

CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR 2025



Cluster
Munition
Coalition

CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR 2025

16th ANNUAL EDITION

Monitoring and Research Committee, ICBL-CMC Governance Board
Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines • DanChurchAid
Human Rights Watch • Humanity & Inclusion • Mines Action Canada
Monitor Editorial Team leaders • ICBL-CMC staff experts

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Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

For more information visit www.the-monitor.org or email monitor@icblcmc.org.

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CLUSTER MUNITION COALITION

The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) is an international civil society campaign working to eradicate cluster munitions and prevent further harm from these weapons. The CMC works through its members to change the policy and practice of governments and organizations and to raise awareness of the devastation that cluster munitions cause.

The CMC is committed to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions and for destroying stockpiles, clearing contaminated areas, and assisting affected communities.

The CMC calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and its full implementation by all, including:

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of cluster munitions;
- Efficient clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants in cluster munition contaminated areas; and
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all cluster munition and explosive remnants of war (ERW) victims.

PREFACE

CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Cluster munitions pose significant dangers to civilians for two principal reasons: their impact at the time of use and their deadly legacy. Launched from the ground or dropped from the air, cluster munitions consist of containers that open and disperse submunitions indiscriminately over a wide area, claiming both civilian and military victims. Many explosive submunitions and bomblets fail to detonate as designed when they are dispersed, becoming *de facto* landmines that kill and maim indiscriminately long after the conflict has ended and create barriers to socio-economic development.

To protect civilians from the effects of cluster munitions, Norway and a number of like-minded countries initiated a fast-track diplomatic process in late 2006 aimed at creating a new international treaty. Working in partnership with United Nations (UN) agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and civil society organizations grouped under the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), the Oslo Process resulted in the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in May 2008, which opened for signature on 3 December 2008.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force on 1 August 2010. It comprehensively prohibits the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions. It also requires destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions within eight years, clearance of cluster munition remnants within 10 years, and assistance to victims, including those injured by submunitions, as well as the families of those injured or killed, and affected communities.

The convention's First Meeting of States Parties was held in November 2010 in Lao PDR—the country with the highest level of contamination by unexploded submunitions. States Parties adopted the Vientiane Action Plan, a 66-point action plan to guide their work until the convention's First Review Conference. The 2015 Dubrovnik Action Plan and the 2021 Lausanne Action Plan were respectively adopted at the first and second review conferences, listing concrete steps to further implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions in the periods from 2015 to 2020 and from 2021 to 2026.

CLUSTER MUNITION COALITION

Launched by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in November 2003, the CMC plays a crucial and ongoing facilitating role in leading global civil society action in favor of the ban on cluster munitions. With campaign contacts in more than 100 countries, the CMC works for the full universalization and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In January 2011, the CMC merged with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to become the ICBL-CMC, but the CMC and ICBL remain two distinct campaigns.

LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for both the CMC and ICBL on the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty, respectively. Created by the ICBL as Landmine Monitor in June 1998, the initiative became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC in 2008 and changed its name in 2010 to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as “the Monitor”).

The Monitor represents the first time that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and report on problems. Established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation, the Monitor has put into practice the concept of civil society-based verification that is now employed in many similar contexts. It has become the *de facto* monitoring regime for both treaties, monitoring and reporting on States Parties’ implementation and compliance, and more generally, assessing the international community’s response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Monitor’s reporting complements transparency reporting required of States Parties under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable for the legal obligations that they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information, covering all aspects of mine action. Although in some cases it does entail field missions, the Monitor does not send researchers into harm’s way and does not include war-zone reporting. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about the issues it is monitoring to benefit the international community as a whole. It aims to promote and advance discussion in support of the goal of a world free of landmines and cluster munitions.

The Monitor is supported by a global reporting network. Key outputs are country profiles and annual reports.¹ A Monitoring and Research Committee provides oversight of the plans and outputs of the ICBL-CMC’s research and monitoring, including all Monitor publication content, and acts as a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The Monitor Project Manager, under the ICBL-CMC, is responsible for the coordination and management of research, editing, and production of all Monitor research products.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

This is the 16th annual *Cluster Munition Monitor*. It is the sister publication to the *Landmine Monitor*, which has been issued annually since 1999.

Cluster Munition Monitor 2025 covers cluster munition ban policy, use, production, transfers, and stockpiling globally. It assesses the impact of cluster munition remnant

¹ Reports, briefing papers, factsheets, maps, detailed country profiles, and other resources produced by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor are available online at www.the-monitor.org.

contamination and casualties, and outlines progress made and challenges faced in efforts to clear contaminated land, provide risk education to affected communities, and assist victims. The report focuses on calendar year 2024, with information included up to August 2025 where possible. Unless otherwise specified, all translations in this report were carried out by the Monitor.

As in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations from around the world contributed to this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of researchers and editors with the support of a significant number of donors. Country-specific contributions were received from a network of more than a dozen Monitor researchers covering 30 countries, with the assistance of ICBL-CMC campaigners. The researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.org.²

The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed to the research for this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for their crucial assistance in the production, release, distribution, and promotion of Monitor reports.

Content produced by the Monitor was reviewed by members of the Monitoring and Research Committee comprised of five member organizations, as well as Monitor Editorial Team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. At the time of publication, the committee's members were: the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Camilo Serna), DanChurchAid (Lene Rasmussen), Human Rights Watch (Mary Wareham), Humanity & Inclusion (Eva Maria Fischer and Alma Taslidžan), Mines Action Canada (Erin Hunt), Monitor Editorial Team leaders (Ban Policy: Mary Wareham; Impact: Loren Persi Vicentic; and Mine Action Funding: Ruth Bottomley), relevant senior ICBL-CMC staff (Éléa Boureux and Kasia Derlicka-Rosenbauer), and *ex officio* member Tamar Gabelnick (ICBL-CMC director).

From January to August 2025, the Monitor's Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and drafted thematic overviews for *Cluster Munition Monitor 2025*. The Editorial Team included:

- **Ban Policy:** Mary Wareham, Mennah Abdelwahab, Mark Hiznay, and Camila Levey;
- **Impact:** Loren Persi Vicentic, Katrin Atkins, Éléa Boureux, Mariarene Fornari, Valérie Nugues, Asees Puri, and Clémentine Tavernier.

Anna Lim (Editorial Consultant) provided final editing in July and August 2025 with support from Éléa Boureux (Project Manager). Michael Hart also contributed to *Cluster Munition Monitor 2025*.

Report formatting and cover design were undertaken by Michael Sherwin. Maps were created by Loreta Marcellino. Heliographie Girard printed the report in Switzerland.

The front cover photograph was provided by Rashad Sibli/DanChurchAid. The back cover photographs were provided by Humanity & Inclusion. Additional photographs found within *Cluster Munition Monitor 2025* were provided by multiple photographers, cited with each photograph.

² See, Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/who-are-we.

We extend our gratitude to Monitor financial contributors. In 2025, this work was made possible with funding from (list accurate as of 1 August 2025):

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- Government of Norway
- Government of Switzerland
- Holy See

The Monitor is also grateful for the support received from private donors.

The Monitor's supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material contained in this report.

In memoriam Slađan Vučković

Slađan Vučković, a cluster munition survivor and campaign member from Niš, Serbia, passed away on 30 June 2025 at the age of 59. While working as a deminer, Slađan lost his arms and part of his leg when a submunition exploded during clearance operations—the submunition was a remnant from cluster munitions dropped by NATO on his hometown of Niš on 25 April 1999. After the incident, Slađan drew on immense courage to turn his personal tragedy into a force for global change. As a member of the Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International) Ban Advocates project, he played a vital role in the efforts that led to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. Slađan fought not only for the removal of cluster munitions but for the dignity, rights, and wellbeing of survivors everywhere. The ICBL-CMC pays tribute to Slađan and honors his lasting contribution to the shared goal of a world free of cluster munitions.



Slađan Vučković campaigning in Niš, Serbia on the Global Day of Action in 2014 to mark the launch of the PAX report "Worldwide Investments in Cluster Munitions: a Shared Responsibility."

© CMC, November 2014

In memoriam Nerina Čevra

Nerina Čevra, a passionate and determined advocate and human rights lawyer dedicated to advancing survivors' rights, victim assistance, disarmament, and human rights, passed away on 6 August 2025. Herself a refugee from the Bosnian war, Nerina brought a powerful human perspective to her advocacy. Nerina joined the Landmine Survivors Network (LSN) in 2003 and played an instrumental role in the inclusion of victim assistance provisions in disarmament treaties such as the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. She facilitated victim engagement in the Arms Trade Treaty and greatly contributed to the development of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Her immense efforts shaped how victim assistance and disability rights are understood and reported on within humanitarian disarmament treaties and other international instruments. The ICBL-CMC pays tribute to Nerina and honors her contribution to survivors' rights, victim assistance, and Monitor reporting.



Nerina Čevra taking part in the ICBL's Lend Your Leg campaign in London in April 2012.

© ICBL, April 2012

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BAC	battle area clearance
CBU	cluster bomb unit
CCW	1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CHA	confirmed hazardous area
CMC	Cluster Munition Coalition
CMR	cluster munition remnants
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
DCA	DanChurchAid
DPICM	dual-purpose improved conventional munition
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EORE	explosive ordnance risk education
ERW	explosive remnants of war
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI	Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced person
IED	improvised explosive device
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
ISU	Implementation Support Unit
NGO	non-governmental organization
NSAG	non-state armed group
SHA	suspected hazardous area
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UXO	unexploded ordnance

2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Table Key

States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of 1 August 2025

Signatories: Signed, but not yet ratified as of 1 August 2025

States not party: Not yet acceded or withdrawal as of 1 August 2025

The Americas

Antigua & Barbuda	Guyana
Belize	Honduras
Bolivia	Mexico
Canada	Nicaragua
Chile	Panama
Colombia	Paraguay
Costa Rica	Peru
Cuba	Saint Kitts & Nevis
Dominican Rep.	Saint Lucia
Ecuador	Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
El Salvador	Trinidad & Tobago
Grenada	Uruguay
Guatemala	
Jamaica	Haiti
Argentina	Dominica
Bahamas	Suriname
Barbados	United States
Brazil	Venezuela

East & South Asia & the Pacific

Afghanistan	Nauru
Australia	New Zealand
Cook Islands	Niue
Fiji	Palau
Japan	Philippines
Lao PDR	Samoa
Maldives	Sri Lanka
Indonesia	
Bangladesh	Myanmar
Bhutan	Nepal
Brunei Darussalam	Pakistan
Cambodia	Papua New Guinea
China	Singapore
India	Solomon Islands
Kiribati	Thailand
Korea, North	Timor-Leste
Korea, South	Tonga
Malaysia	Tuvalu
Marshall Islands	Vanuatu
Micronesia	Vietnam
Mongolia	

Europe, the Caucasus & Central Asia

Albania	Germany	Netherlands
Andorra	Holy See	North Macedonia
Austria	Hungary	Norway
Belgium	Iceland	Portugal
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Ireland	San Marino
Bulgaria	Italy	Slovakia
Croatia	Liechtenstein	Slovenia
Czech Republic	Luxembourg	Spain
Denmark	Malta	Sweden
France	Moldova	Switzerland
Cyprus	Monaco	United Kingdom
	Montenegro	
Armenia	Kazakhstan	Serbia
Azerbaijan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan
Belarus	Latvia	Türkiye
Estonia	Lithuania	Turkmenistan
Finland	Poland	Ukraine
Georgia	Romania	Uzbekistan
Greece	Russia	

Middle East & North Africa

Iraq	Palestine	Tunisia
Lebanon		
Algeria	Kuwait	Syria
Bahrain	Libya	United Arab Emirates
Egypt	Morocco	Yemen
Iran	Oman	
Israel	Qatar	
Jordan	Saudi Arabia	

Sub-Saharan Africa

Benin	Ghana	Nigeria
Botswana	Guinea	Rwanda
Burkina Faso	Guinea-Bissau	Sao Tome & Principe
Burundi	Lesotho	Senegal
Cameroon	Madagascar	Seychelles
Cabo Verde	Malawi	Sierra Leone
Chad	Mali	Somalia
Congo, Rep.	Mauritania	South Africa
Comoros	Mauritius	South Sudan
Côte d'Ivoire	Mozambique	Togo
Eswatini	Namibia	Zambia
Gambia	Niger	
Angola	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Liberia
Central African Rep.	Djibouti	Tanzania
	Kenya	Uganda
Equatorial Guinea	Ethiopia	Sudan
Eritrea	Gabon	Zimbabwe

TABLE OF CONTENTS

MAJOR FINDINGS 1

CLUSTER MUNITION BAN POLICY 7

- 7 Introduction
- 9 Universalization
 - 9 Accessions
 - 10 Ratifications
 - 11 Withdrawals
 - 11 Meetings on Cluster Munitions
 - 13 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 79/58
- 14 Use of Cluster Munitions
 - 15 Historical Use
 - 16 New Use
 - 21 Reported or Alleged Use
- 21 Production of Cluster Munitions
 - 22 Historical Production
 - 22 Current Producers
- 25 Transfers of Cluster Munitions
 - 25 Historical Transfers
 - 26 New Transfers
- 28 Stockpiles of Cluster Munitions and their Destruction
 - 28 Global Stockpiles
 - 30 Stockpile Destruction
- 33 Retention
- 34 Transparency Reporting
- 35 National Implementation Legislation
- 36 Interpretive Issues
 - 37 Interoperability and the Prohibition on Assistance
 - 38 Transit and Foreign Stockpiling
 - 39 Disinvestment
- 40 Appendix: Timeline and Maps
 - 40 Timeline of Cluster Munition Use
 - 44 Status of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions
 - 45 Production of Cluster Munitions
 - 46 Cluster Munition Stockpiles and Destruction

THE IMPACT 49

- 49 Introduction
- 52 Assessing the Impact
 - 52 Cluster Munition Casualties
 - 56 Contamination from Cluster Munition Remnants
- 65 Addressing the Impact
 - 65 Cluster Munition Remnant Clearance
 - 72 Risk Education
 - 77 Victim Assistance
 - 84 Standards
 - 85 Reporting
- 87 Appendix: Maps
 - 87 Cluster Munition Contamination
 - 88 Cluster Munition Casualties

STATUS OF THE CONVENTION 91

- 91 Convention Status
- 94 Convention on Cluster Munitions
- 107 Glossary



In Paksong district of Saravane province, Lao PDR, a clearance technician from Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) uses a GPS device to record the coordinates of cluster munition remnants in a rice field where 178 BLU-26 submunitions were found.

© NPA, May 2025

MAJOR FINDINGS

BAN POLICY

STATUS OF THE 2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

- The Convention on Cluster Munitions has 111 States Parties and 12 signatories. The most recent states to become parties to the convention were South Sudan and Nigeria. The convention came into force for South Sudan on 1 February 2024, and for former signatory Nigeria on 1 August 2023.
- The convention lost one State Party on 6 March 2025, when Lithuania's withdrawal from the convention went into effect. It is the first time that a state has withdrawn from the convention.
- An annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the convention was adopted in December 2024 by 121 states, including 27 states not party to the convention. Many states did not attend the vote in December but did vote on the resolution during its initial consideration by the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in November, when 139 states voted in favor. Russia was the only country to vote against it in either forum.

USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

- There have been no reports or allegations of new use of cluster munitions by any State Party since the convention was adopted in May 2008.
- Cluster munitions were used in Ukraine by Russian and Ukrainian forces during 2024 and the first half of 2025. There were also reports of cluster munition use inside Russia and in areas under Russian control by Ukrainian forces attacking Russian targets, but it was not possible to verify these claims.
- New cluster munition use was also recorded in Myanmar and Syria.
- Thailand appeared to admit to using cluster munitions in the border conflict with Cambodia in July 2025. Neither state is party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
- The Israeli military alleged that cluster munitions were used in an Iranian ballistic missile attack on central Israel in June 2025.

PRODUCTION

- There are 17 countries that still produce cluster munitions or reserve the right to do so: Brazil, China, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Türkiye, and the United States (US). None of these countries is party to the convention.
- Cluster Munition Monitor found evidence of new cluster munition production in Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and South Korea during the reporting period.
- Cluster munitions produced by North Korea were used in Ukraine in 2025. It's not clear whether they were used by North Korean forces engaged in joint military operations with Russia, or acquired from North Korea by Russia and used by Russian forces in Ukraine.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION AND RETENTION

- Since the convention's adoption in 2008, a total of 42 States Parties have collectively destroyed 100% of the cluster munition stocks that they declared, destroying 1.49 million cluster munitions and 179 million submunitions. Peru was the last State Party to complete the destruction of its stockpiles, in December 2023.
- Only six States Parties are retaining live cluster munitions for permitted research and training purposes, of which Germany has the highest number (77 cluster munitions and 4,851 submunitions).

TRANSFER

- Between July 2023 and October 2024, the US announced making at least seven transfers of cluster munitions to Ukraine, with some of those weapons transiting across State Party Germany in the process. Ukraine may have acquired cluster munitions from other countries since 2022, but reports of such transfers have been denied by the countries concerned.
- In June 2024, companies from India and South Korea promoted their cluster munitions for sale at the Eurosatory Arms Exhibition in France, which is a State Party to the convention. Both the convention and French law prohibit the promotion of cluster munitions on French territory.
- In the past, at least 15 countries have transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries. However, since the convention took effect in August 2010, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for purposes permitted by the convention.

TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

- A total of 107 States Parties have submitted an initial Article 7 transparency report for the convention. However, five States Parties—Cabo Verde, the Comoros, the Republic of the Congo, Guinea, and Rwanda—still have not done so.
- Compliance with the annual reporting requirement is overall satisfactory, however, only approximately half of States Parties regularly provide annual updated transparency reports.

NATIONAL LEGISLATION

- A total of 33 States Parties have specific implementation laws for the convention. The last country to enact national implementing legislation was Niue in 2021.
- Another 22 States Parties are planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention, while 43 States Parties regard their existing laws and regulations as sufficient.

THE IMPACT

CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES

- Ukraine had the highest number of annual casualties globally for the third consecutive year. Since February 2022, over 1,200 cluster munition casualties have been recorded in Ukraine.
- Globally, 314 people were recorded as killed or injured by cluster munitions in 2024. However, the actual number is likely much higher as many casualties go unreported. In Ukraine alone, some 40 cluster munition attacks were reported in 2024 where the number of casualties that occurred was not noted.
- New casualties from cluster munitions were recorded in nine countries—Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen—in 2024.
 - All of those countries, except Myanmar, had new casualties from cluster munition remnants recorded in 2024.
 - Casualties from cluster munition attacks occurred in three countries—Myanmar, Syria, and Ukraine—all states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
- Of the total reported casualties in 2024, 257 were the result of cluster munition attacks, while 57 were caused by cluster munition remnants.
- Cluster munitions and their remnants continued to disproportionately impact civilians. All recorded casualties in 2024 were civilians. However, unreliable reporting on military casualties prevented the number of military casualties from being included in the Monitor's casualty dataset.
- In 2024, sex- and age-disaggregated data on cluster munition casualties was severely lacking, especially in conflict-affected countries where reporting was challenging. However, the majority of casualties continued to be men and boys, where the sex was known.
- Children are at particularly high risk of harm from cluster munition remnants, especially submunitions. Children accounted for 42% of all recorded casualties from cluster munition remnants in 2024.

CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION AND CLEARANCE

- A total of 29 countries and other areas are contaminated or suspected to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants. Of those, 10 are States Parties: Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan. One state not party, Myanmar, was added to the list in 2024.
- A total of 11 States Parties have completed clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas—the most recent being Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 2023. No State Party completed clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2024.
- States Parties contaminated with cluster munition remnants released just over 100km² of hazardous area through clearance, technical survey, and non-technical survey during 2024. Combined, these land release methods resulted in the destruction of at least 83,452 cluster munition remnants. The number of cluster munition remnants destroyed in 2024 is the highest reported in the past five years.
- Of the contaminated States Parties, Chile, Germany, Lao PDR, and Mauritania increased the amount of land released in 2024 compared to 2023. For Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and South Sudan, the annual amount decreased in 2024, primarily due to a decline in funding—and, in the case of Lebanon, as a consequence of new conflict that shifted priorities towards emergency response. Chad and Somalia did not release any cluster munition contaminated land in 2024.
- In the first half of 2025, Afghanistan, Chile, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia each requested to extend their current clearance deadlines.

RISK EDUCATION

- In 2024, all contaminated States Parties carried out risk education activities warning of the dangers of cluster munition remnants and other explosive hazards, except for Chile and Germany, where cluster munition contaminated areas are on military land that is inaccessible to the public.
- Men and boys remained the groups at highest risk of harm from cluster munition remnants due to everyday activities that bring them into contact with contaminated areas.
- Corresponding with the high risk of harm that they face, children represented the majority of risk education beneficiaries (59%), comprising 31% boys and 28% girls. Adults constituted the remaining 41% of beneficiaries, with 20% men and 21% women.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

- Victim assistance efforts under the Convention on Cluster Munitions saw some targeted improvements in 2024, but many States Parties faced significant structural and funding challenges that have hampered the provision of adequate and accessible services.
 - In Lao PDR, a multi-year US-funded program extended to continue through 2027 was stalled by funding cuts in 2025.
- Despite some increase in beneficiary numbers within States Parties in 2024, access to emergency and continuing medical care and to rehabilitation services remained limited for survivors living in rural or conflict-affected areas, particularly in Afghanistan and Lebanon.
- National health systems in most cluster munition affected countries have not yet achieved the required sustainability of service delivery. In some affected countries, including in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Somalia, and South Sudan, support from international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) helped fill gaps.
- Limited progress was made in socio-economic inclusion and financial assistance for victims, leaving many needs unmet. Many cluster munition victims could not access income-generating opportunities.
 - However, in 2025, Montenegro passed legislative amendments that gave civilian casualties the right to compensation.
- Vital psychological support was often lacking, particularly in Lao PDR and South Sudan, with some improvements in legislation and coordination reported in Afghanistan and Albania.
- Ongoing conflicts hindered vital victim assistance access and weakened health systems in countries outside the convention that have experienced recent new contamination and casualties from attacks, including in Myanmar, Syria, and Ukraine, as well as in some parts of Yemen.



Lithuania deposited its instrument of withdrawal from the Convention on Cluster Munitions four days before the opening of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, which it did not attend.

© Mary Wareham/HRW, September 2024

CLUSTER MUNITION BAN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions is the sole international instrument dedicated to eradicating cluster munitions. The convention's humanitarian provisions enable communities to recover from armed conflict and its intergenerational impacts, while its disarmament provisions ensure lasting normative change.

The convention is having a positive impact in many ways, as detailed in this report. But it is also coming under strain, as are other key tenets of international humanitarian law (IHL).

The Convention on Cluster Munitions lost one member on 6 March 2025, when Lithuania's withdrawal from it went into effect, going from 112 States Parties to 111. Until then, no country had withdrawn from the convention or from the four other multilateral treaties that comprehensively prohibit an entire class of weapon and that were driven by humanitarian concerns.¹ Yet within a month of the withdrawal, Lithuania and four other European Union member states had announced their intent to leave the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.²

The last country to accede to the convention was South Sudan in August 2023. There were promising developments on universalization in the Pacific region during the reporting period, as the Marshall Islands, Tonga, and Vanuatu showed renewed interest in joining the convention. However, ratification processes by most of the dozen remaining signatories appear to have stalled.

¹ The Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Mine Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. See, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "In times of insecurity and conflict, states must work together to uphold and strengthen international humanitarian law," 18 July 2024, [bit.ly/ICRCStatement18July2024](https://www.icrc.org/en/document/statement-18-july-2024).

² Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania deposited their Mine Ban Treaty withdrawal instruments on 27 June 2025, and the withdrawals will take effect on 27 December 2025. Finland deposited its withdrawal on 10 July 2025, and it will take effect on 10 January 2026. Poland's parliament approved a legislative proposal to withdraw from the Mine Ban Treaty on 25 June 2025, but it has not deposited the withdrawal instrument as of 21 July 2025.



