme (UNDP).

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3 The CEB, the UNOCHA, the OPEC Fund for International Development, the OSCE, and the UNDP.

4 The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. The total amount of international support for 2013 was revised to include a contribution from the EU to the Philippines that was not previously reported by the Monitor. Totals for 2012 and 2011 have also been rectified as a result of database clean-up.
The majority of the funding came from just a few donors, with the top five donors contributing a total of $241.9 million, or more than 70% of all international funding for 2015. The US remained the largest mine action donor and alone provided more than one-third of all international mine action support in 2015. Japan ranked second with nearly 15% of all contributions, while the next three donors—the EU, Norway, and the Netherlands—provided more than $20 million each. Canada re-entered the top 10, replacing Finland, which reduced its contributions by a total of $2.4 million. Sixteen donors contributed less than $1 million each, compared to 13 in 2014.

Support from States Parties in 2015 accounted for more than half of all donor funding, with 27 countries providing some $190 million. While this represents a decline from the $230 million recorded in 2014, States Parties’ total contributions to mine action in 2015 was proportionally similar to all support in 2014. The top five State Party contributors—Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK—provided $126.5 million (37% of all support).

In 2015, the EU and its member states’ contributed a total of $113.5 million and accounted for 33% of total international support reported, down from $166 million provided in 2014 (40% of total international funding for that year).

International funding for mine action in 2015 decreased by $76.7 million compared with 2014. Thirteen donors decreased their funding, led by the EU ($37.8 million down) and Norway ($19.5 million down), who together accounted for $57 million of the global decline. Two donors from 2014 did not report any contribution to mine action in 2015: Saudi Arabia and the Common Humanitarian Fund.

In contrast, four donors contributed more in 2015 than they did in 2014; including a $2.3 million increase from the UK. Canada and the US increased their assistance by more than $1 million each. Four new donors—one State Party, and three institutions—were also identified in 2015: Poland, the CEB, the UNOCHA, and the UNDP.

### Summary of major changes in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Combined Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of more than $10 million</td>
<td>The EU and Norway</td>
<td>$57.3 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of less than $10 million</td>
<td>Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland</td>
<td>$25.5 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of more than $1 million</td>
<td>Canada, the UK, and the US</td>
<td>$4.6 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of less than $1 million</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>$0.7 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors from 2014 that discontinued their support in 2015</td>
<td>The Common Humanitarian Fund, and Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>$0.7 million provided in 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New donors in 2015</td>
<td>Poland, CEB, UNOCHA, and the UNDP</td>
<td>$1.5 million provided in 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As detailed in the table below, changes in the exchange rates between national currencies and the US dollar negatively affected the US dollar value of international contributions.

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5 Eighteen EU member states provided funding in 2015: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
For instance, when expressed in US dollar terms, mine action international support fell in a dozen countries and the EU, with the biggest decreases recorded in Belgium (-91%), Spain (-61%), the EU (-57%), and Norway (-47%). Whereas in national currency terms, declines were recorded in nine countries and the EU, and were less pronounced, although they remain significant in most instances. Similarly, whereas seven states reported increases in their mine action contributions in 2015, after conversion into US dollars, increases were smaller percentage-wise and only observed for four of them: Canada, Italy, Japan, and the UK.