Ms. Wareham and Mr. Goose established and substantially contributed to the *Cluster Munition Monitor* since its initial publication in 2009.

© CMC, September 2024 and November 2011

The biggest accomplishment of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which entered into force on 1 August 2010, has been its stigmatization of cluster munitions as unacceptable weapons through the establishment of a new international norm prohibiting any use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of these weapons.

That norm has not sunk in everywhere, as shown by Lithuania's hasty withdrawal, which it says was driven by the need to maintain "a full spectrum of defensive tools, including cluster munitions."³ This can also be seen in the ongoing use of cluster munitions by Myanmar, Russia, and Ukraine, and alleged use by other states not party such as Iran and Thailand.

Cluster Munition Monitor found evidence of new production of cluster munitions in states not party Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and South Korea during the reporting period. States not party India and South Korea promoted their cluster munitions at the Eurosatory Arms Exhibition in Paris in June 2024 (France is a State Party).

However, respect for the norm is evident in some states that remain outside the convention. There were no reports or allegations of cluster munition use in recent conflicts in states not party Sudan and Yemen, and the weapons do not appear to have been used in Syria since the Assad government was overthrown in December 2024.

Any assumed or limited military utility of cluster munitions is far outweighed by the human suffering and civilian casualties caused by these weapons in the short and long term.

The strength of the norm prohibiting cluster munitions can be seen in the fact that none of its States Parties have engaged in prohibited activities since the convention's adoption in Dublin, Ireland, on 30 May 2008.

The last States Parties with stockpiles completed the convention's stockpile destruction obligation in 2023, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions and more than 179 million submunitions from their stockpiles. Only six States Parties have retained cluster munitions for research and training; the vast majority of States Parties see no need to retain live cluster munitions for such purposes.

Outside of stockpile destruction, States Parties made limited progress in other aspects of implementation during the reporting period. No national laws to implement and enforce the convention were enacted during 2024 or the first half of 2025. Compliance with the convention's annual transparency reporting requirement under Article 7 is overall satisfactory, but five States Parties still have not provided their initial reports, and only half of States Parties regularly provide their annual updated reports.

In Geneva, States Parties, United Nations (UN) agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), work to advance implementation and universalization of the convention with the support of a small, dedicated staff from the convention's Implementation Support Unit (ISU).

³ United Nations (UN), "Lithuania: Notification of Withdrawal," depository notification C.N.347.2024. TREATIES-XXVI.6, 6 September 2024, bit.ly/LithuaniaWithdrawal6Sept2024.

This ban policy overview covers activities during 2024 and through 1 August 2025. The findings reflect detailed profiles on ban policy—available on the Monitor website—for every country in the world.⁴

UNIVERSALIZATION

The Convention on Cluster Munitions requires its States Parties to encourage other states to ratify, accept, approve, or accede to the convention, with the goal of attracting adherence by all.⁵ Developments covered in this year's universalization section include, for the first time, a withdrawal from the convention.

ACCESSIONS

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, states can no longer sign it, but must join through a one-step process known as accession.⁶

The last country to accede to the convention was South Sudan on 3 August 2023. No countries acceded to the convention in 2024 or the first seven months of 2025.

Convention on Cluster Munitions membership by regional or security body⁷

Regional/security body	Support (%)	Support (number of member states)	States not party to the convention
African Union (AU)	81%	44 of 55	Algeria, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and <i>Western Sahara</i>
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	30%	3 of 10	Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
European Union (EU)	74%	20 of 27	Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	72%	23 of 32	Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Türkiye, US
Organization of American States (OAS)	77%	27 of 35	Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Dominica, Suriname, US, Venezuela
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)	56%	10 of 18	Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

Note: Other areas are indicated in *italics*.

⁴ See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

⁵ Accession, ratification, and other methods of joining the convention usually require parliamentary approval, typically in the form of legislation.

⁶ Accession is essentially a process that combines signature and ratification into a single step.

⁷ The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member of the African Union (AU), but Western Sahara's lack of official representation at the UN prevents it from joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions. See, International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), "Country Profile: Western Sahara: Cluster Munition Ban Policy," updated 13 September 2021, bit.ly/MonitorWSClusterBan2021.

There was some promising movement on universalization in the Pacific region during the reporting period. Vanuatu's parliament adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Ratification) Act in November 2024, approving Vanuatu's accession to the convention.⁸ As of 1 August 2025, Vanuatu has not yet deposited its accession instrument with the UN. The Marshall Islands ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 March 2025, and government officials say the government is actively considering acceding to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.⁹ Similarly, Tonga acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 25 June 2025, and government officials say the government regards the Convention on Cluster Munitions positively and is considering accession.¹⁰

RATIFICATIONS

The last country to ratify the convention was Nigeria on 28 February 2023.

Signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions¹¹

Angola	Indonesia
Central African Republic	Jamaica
Cyprus	Kenya
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	Liberia
Djibouti	Tanzania
Haiti	Uganda

None of the 12 remaining signatories took significant steps towards ratifying the convention in 2024 or the first half of 2025. Angola, Central African Republic, Djibouti, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, and Tanzania do not appear to have introduced proposals to ratify the convention to their respective parliaments for consideration and approval.

Modest progress on ratification has been reported in two countries. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) told States Parties in September 2024 that it has made significant efforts to pass the bill ratifying the Convention on Cluster Munitions.¹² Uganda said in September 2024 that "the process of ratification is still going through our internal processes," and a parliamentary committee is considering a draft law to ratify the convention.¹³

Ratification appears to be completely stalled in at least two signatory states. Cyprus has repeatedly stated since 2013 that it cannot ratify the convention until it resolves "the special security situation on the island."¹⁴ Haitian officials state that parliamentary consideration of

⁸ Convention on Cluster Munitions (Ratification), Act No. 19 of 2024, November 2024, bit.ly/VanuatuRatification5Nov2024. See also, Terence Malapa, "Parliament begins second ordinary session," *Vanuatu Daily Post*, 7 November 2024, bit.ly/DailyPostVanuatu7Nov2024.

⁹ Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) meeting with Samuel K. Lanwi Jr., Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the Marshall Islands to the UN in Geneva, Manila, 18 March 2025.

¹⁰ CMC meeting with Grace Motuapuaka, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Tonga, Manila, 18 March 2025.

¹¹ Signatories are bound by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not to engage in acts that "would defeat the object and purpose" of any treaty they have signed. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is considered customary international law and binding on all countries. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, Vienna, 23 May 1969, Art. 18, bit.ly/ViennaConvention23May1969.

¹² Statement of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Convention on Cluster Munitions Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 7 September 2024, bit.ly/StatementDRC7Sept2024.

¹³ Statement of Uganda, Convention on Cluster Munitions Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 10 September 2024, bit.ly/StatementUganda10Sept2024.

¹⁴ Statement of Cyprus, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 2 November 2022. See, UN meetings coverage, "Approving 21 Drafts, First Committee Asks General Assembly to Halt Destructive Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile Tests in Outer Space," 1 November 2022, bit.ly/UNGAFirstCommittee1Nov2022.

the draft ratification decree had been suspended due to “the current crisis in the country, which has rendered the parliament dysfunctional since January 2020.”¹⁵

The vast majority of signatories have ultimately followed through on their pledge to ratify the convention, though it is clear that the pace of ratifications has slowed significantly.¹⁶

WITHDRAWALS

Lithuania’s government decided to withdraw from the Convention on Cluster Munitions in July 2024. It never previously used, produced, or stockpiled cluster munitions, but the government asserted that cluster munitions were necessary to face increased regional security threats. The withdrawal took effect on 6 March 2025, six months after Lithuania deposited the instrument with the UN and notified the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the convention’s States Parties. Lithuania included a note with the denunciation instrument signed by President Gitanas Nausėda, which provides several reasons for why Lithuania “reconsidered its position” and withdrew from the convention.¹⁷

Since September 2024, more than 47 states have expressed concern and regret at Lithuania’s withdrawal, as have the UN Secretary-General, the ICRC, the CMC, and 101 Nobel laureates.¹⁸ The president of the convention’s Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties issued a statement expressing “deep regret” at the withdrawal and calling it “an unprecedented decision that risks eroding the norms and principles that prohibit the use of cluster munitions, which have caused indiscriminate harm and suffering over the past decades.”¹⁹

MEETINGS ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

The convention’s Twelfth Meeting of States Parties took place at the UN in Geneva from 10–13 September 2024, under the presidency of Ambassador Francisca Elizabeth Méndez Escobar, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the UN Office in Geneva. A total of 87

¹⁵ Statement of Haiti, Convention on Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 August 2022, bit.ly/StatementHaiti30Aug2022.

¹⁶ A total of 40 states ratified the convention before it entered into force on 1 August 2010, while 46 ratified between then and the First Review Conference held in September 2015. Another 10 states ratified in the five years leading to the Second Review Conference, held in two parts, in November 2020 and September 2021. Since then, only one state has ratified (Nigeria).

¹⁷ UN, “Lithuania: Notification of Withdrawal,” depositary notification C.N.347.2024.TREATIES-XXVI.6, 6 September 2024, bit.ly/LithuaniaWithdrawal6Sept2024. The note provides seven reasons, summarized as follows: 1) no states from the region followed the example of Lithuania’s signature of the convention; 2) Lithuania fulfilled its obligations under the convention in good faith; 3) “one country [Russia] ... launched an unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, and widely use cluster munitions during this armed conflict”; 4) Lithuania reassessed its defense strategies and capabilities, “determining that the current security environment necessitates maintaining a full spectrum of defensive tools, including cluster munitions”; 5) cluster munitions play “a critical role in [Lithuania’s] defensive operations and deterrence strategies”; 6) Lithuania is committed to adopting “advanced munitions, which include enhanced safety mechanisms and self-destruct features”; and 7) Lithuania remains “deeply committed to minimizing the humanitarian impact of military operations” including via clearance of unexploded ordnance and “by continuing to adhere to international humanitarian law, prioritizing the protection of civilian lives and property, and dedicating efforts to clear unexploded ordnance and support [to] victims of armed conflict.”

¹⁸ The following states have expressed regret or concern at Lithuania’s withdrawal in national or group statements: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mexico, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Switzerland, Togo, United Kingdom (UK), and Zambia.

¹⁹ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Statement of the 13MSP Presidency on Lithuania’s effective withdrawal from the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” 6 March 2025. See, Press Statement of the Southeast Asia and Pacific Regional Workshop on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 19 March 2025, bit.ly/CCMLithuania9Mar2025.

countries attended the meeting – 70 States Parties, four signatories, and 13 states not party – in addition to UN agencies, the ICRC, and the CMC.²⁰

Lithuania deposited its withdrawal instrument four days before the opening of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties and did not attend it. During the meeting, more than 46 States Parties expressed regret at Lithuania's decision to withdraw.²¹ The final report adopted by States Parties at the meeting's conclusion states that "the Meeting deeply regretted Lithuania's decision, exercising its national sovereignty, to denounce the Convention" and urged it to reconsider, offering "a constructive dialogue."²² In this regard, the report states:

The Meeting emphasized the legal obligation of the States parties to promote universal adherence to and strict observance of the Convention's norms, including to discourage, in every possible way, the use, development, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions. The Meeting also emphasized the commitment of the States parties to condemn the use of cluster munitions. The Meeting underlined that due to their wide area effect and high level of unexploded ordnance, cluster munitions kill, injure, and destroy indiscriminately and cause unacceptable harm and severe suffering to civilians and that any perceived military utility is outweighed by the humanitarian harm they cause. The Meeting further noted the importance of putting forth concerted efforts by the States parties and all stakeholders to foster the stigma around the use of cluster munitions, ensure an increase in the membership, and further strengthen the humanitarian norms of the Convention. The Meeting further recalled that the norms established by IHL and enshrined in the CCM [Convention on Cluster Munitions] function precisely as a guardrail to protect civilians in times of conflict or heightened insecurity.

The Meeting elected Ambassador Carlos D. Sorreta, Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the UN in Geneva, as president of the convention's Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to be held in Geneva from 16–19 September 2025. It also decided that the Third Review Conference in 2026 will be presided over by Lao PDR, which hosted the convention's First Meeting of States Parties in November 2010.

For the first time since 2022, the convention held intersessional meetings at the UN in Geneva on 7–8 April 2025, chaired by the convention's president-designate Ambassador Sorreta. Representatives from at least 52 countries participated.²³ The meetings focused on discussing the status of implementation and the "evolving landscape of humanitarian disarmament, particularly in light of recent developments that have tested the resilience of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the norms underpinning the CCM."²⁴ During the intersessional meetings, at least 14 States Parties expressed regret over Lithuania's withdrawal from the convention.²⁵

20 States not party: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Finland, Morocco, Myanmar, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Thailand, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Vietnam, and Zimbabwe participated in the meeting as observers.

21 Austria, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Holy See, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Malawi, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Switzerland, UK, and Zambia, along with a group of African States Parties.

22 Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Final Report of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties," Geneva, 20 September 2024, docs.un.org/CCM/MSP/2024/11.

23 Representatives from at least 52 countries participated in the convention's intersessional meetings at the UN in Geneva on 7–8 April 2025: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, DRC, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Germany, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, UK, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Email from Convention on Cluster Munitions Implementation Support Unit (ISU), 14 July 2025.

24 Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Concept Note from the 13 MSP Presidency: Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meeting 2025," 7–8 April 2025, bit.ly/ConceptNote13MSP8April2025.

25 Austria, Chile, Ireland, Japan, Lao PDR, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland, and Zambia.

The Philippines, as president-designate, hosted a regional workshop on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Manila on 18–19 March 2025, attended by 11 states not party from Southeast Asia and the Pacific.²⁶ Several signatories to the convention participated in a universalization workshop in Geneva on 29 April 2024.²⁷

The Convention on Cluster Munitions remains the sole international instrument to eliminate these weapons and address the unacceptable harm they cause. There were no formal proposals at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) for it to consider cluster munitions again, after its failure in 2011 to adopt a new protocol that aimed to legitimize them.

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 79/58

The annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the Convention on Cluster Munitions is a useful barometer for measuring interest in and support for the convention, especially in states that have not joined.

Since its introduction in 2015, support for the annual UNGA resolution on the convention has grown, and the 2023 vote result represented an all-time high.

By contrast, support for the 2024 resolution was at an all-time low as the final vote took place at a time when several states were not present in the room.²⁸ On 2 December 2024, a total of 121 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 79/58 on the Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, while Russia voted no, and 33 states abstained.²⁹

A total of 27 states not party to the convention voted for the 2024 resolution.³⁰

Russia voted against the resolution as it has done every year since 2015, except when it abstained in 2018 and 2020.

Signatory Cyprus abstained from voting on the UNGA resolution, as did then-withdrawing State Party Lithuania.³¹ Lithuania was the lead co-sponsor on the first UNGA resolution on the convention in 2015 and consistently voted in favor of it until 2024.

²⁶ Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Kiribati, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Singapore, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Convention on Cluster Munitions ISU, “Chair’s Summary,” Southeast Asia and Pacific Regional Workshop on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Manila, Philippines, 18–19 March 2025, bit.ly/CCMWorkshopMarch2025.

²⁷ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Briefing on the CCM for East African States,” undated [April 2024], bit.ly/CCMBriefingApr2024.

²⁸ According to the convention’s ISU, 38 member states were absent during the final vote on the resolution, including many States Parties that traditionally vote in favor of it each year. It appears that several were not present in the room when the resolution was voted on at the beginning of the afternoon session. Email from Convention on Cluster Munitions ISU, 9 December 2024.

²⁹ “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 79/58, 2 December 2024, bit.ly/UNGAVote2Dec2024.

³⁰ These states not party voted in favor during the final vote: Algeria, Armenia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, China, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Suriname, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Yemen.

³¹ The following states abstained from the final vote: Argentina, Bahrain, Belarus, Cambodia, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Korea, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Ukraine, UAE, United States (US), Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.

UNGA Resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions³²

Year	Resolution	In favor	Against	Abstained
2015	70/54	139	2	39
2016	71/45	141	2	39
2017	72/54	142	2	36
2018	73/54	144	1	38
2019	74/62	144	1	38
2020	75/62	147	0	38
2021	76/47	146	1	37
2022	77/79	144	1	37
2023	78/32	148	1	36
2024*	79/58	121 (139)	1	33 (38)

*Numbers in brackets show the initial vote held during the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security meeting on 5 November 2024.

The initial round of voting on the resolution that took place on 5 November 2024 by the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security better captures the intended votes on it: a total of 139 states voted in favor of the resolution during this first round of voting, while Russia voted no and 38 states abstained.³³

During the debate on the 2024 resolution, states not party Iran, Pakistan, and South Korea explained their vote. All repeated well-worn reasons for not joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions contains the convention's core obligations designed to eliminate future humanitarian impact, most crucially the absolute ban on use of cluster munitions. Under Article 1(1)(a), each State Party undertakes "never under any circumstances to use cluster munitions."

³² See, "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 79/58, 2 December 2024, docs.un.org/A/RES/79/58; "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 78/32, 4 December 2023, docs.un.org/A/RES/78/32; "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 77/79, 7 December 2022, docs.un.org/A/RES/77/79; "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 76/47, 6 December 2021, docs.un.org/A/RES/76/47; "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 75/62, 7 December 2020, docs.un.org/A/RES/75/62; "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 74/62, 12 December 2019, docs.un.org/A/RES/74/62; "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 73/54, 5 December 2018, docs.un.org/A/RES/73/54; "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 72/54, 4 December 2017, docs.un.org/A/RES/72/54; "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016, docs.un.org/A/RES/71/45; and "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015, docs.un.org/A/RES/70/54.

³³ See, voting data for Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (draft resolution 79/71), UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 5 November 2024, bit.ly/FirstCommittee5Nov2024.

HISTORICAL USE

There have been no confirmed reports or allegations of new cluster munition use by any State Party since the convention was adopted in 2008. Several past users and producers of cluster munitions, such as France, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the United Kingdom (UK), are States Parties to the convention and have committed to never use cluster munitions under any circumstances.

Since the end of World War II in 1945, at least 23 governments have used cluster munitions in 39 countries and five other areas, as shown by the Timeline of Use table at the end of this overview chapter. Almost every region of the world has experienced cluster munition use at some point over the past 70 years, including Southeast Asia, Southeast Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

Since the convention entered into force in August 2010, cluster munitions have been used by 10 states not party: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Libya, Myanmar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, and Ukraine.

Most states outside the convention have never used cluster munitions.³⁴

Past users of cluster munitions³⁵

User state	Locations used
Armenia	Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan	<i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>
Colombia	Colombia
Eritrea	Ethiopia
Ethiopia	Eritrea
France	Chad, Iraq, Kuwait
Georgia	Georgia, possibly <i>Abkhazia</i>
Iraq	Iran, Iraq
Israel	Egypt, Lebanon, Syria
Libya	Chad, Libya
Morocco	Mauritania, <i>Western Sahara</i>
Myanmar	Myanmar
Netherlands	Former Yugoslavia (<i>Kosovo</i> , Montenegro, Serbia)
Nigeria	Sierra Leone
Russia	Afghanistan (as USSR), Georgia, Syria, Ukraine, <i>Chechnya</i>
Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia, Yemen
South Africa	Admitted past use, but did not specify where
Sudan	Sudan
Syria	Syria
Thailand	Cambodia

³⁴ Nine states not party that produce cluster munitions have stated that they have never used cluster munitions (Brazil, China, Egypt, Greece, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, South Korea, and Türkiye), while the Monitor has not verified any use of cluster munitions by four other producers (India, Iran, North Korea, and Singapore). Israel, Myanmar, Russia, and the US are the only countries to both produce and use cluster munitions.

³⁵ This accounting of states using cluster munitions is incomplete, as cluster munitions have been used in other countries, but the party responsible for the use is not clear. This includes use in Angola, Armenia, DRC, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Zambia.

User state	Locations used
Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine
UK	Iraq, Kuwait, former Yugoslavia (<i>Kosovo</i> , Montenegro, Serbia), <i>Falklands/Malvinas</i>
US	Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Grenada, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Vietnam, Yemen, former Yugoslavia (<i>Kosovo</i> , Montenegro, Serbia)
Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of (FRY)	Albania, BiH, Croatia, <i>Kosovo</i>

Note: Other areas are indicated in *italics*; USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Few non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used cluster munitions, in part due to a lack of necessary infrastructure and the complexity of operating these weapons and their delivery systems. In the past, use of cluster munitions by NSAGs has been recorded in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance; in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) by Croat and Serb militias; in Croatia by a Serb militia; in Israel by Hezbollah; in Libya by the Libyan National Army (LNA); in Syria by the Islamic State; and in Ukraine by Russian-backed separatists (in 2014–2015).

NEW USE

Cluster munitions were used in Ukraine during the reporting period by Russian and Ukrainian forces, while Russia continued to allege Ukrainian cluster munition attacks on Russian territory. Cluster munitions were also used in Myanmar and Syria. Thailand appeared to admit to using cluster munitions in Cambodia, as this report was going to print. Israel alleged that Iran used cluster munitions in a ballistic missile attack. None of these countries have joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

UKRAINE

Both Russia and Ukraine continued to use cluster munitions during 2024 and the first half of 2025, but it is not possible to systematically document and attribute the continued use of these weapons given available evidence and lack of access to areas where there are active hostilities.

As of July 2025, at least 15 types of cluster munitions and three types of individual submunitions have been used in Ukraine since February 2022.³⁶ These types of cluster munitions are all launched from the ground in missiles, rockets, and mortar projectiles except for the RBK-series cluster bomb, which is delivered by aircraft.

Cluster munitions used in Ukraine, 2022–2025

Ground-fired rockets and missiles	Ground-fired artillery and mortar projectiles	Air-delivered bombs and missiles
220mm 9M27K-series Uragan	120mm M971 DPICM	KH-101 cruise missile
300mm 9M55K-series Smerch	155mm M483A1 DPICM	RBK-500 PTAB-1M
300mm 9M54-series Tornado-S	155mm M864 DPICM	Individual ShOAB-0.5 submunitions
9M549 Tornado-S	152mm 3-O-13	Individual PTAB-2.5 submunitions
9M79-series Tochka	203mm 3-O-14	
9M723K1 Iskander-M M39 and M39A1 ATACMS	240mm 3-O-8	

³⁶ Re-purposed bomblets from cluster munitions are being removed from their delivery containers and being dropped by quadcopter drones. See, Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine," 3 June 2025, [bit.ly/HRW3June2025](https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/03/russia-drones-ukraine).

Russian use

Russia has used cluster munitions extensively in Ukraine since the first day of its full-scale invasion of the country on 24 February 2022.³⁷ According to Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ukrainian authorities had documented 5,974 cases of Russia using cluster munitions as of 26 June 2025.³⁸

Russia continued its cluster munition attacks on civilians in densely populated urban areas of Ukraine during the second half of 2024 and first half of 2025, according to local authorities, media reports, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). For example:

- KH-101 cruise missiles with a cluster munition warhead were used in a 17 June 2025 attack on Kyiv that reportedly killed 30 people and injured 172.³⁹
- Cluster munitions were used in a Russian ballistic missile attack on the city of Sumy on 14 April 2025, killing 35 people, including two children, and wounding 117.⁴⁰
- Cluster munitions were used in a Russian attack on Dobropillia, Donetsk region, on 7 March 2025, which killed 11 civilians and injured 48.⁴¹
- Cluster munitions were used in a Russian ballistic missile attack on Sumy on 17 November 2024, which killed 11 people, including two children, and injured 84 others.⁴²

Submunitions with Korean language production markings were found in Ukrainian-controlled territory in 2025, but it's not clear if they were used by North Korean forces engaged in joint military operations with Russia, or if they were from cluster munitions acquired from North Korea by Russia and used by Russian forces in Ukraine. (See *New development and production section*.)

Ukrainian use

Ukraine does not deny using cluster munitions in the conflict and states that “the Armed Forces of Ukraine strictly adhere to the norms of international humanitarian law.”⁴³ The first Ukrainian use of cluster munitions in the conflict was reportedly in March 2022.⁴⁴ Ukraine

³⁷ HRW documented an attack using a ballistic missile containing submunitions that struck the grounds of a hospital in Vuhledar (Donetsk region). See, HRW, “Russian Cluster Munition Strikes Ukrainian Hospital,” 25 February 2022, bit.ly/HRWUkraine25Feb2022.

³⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, “Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the systematic use of cluster munitions by the Russian Federation during its aggression against Ukraine,” 26 June 2025, bit.ly/MFAUkraine26June2025.

³⁹ Olena Goncharova, “A brutal strike’ – Massive Russian missile and drone attack hits Kyiv, killing 30, injuring 172,” *The Kyiv Independent*, 17 June 2025, bit.ly/KiyvInd17June2025; Natalia Yermak, “Russia increasingly targets Ukraine’s cities with cluster munitions, raising civilian toll,” *The Kyiv Independent*, 2 July 2025, bit.ly/KiyvInd2July2025; Vitaliy Klitschko (Vitaliy_Klitschko), “In the capital’s Nyvky, emergency services are currently finding these types of cluster munitions. Another evidence of the genocide that Russia is committing against Ukrainians,” 17 June 2025, 6:28 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/VKTelegram17June2025.

⁴⁰ Svitlana Vlasova and Rosa Rahimi, “Russian strikes on Ukrainian city of Sumy kill 35, in deadliest attack this year,” *CNN*, 13 April 2025, bit.ly/CNNUkraine14Apr2025; Timothy Jones, “Ukraine: More than 30 killed in Russian strike on Sumy,” *DW*, 13 April 2025, bit.ly/DWUkraine13April2025.

⁴¹ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 1 December 2024–31 May 2025,” 30 June 2025, p. 5, bit.ly/OHCHRUkraine30June2025; “‘Apocalyptic’ cluster bomb attack by Russia stuns residents in east Ukraine,” *The Straits Times*, 9 March 2025, bit.ly/StraitsTimes9March2025.

⁴² “Russian ballistic missile with cluster munitions kills 11 people, injures 84 in Ukraine’s North,” *The New Indian Express*, 18 November 2024, bit.ly/NewIndianExpress18Nov2024.

⁴³ Thomas Gibbons-Neff and John Ismay, “To Push Back Russians, Ukrainians Hit a Village With Cluster Munitions,” *The New York Times*, 18 April 2022, bit.ly/NewYorkTimes18April2022.

⁴⁴ The *New York Times* first reported that Ukrainian forces used Uragan cluster munition rockets in an attack on Husarivka, in Kharkiv region, on either 6 or 7 March 2022, when the village was under Russian control. Thomas Gibbons-Neff and John Ismay, “To Push Back Russians, Ukrainians Hit a Village With Cluster Munitions,” *The New York Times*, 18 April 2022, bit.ly/NewYorkTimes18April2022. See also, HRW, “Cluster Munition Use in Russia-Ukraine War,” 29 May 2023, bit.ly/UkraineHRW29May2023.

began using United States (US)-supplied 155mm DPICM artillery projectiles within “a few weeks” of the transfer announced in July 2023, according to reporters embedded with an artillery unit trained and equipped by the US.⁴⁵ Social media posts show purported Russian soldiers handling apparently unexploded DPICM submunitions.⁴⁶ Media coverage of Ukrainian artillery units in combat confirms that both M483A1 and M864 155mm DPICM projectiles, with markings indicating US manufacture in the 1980s to 1990s, are being used.⁴⁷

Since March 2022, there have been further reports from Russian authorities of Ukrainian use of cluster munitions in occupied areas inside Ukraine, mainly in Horlivka, Donetsk region. However, as of yet, this has not included verifiable attacks, and the nature of the incidents remains uncorroborated by independent sources. OHCHR reported that, although it could not verify all incidents, imagery examined in some cases was consistent with cluster munition use. One such incident occurred on 31 January 2025, when at least six civilians in Horlivka were reportedly injured by the explosion of cluster munitions.⁴⁸

Use in Russia

There are reports that Ukraine has used ATACMS ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads to attack targets inside Russia and in areas under Russian control, but it is not possible to verify these claims.⁴⁹ The Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine posted a video on its Telegram channel that appears to show Ukrainian cluster munition use in Kursk, Russia, in August 2024.⁵⁰ A Russian combatant showed a failed ATACMS missile and its payload of M74 submunitions in a September 2024 Telegram post but did not specify the location of the remnants.⁵¹

Russian officials and state-controlled media outlets have claimed that Ukrainian forces are using cluster munitions on Russian territory. There were at least 25 reports alleging Ukrainian cluster munition attacks between August 2024 and July 2025, and at least a dozen

⁴⁵ John Hudson and Anastacia Galouchka, “How Ukraine is exploiting Biden’s cluster bomb gamble,” *The Washington Post*, 21 August 2023, [bit.ly/WashingtonPost21Aug2023](https://www.washingtonpost.com/2023/08/21/ukraine-cluster-bomb-gamble/).

⁴⁶ Roy (GrandpaRoy2), “Foolish Russian goofs around with DPICM submunitions. Are they born with so little common sense, or do their brains just deteriorate living in Russia?” 28 April 2024, 17:52 UTC. X post, [bit.ly/XPostRoy28April2024](https://twitter.com/GrandpaRoy2/status/1784444444444444444).

⁴⁷ Status-6 (Military & Conflict News) (Archer83Able), “Ukrainian artillerymen firing an M864 DPICM 155mm cluster shell from a CAESAR 8x8 self-propelled howitzer on Tatra chassis. Each of these projectiles is carrying 72 submunitions (48 M42 & 24 M46 dual-purpose grenades)” 3 August 2023, 10:08 UTC. X post, [bit.ly/Archer83AbleXPost3Aug2023](https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1684444444444444444).

⁴⁸ OHCHR, “Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 1 December 2024–31 May 2025,” 30 June 2025, p. 6, [bit.ly/OHCHRUkraine30June2025](https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/06/ohchr-report-on-the-human-rights-situation-in-ukraine-1-december-2024-31-may-2025).

⁴⁹ Status-6 (Military & Conflict News) (Archer83Able), “A photo of an M74 submunition from the MGM-140 ATACMS missile with cluster warhead that was used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine during strikes on a fuel depot in Russia-controlled Rovenky tonight. The Ukrainian military conducted strikes on a fuel depot in Russia-controlled town of Rovenky, Luhansk Oblast of Ukraine, tonight. The town is located over 110km from the current frontline in Ukraine.” 10 May 2024, 22:05 UTC. X post, [bit.ly/Archer83AbleXPost10May2024](https://twitter.com/Archer83Able/status/1784444444444444444).

⁵⁰ Official Account of the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ukr_sof), “Where do Russian pontoons ‘disappear’ in Kursk Region? Special Operations Forces operators, together with units of the Defense Forces of Ukraine, accurately destroy them. The video shows the effective impressions of enemy engineering equipment in the Kursk region by SSO operators, as well as the detection and correction of Haimars fire on bridges and pontoon crossings. In addition, together with the Defense Forces of Ukraine, a cluster of equipment, a field warehouse of ammunition, fuel and ammunition, an electronic warfare complex, and a 152-mm D-20 cannon were struck and destroyed.” 21 August 2024, 07:48 UTC. Telegram, [bit.ly/TelegramSOFUkraine21Aug2024](https://t.me/SOFUkraine21Aug2024).

⁵¹ See video in Telegram post, One foot here, one foot there! (combat_engineer). 2 September 2024, 15:07 UTC. Telegram, [bit.ly/CombatEngineerTelegram2Sept2024](https://t.me/CombatEngineerTelegram2Sept2024).

between July 2023 and July 2024.⁵² While many allegations mention civilian casualties, the Monitor has not been able to independently verify these claims.

International response

The use of cluster munitions in Ukraine has been condemned by at least 41 states in national or joint statements at UN bodies such as the UNGA, the Human Rights Council, and the UNSC as of 1 July 2025.⁵³ The cluster munition attacks have also been condemned by the European Union (EU), the NATO Secretary-General, OHCHR, UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs and Experts, and the CMC. At the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in September 2024, States Parties condemned “any use of cluster munitions by any actor and under any circumstances” in the meeting’s final report, as well as in national and group statements.⁵⁴ They have expressed grave concern at the significant increase in civilian casualties and the humanitarian impact resulting from the repeated and well-documented use of cluster munitions since 2021.⁵⁵

MYANMAR

In the past, Myanmar has stated that it has never used, produced, or transferred cluster munitions.⁵⁶ However, evidence has emerged that indicates its armed forces have used a domestically produced air-dropped cluster munition since 2022, and the attacks continued to be reported in 2024 and the first half of 2025.

Cluster munitions were apparently used in an airstrike on a school in Paingyak village in Kawkareik township, Kayin state, on 9 June 2025.⁵⁷ They were also reportedly used in an attack on a school in O-Htein village in Tabayin township, Sagaing region, on 12 May 2025, which the Myanmar military denied.⁵⁸

Cluster munitions were used in several attacks during 2024, including one on Auk Chaing village in Mindat township, Chin state, on 3 April 2024 that the Myanmar military denied

⁵² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Terrorist Crimes Committed by the Kiev Regime,” 12 September 2024, bit.ly/MFARussia12Sep2024; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Speech by O.V. Bushuev, Member of the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Vienna Negotiations on Military Security and Arms Control, at the 1096th Plenary Session of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, 5 February 2025,” 6 February 2025, bit.ly/MFARussia6Feb2025; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry in connection with the terrorist attack by Ukrainian Nazis on Belgorod,” 31 August 2024, bit.ly/MFARussia31Aug2024; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “On the ongoing use of toxic chemicals by Ukrainian armed forces,” 25 December 2024, bit.ly/MFARussia25Dec2024.

⁵³ Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and UK.

⁵⁴ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final Report of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties,” Geneva, 20 September 2024, docs.un.org/CCM/MSP/2024/11.

⁵⁵ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Final report of the Second Review Conference,” Geneva, 6 October 2021, docs.un.org/CCM/CONF/2021/6.

⁵⁶ See, for example, statement of Myanmar, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 15 October 2015, bit.ly/MyanmarStatement15Oct2015.

⁵⁷ “Myanmar Junta Accused of Using Cluster Bombs in Deadly Attack on Karen Village School,” *The Irrawaddy*, 11 June 2025, bit.ly/IrrawaddyMyanmar11June2025.

⁵⁸ Grant Peck, “Funerals held in Myanmar for pupils and teachers killed in airstrike on school,” *The Associated Press*, 13 May 2025, bit.ly/APMyanmar13May2025; and “False airstrike reports spread by malicious media,” *The Global New Light of Myanmar*, 13 May 2025, bit.ly/GNLMyanmar13May2025.

undertaking.⁵⁹ Photographs of the aftermath of an 8 January 2024 airstrike in Thapyi Kan village in Mrauk-U township, Rakhine state, show cluster munition remnants.⁶⁰

In March 2024, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, reported that the Myanmar military's "use of cluster munitions, which are inherently indiscriminate weapons, in areas inhabited by civilians likely constitutes a war crime."⁶¹ The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Myanmar in Geneva issued a statement in response to the report that denied using cluster munitions in the attacks, stating: "With regard to the allegations of use of cluster munitions, the munitions used by Myanmar do not fall within the characteristics of cluster munitions defined by the Convention on Cluster Munitions."⁶²

SYRIA

The Syrian Armed Forces used cluster munitions extensively and repeatedly in 2012–2020, with the support of Russia. It continued to use cluster munitions in 2021–2024. There is no evidence that the transitional government has used cluster munitions since overthrowing the Assad regime in December 2024.

According to Syrian Civil Defence, government and Russian forces carried out multiple cluster munition attacks in northwestern Syria on 27 November 2024, killing at least one civilian and wounding at least 18.⁶³ At Al-Qura camp, one child was killed and five civilians injured in an attack that used 300mm 9M55K rockets delivering 9N210 and 9N235 submunitions. At Darat Izza, a girl and man were injured in an attack on a residential neighborhood, where Syrian Civil Defence found remnants of 300mm 9M55K cluster munition rockets and 9N210 and 9N235 submunitions. On the same day, 11 civilians were injured in a cluster munition attack in Atarib.

According to a report by the UN's Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, government forces carried out a cluster munition attack on Idlib on 7 January 2024, injuring two civilians.⁶⁴ The report also reiterates the commission's call for the government "to immediately cease using cluster munitions in populated areas and to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions."



The empty cargo section of a fired cluster munition rocket in the city of Darat Izza, in Syria's Aleppo governorate.

© White Helmets (Syria Civil Defence), November 2024

⁵⁹ "Regime Accused of Using Cluster Bombs in Arakan State," *Development Media Group*, 12 October 2024, bit.ly/DMGMyanmar12Oct2024; and "Subversive media circulate misinformation about Aukchai village in Mindat," *The Global New Light Of Myanmar*, 7 April 2024, bit.ly/GNLMyanmar7Apr2024.

⁶⁰ Facebook post by *Narinjara News*, 9 January 2024, bit.ly/NarinjaraNewsMyanmar9Jan2024.

⁶¹ Human Rights Council, "Situation of human rights in Myanmar: Report on the situation of human rights in Myanmar by Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews," 20 March 2024, docs.un.org/A/HRC/55/65.

⁶² Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in Geneva, "Myanmar's Observations on the report entitled 'Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar'," 15 March 2024, bit.ly/MyanmarGVA15March2024.

⁶³ Syrian Civil Defence, "A new escalation in attacks against civilians in northwestern Syria, causing casualties and exacerbating the humanitarian crisis," 27 November 2024, bit.ly/WhiteHelmetsSyria27Nov2024.

⁶⁴ Human Rights Council, "Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic," 12 August 2024, docs.un.org/A/HRC/57/86.

Under the Assad regime, Syria showed no interest in the convention and took no steps to join it.⁶⁵ On 8 December 2024, the government of President Bashar al-Assad was overthrown by a coalition of armed groups led by Hay'et Tahrir al-Sham, ending over 50 years of Baath Party rule in Syria. The CMC has urged Syria's transitional government to prepare to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.⁶⁶

REPORTED OR ALLEGED USE

There were allegations of cluster munition use in four other conflicts during the reporting period, but the Monitor could not independently confirm or verify these claims:

- In south Lebanon, unexploded submunitions were photographed after Israeli strikes on Hezbollah storage facilities, and the remnants indicated that the submunitions were ejected from stockpiled munitions hit by attacks.⁶⁷
- The Israeli military alleged that cluster munitions were used in an Iranian ballistic missile attack on central Israel on 19 June 2025.⁶⁸
- Palestine raised concern in September 2024 over the "Israeli use of internationally banned weapons in its attacks on the Gaza Strip" and said that there are "documented cases of injuries among Palestinian people in Gaza during the Israeli air strikes that are similar to those caused by the cluster bombs."⁶⁹
- Thailand appeared to admit to using cluster munitions in the border conflict with Cambodia that intensified as this report was being finalized.⁷⁰ According to the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), Thailand used an unspecified type of cluster munition in attacks near Phnom Khmouch (Ghost Mountain) and near Techo Thammachart village in Choam Khsant district, Preah Vihear province, on 25 July 2025.⁷¹

PRODUCTION OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never develop, produce, or acquire cluster munitions.

⁶⁵ The Syrian government commented publicly once on the convention, in 2011, when it described cluster munitions as "criminalized by humanity" but said it "cannot sign" the convention "due to Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights." Statement of Syria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011, bit.ly/SyriaStatement15Sep2011.

⁶⁶ Letters from CMC, to H.E. Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Transitional Government of Syria, 20 March 2025; and to Raed al-Saleh, Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management, Transitional Government of Syria, 11 July 2025.

⁶⁷ In September 2024, the CMC warned against any use of cluster munitions by any actor under any circumstances as conflict escalated between Israel and Hezbollah forces in Lebanon. The statement noted that a photo purportedly taken in south Lebanon that circulated on social media appeared to show a DPICM-type submunition made in China. Information suggests that the submunition was ejected from a Hezbollah storage facility that was attacked by Israeli forces. Another photo of the same type of submunition showed its stabilization ribbon was still neatly folded up, indicating that it may have been kicked out of its dispenser during an attack on a storage facility. See, CMC, Statement on Lebanon, 26 September 2024, bit.ly/CMCLebanon26Sept2024.

⁶⁸ Natan Odenheimer, Sanjana Varghese, Riley Mellen, John Ismay, and Adam Rasgon, "Israel's Military Says Iran Struck Israel With Missile Armed With Cluster Munitions," *The New York Times*, 19 June 2025, bit.ly/NewYorkTimes19Jun2025.

⁶⁹ Statement of Palestine, Convention on Cluster Munitions Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 10 September 2024, bit.ly/PalestineStatement10Sept2024.

⁷⁰ "Thai Army clarifies use of cluster munitions, insists they are aimed at military targets only," *The Straits Times*, 25 July 2025, bit.ly/StraitsTimes25July2025.

⁷¹ Niem Chheng, "CMAA condemns Thai use of cluster munitions," *The Phnom Penh Post*, 25 July 2025, bit.ly/PhnomPenhPost25July2025.

HISTORICAL PRODUCTION

Since World War II, at least 35 states have developed or produced more than 200 types of cluster munitions. This includes 18 countries that ceased manufacturing these weapons prior to or upon joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions.⁷²

Of the 18 states that have ceased production of cluster munitions, all are States Parties to the convention with the exception of Argentina. There were no changes to this list during the reporting period.

Several States Parties have provided information on the conversion or decommissioning of cluster munition production facilities in their Article 7 transparency reports, including BiH, Croatia, France, Japan, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland.⁷³

CURRENT PRODUCERS

Since the convention took effect in August 2010, there have been no confirmed instances of new production of cluster munitions by any State Party. However, a total of 17 countries are currently producing cluster munitions, or produced them in the past and have yet to commit to never produce them in the future. The Monitor's last addition to the list of producers was Myanmar in 2024. None of these states are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

NEW DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

Cluster Munition Monitor found evidence of new cluster munition production in Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and South Korea during the reporting period:

- Iran does not comment publicly on its production of cluster munitions, but evidence strongly suggests that it is manufacturing cluster munitions for its missiles and rockets. During an attack on Israel on 19 June 2025, Iran allegedly used cluster munitions that could have come from a Qiam series missile (the Iranian version of the Soviet-era Scud missile) or a larger Khorramshahr missile, according to one expert.⁷⁴
- Evidence emerged in 2023 that indicates Myanmar has developed and manufactured a cluster munition since 2021. Myanmar denies the weapon is a cluster munition.⁷⁵

Former producers of cluster munitions

Argentina	Italy
Australia	Japan
Belgium	Netherlands
BiH	Slovakia
Chile	South Africa
Croatia	Spain
France	Sweden
Germany	Switzerland
Iraq	UK

Cluster munition producers

Brazil	Myanmar
China	Pakistan
Egypt	Poland
Greece	Romania
India	Russia
Iran	Singapore
Israel	Türkiye
Korea, North	US
Korea, South	

⁷² The loading, assembling, and packaging of submunitions and carrier munitions into a condition suitable for storage or use in combat is considered production of cluster munitions. Modifying the original manufacturers' delivery configuration for improved combat performance is also considered a form of production.

⁷³ Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK did not report on the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities, most likely because production of cluster munitions ceased before they became States Parties to the convention. BiH, which inherited some of the production capacity of the former Yugoslavia, has declared that "there are no production facilities for [cluster munitions] in Bosnia and Herzegovina." BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form E, 20 August 2011. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM.

⁷⁴ Natan Odenheimer, Sanjana Varghese, Riley Mellen, John Ismay, and Adam Rasgon, "Israel's Military Says Iran Struck Israel With Missile Armed With Cluster Munitions," *The New York Times*, 19 June 2025, bit.ly/NewYorkTimes19Jun2025.

⁷⁵ See, CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2024* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2024), bit.ly/CMMonitor2024.

- The first publicly available evidence of North Korean production and transfer of cluster munitions emerged in early May 2025. Photographs were posted to social media by Ukrainian combatants after an attack on their position inside Ukraine that showed what appears to be an unexploded cylindrical submunition similar to the M42-series DPICM that failed to function. Korean language markings on the submunition have a designation of “JU-90” indicating North Korean production.⁷⁶ As of early July 2025, there is no information about whether this submunition was used by North Korean forces engaged in joint military operations with Russia or whether it was acquired by Russia and used by Russian forces in Ukraine.
- South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed in June 2025 that “a defense contractor did produce cluster munitions in 2024” but said that “the specific types of cluster munitions cannot be disclosed.”⁷⁷

Production may have also occurred in other countries listed as producers, such as India and Pakistan. It was not possible to detail new activities due to overall lack of transparency by the states concerned.

Greece, Israel, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Türkiye, and the US continue to indicate no active production, but the Monitor will continue to list them as producers until they renounce future production.⁷⁸ States that say their policy is aligned with the convention’s prohibitions should elaborate how specific policies, practices, and doctrines have changed in this regard, and detail measures being put in place to deter and prevent such activities in the future.

Since the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, several companies that once manufactured cluster munitions have ceased their production:⁷⁹

- Israel Military Industries (IMI)—Israel’s last cluster munition manufacturer—was acquired in late 2018 by Elbit Systems Ltd., which confirmed in October 2020 that it had discontinued the production of cluster munitions.⁸⁰
- Romanian company AEROTEH S.A. told the Monitor in July 2023 that it “has decided since 2008 not to be involved in the production of cluster munitions and is firmly committed not to produce any type of components for such ammunition in the future

⁷⁶ The submunition was identified by a Monitor researcher in South Korea, in an email dated 1 June 2025. The Korean characters for “Juche” (associated with the guiding ideology of North Korea) appeared on the dud submunition. “Ju-ch” was clearly visible but the “e” part was not clear and was partially obscured in the photo. See also, Collective Awareness to UXO, “Kt 90 Submunition,” accessed 23 June 2025, bit.ly/Kt90Submunition.

⁷⁷ Response from Lieutenant Colonel Lee Jeong-jae, Artillery Program Team, Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), South Korea Ministry of National Defense, to an Official Information Disclosure Request by World Without War, 13 June 2025.

⁷⁸ For example, in April and October 2021, Türkiye informed the president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions that “Turkey has never used, produced, imported or transferred cluster munitions since 2005 and does not intend to do so in the future.” But having no plans or intention to produce is insufficient. Türkiye should pledge not to produce in the future. Letter from Amb. Sadik Arslan, Permanent Representative of Türkiye to the UN in Geneva, to Amb. Aidan Liddle of the UK, President of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, 5 October 2021.

⁷⁹ See the relevant Monitor country profiles for the reasons given by these companies for stopping production of cluster munitions, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

⁸⁰ In October 2020, Elbit Systems Ltd. stated that it had “discontinued production, sales and deliveries of IMI’s [Israel Military Industries] M999 submunition, as well as all other munitions that are prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.” Email from David Block Temin, Executive Vice President, Chief Compliance Officer, and Senior Counsel, Elbit Systems Ltd., to PAX, 14 October 2020. See also, Tovah Lazaroff, “Elbit rejects HSBC’s BDS disclaimer stating: ‘We don’t produce cluster bombs,’” *The Jerusalem Post*, 3 January 2019, bit.ly/JerusalemPost3Jan2019; and PAX, “Elbit Systems confirms cluster munitions exit,” 23 January 2019, bit.ly/PAXElbitSystems23Jan2019.

nor to participate in any governmental or industrial cooperation program with other companies for the production or development of cluster munitions.”⁸¹

- Singapore's only cluster munition manufacturer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, announced in 2015 that it would no longer produce them, stating: “As a responsible military technology manufacturer we do not design, produce and sell anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions and any related key components.”⁸²
- The last US manufacturer of cluster munitions, Textron Systems Corporation, formally ended its production of the weapon in 2016.⁸³

US ALTERNATIVES

The US last budgeted funds to produce new cluster munitions in 2007.⁸⁴

However, the US is developing and producing several replacements for cluster munitions that may fail to meet the submunition reliability policy of its own Department of Defense, and that may still fall under the definition of cluster munitions prohibited under the convention.