Changes in mine action funding in national currency terms and US$ terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Amount of decrease/increase (national currency)</th>
<th>% change from 2014 (national currency)</th>
<th>Amount of decrease/increase (US$)</th>
<th>% change from 2014 (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>−A$1,872,288</td>
<td>−26%</td>
<td>−2,515,983</td>
<td>−38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>−€2,108,028</td>
<td>−89%</td>
<td>−2,862,472</td>
<td>−91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>+C$2,985,063</td>
<td>+35%</td>
<td>+1,286,435</td>
<td>+17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>−DKK5,992,070</td>
<td>−9%</td>
<td>−2,893,585</td>
<td>−24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>−€24,176,117</td>
<td>−48%</td>
<td>−37,889,611</td>
<td>−57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>−€1,000,000</td>
<td>−17%</td>
<td>−2,430,200</td>
<td>−30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>+€522,724</td>
<td>+4%</td>
<td>+2,321,657</td>
<td>−13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>−€120,132</td>
<td>−4%</td>
<td>−881,638</td>
<td>−20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>+€1,011,863</td>
<td>+61%</td>
<td>757,397</td>
<td>+34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>−¥775,709,694</td>
<td>+15%</td>
<td>+203,544</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>+€417,089</td>
<td>+2%</td>
<td>−3,820,985</td>
<td>−15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>−NZ$4,411,378</td>
<td>−49%</td>
<td>−4,270,699</td>
<td>−57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>−NOK83,259,000</td>
<td>−31%</td>
<td>−19,497,908</td>
<td>−47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>−€442,626</td>
<td>−53%</td>
<td>−673,298</td>
<td>−61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>−SEK1,515,000</td>
<td>−3%</td>
<td>−1,629,144</td>
<td>−21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>+CHF213,670</td>
<td>+1%</td>
<td>−680,752</td>
<td>−4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>+£2,079,294</td>
<td>+26%</td>
<td>+2,221,763</td>
<td>+17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FUNDING PATHS

Donors contributed to mine action through several trust fund mechanisms, notably the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) administered by UNMAS and the ITF Enhancing Human Security (established by the government of Slovenia and formerly known as the International Trust Fund).

In 2015, contributions to the VTF totaled $52.6 million from 19 donors, compared to some $45 million from 22 donors in 2014.7 Several small donors used the VTF to contribute

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to mine action. Twelve donors and two international institutions allocated $7 million in 2015 through the ITF for mine action programs in seven states and one area, as well as for global activities.

Other organizations that received a significant proportion of contributions in 2015 included Norwegian People’s Aid ($24.8 million), Halo Trust ($20.8 million), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) ($11.5 million from nine donors), and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) ($10.8 million from seven donors).

RECIPIENTS

A total of 41 states and three other areas received $302.7 million from 31 donors in 2015. A further $37.4 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area.

Afghanistan received the largest amount of funding ($52.6 million) from the largest number of donors (17). Nine states, or one-fifth of all recipients, had only one donor.

List of international support recipients in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other recipients*</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>340.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated by *italics*. *Other recipients in 2015 included: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Central African Republic, Egypt, India, Jordan, Kosovo, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Peru, Solomon Islands, and Thailand. Each received less than $1 million.

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8 The small donors included Andorra, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Poland, and South Korea.
10 Four donors provided funding to global activities only: Andorra, Austria, Estonia, and the OSCE.
11 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Egypt, India, Peru, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, and Yemen.
As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding. The top five recipient states—Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Syria—received 48% of all international support in 2015.

In 2015, 33 states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared to 2014, including 11 recipients receiving less support and four recipients receiving no new support. Syria was the recipient with the largest increase, receiving $13.4 million more than in 2014, while Angola was the recipient with the largest decrease, receiving $25.9 million less than in 2014. These fluctuations may be a reflection of shifts in donor priorities and changes in local situations, as well as the closing of some programs.

**REGIONAL SUPPORT IN 2015**

The East and South Asia and the Pacific region received the highest share of international support at 40%; followed by the Middle East and North Africa (22%), Sub-Saharan Africa (14%), Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (9%), and the Americas (4%).

While support to the first two regions remained relatively unchanged in 2015, the share of support going to Sub-Saharan Africa declined by more than 40% compared to 2014 as a result of substantial drops in support provided to Angola (-80%) and to Mozambique (-70%), which declared itself to be mine-free in 2015.

The proportion of funding going to Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia also decreased by 40% in 2015, which is the result of a return to a normal level of funding following a significant disbursement of EU funds to Turkey for clearance activities in 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2015 contribution (US$ million)</th>
<th>2014 contribution (US$ million)</th>
<th>Percentage change from 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East and South Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>136.6</td>
<td>149.8</td>
<td>-9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>+6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>-41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>-40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>+27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>-33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>340.1</td>
<td>416.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FUNDING BY THEMATIC SECTOR**

In 2015, 64% of mine action funding supported clearance and risk education activities. Victim assistance support dropped by $4 million from 2014, but still represented 7% of total international support to mine action. Stockpile destruction received less than $1 million.