The US Army has budgeted over US\$600 million during 2022–2029 for researching and developing replacements for 155mm artillery projectiles containing older DPICM (M42/M46). In 2018, two parallel research and development tracks began to develop Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munitions (C-DAEM) and a replacement for DPICM as “policy-compliant munitions.”⁸⁵ The US Army has approved acquiring an advanced Israeli-designed M999 antipersonnel munition to fulfil this requirement, and has renamed it the XM1208.⁸⁶ The XM1208 projectile dispenses nine M99 “advanced submunitions.”⁸⁷ The second project

⁸¹ Email from Dumitru Banut, General Director, AEROTEH S.A., 6 July 2023. A letter attached to the email referred to the company's “Statement of Principles,” bit.ly/AEROTEHStatementofPrinciples2022. The letter also stated that during 2022, a meeting of AEROTEH S.A. shareholders decided “to delete from its object of activity ‘Manufacturing of Armament and Ammunition - CAEN code 2540’...from the industrial activities of our company.” According to the letter, the decision to delete this code “represents also, the commitment of AEROTEH S.A. not to manufacture any type of armaments or ammunition in the future, therefore implicitly no type of components for cluster submunitions.” See, AEROTEH S.A., “Decision of the Extraordinary General Assembly of Shareholders: AEROTEH S.A., No. 1 of 08.11.2022,” 8 November 2022, bit.ly/AEROTEHMeeting8Nov2022.

⁸² See, Singapore Technologies Engineering website, www.stengg.com/en; PAX, “Singapore Technologies Engineering stops production of cluster munitions,” 19 November 2015, bit.ly/StopExplosiveSTE2015; and Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, “ST Engineering Quits Cluster Munitions,” 18 November 2015. The president of the company said the decision came about in part because “we often get asked by the investment community [about] our stand on cluster munitions.” Letter from Tan Pheng Hock, President and Chief Executive Officer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, to PAX, 11 November 2015.

⁸³ Orbital ATK (formerly Alliant Techsystems) of Hopkins, Minnesota, US, manufactured a solid rocket motor for the BLU-108 canisters contained in the CBU-105 cluster munition, but produced it only for use in that weapon. See, Marjorie Censer, “Textron to discontinue production of sensor-fuzed weapon,” *Inside Defense*, 30 August 2016, bit.ly/TextronDiscontinue; and “Last US cluster-bomb maker to cease production,” *Agence France-Presse (AFP)*, 1 September 2016, bit.ly/AFPClusterBombs1Sept2016.

⁸⁴ For details on US production of cluster munitions in 2005–2007, see, HRW and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 257–258, bit.ly/HRWLandmineActionMay2009; and ICBL, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2010* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), p. 263, bit.ly/CMMonitor2010.

⁸⁵ US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Estimates, RDT&E – Volume II, Budget Activity 5B, “Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munitions,” March 2023, Vol. 3B, pp. 154–163; US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Estimates, “Procurement of Ammunition, Army,” March 2024, p. 412; and US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Estimates, RDT&E – Volume II, Budget Activity 5B, “Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munitions,” March 2024, Vol. 3B, p. 173.

⁸⁶ Ibid. Hardware and some components of this projectile are being imported from Israel in cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Defense. It is unclear if the original Israeli manufacturer is involved in this transfer of technology. Previously, in October 2020, Elbit Systems Ltd. stated that it had “discontinued production, sales and deliveries of IMI's M999 submunition, as well as all other munitions that are prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.” Email from David Block Temin, Executive Vice President, Chief Compliance Officer, and Senior Counsel, Elbit Systems Ltd., to PAX, 14 October 2020.

⁸⁷ US Department of Defense, Joint Program Executive Office: Armaments and Ammunition, “C-DAEM DPICM Replacement (XM1208),” undated, bit.ly/USDODC-DAEM.

in the replacement program is called “C-DAEM DPICM Replacement.” This is intended to attack targets ranging from personnel to soft-skinned vehicles. Both the Army’s fiscal year 2025 research and its procurement justification materials no longer provide details on the C-DAEM DPICM replacement program.⁸⁸

Another replacement program is the Alternative Warhead variant for the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rocket. Production of it began in 2015 in order to replace M26 rockets, which deliver M77 DPICM munitions. This GMLRS Alternative Warhead contains 160,000 pre-formed tungsten fragments, but no explosive submunitions. A longer-term US research project will test a “Sensor Fuzed Weapon” (type not specified) for delivery by the GMLRS rocket by 2030. Efforts under this project will “determine the feasibility and effectiveness of utilizing GMLRS rockets to dispense anti-armor submunitions for engaging medium and heavy armor targets.”⁸⁹

TRANSFERS OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Under Article 1(1)(b) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties undertake to never “transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly” cluster munitions.

HISTORICAL TRANSFERS

The true scope of the global trade in cluster munitions is difficult to ascertain due to the overall lack of transparency on arms transfers. However, the Monitor has identified at least 15 countries that, in the past, have transferred more than 50 types of cluster munitions to at least 60 other countries.⁹⁰ While the historical record is incomplete and there are variations in publicly available information, the US was most likely the world’s leading exporter as it transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions, containing tens of millions of submunitions, to at least 30 countries and other areas.⁹¹

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin are reported to be in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including countries that inherited stocks after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.⁹² The full extent of China’s exports of cluster munitions is not known, but unexploded submunitions of Chinese origin have been found in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan.

Since the convention took effect in August 2010, no State Party is known to have transferred cluster munitions other than for the purposes of stockpile destruction or to retain them for research and training in the detection and clearance of cluster munition remnants, as permitted by the convention.⁹³

⁸⁸ US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Estimates, RDT&E – Volume II, Budget Activity 5B, “Canon-Delivered Area Effects Munitions,” March 2023, Vol. 3B, pp. 154–163.

⁸⁹ US Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Estimates, RDT&E – Volume III, Budget Activity 7, “Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System (GMLRS),” March 2023, Volume 4B, pp. 301–308, [bit.ly/USDefenseBudgetMar2023](https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Record/USDefenseBudgetMar2023).

⁹⁰ There is no comprehensive accounting of global transfers of cluster munitions, but at least seven States Parties exported them in the past (Chile, France, Germany, Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK) in addition to exports by states not party Brazil, Egypt, Israel, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, the US, and the former Yugoslavia.

⁹¹ Recipients of US exports include Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Türkiye, UAE, and the UK, as well as Taiwan.

⁹² Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, North Korea, North Macedonia, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Syria, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. In addition, cluster munition remnants of Soviet origin have been identified in South Sudan and Sudan.

⁹³ States Parties Chile, France, Germany, the Republic of Moldova, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK exported cluster munitions before they adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions. At least 11 States Parties have transferred cluster munition stocks to other countries for the purpose of destruction: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

NEW TRANSFERS

Between July 2023 and October 2024, the US announced at least seven transfers of cluster munitions to Ukraine, as listed in the following table. The Monitor has not seen evidence of additional cluster munition transfers by the US since October 2024. The US has not disclosed the quantities of cluster munitions provided to Ukraine, or information on the specific types and their dud rates; nor has it provided details on how the cluster munitions have been transferred to Ukraine.

The US transferred at least four types of cluster munitions to Ukraine during 2023 and 2024: two variants of 155mm DPICM artillery projectiles and two variants of the ATACMS ballistic missiles, as described below. It did not specify the types of cluster munitions transferred in its last announcements made on 25 September and 16 October 2024, despite multiple requests for clarity and greater transparency.⁹⁴ *The Associated Press* reported that the 25 September package of US military assistance to Ukraine included “medium-range cluster bombs.”⁹⁵

In July 2023, the Department of Defense announced that the US was transferring to Ukraine “155mm artillery rounds” that deliver DPICM submunitions.⁹⁶ A July 2024 media investigation showed that, since July 2023, 155mm M864 and M483A1 cluster munition artillery projectiles stored at the US Army’s ammunition storage depot in Miesau in Rhineland-Palatinate, Germany, had been transferred to Ukraine, transiting across Germany and Poland in the process.⁹⁷ US Department of Defense officials claim the DPICM submunitions “have a dud rate less than 2.35 percent,” but also say that the testing data behind this figure is “classified.”⁹⁸ Historic data for these submunitions shows that they have a failure rate of 6–14%, and often higher in operations due to wind, soft soil, dense vegetation, and other factors.⁹⁹

The US has also transferred M39 ATACMS ballistic missiles to Ukraine, which contain 950 M74 submunitions to ranges of 165 kilometers (100 miles).¹⁰⁰ Another transfer of longer

Announced US cluster munition transfers to Ukraine

Date of announcement	Type of cluster munition
7 July 2023	155mm DPICM
21 September 2023	155mm DPICM
17 October 2023	ATACMS M39
12 March 2024	155mm DPICM
24 April 2024	ATACMS M39A1
25 September 2024	Not specified
16 October 2024	Not specified

⁹⁴ Cluster Munition Coalition US, “Sixth Transfer of Banned US Cluster Munitions Condemned by US Campaigners,” 26 September 2024, bit.ly/CMCUS26Sept2024.

⁹⁵ Lolita C. Baldor and Matthew Lee, “US is sending \$375 million in military aid to Ukraine and will announce billions more,” *The Associated Press*, 25 September 2024, bit.ly/AssociatedPress25Sept2024. The US stockpiles a range of aging and obsolete air-dropped cluster munitions, including CBU-87 CEM, CBU-97 SFW, and CBU-99 Rockeye. The US has provided F-16 combat aircraft to Ukraine, which can deliver these weapons, as well as JSOW (Joint Stand-off Weapon) glide bombs that include AGM-154A, a cluster munition variant that contains 145 BLU-97 combined effects submunitions.

⁹⁶ US Department of Defense press release, “Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine,” 7 July 2023, bit.ly/DoDPRESSRelease7July2023.

⁹⁷ “Despite the ban: US cluster munitions in Germany – an investigation by Panorama and STRG_F,” *NDR*, 25 July 2024, bit.ly/NDR25July2024; and Mary Wareham, “US Sending Cluster Munitions to Ukraine via Germany,” *Responsible Statecraft*, 30 July 2024, bit.ly/Wareham30Jul2024.

⁹⁸ US Department of Defense, “Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Colin Kahl Holds Press Briefing,” 7 July 2023, bit.ly/DoDPRESSBriefing7July2023.

⁹⁹ From briefings provided to Congress, it appears that the US was planning to transfer 155mm M864 cluster munition artillery projectiles that each contain 72 DPICM submunitions, as well as 155mm M483A1 artillery projectiles that each contain 88 DPICM submunitions. The two types of projectiles deliver M42 and M46 DPICM submunitions. See, John Ismay, “Cluster Weapons U.S. Is Sending Ukraine Often Fail to Detonate,” *The New York Times*, 8 July 2023, bit.ly/NewYorkTimes8July2023; and Karen DeYoung, Alex Horton, and Missy Ryan, “Biden approves cluster munition supply to Ukraine,” *The Washington Post*, 6 July 2023, bit.ly/WashingtonPost7July2023.

¹⁰⁰ Lolita C. Baldor, “Ukraine uses US-provided long-range ATACMS missiles against Russian forces for the first time,” *The Associated Press*, 17 October 2023, bit.ly/APUkraineUSMissiles17Oct2023.

This promotion of cluster munitions raises serious concerns for Eurosatory host France because it is a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and its 2010 implementing legislation prohibits any supply, sale, import, export, trade, brokering, and transfer of cluster munitions, as well as the assistance, encouragement, or inducement of prohibited activities.¹⁰⁹

STOCKPILES OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS AND THEIR DESTRUCTION

GLOBAL STOCKPILES

The Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global effort to ban cluster munitions, 94 countries stockpiled millions of cluster munitions, containing more than one billion submunitions.¹¹⁰ At least 45 countries—42 States Parties, two signatories, and one state not party—that once possessed cluster munition stocks have now destroyed them. (See *Stockpile Destruction* section below.)

STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY STATES PARTIES

In the past, the convention's States Parties stockpiled a collective total of nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions, containing more than 179 million submunitions.

There are currently no States Parties with declared cluster munition stockpiles still to destroy.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ France's 2010 Law on the Elimination of Cluster Munitions prohibits the development, manufacture, production, acquisition, stockpiling, supply, sale, import, export, trade, brokering, transfer, and use of cluster munitions, as well as the assistance, encouragement, or inducement of prohibited activities. It provides sanctions for violations of up to 10 years' imprisonment and/or a fine of €150,000 (US\$162,300). For detailed analysis, see, ICBL, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2010* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 65–66, bit.ly/CMMonitor2010. Average exchange rate for 2024: €1=US\$1.082. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 6 January 2025, bit.ly/FederalReserveRelease.

¹¹⁰ The number of countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions has increased significantly since 2002, when HRW provided the first list identifying 56 states that stockpiled cluster munitions. This is largely due to new information disclosed by States Parties under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. HRW, "Memorandum to CCW Delegates: A Global Overview of Explosive Submunitions," 20 May 2002, www.hrw.org/node/66890.

¹¹¹ **Guinea:** Guinea apparently imported cluster munitions in the past but has not confirmed if it still possesses them as it still has not submitted an initial Article 7 transparency report for the convention, which was originally due in April 2015. **Lebanon:** In its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report for calendar year 2024, Lebanon says that it "does not possess stockpiles of cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control." See, Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2024), Form B. However, Lebanon has explained that it identified new cluster munition contamination resulting from strikes on storage facilities. Submunitions were "kicked out from weapon & munitions depots belonging to non-state groups, due to the bombing of those sites, rather than being used in the conventional sense. It worth [sic] noting that these storage sites containing the ammunition were not known to the Lebanese authorities prior to the conflict." See, Lebanon response to Observations and Comments of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Analysis Group, 23 April 2025, p. 1, bit.ly/CCMArt4Lebanon23Apr2025. Lebanon further stated at the Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings in April 2025: "The detonation of previously unknown munitions stockpiles has resulted in the widespread dispersal of unexploded cluster munitions, significantly increasing the risk to communities and requiring comprehensive surveys, detailed assessments, and immediate action to mitigate these emerging threats." See, statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2025, bit.ly/LebanonStatement7Apr2025. Lebanon should investigate this incident and identify and destroy any stockpiles held by state or non-state actors in areas under its jurisdiction and control.

Countries that have stockpiled cluster munitions¹¹²

States Parties	Signatories	States not party
Afghanistan Austria Belgium BiH Botswana Bulgaria Cameroon Canada Chile Colombia Congo, Rep. of Côte d'Ivoire Croatia Cuba Czech Republic Denmark Ecuador France Germany Guinea-Bissau Honduras Hungary Iraq Italy Japan Moldova Montenegro Mozambique Netherlands Nigeria North Macedonia Norway Peru Philippines Portugal Slovakia Slovenia South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland UK	Angola Central African Rep. Cyprus Indonesia	Algeria Argentina Armenia Azerbaijan Bahrain Belarus Brazil Cambodia China Egypt Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Finland Georgia Greece India Iran Israel Jordan Kazakhstan Korea, North Korea, South Kuwait Libya Mongolia Morocco Myanmar Oman Pakistan Poland Qatar Romania Russia Saudi Arabia Serbia Singapore Sudan Syria Thailand Türkiye Turkmenistan
42	4 (2 current)	49 (48 current)

Note: Countries in **bold** still possess stockpiles.

¹¹² This information is drawn from the Monitor's Cluster Munition Ban Policy country profiles, which in turn use information provided by states in their Article 7 transparency reports, as well as statements and other sources. Armenia was added to the list of stockpilers following evidence of its use of cluster munitions in 2020. See, ICBL-CMC, "Country Profile: Armenia: Cluster Munition Ban Policy," updated 20 June 2024, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY SIGNATORIES

At least two signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions stockpile cluster munitions:

- Cyprus transferred 3,760 4.2-inch OF mortar projectiles, containing a total of 2,559 M20G submunitions, to Bulgaria in 2014. By August 2019, they had been destroyed by private company EXPAL Bulgaria.¹¹³ Cyprus has never made a public statement or provided a voluntary transparency report to confirm if it has now destroyed all of its stockpiled cluster munitions.
- Indonesia has acknowledged possessing cluster munitions but has not shared information on its plan to destroy them under the convention. In June 2022, an Indonesian official told the Monitor that the stockpile consists of approximately 150 “very old” cluster bombs.¹¹⁴

Two signatories possessed cluster munitions in the past:

- Angola stated in 2017 that all its stockpiled cluster munitions were destroyed in or by 2012.¹¹⁵
- The Central African Republic stated in 2011 that it had destroyed a “considerable” stockpile of cluster munitions and no longer had stocks on its territory.¹¹⁶

STOCKPILES POSSESSED BY STATES NOT PARTY

It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the quantity of cluster munitions held by states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as few have publicly shared information on the types and quantities in their possession.

Some states not party have provided limited information on their stocks. For example, the US reported in 2011 that its stockpile was comprised of “more than six million cluster munitions.”¹¹⁷ Georgia destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs, containing 320,375 submunitions, in 2004.¹¹⁸ Venezuela destroyed an unspecified quantity of cluster munitions belonging to its air force in 2011.¹¹⁹

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is required to declare and destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than eight years after entry into force of the convention for that State Party.

¹¹³ Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 June 2017; Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2019; and Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 25 April 2020. The Greek-made GRM-20 4.2-inch (107mm) mortar system uses these projectiles, each of which contains 20 submunitions.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Risha Jilian Chaniago, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the UN in Geneva, Geneva, 24 June 2022.

¹¹⁵ Statement of Angola, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017, bit.ly/CCMStatementAngola4Sep2017.

¹¹⁶ Statement of the Central African Republic, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011, bit.ly/StatementCAR14Sep2011.

¹¹⁷ Statement of the US, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011, bit.ly/CCWUSStatement14Nov2011. The types of cluster munitions included in this figure were listed on a slide projected during an informal briefing to CCW delegates by a member of the US delegation. Several of the types (such as CBU-58, CBU-55B, and M509A1) were not listed in the “active” or “total” inventory by the US Department of Defense in a report to Congress in 2004.

¹¹⁸ “Time schedule for cluster bomb disposal: Attachment 1.4,” undated. This document was provided by the press office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Secretariat, 7 May 2014.

¹¹⁹ “The Ministry of Defense of Venezuela destroys cluster bombs,” *InfoDefensa*, 26 August 2011, bit.ly/InfoDefensa26Aug2011.

States Parties that have completed stockpile destruction¹²⁰

State Party (year of completion)	Cluster munitions	Submunitions
Austria (2010)	12,672	798,336
Belgium (2010)	115,210	10,138,480
BiH (2011)	445	148,059
Botswana (2018)	510	14,400
Bulgaria (2023)	6,862	186,349
Cameroon (2017)*	6	906
Canada (2014)	13,623	1,361,958
Chile (2013)	249	25,896
Colombia (2009)	72	10,832
Côte d'Ivoire (2013)	68	10,200
Croatia (2018)	7,235	178,318
Cuba (2017)**	1,856	N/R
Czech Republic (2010)	480	16,400
Denmark (2014)	42,176	2,440,940
Ecuador (2004)	117	17,199
France (2016)	34,876	14,916,881
Germany (2015)	573,700	62,923,935
Hungary (2011)	287	3,954
Italy (2015)	4,963	2,849,979
Japan (2015)	14,011	2,027,907
Moldova (2010)	1,385	27,050
Montenegro (2010)	353	51,891
Mozambique (2015)	293	12,804
Netherlands (2012)	193,643	25,867,510
North Macedonia (2013)	2,426	39,980
Norway (2010)	52,190	3,087,910
Peru (2023)	2,012	162,417
Philippines (2011)	114	0
Portugal (2011)	11	1,617
Slovakia (2023)	1,235	299,187
Slovenia (2017)	1,080	52,920
South Africa (2023)	1,485	99,065
Spain (2018)	6,837	293,652
Sweden (2015)	370	20,595
Switzerland (2019)	206,061	12,211,950
UK (2013)	190,832	38,759,034
Total	1,489,745	179,058,511

Note: N/R=not reported.

*Cameroon retained its entire stockpile for research and training.

**Cuba reported the total number of cluster munitions destroyed, but not the quantity of submunitions destroyed.

¹²⁰ See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp. Some quantities of cluster munitions and/or submunitions have changed since previous reports due to adjusted information provided in Article 7 reports. In addition, before the convention took effect, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK destroyed a collective total of 712,977 cluster munitions containing more than 78 million submunitions.

At least 42 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions have now completed destruction of those stocks, collectively destroying nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions containing 179 million submunitions. This represents 100% of all cluster munitions that States Parties have declared stockpiling.

Bulgaria, Peru, Slovakia, and South Africa were the last States Parties to complete the destruction of their respective stockpiles, in 2023.¹²¹

Six States Parties that once stockpiled cluster munitions are not listed in the overview table due to insufficient information on the quantities destroyed:

- Afghanistan and Iraq have reported completing stockpile destruction, but neither provided a specific date of completion or information on the types and quantities destroyed. Both countries have reported the discovery and destruction of cluster munitions found in abandoned arms caches.
- The Republic of the Congo has stated that it has no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory, but it must provide a transparency report to formally confirm that it does not possess stocks.¹²²
- Guinea-Bissau initially reported possessing cluster munitions in 2011 but did not provide information on the types or quantities.¹²³ It subsequently reported in July 2022 that it does not possess any stocks.¹²⁴
- Honduras provided a transparency report in 2017 but did not declare any cluster munitions as it destroyed its stockpile long before the convention's entry into force.¹²⁵

¹²¹ Bulgaria, Slovakia, and South Africa announced the completion of stockpile destruction at the convention's Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2023, while Peru confirmed its stockpile destruction completion on 15 December 2023. See, Alejo Marchessini, "Peru completes the destruction of its cluster munitions stockpiles," *defensa.com*, 28 December 2023, bit.ly/defensa28Dec2023; and HRW, "Cluster Munitions: Peru Destroys Stockpiled Weapons," 18 December 2023, bit.ly/PeruHRW18Dec2023.

¹²² In September 2011, the Republic of the Congo stated that it had no stockpiles of cluster munitions on its territory. In May 2013, it reported that it had destroyed its remaining 372 antipersonnel landmines that were held for training and research purposes, following massive explosions at a weapons depot in Brazzaville in March 2012. It reported that it was now a country free of landmines and cluster munitions. Statement of the Republic of the Congo, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011, bit.ly/StatementRepCongo15Sep2011; statement by Col. Nkoua, National Focal Point of the Struggle Against Mines, seminar to mark the 20th Anniversary of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) hosted by the Congolese Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Bombs (CCBL), Kinshasa, 19 December 2012; and statement of the Republic of the Congo, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, 22 May 2013. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).

¹²³ Guinea-Bissau Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 1 January 2020; and statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 3 September 2014, bit.ly/StatementGuinea-BissauSep2014. Guinea-Bissau told States Parties that it had asked for help to destroy its stockpile in 2013 from the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which had conducted a technical assessment in 2011 that found that Guinea-Bissau's cluster munition stocks were being held by the armed forces "in very bad conditions." See, statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 11 September 2013, bit.ly/StatementGuinea-Bissau11Sep2013. A 2011 inventory review by the National Mine Action Coordination Center (Centro Nacional de Coordenação da Acção Anti-Minas, CAAMI) found that an air force base in Bissau City held stocks of cluster munitions. Interview with César Luis Gomes Lopes de Carvalho, General Director, CAAMI, in Geneva, 27 June 2011. RBK-series air-dropped bombs and PTAB-2.5 submunitions were among munitions ejected by an explosion at an ammunition storage facility on the outskirts of Bissau City in 2000. See, Cleared Ground Demining, "Guinea Bissau," undated, bit.ly/ClearedGroundGuinea-Bissau.

¹²⁴ Statement of Guinea-Bissau, Convention on Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 31 August 2022, bit.ly/GuineaBissauStatement31Aug2022; and Guinea-Bissau Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 6 July 2022.

¹²⁵ According to officials, the stockpile of air-dropped Rockeye cluster bombs and an unidentified type of artillery-delivered cluster munition were destroyed before 2007. HRW meetings with Honduran officials, in San José, 5 September 2007, and in Vienna, 3–5 December 2007.

- Nigeria reported in April 2023 and February 2024 that it does not stockpile cluster munitions.¹²⁶ Previously, it requested technical assistance and cooperation to fulfill its stockpile destruction obligations.¹²⁷

RETENTION

Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions permits the retention of cluster munitions and submunitions for the development of training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques, and for the development of countermeasures such as armor to protect troops and equipment from the weapons.

The vast majority of States Parties are not retaining live cluster munitions for research or training purposes, including all except six of the 42 States Parties that once possessed cluster munitions.

Cluster munitions retained for training (as of July 2025)¹²⁸

State Party	Quantity of cluster munitions (submunitions)			Year first reported
	Currently retained	Consumed in 2024	Initially retained	
Germany	77 (4,851)	21 (1,323)	685 (62,580)	2011
Switzerland	28 (1,488)	0 (0)	138 (7,346)	2013
Cameroon	5 (755)	0 (0)	6 (906)	2014
Bulgaria	5 (250)	0 (0)	8 (400)	2017
France	3 (189)	0 (0)	55 (10,284)	2011
Spain	2 (275)	0 (0)	711 (16,652)	2011

Germany is retaining the highest number of cluster munitions of any State Party, followed by Switzerland and Cameroon.

During 2024, only one State Party consumed cluster munitions for research and training purposes. Germany reported in March 2025 that the total number of cluster munitions retained has been reduced to 77 cluster munitions and 4,851 submunitions, after it consumed 21 cluster munitions (20 DM642 cluster munitions and one DM602 cluster munition) and 1,323 DM1348 submunitions in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training in 2024.¹²⁹

The five other States Parties did not consume any retained cluster munitions for research and training purposes during 2024:

- Bulgaria last used its retained stocks in 2023, when the Bulgarian Armed Forces consumed one cluster munition and 50 submunitions during training.¹³⁰ It is retaining five 9N123K cluster munitions delivered by Tochka ballistic missile and 250 9N24 submunitions.

¹²⁶ Nigeria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Forms B, C, and D, 28 February 2024.

¹²⁷ See, for example, "Croatia Progress Report – monitoring progress in implementing the Vientiane Action Plan up to the First Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 6 October 2015, p. 15, docs.un.org/CCM/CONF/2015/6; and statement of Nigeria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 11 September 2012, bit.ly/NigeriaCCM11Sept2012.

¹²⁸ For more information on retention, including the specific types of cluster munitions retained by each country, see, Monitor country profiles, www.the-monitor.org/cp; and the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM.

¹²⁹ Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C, 31 March 2025.

¹³⁰ Bulgaria Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C, 29 April 2024.

- Cameroon reported a lower number of retained cluster munitions in 2023, but did not indicate if one cluster bomb and 151 submunitions were consumed during research and training.¹³¹ It did not provide an update in 2024. Cameroon is retaining five BLG-66 Belouga cluster bombs and 755 submunitions.¹³²
- France reported in May 2024 that its technical experts from the armed forces destroyed one submunition on 20 April 2023.¹³³ It is retaining three OGR 155mm cluster munitions and 189 OGR submunitions for research and training purposes.¹³⁴
- Spain last consumed retained cluster munitions in 2020. It is retaining one CBU-100/B cluster munition containing 247 submunitions and one BME-330 B/AP containing 28 submunitions.¹³⁵
- Switzerland last consumed 62 submunitions in training in 2023.¹³⁶ It is retaining 28 cluster munitions and 1,488 submunitions of various types for research and training purposes. This is fewer than the previous total provided in April 2024 and comes after Switzerland provided updated transparency reports covering 2022 and 2023 that correct the previously reported quantities retained.¹³⁷

The number of States Parties retaining cluster munitions for research and training purposes decreased after the Monitor removed four States Parties that were previously listed. BiH, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden have only retained submunitions without the cluster munitions that could allow them to be used.

States Parties, such as Belgium, Chile, Croatia, and Moldova, report retaining inert items that are free from explosives. The Monitor also does not consider them to be cluster munitions capable of being used.

All States Parties retaining cluster munitions for training have reduced their stocks since making their initial declarations, in most cases significantly. This shows how the initial amounts retained were far from the “minimum number absolutely necessary” for the permitted purposes under the convention.

Very few States Parties have replenished their stocks of cluster munitions retained for research and training. This shows how live and intact cluster munitions were never essential for research and training purposes in the first place.

TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to submit an initial transparency report within 180 days of the convention taking effect for that country. Timely submission of the report is a legal obligation.¹³⁸

¹³¹ Cameroon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar years 2019–2022), Form B, 27 June 2023.

¹³² Cameroon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form B, 25 October 2024.

¹³³ France Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C, 29 May 2024.

¹³⁴ France Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C, 2 May 2025.

¹³⁵ Spain Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C, 15 April 2025.

¹³⁶ Switzerland Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C, 30 April 2024.

¹³⁷ Email from Col. Prasenjit Chaudhuri, Head of Swiss Verification Unit, Swiss Armed Forces, 26 November 2024; and notes from Cluster Munition Monitor call with Col. Prasenjit Chaudhuri, Head of Verification Unit, Swiss Armed Forces, 20 September 2024. According to Chaudhuri, the miscalculated numbers were due to inadequate internal reporting and were introduced in the transparency report for calendar year 2022, and carried into the transparency report for calendar year 2023.

¹³⁸ The transparency report should be emailed to the UN Secretary-General via the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs at ccm@un.org. For more information, see, www.clusterconvention.org/reporting-forms.

As of 1 August 2025, 107 States Parties have submitted an initial transparency report.¹³⁹ This includes Togo, which provided its initial transparency report in May 2025, confirming that “Togo has never developed, produced, transferred, or used cluster munitions.”¹⁴⁰

Of the five States Parties with outstanding initial Article 7 reports, Cabo Verde, the Comoros, and Guinea are more than a decade overdue.

States Parties with outstanding initial Article 7 deadlines

State Party	Date due
Cabo Verde	28 September 2011
Comoros	30 June 2011
Congo, Rep. of	28 August 2015
Guinea	19 April 2015
Rwanda	31 July 2016

After providing an initial transparency report, States Parties must submit an updated annual report by 30 April each year, covering developments during the previous calendar year. Approximately half of the convention’s States Parties regularly provide annual updated Article 7 reports.¹⁴¹ Eight States Parties have never provided an annual update since submitting their initial report.¹⁴²

South Sudan provided four voluntary transparency reports before acceding to the convention, while Canada and Palau provided voluntary reports prior to ratifying it. Since 2011, signatory DRC has submitted four voluntary Article 7

transparency reports, most recently in 2022. State not party Brunei Darussalam provided a voluntary submission in 2020.

The CMC continues to encourage States Parties to submit their Article 7 transparency reports by the deadline and provide complete information, including definitive statements.¹⁴³



At the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Geneva, the Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines shares Italy’s experience of promoting the convention through the adoption of national implementation measures.

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NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION LEGISLATION

According to Article 9 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are required to take “all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions.” The CMC urges all States Parties to enact comprehensive national legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions and provide binding, enduring, and unequivocal rules.

A total of 33 States Parties have enacted specific implementing legislation for the convention. Prior to the convention’s entry into force in August 2010, a total of 11 states had enacted implementing legislation, while 22 states have done so since.

¹³⁹ Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, BiH, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, UK, Uruguay, and Zambia.

¹⁴⁰ Togo Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form B, 8 May 2025.

¹⁴¹ As of 1 August 2025, at least 51 States Parties had not provided their annual updated report due by 30 April 2025.

¹⁴² Benin, Burundi, Fiji, Madagascar, Mali, Nauru, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

¹⁴³ Often states do not provide definitive statements throughout their reports. Notably, some simply indicate “not applicable.” States should, for example, include a short narrative statement on Form E on conversion of production facilities, i.e., “Country X never produced cluster munitions,” instead of simply putting “N/A” on the form. In addition, only a small number of states used voluntary Form J to provide additional information.

Niue was the last country to enact national implementing legislation for the convention, in 2021. The Monitor is not aware of any State Party enacting implementation legislation for the convention during 2024 or the first half of 2025.

A total of 22 States Parties have indicated that they are either planning or are in the process of drafting, reviewing, or adopting specific legislative measures to implement the convention.¹⁴⁴

A total of 43 States Parties have indicated that they regard existing laws and regulations as sufficient to enforce their adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.¹⁴⁵

Other States Parties are still considering whether specific implementing legislation for the convention is needed.

Several guides are available to encourage the preparation of robust legislation. The CMC prepared model legislation in 2020.¹⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Harvard Law School's International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) have identified key components of comprehensive legislation.¹⁴⁷ The ICRC has proposed a model law for common law states.¹⁴⁸ New Zealand has prepared a model law for small states that do not possess cluster munitions and are not contaminated by their remnants.¹⁴⁹

National implementation legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions

State Party (year enacted)	
Afghanistan (2018)	Italy (2011)
Australia (2012)	Japan (2009)
Austria (2008)	Liechtenstein (2013)
Belgium (2006)	Luxembourg (2009)
Bulgaria (2015)	Mauritius (2016)
Cameroon (2016)	Namibia (2019)
Canada (2014)	New Zealand (2009)
Colombia (2012)	Niue (2021)
Cook Islands (2011)	Norway (2008)
Czech Republic (2011)	Saint Kitts and Nevis (2014)
Ecuador (2010)	Samoa (2012)
France (2010)	Spain (2015)
Germany (2009)	Sweden (2012)
Guatemala (2012)	Switzerland (2012)
Hungary (2012)	Togo (2015)
Iceland (2015)	UK (2010)
Ireland (2008)	

INTERPRETIVE ISSUES

During the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the final negotiations in Dublin, where the convention was adopted on 30 May 2008, it appeared that there was not a uniform view on certain important issues relating to states' interpretation and implementation of the convention. The CMC encourages States Parties and signatories that have not yet done so to express their views on three key issues of concern:

1. The prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions ("interoperability");

¹⁴⁴ Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, and Zambia.

¹⁴⁵ Albania, Andorra, Benin, Bolivia, BiH, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, El Salvador, Fiji, Guyana, Holy See, Honduras, Iraq, Lithuania, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, Nicaragua, North Macedonia, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, San Marino, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

¹⁴⁶ CMC, "2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions: Model Legislation. Act to implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions," 2020, bit.ly/CMCModelLegislation.

¹⁴⁷ HRW and Harvard Law School's International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC), "Staying Strong: Key Components and Positive Precedent for Convention on Cluster Munitions Legislation," September 2014, bit.ly/StayingStrong2014.

¹⁴⁸ ICRC, "Model Law: Convention on Cluster Munitions: Legislation for Common Law States on the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions," March 2013, bit.ly/CCMModelLegislationICRC.

¹⁴⁹ New Zealand, "Model Legislation: Cluster Munitions Act," 7 September 2011, bit.ly/CCMModelLegislationNZ2011.

2. The prohibitions on transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions; and
3. The prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions.

Several States Parties and signatories have elaborated their views on these issues, including through Article 7 transparency reports, statements at meetings, parliamentary debates, and direct communications with the CMC and the Monitor. Several strong implementation laws provide useful models for how to implement certain provisions of the convention. Yet, more than three dozen States Parties have not articulated their views on even one of these interpretive issues, and there were no new statements during the reporting period.¹⁵⁰ Please refer to previous *Cluster Munition Monitor* reports, in addition to Monitor country profiles, for detailed positions on key interpretive issues.

More than 400 US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2010–2011 demonstrate how the US—despite not participating in the Oslo Process—made numerous attempts to influence its allies, partners, and other states on the content of the draft Convention on Cluster Munitions, particularly with respect to interoperability, US stockpiles, and foreign stockpiling.¹⁵¹

INTEROPERABILITY AND THE PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE

Article 1 of the convention obligates States Parties “never under any circumstances to ... assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Yet during the Oslo Process, some states expressed concern about the application of the prohibition on assistance during joint military operations with countries that have not joined the convention. In response to these “interoperability” concerns, Article 21 on “Relations with States not Party to this Convention” was included in the convention. The CMC has strongly criticized Article 21 for being politically motivated and for leaving a degree of ambiguity about how the prohibition on assistance would be applied in joint military operations.

Article 21 states that States Parties “may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” It does not, however, negate States Parties’ obligation under Article 1 to “never under any circumstances” assist with prohibited acts. The article also requires States Parties to discourage use of cluster munitions by states not party, and to encourage them to join the convention.

Together, Article 1 and Article 21 should have a unified and coherent purpose, as the convention cannot require States Parties to both discourage the use of cluster munitions and, by implication, allow them to encourage it. Furthermore, to interpret Article 21 as qualifying Article 1 would run counter to the object and purpose of the convention, which is to eliminate cluster munitions and the harm they cause to civilians.

Therefore, States Parties must not intentionally or deliberately assist, induce, or encourage any activity prohibited under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even when engaging in joint operations with states not party. Forms of prohibited assistance include, but are not limited to:

- Securing, storing, or transporting cluster munitions that belong to a state not party;
- Agreeing to rules of engagement that allow cluster munition use by a state not party;

¹⁵⁰ The States Parties that have yet to publicly elaborate a view on any of these interpretive issues include: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Cook Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eswatini, Fiji, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Lesotho, Lithuania, Maldives, Mauritania, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Nauru, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Uruguay.

¹⁵¹ As of July 2012, Wikileaks had made public a total of 428 cables relating to cluster munitions, that originated from 100 locations between 2003 and 2010.

- Accepting orders from a state not party to use cluster munitions;
- Requesting a state not party to use cluster munitions;
- Participating in planning for use of cluster munitions by a state not party; and
- Training others to use cluster munitions.

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have agreed that the convention's Article 21 provision on interoperability should not be read as allowing states to avoid their specific obligation under Article 1 to prohibit assistance with prohibited acts.¹⁵²

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UK have indicated their support for the contrary view, that the convention's Article 1 prohibition on assistance with prohibited acts may be overridden by the interoperability provisions contained in Article 21. In discussions relating to the Second Review Conference, these States Parties, along with Lithuania, used Article 21 as a justification to argue forcefully against unequivocally condemning new use of cluster munitions.

States Parties France, the Netherlands, and Spain have provided the view that Article 21 permits military cooperation in joint operations but have not indicated the forms of assistance allowed.

TRANSIT AND FOREIGN STOCKPILING

The CMC has stated that the injunction not to provide any form of direct or indirect assistance with prohibited acts contained in Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions should be seen as banning the transit of cluster munitions across or through the national territory, airspace, or waters of a State Party. The convention should also be seen as banning the stockpiling of cluster munitions by a state not party on the territory of a State Party.

At least 34 States Parties and signatories have declared that transit and foreign stockpiling are prohibited by the convention.¹⁵³

States Parties Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have indicated support for the opposite view, that transit and foreign stockpiling are not prohibited by the convention.

US STOCKPILING AND TRANSIT

States Parties Norway and the UK have confirmed that the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from their respective territories during 2010. US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US stockpiled and therefore may still store cluster munitions in States Parties Afghanistan, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in states not party Israel, Qatar, and possibly Kuwait.

¹⁵² Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Togo. See, CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2012* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2012), pp. 34–35, bit.ly/CMMonitor2012; CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2011* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 25–27, bit.ly/CMMonitor2011; ICBL, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2010* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21, bit.ly/CMMonitor2010; HRW and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26, bit.ly/HRWLandmineActionMay2009; and HRW and IHRC, "Staying Strong: Key Components and Positive Precedent for Convention on Cluster Munitions Legislation," 3 September 2014, pp. 19–23, bit.ly/StayingStrong2014.

¹⁵³ Austria, Belgium, BiH, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Ecuador, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Ireland, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, and Zambia. See, CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2011* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), pp. 27–29, bit.ly/CMMonitor2011; ICBL, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2010* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 20–21, bit.ly/CMMonitor2010; and HRW and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 25–26, bit.ly/HRWLandmineActionMay2009.

A July 2024 media report showed that cluster munitions held at a US base in Germany were being transferred to Ukraine since July 2023 as part of US military assistance, transiting across Germany and Poland in the process.¹⁵⁴

DISINVESTMENT

Several States Parties, as well as the CMC, view the convention's Article 1 ban on assistance with prohibited acts as constituting a prohibition on investment in the production of cluster munitions. The Lausanne Action Plan, adopted by States Parties at the convention's Second Review Conference in September 2021, encourages the adoption of national legislation prohibiting investment in producers of cluster munitions.¹⁵⁵

Since 2007, a total of 11 States Parties have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits investment in cluster munitions.

Disinvestment laws on cluster munitions

State Party	Year enacted
Belgium	2007
Ireland	2008
Italy	2021
Liechtenstein	2013
Luxembourg	2009
Netherlands	2013
New Zealand	2009
Saint Kitts and Nevis	2014
Samoa	2012
Spain	2015
Switzerland	2013

At least 38 States Parties and signatories have stated that they regard investments in cluster munition production as a form of assistance that is prohibited by the convention.¹⁵⁶

A few States Parties to the convention, including Germany, Japan, and Sweden, have expressed the contrary view that the convention does not prohibit investment in cluster munition production.

Government pension funds in Australia, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden have either fully or partially withdrawn investments, or banned investments, in cluster munition producers.

In States Parties Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK, financial institutions have acted to stop investment in cluster munition producers and promote socially responsible investment.

Several private companies in states not party have ceased production of cluster munitions, in part due to inquiries from financial institutions keen to screen their investments

for prohibited weapons. These companies include Elbit Systems Ltd. of Israel, Singapore Technologies Engineering, and US companies Lockheed Martin, Orbital ATK, and Textron Systems.

¹⁵⁴ "Despite the ban: US cluster munitions in Germany – an investigation by Panorama and STRG_F," *NDR*, 25 July 2024, bit.ly/NDR25July2024.

¹⁵⁵ Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Final Report of the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Annex II: Lausanne Action Plan," 6 October 2021, Action 47, docs.un.org/en/CCM/CONF/2021/6.

¹⁵⁶ Australia, BiH, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, DRC, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Montenegro, Niger, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, Trinidad and Tobago, UK, and Zambia.

Timeline of cluster munition use¹⁵⁷

Date	Location	Known details of use
2022–present	Ukraine	The Russian Armed Forces have used cluster munitions repeatedly in Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion of the country on 24 February 2022. Ukrainian forces have used cluster munitions since March 2022. At least 15 types of cluster munitions have been used in Ukraine since 2022.
2022–present	Myanmar	Myanmar Armed Forces have used a domestically produced air-dropped cluster munition since 2022.
2012–2024	Syria	Syrian Armed Forces used cluster munitions extensively, and with Russia's support. Islamic State forces used at least one type of cluster munition in Syria.
2020	Azerbaijan, Armenia	Armenia and Azerbaijan used cluster munitions in the conflict over <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i> in September–October 2020.
2015–2019	Libya	Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), formerly known as the Libyan National Army (LNA), used air-dropped cluster munitions in Tripoli in 2019. The Monitor could not conclusively attribute responsibility for cluster munition attacks reported in 2015 and 2018.
2015–2017	Yemen	A Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states, engaged in a military operation against Houthi forces in Yemen, used at least seven types of air-dropped and ground-fired cluster munitions in at least 23 attacks between 2015 and 2017.
2016	Azerbaijan, <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	Two types of cluster munition rockets were used in April 2016, but the Monitor could not conclusively determine responsibility. Armenia and Azerbaijan both denied using cluster munitions and accused each other of using them.
2016	Somalia	BL755 cluster munitions were found in Somalia after a January 2016 airstrike against al-Shabaab forces. Kenya denied allegations that it was responsible.
2015	Sudan	The Sudanese Air Force was responsible for cluster munition attacks in Southern Kordofan in February, March, and May 2015 using RBK-500 AO-2.5 RT cluster bombs.
2014–2015	Ukraine	From July 2014 until a February 2015 ceasefire, Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed insurgent groups used two types of cluster munition rockets in eastern Ukraine.
2014	South Sudan	In Jonglei state, the UN found the remnants of at least eight RBK-250-275 cluster bombs and AO-1SCh submunitions by the road 16 kilometers south of Bor in February 2014, in an area not known to be contaminated by remnants before that time.
2012	Sudan	There were two compelling allegations of cluster munition use by the armed forces of Sudan in Southern Kordofan state, involving a Chinese Type-81 DPICM in Troji on 29 February 2012 and a RBK-500 AO-2.5RT cluster bomb in Ongolo on 15 April 2012.
2011	Libya	Libyan government forces used MAT-120 mortar-fired cluster munitions, RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M cluster bombs, and 122mm cargo rockets containing an unidentified type of DPICM.

¹⁵⁷ See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp. This accounting does not capture every location of cluster munitions use. Cluster munitions have been used in some countries, but the party responsible for the use is not clear.


Date	Location	Known details of use
2011	Cambodia	Thai forces fired artillery-delivered cluster munitions with M42/M46 and M85 type DPICM submunitions into Cambodia during border clashes near Preah Vihear temple.
2009	Yemen	The US used at least five TLAM-D cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, to attack a “training camp” in Abyan governorate on 17 December 2009. Northern Saada governorate is contaminated by cluster munitions used in late 2009 during fighting by the government of Yemen, Houthi rebels, and Saudi Arabia. The user responsible is not clear, but remnants include US-made CBU-52 cluster bombs and BLU-97, BLU-61, and M42/M46 submunitions, as well as Soviet-made RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh cluster bombs.
2008	Georgia	Russian and Georgian forces used cluster munitions during the August 2008 conflict. Submunitions cleared by deminers include air-dropped AO-2.5RTM and rocket-delivered 9N210 and M095.
2006	Lebanon	Israeli forces used ground-launched and air-dropped cluster munitions in a conflict against Hezbollah. The UN estimates that Israel used up to 4 million submunitions.
2006	Israel	Hezbollah forces fired more than 100 Chinese-produced Type-81 122mm cluster munition rockets into northern Israel.
2003	Iraq	The US and the UK used nearly 13,000 cluster munitions, containing an estimated 1.8 to 2 million submunitions in the three weeks of major combat in 2003.
Unknown	Uganda	RBK-250-275 bombs and AO-1SCh submunitions have been found in the northern district of Gulu.
2001–2002	Afghanistan	The US dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 submunitions.
1999	Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of (FRY)	The US, the UK, and the Netherlands dropped 1,765 cluster bombs containing 295,000 submunitions in what is now Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia, and in Albania. FRY also used cluster munitions.
1999	<i>Chechnya</i>	Russian forces used cluster munitions in a conflict against NSAGs.
1998–2003	Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	Deminers have found BL755 bombs, BLU-63 cluster munitions, and PM-1 submunitions.
1998–1999	Albania	Yugoslav forces used rocket-delivered cluster munitions in disputed border areas, and NATO forces conducted six aerial cluster munition strikes.
1998	Colombia	The Colombian Air Force used a World War II-era cluster munition in an attack on Santo Domingo in the municipality of Tame on 13 December.
1998	Ethiopia, Eritrea	Ethiopia attacked Asmara airport and dropped BL755 bombs in Gash-Barka province in Eritrea. Eritrea used cluster munitions in two separate strikes in Mekele, including at a school.
1998	Afghanistan, Sudan	In August, US ships and submarines fired 66 TLAM-D Block 3 cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, at a factory in Khartoum, Sudan, and at reported NSAG training camps in Afghanistan.