---

12 Despite a dramatic increase in funding received, conflict and instability prevented access to areas requiring clearance and the implementation of a comprehensive mine action program in Syria. Some of the funding received in 2015 was used by international humanitarian demining organizations for clearance, risk education, and victim assistance in Syria. Projects also sought to improve the capabilities of local Syrian organizations, often supported by offices outside the country. See, for example, UNMAS, “Programmes: Syria,” last updated September 2016.

13 The sharp decrease in international support for mine action in Angola in 2015 is the result of changes in donors’ contributions, notably following the one-year disbursement of EU funds for clearance activities in Angola in 2014 (with $25 million received).
donated by Germany for the destruction of Ukraine’s PFM-1 landmines through the NATO Support Agency.

Various funding represented 27% of all international support to mine action. This includes contributions not disaggregated by the donors, as well as funding not earmarked for any sectors. Unearmarked funding represented more than 10% ($11.9 million) of all various funding in 2015.

**Contributions by thematic sector in 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total contribution (US$ million)</th>
<th>% of total contribution</th>
<th>No. of donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearance and risk education</td>
<td>218.6</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>90.2</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim assistance</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpile destruction</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>340.1</td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/A = not applicable

**Clearance and risk education**

In 2015, $218.6 million, or 64% of all reported support for mine action, went toward clearance and risk education activities. This represents a decrease of $63.2 million from 2014.

Five of the 10 largest donors—the US, Japan, the EU, Norway, and the UK—provided three-quarters of all support to clearance and risk education ($167.1 million).

Many donors reported clearance and risk education as a combined figure. Twenty-three donors did, however, indicate contributions specifically for clearance activities, providing a total of $106 million in 33 countries and other areas (21 States Parties, one Signatory, eight states not party, and three other areas).

Twelve donors reported contributions totaling $6.1 million specifically for risk education projects in 10 countries. Iraq received the most risk education-specific funding with $1.5 million.

**Victim assistance**

Direct international support for victim assistance activities reached $24.2 million in 2015, down from $27.7 million in 2014. This represents 7% of all reported support for mine action in 2015, about the same share as in 2014 and 2013.

---

14 In 2014, international support was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education ($281.8 million, or 68% of total international support), victim assistance ($27.7 million, or 7%), advocacy ($20.7 million, or 5%), capacity-building ($14.9 million, or 3%), stockpile destruction ($3.2 million, or 1%), and various activities ($68.5 million, or 16%).

15 Funding for victim assistance activities is especially difficult to track because many donors report that they provide support for victims through more general programs for development and for the rights of persons with disabilities. In some cases, the Monitor does not include those funds in its reporting. In cases where it is included, it is difficult to estimate to what extent resources effectively reach landmine victims.
Seventeen\textsuperscript{16} of the 35 donors identified reported contributing to victim assistance projects in 10 States Parties, five states not party, and one other area.\textsuperscript{17} Most mine-affected countries did not receive any direct international support for victim assistance.

The top three victim assistance donors—the US, Germany, and Switzerland—provided 63\% ($15.2 million) of all victim assistance funding in 2015.

Eight donors reported contributing $11.9 million, half of all support to victim assistance in 2015, through the ICRC or national Red Cross societies.

**Advocacy & capacity-building**

In 2015, less than 1\% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities ($2.2 million), this represented a drop of more than $20 million compared to 2014. Of the 35 donors reporting international contributions to mine action, eight reported supporting advocacy activities.

Eight donors provided $4.4 million—1\% of all international support—to support capacity-building activities in five States Parties, two states not party, and one other area.

**NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2015**

While there has been more transparency from affected states, overall national contributions to mine action continue to be under-reported. Few States Parties report national funding in their annual Article 7 reports.\textsuperscript{18} States Parties such as Algeria and Iraq, as well as states not party India, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam—all mine-affected states with significant contamination and major clearance operations, usually conducted by the army—have never reported annual expenditures.

Fourteen affected states reported $131.2 million in contributions to mine action from their national budget in 2015, some $62 million less than the $193.6 million reported in 2014 (a 32\% decrease).\textsuperscript{19} This decrease is largely the result of less support provided by Angola to its mine action program, with a total contribution amounting to $60 million in 2015 (half as much as in 2014, when it provided more than $120 million). Nevertheless, Angola still accounted for 43\% of all national funding for 2015. Additionally, four States Parties reported contributing a large part of their own mine action programs: Bosnia and Herzegovina ($13.2 million, 58\% of total program cost), Chile ($4.4 million, 100\%), Croatia ($30.8 million, 56\%), and Peru ($1.4 million, 88\%); as did state not party Lebanon ($9.0 million, 52\%).

**FIVE-YEAR SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION 2011–2015**

Over the past five years (2011–2015), total support to mine action amounted to $3.1 billion, an average of about $614 million per year.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{16} Victim assistance donors included: Australia, Belgium, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Slovenia, Turkey, the US, and the OPEC Fund for International Development.

\textsuperscript{17} States Parties recipients of international assistance for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine. States not party that received international assistance for victim assistance were: Egypt, India, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Palestine. Western Sahara was the sole other area that received victim assistance funding.

\textsuperscript{18} Only two of the 14 affected states analyzed in this chapter reported national funding for mine action in a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2015: Sudan and Zimbabwe. For 2014, only Sudan reported.

\textsuperscript{19} Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Peru, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

\textsuperscript{20} The last time total support amounted to less than $500 million was in 2005, when it was $418.9 million, according to revised Monitor data.
Although data about national support remains incomplete, such support has accounted for about 30% of total mine action funding over the period, and amounted to approximately $905 million.

International support totaled $2.2 billion, an average of $430 million per year, and represented 70% of all support. Three donors—the US, Japan, and Norway—contributed $1.1 billion, almost 50% of total international support. Three other donors—the EU, the Netherlands, and Germany—contributed more than $100 million each. Support from States Parties accounted for 60% of all international funding with $1.3 billion provided.

Between 2011–2015, the top four recipients—Afghanistan ($360.8 million), Iraq ($174.5 million), Lao PDR ($164.7 million), and Cambodia ($149.7 million)—received 40% of all international contributions.

### Summary of contributions: 2011–2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National Support</th>
<th>International Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>466.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>498.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>440.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>416.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>340.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Graph showing contributions from 2011 to 2015]
SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION: 2015

National contributions

(amount in parenthesis)

Recipients
- More than US$15 million
- US$3-15 million
- Less than US$3 million

International donors
- More than US$15 million
- US$3-15 million
- Less than US$3 million

Notes:
The European Union as an entity provided US$29 million in international support for mine action.
Other international donors contributing less than US$3 million each in 2015 included the Council of Europe Development Bank, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the OPEC Fund for International Development, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and UNDP.
International donors provided an additional US$37.4 million without designating recipient state(s).

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are bold. Signatory is italics. OTHER AREAS are UPPERCASE ITALICS.
The Broken Chair outside the UN in Geneva is equipped with a prosthetic for the International Day of Persons with Disabilities. Daniel Berset’s artistic work was first installed in 1997 by Handicap International to encourage signature and entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty.

© ICBL-CMC, December 2015
STATUS OF THE CONVENTION

1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION (1997 MINE BAN TREATY)

Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any state that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s).