Date	Location	Known details of use
1997	Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone has said that Nigerian peacekeepers in the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) used BLG-66 Beluga bombs on the eastern town of Kenema. ECOMOG Force Commander General Victor Malu denied these reports.
1996–1999	Sudan	Sudanese government forces used air-dropped cluster munitions in southern Sudan.
1995	Croatia	An NSAG used Orkan M-87 multiple rocket launchers in an attack on the city of Zagreb on 2–3 May. The Croatian government claimed that Serb forces used BL755 bombs in Sisak, Kutina, and along the Kupa River.
1994–1996	<i>Chechnya</i>	Russian forces used cluster munitions in a conflict against NSAGs.
1992–1997	Tajikistan	ShOAB-0.5 and AO-2.5RT submunitions have been found in the town of Gharm in the Rasht Valley, used by unknown forces engaged in civil war.
1992–1995	Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	Yugoslav forces and NSAGs used cluster munitions during the war. NATO aircraft dropped two CBU-87 bombs.
1992–1994	<i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i> , Azerbaijan	Submunition contamination has been identified in at least 162 locations in <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i> . Submunition types cleared by deminers include PTAB-1, ShOAB-0.5, and AO-2.5 RT. There are also reports of contamination in other parts of occupied Azerbaijan, adjacent to <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i> .
1992–1994	Angola	Deminers have found dud Soviet-made PTAB and AO-2.5 RT submunitions in various locations.
1991	Iraq, Kuwait	The US, France, and the UK dropped 61,000 cluster bombs containing some 20 million submunitions. The number of cluster munitions delivered by surface-launched artillery and rocket systems is not known, but an estimated 30 million or more DPICM submunitions were used in the conflict.
1991	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabian and US forces used artillery-delivered and air-dropped cluster munitions in the conflict against Iraqi forces during the Battle of Khafji.
1988	Iran	US Navy aircraft attacked Iranian Revolutionary Guard speedboats and an Iranian Navy ship using Mk-20 Rockeye bombs during Operation Praying Mantis.
1986–1987	Chad	French aircraft dropped cluster munitions on a Libyan airfield at Wadi Doum. Libyan forces also used AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5 submunitions at various locations.
1986	Libya	US Navy aircraft attacked Libyan ships using Mk-20 Rockeye cluster bombs in the Gulf of Sidra on 25 March. On 14–15 April, US Navy aircraft dropped 60 Rockeye bombs on Benina Airfield.
1984–1988	Iran, Iraq	It has been reported that Iraq first used air-dropped bombs in 1984. Iraq reportedly used Ababil-50 surface-to-surface cluster munition rockets during the later stages of the war.
1983	Lebanon	US Navy aircraft dropped 12 CBU-59 and 28 Mk-20 Rockeye bombs in a conflict against Syrian air defense units near Beirut.
1983	Grenada	US Navy aircraft dropped 21 Mk-20 Rockeye bombs during close air support operations.

Date	Location	Known details of use
1982	<i>Falkland Islands/ Malvinas</i>	UK forces dropped 107 BL755 cluster bombs containing a total of 15,729 submunitions.
1982	Lebanon	Israel used cluster munitions in a conflict against Syrian forces and NSAGs in Lebanon.
1979–1989	Afghanistan	Soviet forces extensively used air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions. NSAGs also used rocket-delivered cluster munitions on a smaller scale.
1978	Lebanon	Israel used cluster munitions in southern Lebanon.
1977–1978	Somalia	Contamination was discovered in 2013 in the Somali border region, including PTAB-2.5M and AO-1SCh submunitions, but the party responsible is unknown.
1975–1988	<i>Western Sahara, Mauritania</i>	Moroccan forces used artillery-fired and air-dropped cluster munitions in a conflict against an NSAG in Western Sahara. Cluster munition remnants of the same types used by Morocco in <i>Western Sahara</i> have been found in Mauritania.
1973	Egypt, Syria	Israel used air-dropped cluster munitions against Egyptian air defense installations in the Suez Canal zone and on reported NSAG training camps near Damascus.
1970s	Zambia	Remnants of cluster munitions, including unexploded submunitions from air-dropped bombs, have been found at Chikumbi and Shang'ombo.
1965–1975	Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam	US bombing data shows that approximately 80,000 cluster munitions, containing 26 million submunitions, were dropped on Cambodia in 1969–1973; over 414,000 cluster bombs, containing at least 260 million submunitions, were dropped on Lao PDR in 1965–1973; and over 296,000 cluster munitions, containing nearly 97 million submunitions, were dropped in Vietnam in 1965–1975.
1939–1945	Germany, Italy, Libya, Malta, Palau, Solomon Islands, USSR, the UK, possibly other locations	Munitions similar in function to modern cluster munitions were used by belligerent parties during World War II in Europe, North Africa, and the Pacific.

Note: Other areas are indicated in *italics*; NSAG=non-state armed group; USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

STATUS OF THE 2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS




MAP KEY

- States Parties (111)
- Signatories (12)
- States not party (74)

DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.

PRODUCTION OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS



MAP KEY


- Current producer
- Past producer

Note: **States Parties** to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are **bold**, signatories are underlined, states not party are plain text, other areas are *italics*.

DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.

CLUSTER MUNITION STOCKPILES AND DESTRUCTION





Paintings on a wall in Syrian village al-Nayrab, in Idlib governorate, explain what to do if unexploded ordnance is discovered. (Source: bit.ly/NewHumanitarian10April2025)

© Hasan Belal/The New Humanitarian, February 2025

THE IMPACT

INTRODUCTION

In joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties made a collective pledge “to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions,” as stated in the convention’s preamble. As conflict continues in multiple regions and the norms of international humanitarian law—including humanitarian disarmament provisions—face increasing strain, the convention’s relevance and the imperative to protect civilians and assist victims remain vital.

This overview outlines the state of the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions related to casualties and contamination. It also highlights the responsibilities and progress of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in fulfilling their obligations to remove the threat of cluster munition remnants and to assist victims.

This reporting comes at a critical juncture, with just one year remaining for the convention’s community to act on the implementation of the five-year Lausanne Action Plan—adopted during the convention’s Second Review Conference in 2021 to help States Parties achieve significant and sustainable progress towards the universalization and implementation of the convention for the period 2021–2026.

This overview presents the latest available annual data for calendar year 2024—covering casualties,¹ contamination, clearance, and risk education—along with updates on progress through 1 August 2025 where relevant and available.²

CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES AND IMPACTS

In 2024, cluster munition casualties were recorded in nine countries, with 314 casualties identified. Casualties from cluster munition attacks occurred in three states not party, while casualties from unexploded submunitions were recorded in nine countries, including four

¹ Casualties mean people killed and injured, including those for whom the survival outcome is not known.

² Unless otherwise stated, findings draw from detailed country profiles that are available on the Monitor website. See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information: www.the-monitor.org/cp. See also, archived Monitor country profiles for the period 2010–2022, bit.ly/MonitorArchives2; and archived Monitor country profiles for the period 1999–2014, bit.ly/MonitorArchives1.

States Parties. The actual number of casualties is likely higher due to limited access to information from conflict-affected areas.

All recorded casualties in 2024 were civilians, which is consistent with the known indiscriminate effects of cluster munitions. However, unreliable reporting and unverifiable claims of military casualties from opposing sides prevented numbers of military casualties from being accepted for entry in the Monitor's casualty dataset.

Children continued to be disproportionately affected by the ongoing consequences of use, accounting for 42% of casualties from cluster munition remnants.

Ukraine had the highest annual total of cluster munition casualties for the third consecutive year. At least 193 casualties from cluster munition attacks were recorded for Ukraine in 2024, and over a thousand casualties from attacks were recorded since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Additional attacks were reported where the number of casualties was not confirmed.

Cluster munition casualties during attacks were also recorded in Myanmar and Syria.

PROGRESS IN CLEARING CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS

As of the end of 2024, 10 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions were still contaminated by cluster munition remnants, while two signatories, 15 states not party, and two other areas have, or are believed to have, areas containing cluster munition remnants.³ Of these, new use of cluster munitions was recorded in 2024 and 2025 in states not party Myanmar, Syria, and Ukraine.

Within the last five years, the total number of contaminated States Parties remained the same. Although one State Party, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), completed clearance in 2023, South Sudan, known to be contaminated, acceded to the convention in August 2023, with its clearance obligations entering into force in February 2024. In line with their Article 4 obligations, most States Parties—with the exception of Chad and Somalia—gained a better understanding of the extent of contamination in the last five years and released contaminated land. However, in some States Parties, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Mauritania, newly discovered contamination hampered progress towards completion.

In 2024, among the States Parties with obligations to release contaminated land, Lao PDR remained by far the most active, accounting for more than 73% of all cluster munition contaminated land released by States Parties throughout the reporting year. Chile, Germany, Iraq, and South Sudan also made substantial progress relative to their remaining contamination. In contrast, Afghanistan, Chad, Lebanon, and Somalia reported little or no land release in 2024, largely due to limited resources and access constraints, or changing priorities in the light of recent conflict in the case of Lebanon.

States Parties reported that 101.85km² of hazardous area was released via clearance, technical survey, and non-technical survey during 2024, resulting in the destruction of at least 83,452 cluster munition remnants, primarily unexploded submunitions and unexploded bomblets.⁴ The amount of land released through clearance increased in 2024 compared to 2023, but does not match the amount of land released through clearance in 2022 or in the years prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the number of cluster munition remnants destroyed in 2024 is the highest since 2019, which likely indicates increased efficiency of the land release process in States Parties.

³ The two 'other areas' are Kosovo and Western Sahara, which are not recognized by the United Nations and, as such, cannot join the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

⁴ The contamination and clearance figures presented in this report are rounded to the nearest hundredth. As such, some individual figures, for instance confirmed and suspected hazardous areas, when combined after rounding will not equal the reported total.

Requests by States Parties to extend Article 4 clearance deadlines have been made every year since the first extension requests were submitted in 2019. Only State Party South Sudan, which acceded to the Convention on 3 August 2023, is working towards its original 10-year clearance deadline under Article 4.⁵ All other States Parties with clearance obligations have previously sought, or are currently requesting, extensions to their clearance deadlines, with five extension requests to be decided at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2025.

RISK EDUCATION IN RESPONSE TO RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR

In 2024, risk education remained vital in mitigating harm from cluster munition remnants. Nomads, displaced persons and returnees, and people undertaking outdoor livelihood activities—such as farming, tending livestock, scrap metal collection, and entering hazardous areas for the collection of firewood and other natural resources—remained the main groups at risk of harm from cluster munition remnants.

Risk education strategies were adapted to context-specific needs and targeted high-risk groups, though some challenges persisted, including geographical barriers to access people in remote areas, limited trust of some at-risk groups towards risk education implementers, and the ability to reach mobile populations. Conflict, insecurity, and funding shortfalls also hampered efforts. Delivery methods ranged from integrated approaches, emergency responses, and school programs to community outreach and mass media campaigns, with increasing use of digital tools.

Children continued to be the largest group of direct beneficiaries of risk education. Men and boys engaged in livelihood activities that bring them into contaminated areas were also heavily targeted for risk education.

Risk education activities were implemented in 2024 in all contaminated States Parties, except for Chile and Germany, where cluster munition contaminated areas are on military land that is inaccessible to the public.

CHALLENGES IN PROVIDING ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS

Victim assistance under the Convention on Cluster Munitions remained uneven and under-resourced across affected States Parties. Overall, despite some targeted improvements, structural constraints, limited resources, and weak coordination continued to hinder implementation of the Lausanne Action Plan's victim assistance commitments.

While emergency and continuing medical care have been integrated into some national health systems, services frequently lacked adequate funding, trained personnel, and access to rural or conflict-affected areas. Support from international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) helped fill gaps, as national systems have not yet achieved the required sustainability of service delivery. Rehabilitation services—including physiotherapy and the provision of prostheses and assistive devices—were often available but limited to the capital or major cities, and faced challenges related to staffing, funding, and geographic reach. Psychosocial and peer-to-peer support remained limited despite their recognized value. In countries where international funding declined, significant reductions in these services were noted.

Despite some progress in socio-economic inclusion and inclusive education for cluster munition victims in many countries, systemic hurdles continued to result in unmet needs. While vocational training, livelihood support, and legal and policy frameworks for economic inclusion and employment exist in some countries, many cluster munition victims were still unable to access income-generating opportunities.

⁵ Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Country Profile: South Sudan," updated 26 June 2024, bit.ly/SouthSudanCCMProfile.

ASSESSING THE IMPACT

CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES

CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES RECORDED GLOBALLY, FOR ALL TIME

The Monitor tracks global cluster munition casualties back to the mid-1960s, beginning with massive United States (US) cluster munition attacks in Southeast Asia. The Monitor recorded a global total of 24,816 cluster munition casualties—people killed and injured—for all time through to the end of 2024. This figure encompasses casualties from both direct cluster munition attacks (6,024) and unexploded cluster munition remnants (18,791).⁶

Many casualties go unreported. The total calculation of estimated casualties for individual countries from the period prior to entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions indicates that at least 56,800 casualties have occurred worldwide.⁷

As of the end of 2024, and dating back to the US bombing of Southeast Asia in the 1960s, cluster munition casualties have been recorded in 16 States Parties to the convention, four signatory states, 17 states not party, and two other areas.

The states with the highest number of recorded casualties, for all time, in the Monitor dataset are: Lao PDR (7,812), Syria (4,489), Iraq (3,212), Vietnam (2,135), and Ukraine (1,308). Both Lao PDR and Iraq are States Parties to the convention.

Not all States Parties with cluster munition casualties recorded on their territory have acknowledged the application of the Convention on Cluster Munitions obligation regarding victim assistance. Cluster munition casualties have been reported in Colombia and Mozambique, but neither have themselves reported any cluster munition victims and therefore do not recognize the application of the obligation to assist victims under the convention.⁸

The majority of recorded cluster munition casualties for all time (53%, or 13,211) occurred in States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

⁶ For one casualty in Montenegro, the cause was not recorded.

⁷ Other global estimates have put the total number of cluster munition casualties for all time at 86,600 to 100,000. However, these are based on extrapolations from limited data samples, which may not be representative of national averages or the actual number of casualties calculated by the Monitor based on known data and various country estimates recorded in Humanity & Inclusion (HI) data. See, Handicap International (HI), *Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities* (Brussels: HI, May 2007), bit.ly/MonitorHICircleofImpact2007.

⁸ **Colombia:** As identified in Case No. 12.416 (Santo Domingo Massacre v. the Republic of Colombia) heard before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), 17 civilians were killed and 27 were injured during a cluster munition attack in Santo Domingo, Colombia, on 13 December 1998. All casualties occurred at the time of the attack and no unexploded submunition casualties were reported in Colombia. Colombia later ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which entered into force for the country on 1 March 2016. In November 2017 the Supreme Court of Colombia upheld the decision of IACHR case, Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, regarding redress for cluster munition victims of the attack in 1998. The IACHR prescribed measures for remedy that are essentially consistent with the victim assistance obligations of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. IACHR, “Case of The Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia (Preliminary objections, merits and reparations): Judgement of November 30, 2012,” 30 November 2012, bit.ly/IACHRColombia30Nov2012. See also, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Colombia, Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre,” undated, bit.ly/ICRCSantoDomingo2012. **Mozambique:** Casualties that occurred in Mozambique due to cluster munition attacks by Rhodesia were likely predominantly Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) forces. Previously, Mozambique reported on victim assistance efforts under the Convention on Cluster Munitions and stated that “additional surveys are needed to identify victims of cluster munitions.” See, for example, Mozambique Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Reports (for calendar years 2010 and 2014), Form H. No such surveys were reported. However, in its most recent Article 7 report from 2020, Mozambique said that “at the moment there is no evidence of victims of cluster munitions.” Mozambique Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form H. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM.

A total of 604 casualties have been recorded for all time in signatories Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Uganda.

In states not party, a total of 10,584 cluster munition casualties were recorded for all time up to the end of 2024. Since the convention's entry into force in August 2010, casualties from cluster munition attacks have only occurred in states not party, namely Azerbaijan, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

States and other areas with cluster munition casualties (as of 31 December 2024)⁹

More than 1,000 recorded casualties	100–1,000 recorded casualties	10–99 recorded casualties	Less than 10 recorded casualties/ Unknown
Iraq Lao PDR Syria Ukraine Vietnam	Afghanistan <u>Angola</u> Azerbaijan Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Cambodia Croatia <u>DRC</u> Eritrea Ethiopia <i>Kosovo</i> Kuwait Lebanon Russia Serbia South Sudan* Yemen <i>Western Sahara</i>	Albania Colombia Georgia Israel Myanmar Sierra Leone Sudan Tajikistan <u>Uganda</u>	Chad Guinea-Bissau <u>Liberia</u> Libya Mauritania Montenegro Mozambique Somalia

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**; signatories are underlined; and other areas are in *italics*.

*South Sudan acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in August 2023, and the convention entered into force on 1 February 2024.

A total of 417 cluster munition casualties were recorded for all time in other areas, including Kosovo and Western Sahara, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh, which was previously reported as an 'other area'. Nagorno-Karabakh was depopulated by mass exodus of the existing inhabitants to Armenia when Azerbaijan gained territorial control in 2023, making it unlikely that any living cluster munition victims recorded in that data remained in the area in 2024.¹⁰

⁹ No numbers or estimated casualty totals are known for Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, or Mozambique. No cluster munition victims have been reported by Chile. Media reporting in 2021 on two survivors of a military explosive remnant of war (ERW) incident in Chile in 1995 described the item as a cluster munition remnant, however it was assessed that the munition involved was an explosive anti-aircraft shell. Email from Sergio Larraín Barth, International Programs & Operations Desk Officer, Chile Ministry of National Defense, 23 January 2025. It is possible that cluster munition casualties have occurred but gone unrecorded in other states where cluster munitions were used, abandoned, or stored in the past, such as State Party Zambia and non-signatories Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe. Better identification and disaggregation of cluster munition casualties is needed in most cluster munition affected states and areas.

¹⁰ The self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh Republic ceased to exist as of January 2024 and Nagorno-Karabakh is no longer addressed as an 'other area' in the context of mine action in Monitor reporting. See also, Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Nagorno-Karabakh Depopulated: What Now?" Daily Brief, 5 October 2023, [bit.ly/HRWDailyBrief5Oct2023](https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/05/nagorno-karabakh-depopulated).

CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES IN 2024

In 2024, casualties from cluster munition attacks and unexploded submunitions were recorded in a total of nine countries. Casualties from attacks were recorded in three states not party, while casualties from cluster munition remnants were recorded in eight countries, including five States Parties and three states not party. Cluster munition remnants continue to pose a significant threat, disproportionately affecting civilians. Children are especially vulnerable to unexploded submunitions.

For 2024, the Monitor recorded a total of 314 cluster munition casualties. The actual number of casualties for 2024 is likely significantly higher than the number recorded. Limited access to conflict-affected regions and inconsistencies in reporting make it difficult to draw definitive trends from annual casualty totals in the short term. The Monitor adjusts casualty data over time as new information becomes available.

For the third consecutive year, Ukraine continued to have the highest number of annual casualties of cluster munitions, with 208 casualties for 2024. From February 2022 through the end of 2024, a total of 1,231 cluster munition casualties were recorded for Ukraine.

As was the case since the full Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, civilian casualties from the numerous cluster munition attacks in the country in 2024 could have gone unrecorded. Monitor analysis of data from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) indicates that some 40 additional cluster munition attacks in Ukraine were reported in 2024 where the number of casualties that occurred was not noted.¹¹ These attacks were differentiated from attacks where it was reported that there were no casualties, and other attacks where claims of unsubstantiated or unspecified enemy military casualties were made.

Both Russia and Ukraine used cluster munitions in Ukraine in 2024. Event description notes in ACLED data included unconfirmed information from multiple sources that reported attacks involving cluster munitions resulting in estimates of some 180 Ukrainian and Russian military personnel killed in 2024.¹² These military casualty estimates and unverifiable claims were not included in the Monitor's annual casualty total.

Russian state-disseminated information, media, and social media channels reported alleged Ukrainian cluster munition attacks on Russian territory in 2024 that resulted in 116 civilian casualties. However, there were no independently confirmed reports of Ukraine deploying cluster munitions on Russian territory in 2024. Although it has been noted that Ukraine did use cluster munitions in the conflict against Russian forces inside Ukraine, this has not included verifiable attacks occurring across the border, and the nature of the incidents remains uncorroborated by independent sources. These stated casualties were not included in the Monitor's annual casualty total.

Casualties from cluster munition attacks

Since Cluster Munition Monitor reporting began, all casualties specifically from cluster munition attacks have occurred in states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.



Cluster Munition Coalition campaigner from Lebanon, Raed Mokaied, who lost his 5-year-old son in a cluster munition remnant incident, addresses government delegates gathered in Geneva during the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

© CMC, September 2024

¹¹ Online database of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). See, ACLED website, www.acleddata.com.

¹² Monitor analysis of ACLED data for calendar year 2024.

In 2024, 257 casualties from attacks with cluster munitions were reported in states not party Myanmar, Syria, and Ukraine.

In Ukraine, the Monitor recorded 193 casualties from cluster munition attacks in 2024, and 90 in 2023, with a total of at least 1,173 such casualties from attacks since Russia's full invasion began on 24 February 2022 through to the end of 2024.

Casualties from cluster munition attacks in Ukraine continued into 2025. United Nations (UN) sources, including the Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), reported that on 7 March 2025, Russian forces attacked Dobropillia, Donetsk region, killing 11 civilians and injuring 48.¹³ Investigations by HRMMU and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) found that, among other weapons deployed in the attacks, a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) "likely deployed cluster munitions, which caused a significant number of the casualties."¹⁴

Russian authorities reported Ukrainian use of cluster munitions in occupied areas in Ukraine, mainly Horlivka, Donetsk region. OHCHR reported that it could not verify all incidents, but imagery examined in some cases was consistent with cluster munition use. On 31 January 2025, cluster munition shells reportedly injured at least six civilians in Horlivka.¹⁵

In Myanmar, cluster munitions used in aerial attacks by Myanmar Armed Forces have been reported as resulting in at least 32 civilian casualties in 2024.¹⁶

In Syria, cluster munition attacks in 2024 caused 27 casualties.¹⁷

Casualties from cluster munition remnants

In 2024, 57 casualties from cluster munition remnants were recorded in States Parties Afghanistan (7), Iraq (11), Lao PDR (2), Lebanon (2), and Mauritania (2), and in states not party Syria (17), Ukraine (15), and Yemen (1). Casualties caused by cluster munition remnants

are often not specifically identified as such due to a lack of resources and detailed or disaggregated data, and may account for dozens, or even hundreds, of the explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties recorded in contaminated countries and areas each year.



The Cambodian Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munitions (CCBL) raises awareness about the dangers of mines and explosive remnants of war in the mine-affected community of Sok San village, in Cambodia's Banteay Meanchey province.

© CCBL, February 2025

Civilian cluster munition casualties

A high ratio of civilian casualties from cluster munitions is consistent with the indiscriminate nature of these weapons and their disproportionate impact. Due to unreliable reporting on military casualties and unsubstantiated estimates in Ukraine, no military casualties were so far included in Monitor reporting for 2024. Thus, all casualties recorded in 2024 were civilians. However, as noted above, claims of extensive military casualties of cluster munitions during battles were reported in Ukraine, but remained unquantified and/or unsubstantiated.

¹³ United Nations (UN) press release, "Stark increase in civilian casualties in March, UN Human Rights Monitors say," 9 April 2025, bit.ly/UkraineUN9Apr2025.

¹⁴ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine: 1 December 2024–31 May 2025," 30 June 2025, pp. 5–6, bit.ly/UkraineOHCHR30June2025.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Monitor media monitoring for calendar year 2024; and Monitor analysis of ACLED data for calendar year 2024.

¹⁷ Ibid.

Reports of civilian casualties from cluster munition attacks often lacked detailed information on victims' sex and age compared to those caused by cluster munition remnants.

Overall, in 2024, sex- and age-disaggregated data was severely lacking. However, at least five casualties were women in 2024, as was the case in 2023. In 2024, 30 child casualties from cluster munitions were recorded, including 24 child casualties from cluster munition remnants and six child casualties due to cluster munition attacks. Three child casualties were girls and 12 were boys, where the age and sex were reported. Children accounted for 42% of casualties from cluster munition remnants.

CONTAMINATION FROM CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS

GLOBAL CONTAMINATION

A total of 27 states are known or suspected to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants as of 31 December 2024. Of these contaminated states, 10 are States Parties, two are signatories, and 15 are states not party.¹⁸ Two other areas are also known or suspected to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants.

Estimated cluster munition remnant contamination (as of 31 December 2024)¹⁹

Massive (more than 1,000km ²)	Large (100– 1,000km ²)	Medium (10–99km ²)	Small (less than 10km ²)	Unknown
Lao PDR Vietnam	Cambodia Iraq	Azerbaijan Chad Chile Mauritania Syria Ukraine Yemen	Afghanistan <u>DRC</u> Georgia Germany Iran <i>Kosovo</i> Lebanon Libya Serbia Somalia South Sudan Sudan Tajikistan <i>Western Sahara</i>	<u>Angola</u> Armenia Kuwait Myanmar

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**; signatories are underlined; and other areas are in *italics*.

¹⁸ Nagorno-Karabakh—formerly listed as an 'other area'—is now considered part of the territory of Azerbaijan, as it ceased to exist as of January 2024. See, Piotr Sauer, "Nagorno-Karabakh's breakaway government says it will dissolve itself," *The Guardian*, 28 September 2023, bit.ly/TheGuardian28Sept2023; and Laurens Broers, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic: The life and death of an unrecognized state," *Eurasianet*, 2 January 2024, bit.ly/Eurasianet2Jan2024.

¹⁹ The extent of contamination is unknown but assumed to be small for Angola and Armenia. Based on evidence of extensive use of cluster munitions in Syria and Ukraine, it is believed that both countries suffer from at least a medium contamination level. However, in both countries no comprehensive surveys have been conducted yet that would allow a more exact estimation of the extent of the contamination. Since its formal dissolution as of 1 January 2024, Nagorno-Karabakh is now included in the reporting for territory under the jurisdiction and control of Azerbaijan. According to a survey by The HALO Trust, the contamination was estimated to be more than 16km². Despite some clearance work conducted by The HALO Trust, the extent of the remaining cluster munition contamination—including in other areas in Azerbaijan—is believed to be medium.

CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANT CONTAMINATION IN STATES PARTIES

States Parties that have completed clearance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties are obliged to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the convention.

No State Party completed clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas in 2024. The last State Party to report completion was Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in August 2023.²⁰ Prior to this, the most recent States Parties to complete clearance were Croatia and Montenegro in 2020.

In all, a total of 11 States Parties have completed clearance of cluster munition remnants as required by the convention.²¹

Extent of contamination in States Parties

The Convention on Cluster Munitions requires that States Parties identify the precise location, scope, and extent of cluster munition contaminated areas under their jurisdiction or control.

Afghanistan reported that a total of 8.99km² of land is contaminated by cluster munition remnants, covering 16 areas across the provinces of Bamyan, Nangarhar, Paktya, and Samangan, as of the end of 2024.²² In its updated extension request submitted in April 2025, asking for an additional two years, Afghanistan reported that it is in discussion with the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) and the office of the Prime Minister to mobilize the required resources to clear the remaining contamination within the requested extension period. However, at the same time, Afghanistan drew attention to the fact that international funding for clearance, including for addressing cluster munition contaminated areas, had drastically reduced or ceased completely since the Taliban have become the ruling authorities in Afghanistan.²³ Furthermore, it was mentioned that the ongoing survey and re-survey of 5,522 villages may lead to the discovery of additional cluster munition contamination, as cluster munition remnants had previously been found during battle area clearance (BAC) and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks.²⁴

States Parties that have completed clearance of cluster munition remnants

State Party	Year of completion
BiH	2023
Croatia	2020
Montenegro	2020
Mozambique	2016
Norway	2013
Congo, Republic of the	2012
Grenada	2012
Palau	2010
Zambia	2010
Albania	2009
Guinea-Bissau	2008

²⁰ Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F; and Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Country profiles: Bosnia and Herzegovina," updated 25 June 2024, bit.ly/CCMBiHProfile.

²¹ See the individual country profiles for: Albania, BiH, Republic of the Congo, Croatia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Montenegro, Mozambique, Norway, Palau, and Zambia. Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Country profiles," undated, www.clusterconvention.org/country-profiles.

²² Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), 2 April 2025.

²³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 2 April 2025.

²⁴ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 2 April 2025.

Chad reported in June 2021 that the last area known to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants had been cleared.²⁵ However, Tibesti province in the northwest of Chad is suspected to contain cluster munition contamination around former Libyan military bases, but had not yet been surveyed.²⁶ In 2022, Chad submitted an Article 4 deadline extension request through 1 October 2024 to conduct non-technical survey of 19.05km² in Tibesti (in Aouzou, Bardai, Emi Koussi, Wour, and Zouar sub-prefectures).²⁷ A lack of funding saw no survey activities conducted during 2023; and in January 2024, Chad submitted its second Article 4 deadline extension request, which was subsequently granted at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in September 2024 to extend the clearance deadline to October 2026.²⁸ For 2024, Chad reported no progress on the implementation of the planned survey due to a lack of financial resources.²⁹

In **Chile**, contamination from cluster munition remnants is limited to land on an army base and three ranges used for military training by the Chilean Air Force. As of the end of 2024, the remaining contamination across the four different sites totaled 21.25km².³⁰ While reporting the release of some contaminated areas through technical survey in 2024, Chile submitted a fourth deadline extension request in December 2024 in order to clear the remaining contaminated areas through December 2028.³¹

In **Germany**, a former military training site in Wittstock, 80km northwest of Berlin, is known to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants. In March 2025, Germany reported that 3.2km² are still contaminated and will be cleared by 1 August 2030, a new deadline resulting from Germany's second Article 4 extension request granted in September 2024.³²

In **Iraq**, the Regional Mine Action Center for the south of the country (RMAC South) reported that, as of the end of 2024, cluster munition remnants affected a total area of 210.34km². The RMAC in the Middle Euphrates region reported 4.41km² of contamination, while RMAC North reported 11.31km².³³ In addition, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq reported 1.31km² contaminated with cluster munitions, resulting in a total of 227.36km² being contaminated

25 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibril Brahim, Coordinator, National High Commission for Demining (Haut-Commissariat National au Déminage, HCND), 18 June 2021; and Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form F.

26 Emails from Romain Coupez, Regional Security Manager, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 10 May 2017 and 31 May 2018; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Romain Coupez, Regional Security Manager, MAG, 3 May 2017.

27 Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2022, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequest30May2022.

28 Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), pp. 3–4; Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 9 January 2024, p. 3, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequest2024; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Analysis Group for Article 4 Extension Requests, "Analysis of Chad's request of deadline extension under Article 4.1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions," 5 July 2024, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequest2024Analysis.

29 Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 3; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Soultani Moussa, Director of Operations, HCND, 22 April 2025.

30 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Chile Ministry of National Defense, 17 March 2025.

31 Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 13 December 2024, bit.ly/ChileArt4ExtRequest2024; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Chile Ministry of National Defense, 17 March 2025.

32 Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 10 May 2024, pp. 55–56, bit.ly/GermanyArt4ExtRequest2024.

33 Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, Regional Mine Action Centre for the south of the country (RMAC South), Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), 23 March 2025.

with cluster munition remnants throughout Iraq.³⁴ This represents an increase of 21.59km² from the 2023 total due to newly discovered and surveyed contaminated areas.³⁵

Lao PDR is the State Party most heavily contaminated by cluster munition remnants. Of the country's 18 provinces, 15 are contaminated, with nine being heavily contaminated.³⁶ Due to the massive extent of the overall contamination, Lao PDR does not provide an estimate of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) but applies the Cluster Munition Remnant Survey (CMRS) approach, combining non-technical and technical survey to directly identify and define confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).³⁷ Despite land release activities, the overall extent of confirmed cluster munition contamination in Lao PDR has not changed significantly over recent years as a result of new CHAs identified through CMRS. Contamination accounts for more than 1,500km² across 15 provinces, with survey still ongoing.³⁸



An unexploded MZD-2 submunition lies by the fence of an orange orchard in South Lebanon.

© Rashad Siblini/DCA, February 2025

In its revised extension request submitted in April 2025, **Lebanon** reported cluster munition remnant contamination totaling 5.33km², with 5.02km² classified as CHA and 0.3km² as SHA.³⁹ Despite land release activities, the overall extent of the contamination increased compared to the 4.65km² reported in 2023. This is due to 11 sites with legacy cluster munition contamination surveyed and newly registered in the database, and to new contamination resulting from kick-outs from strikes on Hezbollah ammunition and weapon storehouses.⁴⁰ All contamination is located in Bekaa, Mount Lebanon, and South Lebanon.

Mauritania reported the discovery of previously unknown cluster munition contaminated areas in 2020. In February 2021,

an initial assessment found that 14.01km² of land was contaminated with cluster munition remnants in the region of Tiris Zemmour in the north of Mauritania, bordering Western

³⁴ The figure reported for the Kurdistan Region in Iraq's 2024 Article 7 Report is 1.31km². However, the figure reported to the Monitor by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) was 3.79km². For this overview, the figure as provided in the Article 7 Report has been used. See, Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Khatab, Plan Manager, IKMAA, 27 April 2025.

³⁵ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F.

³⁶ Survey is complete in Attapeu, Champasak, Salavan, Savannakhet, and Sekong provinces. In Xieng Khouang, survey is still ongoing. In Bolikhamxai, Houaphanh, Khammouane, Luang Prabang, and Vientiane, survey is being undertaken, although not systematically. A further 0.53km² of confirmed hazardous area (CHA) has been identified in Phongsaly. See, Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F.

³⁷ United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), "Technical Note for Mine Action 08.20/02: Cluster munition remnant survey," 23 January 2024, bit.ly/CMRSurveyTechNote23Jan2024.

³⁸ Lao PDR, in its Convention on Cluster Munitions second Article 4 deadline extension request, identified the remaining CHA to be 1,502.08km² (1,843.62km² minus a total of 341.54km² cleared as of the end of December 2023). However, in its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports for 2023 and 2024, Lao PDR identified the total remaining CHA to be 1,963.78km², without specifying whether this figure takes into account ongoing survey and land release activities. For this overview, the figures provided in the second deadline extension request have been used. See, Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), Part B Detailed Narrative, 10 June 2024, p. 8, bit.ly/LaosArt4ExtRequest2024; and Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports (for calendar years 2023 and 2024), Form F.

³⁹ Lebanon response to Observations and Comments of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Analysis Group, 23 April 2025, p. 2, bit.ly/CCMArt4Lebanon23Apr2025.

⁴⁰ Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Charbel Njeim, Operations Section Head, Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC), 14 March 2025.

Sahara.⁴¹ In March 2023, Mauritania submitted its second extension request, aiming to conduct further survey and clear the discovered contamination.⁴² Two new areas in the same region were subsequently identified in 2023.⁴³ As of the end of 2024, the total confirmed cluster munition contamination in Mauritania is spread over nine CHAs accounting for 13.67km², while an additional 1.5km² has been classified as SHA, amounting to a total of 15.17km². Mauritania aims to clear this contamination during its third extension period, thus by 1 August 2028.⁴⁴

In **Somalia**, the total extent of contamination is believed to be small. As of the end of 2023, Somalia had identified 600m² of contamination in the states of Jubaland, Galmudug, and South West.⁴⁵ An update provided by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported one CHA of 85,589m² contaminated with cluster munition remnants as of the end of 2024.⁴⁶ As of 1 August 2025, Somalia had not submitted its Article 7 report for calendar year 2024.

South Sudan reported a total of 9.53km² of cluster munition remnant contamination, with 8.69km² classified as CHA and 0.84km² as SHA as of the end of 2024. The contamination affects eight of South Sudan's 10 states, with the majority of the contamination located in Central Equatoria state (4.25km²) and Eastern Equatoria state (3.92km²).⁴⁷

Possible contamination in States Parties

In May 2009, **Colombia's** then defense minister and later president, Juan Manuel Santos, acknowledged that the Colombian Military Forces had used cluster munitions in the past "to destroy clandestine airstrips and camps held by illegal armed groups," and noted that the submunitions sometimes did not explode and "became a danger to the civilian population."⁴⁸ In 2010, the Ministry of National Defense said that the Colombian Air Force last used cluster munitions on 10 October 2006 "to destroy clandestine airstrips belonging to organizations dedicated to drug trafficking in remote areas of the country where the risk to civilians was minimal."⁴⁹ When the convention entered into force for Colombia in 2016, Colombia reported that it was in the process of establishing the location and extent of any cluster munition contamination.⁵⁰ In 2017, Colombia stated that it had no cluster munition remnant

⁴¹ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 30 June 2021, p. 2, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCMArt4ExtRequest2021.

⁴² Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 March 2023, p. 7, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCM2Art4ExtRequest2023.

⁴³ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Col. Mohamedou Baham, Coordinator, National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD), 20 May 2024.

⁴⁴ In its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report for 2024, Mauritania reported the contaminated 15.17km² as all CHA. However, in a questionnaire response submitted to the Monitor, 1.5km² of the 15.17km² was declared as suspected hazardous area (SHA). For this overview, the figures provided in the Monitor questionnaire have been used. See, Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Houssein Neya, Database Administrator, PNDHD, 1 April 2025. See also, Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 26 December 2024, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt4ExtRequest2024.

⁴⁵ Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form F.

⁴⁶ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mustafa Bawar, Senior Information Management (IM) Officer, UNMAS, 26 May 2025.

⁴⁷ South Sudan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 4 April 2025.

⁴⁸ Carlos Osorio, "Colombia destroys its last cluster bombs," *Agence France-Presse*, 7 May 2009.

⁴⁹ Colombia Ministry of National Defense presentation on cluster munitions, Bogotá, December 2010.

⁵⁰ Colombia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (initial report, for the period 1 March–28 August 2016), Form F, 28 August 2016; and Colombia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J.

contamination, yet no survey was undertaken to confirm this.⁵¹ In 2021, a study reported that contamination was a possibility since the Colombian Air Force had acquired two types of cluster bombs in the 1990s: the CB-250K from Chile and the ARC-32 from Israel. Yet, prior to ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and subsequent stockpile destruction, there was a lack of sufficient information on the use of these two cluster bombs.⁵² In 2024, as in previous years, Colombia did not confirm any contamination on its territory.⁵³

The **United Kingdom** (UK) does not have any contamination on its territory. However, it is estimated that more than 2,000 crates of AN-M1A1 and/or AN-M4A1 ‘cluster adapter’ type bombs and some 800 fused cluster bombs remain in UK waters.⁵⁴ These are located at Sheerness off the east coast of England in the cargo of a sunken World War II ship.⁵⁵ The wreck is in a no-entry exclusion zone and under constant radar surveillance. The UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency undertakes regular surveys and has reported that the wreck is showing evidence of gradual deterioration but is considered to be in stable condition.⁵⁶ However, in April 2024, media reported that ongoing safety works on the wreck have been delayed due to the detection of unidentified objects around the wreck site, requiring further investigation.⁵⁷ While the UK government published the results of a new maritime survey conducted in September 2024, it did not provide any clarification on the previously discovered unidentified objects around the wreck site. The main result of the survey concludes that the wreck continues to deteriorate and is tilting towards the east. It does not provide any information about whether this implies an increased risk emerging from any of the ammunition remaining in the wreck.⁵⁸

CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANT CONTAMINATION IN SIGNATORIES

Two signatories to the Convention on Cluster Munitions—Angola and the DRC—may be contaminated by cluster munition remnants, but the extent of contamination is unknown.

Angola has not reported any areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants in its transparency reports. However, cluster munition remnants have repeatedly been found and

⁵¹ Colombia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F; and email from Camilo Serna, Sub-Director, Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas, CCCM), 30 July 2020.

⁵² Carlos Andrés Soler Palomino, “Technical Study of the cluster munitions used by the Colombian Air Force: strategic guidelines for the compliance with Article 4 of the Oslo Convention,” Postgraduate School of the Colombian Air Force, 2021.

⁵³ Colombia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F.

⁵⁴ United Kingdom (UK) Maritime and Coastguard Agency, “Report on the Wreck of the SS Richard Montgomery,” May 1999, bit.ly/SSMontgomeryReport1999; and UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency, “SS Richard Montgomery: background information,” updated 16 July 2024.

⁵⁵ The SS Richard Montgomery, carrying a cargo of munitions, was shipwrecked off the Thames Estuary, near Sheerness, in August 1944 and remains submerged there. The former UK Defence Evaluation and Research Agency has listed best estimates of the munitions which remain aboard the ship, including 2,297 cases of fragmentation cluster bombs with AN-M1A1 and/or AN-M4A1 “cluster adapter” submunitions. Reports indicate that the wreck is generally stable but is showing accelerated levels of deterioration. See, “Unexploded bombs from the second world war are getting more dangerous,” *New Scientist*, 27 March 2024, bit.ly/NewScientist27March2024; “Masts to be cut from Thames Estuary wreck packed with explosives,” *BBC News*, 4 June 2020, bit.ly/BBCNews4June2020; UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency, “Report On The Wreck Of The SS Richard Montgomery,” November 2000, p. 20; and Jamie Doward and Chris Bradford, “Fears grow that WW2 wreck could explode on Kent coast,” *The Guardian*, 17 August 2019, bit.ly/TheGuardian17Aug2019.

⁵⁶ UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency, “SS Richard Montgomery: background information,” updated 5 June 2025, bit.ly/MontgomeryMaritimeCoastguardAgency.

⁵⁷ Liz Jackson, “Explosives-filled shipwreck has safety work delayed as objects found,” *BBC*, 13 April 2024, bbc.in/3zZuUDo.

⁵⁸ UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency, “SS Richard Montgomery: Survey Report 2024,” 2 December 2024, bit.ly/MaritimeCoastguardAgency2Dec2024.

destroyed through EOD callouts, including in 2024, when 625 cluster munition remnants were destroyed in Cuando and two in Bié province.⁵⁹

The **DRC** consistently reported for the period 2013–2021 a total of 0.16km² of land contaminated by cluster munition remnants. The contamination has been primarily from Mk 118 and PM1 submunitions and was reported to be located in the provinces of Equateur, Ituri, South-Kivu, and Tanganyika. At the same time, it was reported that cluster munition contaminated land had been released in these provinces, but also in Maniema and Tshopo.⁶⁰ As of 31 December 2024, DRC reported an updated cluster munition remnant contamination figure of 0.3km² spread over 20 CHAs, and added that a nationwide survey has not yet been initiated as the Convention is pending ratification.⁶¹

CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANT CONTAMINATION IN STATES NOT PARTY AND OTHER AREAS

Fifteen states not party and two other areas are, or are believed to be, contaminated by cluster munition remnants.

In **Armenia**, land contaminated by ERW was assessed as totaling 42.17km² as of December 2023.⁶² This is an increase of approximately 7% from the 2022 total of 39.24km².⁶³ In 2022, less than 3% of the contamination was estimated to be cluster munition remnants.⁶⁴ As of 1 August 2025, no new update on the extent of cluster munition contamination was available.

Azerbaijan's extent of cluster munition contamination in areas under its jurisdiction is not known due to ERW contamination in areas regained during the conflict with Armenia in 2020 that are yet to be surveyed. In former other area Nagorno-Karabakh, a survey by The HALO Trust in the aftermath of the 2020 conflict found that 68% of inhabited settlements had experienced cluster munition use and contamination. The current extent of contamination in this region is not known but believed to total less than 16km².⁶⁵ As of December 2024, the Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA) reported that the former lines of contact are treated as high-risk zones and consequently are classified as CHA, but that contamination in these areas is not disaggregated by type of explosive ordnance.⁶⁶

Cambodia reduced the amount of cluster munition remnant contaminated area through land release in 2024. As of the end of 2024, the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) reported a total contamination of 681.22km², a 7% decrease from the contaminated area reported as of the end of 2023.⁶⁷ Most of the contaminated areas are in the northeast, along the borders with Lao PDR and Vietnam.

⁵⁹ Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT.

⁶⁰ Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (voluntary, for calendar years 2013 to 2021), Form F, 30 May 2022.

⁶¹ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Joseph Lukongola, Chief Operating Officer, Congolese Mine Action Center (Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM), May 2025.

⁶² Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE), "National Mine Action Authority the Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise sums up the activities carried out in 2023," 29 December 2023, bit.ly/ArmeniaCHDE2023.

⁶³ CHDE, "Non-Technical Survey," undated, bit.ly/CHDEArmeniaNTS.

⁶⁴ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "Update of work of UN in Mine Action in Armenia," 20 October 2022, bit.ly/ArmeniaUNDP2022.

⁶⁵ Liz Cookman, "Nagorno-Karabakh: Land still laced with mines, year after war," *Al Jazeera*, 9 November 2021, bit.ly/AlJazeera9Nov2021; and "The HALO Trust clears Stepanakert of unexploded hazards left by 2020 war," *Armenian Weekly*, 19 May 2022, bit.ly/ArmenianWeekly19May2022.

⁶⁶ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Yagizarov Shamil, Head of GIS Division of the Information Department, Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA), 18 April 2025. ANAMA was formerly called Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action.

⁶⁷ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sophea In, Deputy Manager of the Database Unit, Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), 4 June 2025; and presentation by CMAA, Regional Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Impact of Improvised Anti-Personnel Mines Within the Framework of the Convention, Accra, 13–15 February 2024, p. 2, bit.ly/CMAA15Feb2024.

Georgia is thought to be free of contamination, though South Ossetia—a disputed territory not controlled by the government of Georgia—is a possible exception.

Iran's extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants is not known. Some contamination is believed to date from the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988), when cluster munitions were widely used in Khuzestan and to a lesser extent in Kermanshah.⁶⁸

In **Kuwait**, cluster munition remnants dating back to Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of the country continue to be periodically detected or unearthed. A survey of oilfields, which was completed between 2017 and 2021, reportedly found a large number of "unexploded ordnance, particularly cluster munitions."⁶⁹ Torrential rains in 2022 also exposed cluster munition remnants in the desert area of Kabad in Al Jahra. The most recent report of the confirmed presence of cluster munition remnants was in November 2023, when the Kuwait Interior Ministry was reported to have destroyed "a large number of projectiles and cluster bombs" in the Salmiya Beach area.⁷⁰

In other area **Kosovo**, the Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) reported 9.24km² of cluster munition remnant contamination as of the end of 2023.⁷¹ No further update on contamination was provided in 2024.

Libya's contamination from cluster munition remnants is primarily the result of armed conflict in 2011 and renewed conflict since 2014, particularly in urban areas. In 2019, there were several instances or allegations of cluster munition use by forces affiliated with the Libyan National Army (LNA).⁷² As of 31 December 2024, Libya reported 0.69km² of cluster munition contamination spread across seven CHAs.⁷³

In **Myanmar**, there have been a number of reports of the use of cluster munitions in aerial attacks, including in 2024 (*see Use of Cluster Munitions section in Ban Policy*), yet the presence or extent of contamination remains unknown.

Serbia reduced its remaining cluster munition contamination to 0.27km², located in two SHAs, through clearance of 0.35km² during 2024.⁷⁴

Sudan reported 33,196m² of cluster munition remnant contamination as of the end of 2024, with 27,580m² classified as CHA and 5,616m² as SHA.⁷⁵ This is the first time Sudan provided an update on contamination since conflict erupted in 2023. The reported figure accounts for less than 24% of the extent reported as of the end of 2021 (142,402m²).⁷⁶

In **Syria**, cluster munitions were used extensively in 2012–2020 across 13 of its 14 governorates, before use appeared to decline significantly in 2021. The HALO Trust conducted an initial assessment of ERW contamination in northwest Syria in 2018–2020 that showed cluster munition remnants were the most frequently found type of ordnance and

⁶⁸ Interview with Ali Alizadeh, Iranian Air Force Colonel (ret.), Tehran, 8 February 2014.

⁶⁹ Sebastian Castelier and Aladdin Elbarbary, "Killer mines in Kuwait keep Gulf War alive and deadly," *Al Jazeera*, 28 November 2023, bit.ly/KuwaitAlJazeera28Nov2023.

⁷⁰ Ramadan Al Sherbini, "Invasion-era bombs found on Kuwaiti beach," *Gulf News*, 24 November 2023, bit.ly/KuwaitGulfNews24Nov2023.

⁷¹ Republic of Kosovo, "Kosovo Mine Action Strategy, 2025–2030," 18 June 2024, p. 3, bit.ly/KMACStrategy2025-2030.