As of 10 November 2016 there were 162 States Parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>Signature Dates</th>
<th>Accession Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>11 Sep 02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 3 May 99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>7 May 98; 6 Sep 00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>3 Sep 03 (a)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98</td>
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<td>Benin</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98</td>
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<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>18 Aug 05 (a)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98</td>
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<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98</td>
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<td>Botswana</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98</td>
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<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03</td>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99</td>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97</td>
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Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a)
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
Congo, Rep 4 May 01 (a)
Congo, DR 2 May 02 (a)
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99
Côte d’Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Croatia 4 Dec 97; 18 May 98
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a)
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a)
Estonia 12 May 04 (a)
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
Finland 9 Jan 12 (a)
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03
Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98
Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01
Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03
Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06
Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98
Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98
Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99
Indonesia 4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07
Iraq 15 Aug 07 (a)
Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99
Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98
Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98
Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98
Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01
Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a)
Kuwait 30 Jul 07 (a)
Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)
Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a)
Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03
Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99
Macedonia FYR 9 Sep 98 (a)
Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99
Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98
Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99
Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00
Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98
Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01
Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00
Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98
Montenegro 23 Oct 06 (s)
Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98
Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98
Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a)
Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99
New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99
Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a)
Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98
Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98
Oman 20 Aug 14 (a)
Palau 18 Nov 07 (a)
Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98
Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a)
Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98
Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98
Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00
Poland 4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12
Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99
Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98
Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00
Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98
São Tomé & Príncipe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a)
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01
Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Somalia 16 Apr 12 (a)
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98
South Sudan 11 Nov 11 (s)
Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99
Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03
Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02
Swaziland 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98
Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98
Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a)
Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00
Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98
Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a)
Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00
Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98
Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99
Turkey 25 Sep 03 (a)
Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98
Tuvalu 13 September 2011 (a)
Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01
Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99
Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98
Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01
Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98

SIGNATORY
Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97

NON-SIGNATORIES
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Burma/Myanmar
China
Cuba
Egypt
Georgia
India
Iran
Israel
Kazakhstan
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kyrgyzstan
Lao PDR
Lebanon
Libya
Micronesia
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Pakistan
Palestine
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Syria
Tonga
United Arab Emirates
United States
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
MINE BAN TREATY

18 SEPTEMBER 1997

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

PREAMBLE

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1
General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
   a) To use anti-personnel mines;
   b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
   c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

ARTICLE 2
Definitions

1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

4. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.

5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

ARTICLE 3
Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.

2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.
ARTICLE 4
Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

ARTICLE 5
Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:
   a) The duration of the proposed extension;
   b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
      (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
      (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
      (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
   c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
   d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.
ARTICLE 6
International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
   a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
   b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;
   c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
   d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
   e) Assistance to mine victims;
   f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.
ARTICLE 7
Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:
   a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
   b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
   c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
   d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;
   e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;
   f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
   g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;
   h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and
   i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

ARTICLE 8
Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.
10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:
   a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
   b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
   c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.
ARTICLE 9
National implementation measures
Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 10
Settlement of disputes
1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

ARTICLE 11
Meetings of the States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
   a) The operation and status of this Convention;
   b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
   c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
   d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
   e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
   f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 12
Review Conferences
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States
Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
   a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
   b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
   c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
   d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 13
Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

ARTICLE 14
Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
ARTICLE 15
Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

ARTICLE 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

ARTICLE 17
Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 18
Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

ARTICLE 19
Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 20
Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

ARTICLE 21
Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

ARTICLE 22
Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Landmine Monitor 2016 provides a global overview of efforts in 2015, and into November 2016 where possible, to universalize and fully implement the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally assesses the international community's response to the global landmine and explosive remnants of war problem. It covers developments in the areas of antipersonnel landmine use, production, stockpiling, mine action, casualties, victim assistance, and mine action funding.

This report was prepared by Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the unprecedented civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has reported on the international community's response to the global landmine problem and its solutions since 1999.

Cover: A family member stands next to the graves of three children who were killed when an improvised mine planted by the so-called Islamic State (IS) in a school in Manbij, Syria, detonated on 27 September 2016. © Ole Solvang/Human Rights Watch, October 2016

Top left: Landmine survivors learning how to make craft from recycled paper as part of an income-generating project in Uganda. © Uganda Landmine Survivors Association, February 2015

Top right: Amongst temporary shelters housing refugees fleeing Pakistan, a deminer searches for mines during emergency clearance at Gulan Refugee Camp, Khost Province, Afghanistan. © HALO Trust, September 2015.

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