⁷² United Nations Security Council (UNSC), "Final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1973 (2011)," S/2019/914, Annex 17, 9 December 2019, bit.ly/UNSCLibya9Dec2019; HRW, "Libya: Banned Cluster Munitions Used in Tripoli," 20 February 2020, bit.ly/HRWLibya13Feb2020; and Sami Zaptia, "Tripoli forces claim successes and accuse Hafter of using cluster bombs and internationally banned phosphorus bombs," *Libya Herald*, 20 June 2019, bit.ly/LibyaHerald20June2019.

⁷³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Abdullatif Abujarida, Head of Information Department, Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC), 18 March 2025.

⁷⁴ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Slađana Košutić, Senior Advisor, Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC), 27 March 2025.

⁷⁵ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Moawla Almanna, Chief of Operations, Sudan National Mine Action Center (SNMAC), 11 March 2025.

⁷⁶ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abd El Majid, Chief of Operations, SNMAC, 20 April 2022.

also accounted for the highest number of casualties.⁷⁷ Although cluster munition contamination in Syria is believed to be significant, its exact extent remains undetermined.⁷⁸

Tajikistan has reported cluster munition remnant contamination totaling 4.92km² of CHA as of the end of 2024.⁷⁹ This accounts for 1.18km² more than reported as of the end of 2023.⁸⁰

In **Ukraine**, extensive cluster munition attacks were reported since the Russian invasion in 2022, resulting in widespread contamination. The extent of contaminated areas remains difficult to ascertain. As of 1 August 2025, Ukraine's database included 4,385 SHAs and CHAs, accounting for 540.69km² of contamination, without specifying the type of explosive ordnance and not including an area 20km from the frontline that remains inaccessible to mine action operators.⁸¹

Vietnam is massively contaminated by cluster munition remnants, but there is no accurate estimate of the extent of contamination. Despite ongoing land release activities, the Vietnam National Mine Action Center (VNMAC) reported in 2024 that more than 5.6 million hectares (56,000km²) are contaminated by ERW, including cluster munition remnants. This represents nearly 18% of Vietnam's total land area. The contamination is mostly found in the central provinces of Quang Tri, Quang Binh, Ha Tinh, Nghe An, and Quang Ngai. As of 7 July 2024, Quang Tri province reported that the remaining cluster munition contamination accounts for 332.54km², covering 7% of the area of the province.⁸²

Yemen identified approximately 18km² of suspected cluster munition contaminated area in 2014, before a Saudi Arabia-led coalition used cluster munitions in Yemen in 2015–2017. This new use reportedly increased cluster munition contamination in northwestern and central areas.⁸³ The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reported in 2021 that cluster munition and ERW contamination is widespread in the north.⁸⁴ In southern Yemen, with the exception of a few areas where the frontlines have shifted, there is no cluster



A Humanity & Inclusion (HI) deminer prepares to destroy an unexploded submunition using the “Dragon Lance” tool in Syria’s Raqqah governorate.

© HI, May 2025

⁷⁷ The HALO Trust, “A Hidden Emergency: Why Explosive Ordnance Contamination must be addressed now in Northwest Syria,” December 2020, pp. 7 and 9, bit.ly/HALOSyriaDec2020.

⁷⁸ Information Management and Mine Action Program (iMMAP), “Northeast Syria: Humanitarian Mine Action Response: Bi-annual Update (October 2022–March 2023),” 20 June 2023, bit.ly/iMMAPSyriaJune2023; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Cassiopee Bruschini-Chaumat, Programme Officer, The HALO Trust, 25 April 2023; and by Francesca Chiaudani, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 8 May 2023.

⁷⁹ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Daler Eshonjonov, Operations Manager, Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC), 13 March 2025.

⁸⁰ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Daler Eshonjonov, Operations Manager, TNMAC, 3 April 2024.

⁸¹ Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, “Implementation of humanitarian demining activities,” accessed 1 August 2025, bit.ly/UkraineDeminingActivitiesMap; and Eoghan Macguire, Gyula Csák, Logan Williams, and Galen Reich, “Ukraine’s Contaminated Land: Clearing Landmines With Rakes, Tractors and Drones,” Bellingcat, 2 July 2025, bit.ly/Bellingcat2July2025.

⁸² Vietnam National Mine Action Center (VNMAC), “National Digital Library on Explosive Ordnance Risk Education,” undated, bit.ly/VNMACDigitalLibrary; and Quang Tri Mine Action Center (QTMAC) “Dashboard—Quang Tri Cluster Submunitions Contamination Map,” accessed 7 July 2025, bit.ly/QuangTriMADashboard.

⁸³ UNDP, “Grant Progress Report for 1 October–31 December 2015,” 25 January 2016; and UNDP, “Yemen Emergency Mine Action Project: Annual Report 2021,” February 2022, p. 7.

⁸⁴ UNDP, “Yemen Emergency Mine Action Project: Annual Report 2020,” February 2021, p. 8.

munition remnant contamination.⁸⁵ As of 1 August 2025, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) had not provided any updates on cluster munition contamination.⁸⁶

Other area **Western Sahara** reported having 1.73km² of cluster munition remnant contamination as of the end of 2024.⁸⁷ This figure only defines cluster munition contamination east of the Berm and represents a slight decrease from the 2.08km² reported for 2023 due to clearance activities.⁸⁸

ADDRESSING THE IMPACT

CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANT CLEARANCE


Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is obligated to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the convention.

STATES PARTIES' PROGRESS TOWARDS CLEARANCE OBLIGATIONS


In 2024, States Parties with clearance obligations released a combined total of 101.85km² of hazardous area, in which 83,452 cluster munition remnants—primarily unexploded submunitions—were destroyed.

The land release total for 2024 represents an increase from the 92.04km² released in 2023, with eight of the 10 States Parties with ongoing Article 4 obligations conducting land release activities in 2024. While Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and South Sudan all released less land in 2024 than in 2023, the land release rate increased in 2024 for Chile, Germany, Lao PDR, and Mauritania. Both Chad and Somalia did not release any cluster munition contaminated land in 2024, as was the case in 2023.

States Parties that released more than 1km² of cluster munition contaminated land in 2024



States Parties that destroyed more than 1,000 cluster munition remnants in 2024



⁸⁵ Email from Stephen Bryant, Chief Technical Advisor for Mine Action, UNDP, 11 August 2020.

⁸⁶ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ameen Saleh Alaqili, Director, Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC), 22 May 2023.

⁸⁷ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kebe Elhadji, Chief of Mine Action Program, UNMAS, 28 March 2025.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

Cluster munition remnant land release by States Parties in 2023–2024⁸⁹

State Party	2024		2023	
	Land release (km ²)	Cluster munition remnants destroyed	Land release (km ²)	Cluster munition remnants destroyed
Afghanistan	0.33	1,506	1.03	740
BiH	N/A*		0.49	434
Chad	0	0	0	0
Chile	8.09	0	1.44	229
Germany	1.21	327	0.87	483
Iraq	12.09	7,424	20.95	8,011
Lao PDR	75.03	71,073	62.09	58,735
Lebanon	0.45	1,631	0.85	1,956
Mauritania	1.12	29	0	0
Somalia	0	0	N/R	N/R
South Sudan	3.53	1,462	4.32	2,760
TOTAL	101.85	83,452	92.04	73,348

Note: N/A=not applicable; N/R=not reported.

*All survey and clearance completed in August 2023.

⁸⁹ The following references are for calendar year 2024. **Afghanistan:** Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 2 April 2025; and email from Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 30 June 2025. **Chad:** Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), pp. 3–4. **Chile:** Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 13 December 2024, p. 3, bit.ly/ChileArt4ExtRequest2024; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Chile Ministry of National Defense, 17 March 2025. **Germany:** Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F. **Iraq:** Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, DMA, 23 March 2025; and by Ahmed Khatab, Plan Manager, IKMAA, 27 April 2025. **Lao PDR:** Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F. **Lebanon:** Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Charbel Njeim, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 14 March 2025. **Mauritania:** Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Comdt. Mamadou Sarr, Chief of Operations, PNDHD, 1 April 2025. **Somalia:** Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 3 April 2025, pp. 1 and 3–4, bit.ly/SomaliaArt4ExtRequest2025; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Hussein Ibrahim, Project Manager, UNMAS, 26 May 2025. **South Sudan:** In its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report for 2024, South Sudan reported that 73 cluster munition remnants had been destroyed during clearance activities. However, UNMAS reported to the Monitor that 1,462 cluster munition remnants had been destroyed in South Sudan during land release activities, including during explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks. For this overview, the figure of the Article 7 report has been used. See, South Sudan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 4 April 2025.

The following references are for calendar year 2023. **Afghanistan:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Abdul Habib Rahimi, Operations Manager, DMAC, 27 April 2024. **BiH:** BiH Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F. **Chad:** Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 5. **Chile:** Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Chile Ministry of National Defense, 6 May 2024. **Germany:** Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F. **Iraq:** Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, DMA, 20 May 2024. **Lao PDR:** Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F. **Lebanon:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Charbel Njeim, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 8 April 2024. **Mauritania:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Capt. Mamadou Sarr, Chief of Operations, PNDHD, 20 May 2024. **South Sudan:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 25 April 2024.

STATUS OF ARTICLE 4 PROGRESS TO COMPLETION (AS OF 1 AUGUST 2025)

Despite making progress in surveying and clearing areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants, the submission of extension requests has regrettably become standard practice rather than the intended rare exception in response to extraordinary circumstances.

Status of Article 4 progress to completion (as of 1 August 2025)

State Party	Current deadline	Extension period (number of request)	Original deadline	Status
Afghanistan	1 March 2026	4 years (1 st)	1 March 2022	Requested 2-year extension until 1 March 2028
Chad	1 October 2026	13 months (1 st) 2 years (2 nd)	1 September 2023	Behind target
Chile	1 June 2026	1 year (1 st) 1 year (2 nd) 3 years (3 rd)	1 June 2021	Requested 2-year-and-6-month extension until 1 December 2028
Germany	1 August 2030	5 years (1 st) 5 years (2 nd)	1 August 2020	On target
Iraq	1 November 2028	5 years (1 st)	1 November 2023	Behind target
Lao PDR	1 August 2030	5 years (1 st) 5 years (2 nd)	1 August 2020	On target
Lebanon	1 May 2026	5 years (1 st)	1 May 2021	Requested 4-year extension until 1 May 2030
Mauritania	1 August 2026	2 years (1 st) 2 years (2 nd)	1 August 2022	Requested 2-year extension until 1 August 2028
Somalia	1 March 2026	N/A	1 March 2026	Requested 4-year extension until 1 March 2030
South Sudan	1 February 2034	N/A	1 February 2034	On target

Note: N/A=not applicable.

Germany and Lao PDR submitted the first clearance deadline extension requests in 2019. Both states received five-year extensions. More requests have been submitted by other States Parties every year since 2019.

In 2020–2021, requests to extend Article 4 clearance deadlines were granted to Afghanistan, BiH, Chile, Lebanon, and Mauritania. In 2022, Chile submitted a third extension request based on the completion of technical survey. Requests were also submitted in 2022 by BiH and Chad.

In 2023, Iraq submitted its first extension request, and Mauritania submitted its second.

In 2024, Chad, Germany, and Lao PDR all submitted their second extension requests, which were granted during the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in September 2024.

In 2025, Somalia submitted its first extension request, Afghanistan and Lebanon their second, Mauritania its third, and Chile its fourth, all of which will be considered during the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in September 2025.⁹⁰

STATES PARTIES' INDIVIDUAL PROGRESS TOWARDS CLEARANCE OBLIGATIONS IN 2024 AND PREVIOUS YEARS

Afghanistan reported that 0.33km² of SHA was canceled and 1,506 cluster munition remnants were destroyed during EOD spot tasks, BAC, and weapons and ammunitions destruction activities in 2024. No cluster munition contaminated land was released through clearance or technical survey in 2024. Since the Taliban gained control over Afghanistan in August 2021, operational capacity has been significantly reduced due to decreased, ceased, and/or canceled funding.⁹¹ Consequently, the country submitted its second extension request in December 2024 for two years, until 1 March 2028.⁹² The additional time requested in order to address the remaining 8.99km² of cluster munition contamination is ambitious. Timely completion will only come about if the required funding can be sourced rapidly. Initially, Afghanistan reported that it would meet its original clearance deadline of 1 March 2022, as there was a commitment from UNMAS and the US to financially support clearance operations for 10 areas.⁹³ The discovery of additional contamination and a change in donor priorities led Afghanistan to submit an extension request in 2021, which was granted until March 2026 at a time when it was not yet known that funding would decrease further.⁹⁴

Chad did not report any survey or clearance of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants in 2024.⁹⁵ Chad is not on track to meet the projected target, despite being granted a second extension to its clearance deadline until 1 October 2026 specifically to conduct survey in Tibesti province and to mobilize funding and other resources for survey teams.⁹⁶ As in previous years, Chad reported in 2025 that it does not have the financial means to implement the planned survey, but did not provide further information about any progress in resource mobilization.⁹⁷



Demining organization DanChurchAid (DCA) conducts rubble clearance in a residential area of the city of Ar-Raqqa in Syria. The area is marked to prevent residents from getting too close to the clearance site.

© Rasmus Emil Gravesen/DCA, February 2025

⁹⁰ Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Extension requests to be considered at the 13th Meeting of States Parties (13MSP)," undated, www.clusterconvention.org/13msp-er.

⁹¹ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 2 April 2025; and email from Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 30 June 2025.

⁹² Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 13 March 2025, bit.ly/AfghanistanArt4ExtRequest2025.

⁹³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programmes, DMAC, 21 February 2021.

⁹⁴ Afghanistan Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 3 August 2021, bit.ly/AfghanistanCCMArt4ExtRequest2021; and email from Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programmes, DMAC, 17 July 2021.

⁹⁵ Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), pp. 3–4.

⁹⁶ Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Final Report of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties," Geneva, 20 September 2024, p. 6, docs.un.org/CCM/MSP/2024/11; and Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 9 January 2024, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequest2024.

⁹⁷ Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), pp. 3–4.



A deminer conducts battle area clearance in a park on the outskirts of the city of Mykolaiv in Ukraine. The area was contaminated with cluster munition remnants.

© Rasmus Emil Gravesen/DCA, November 2024

Chile did not report any clearance activities but reduced 8.09km² of contaminated land through technical survey in 2024.⁹⁸ While this decreased the overall contamination considerably, Chile does not expect to be able to reduce or clear the remaining 21.25km² within the current extension period ending on 1 June 2026. Chile therefore submitted its fourth extension request in December 2024, requesting to complete clearance by 1 December 2028.⁹⁹ While the overall plan to address the remaining contamination is reasonable, the forecast of clearing around 7km² annually over three years is ambitious, particularly as Chile is still seeking international assistance to provide some of the financial resources to effectively implement the proposed plan.¹⁰⁰ Chile has also made little progress clearing contaminated areas in the past. In January 2020, it sought its first extension period,

initially for five years until 2026.¹⁰¹ It revised the request to a one-year interim extension in June 2020 to enable technical survey before submitting an extension request with a clearance plan.¹⁰² In June 2021, Chile then submitted a second one-year extension request and reported that the survey had not taken place due to a lack of resources and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁰³ Following the completion of the technical survey in 2021, Chile submitted a third extension request in April 2022, for a period of three years until 1 June 2026, to clear 30.77km² of CHA identified in the 2021 survey.¹⁰⁴

Germany cleared 1.21km² of contaminated land during 2024 and destroyed 327 cluster munition remnants. Between 2017 and 2024, it cleared a total of 7.8km².¹⁰⁵ Germany is on target working towards the deadline of its second extension period (1 August 2030).

Iraq reported clearing 7.58km² and releasing 4.51km² of cluster munition contaminated land through survey in the southern and northern provinces and in the Middle Euphrates region in 2024.¹⁰⁶ These figures represent a significant decrease compared to the 13.26km²

⁹⁸ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 13 December 2024, p. 3, bit.ly/ChileArt4ExtRequest2024; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Chile Ministry of National Defense, 17 March 2025.

⁹⁹ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F; presentation of Chile, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2025, p. 3, bit.ly/ChilePresentation7Apr2025; Chile Ministry of National Defense, "Chile's response to the Observations and Comments of the CCM Article 4 Analysis Group on the Extension Request submitted by Chile on 13 December 2024," 2 April 2025, p. 1, bit.ly/ChileResponse2Apr2025; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Chile Ministry of National Defense, 17 March 2025.

¹⁰⁰ Chile Ministry of National Defense, "Chile's response to the Observations and Comments of the CCM Article 4 Analysis Group on the Extension Request submitted by Chile on 13 December 2024," 2 April 2025, pp. 7–8, bit.ly/ChileResponse2Apr2025; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Chile Ministry of National Defense, 17 March 2025.

¹⁰¹ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request, January 2020, bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequestJan2020.

¹⁰² Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 29 June 2020, pp. 5 and 7, bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequestJune2020.

¹⁰³ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 22 June 2021, bit.ly/ChileCCMArt4ExtRequest2021.

¹⁰⁴ Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 9 May 2022, bit.ly/ChileRevisedArt4RequestMay2022.

¹⁰⁵ Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F.

¹⁰⁶ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, DMA, 23 March 2025; and by Ahmed Khatib, Plan Manager, IKMAA, 27 April 2025.

cleared and the 7.69km² reduced in 2023. A total of 7,424 submunitions were destroyed in 2024, another decrease compared to the 2023 figure of 8,011. The decreased output is related to a reduced number of available clearance teams, which Iraq reported as a hinderance to completing clearance of cluster munition contaminated areas by its deadline of 1 November 2028.¹⁰⁷

As in previous years, **Lao PDR** released the most land of any affected country, including 70km² of agricultural land and 5.03km² of land required for development projects.¹⁰⁸ In total, 71,073 cluster munition remnants were destroyed in 2024. More than 96% (72.2km²) of the total land released in 2024 occurred in the nine most heavily contaminated provinces.¹⁰⁹ Lao PDR is working towards its clearance deadline of 1 August 2030, with plans to conduct non-technical survey in 750 villages, as well as to continue systematic CMRS on an area of 100km² and to release 325km² of identified CHA.¹¹⁰

Lebanon reported releasing 0.45km² of hazardous area during 2024, of which 0.39km² was cleared, 0.03km² was canceled through non-technical survey, and 0.03km² was reduced through technical survey. The 0.39km² cleared in 2024 represents a decline from the 0.66km² cleared in 2023 due to the outbreak of new conflict that required clearance tasks to be suspended for security reasons, particularly in South Lebanon. Furthermore, capacities had to be freed for emergency responses to new threats from explosive ordnance, including new cluster munition contamination resulting from kick-outs from strikes on Hezbollah ammunition and weapon storehouses.¹¹¹ Other factors negatively affecting land release progress included the overall decrease of funding, as well as the persistently difficult economic situation alongside significant inflation rates.¹¹² The remaining legacy cluster munition contamination is also primarily located in terrain that is difficult to clear. For these reasons, Lebanon submitted its second request on 27 November 2024, asking to extend its clearance deadline until 1 May 2030 in order to address the remaining 5.33km².¹¹³



A deminer prepares to clear cluster munition contaminated land in a residential area of South Lebanon.

© ITF/NPA, April 2025

¹⁰⁷ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, DMA, 23 March 2025.

¹⁰⁸ Development land is predominantly cleared by commercial operators and does not consist exclusively of areas known to be contaminated with cluster munitions. See, Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F.

¹⁰⁹ The nine provinces are: Attapeu, Bolikhamxai, Champasak, Khammouane, Luangprabang, Salavan, Savannakhet, Xekong, and Xieng Khouang. See, Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F.

¹¹⁰ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Annex 1: Detailed Work Plan (updated), 17 May 2024, www.clusterconvention.org/12msp-er.

¹¹¹ LMAC, "LMAC Annual Report 2024," undated, p. 46, bit.ly/LMACAnnualReport2024; Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Charbel Njeim, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 14 March 2025; statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2025, bit.ly/LebanonStatement7Apr2025; Hanna Davis, "In Lebanon, explosives litter the land long after Israel's wars," *The New Arab*, 14 May 2025, bit.ly/DavisLebanon14May2025; and "Lebanon: after the war, mine clearance," *ARTE TV*, 2024, bit.ly/LebanonARTE2024.

¹¹² Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; LMAC, "LMAC Annual Report 2024," undated, p. 7, bit.ly/LMACAnnualReport2024; and World Bank Group, "Macro Poverty Outlook: Lebanon," 10 April 2025, p. 2, bit.ly/LebanonWorldBank10Apr2025.

¹¹³ Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2024, bit.ly/LebanonArt4ExtRequest2024; and Lebanon response to Observations and Comments of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Analysis Group, 23 April 2025, p. 2, bit.ly/CCMArt4Lebanon23Apr2025.

Mauritania reported releasing 0.1km² of cluster munition contaminated land through clearance and a further 1.02km² through technical survey in 2024. This is a positive upturn, as no land was released during the previous reporting period in 2023.¹¹⁴ Mauritania is currently working towards its clearance deadline of 1 August 2026, but in December 2024, requested another two-year extension through 1 August 2028, reporting a lack of funding as the reason for the delay in completion.¹¹⁵ Initially, Mauritania had declared clearance completion of cluster munition remnants in September 2014. However, in its Article 7 transparency report for 2019, Mauritania reported that it had discovered previously unknown cluster munition contaminated areas.¹¹⁶ Following an initial assessment of the areas in February 2021, Mauritania received a first extension of its Article 4 deadline to complete survey and clearance by 1 August 2024.¹¹⁷ In March 2022, Mauritania reported that it still needed to determine the extent of contaminated areas to confirm if it could meet this deadline, which then led to the current extension through 1 August 2026.¹¹⁸

No cluster munition contaminated land was released in **Somalia** in 2024. Somalia also has yet to commence survey to determine the precise levels of contamination. After uncertainty regarding Somalia's ability to meet its original 2026 clearance deadline, it submitted its first extension request in December 2024 for four years to complete survey and clearance by 1 March 2030.¹¹⁹ It reported access restrictions due to ongoing security issues, constrained and further decreasing financial resources, as well as limited technical resources, as the primary reasons for insufficient progress to date.¹²⁰

South Sudan reported in 2024—its first year with clearance obligations—the release of 3.53km² of hazardous area, of which 3.52km² was cleared and 0.01km² was canceled through non-technical survey.¹²¹ This represents a decrease from the land release figures reported for 2023, 2022, and 2021, each totaling over 4km².¹²² Inaccessibility to affected areas due to poor road infrastructure and insecurity, as well as a lack of funding to deploy more capacities, were the reasons reported for the decrease in land release.¹²³ South Sudan is the only country working towards its original deadline after the convention entered into force for the country on 1 February 2024.¹²⁴

¹¹⁴ Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Comdt. Mamadou Sarr, Chief of Operations, PNDHD, 1 April 2025 and 20 May 2024; and Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F.

¹¹⁵ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 19 March 2025, p. 15, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt4ExtRequest2025.

¹¹⁶ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form F.

¹¹⁷ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 30 June 2021, p. 2, bit.ly/MauritaniaCCMArt4ExtRequest2021.

¹¹⁸ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Moustapha Ould Cheikhna, Head of Operations, PNDHD, 21 March 2022.

¹¹⁹ Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 4 December 2024, bit.ly/SomaliaArt4ExtRequest2024.

¹²⁰ Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions First Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 3 April 2025, p. 2, bit.ly/SomaliaArt4ExtRequest2025; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Hussein Ibrahim, Project Manager, UNMAS, 26 May 2025.

¹²¹ In its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report for calendar year 2024, South Sudan reported that 73 cluster munition remnants had been destroyed during clearance activities. However, UNMAS reported to the Monitor that 1,462 cluster munition remnants had been destroyed in South Sudan during land release activities, including during EOD spot tasks. For this overview the figure of the Article 7 report has been used. See, South Sudan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 11 June 2025.

¹²² Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 25 April 2024.

¹²³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 4 April 2025.

¹²⁴ Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Country Profile: South Sudan," updated 26 June 2024, bit.ly/SouthSudanCCMProfile.

CLEARANCE IN SIGNATORY STATES, STATES NOT PARTY, AND OTHER AREAS IN 2024

During 2024, signatory Angola, states not party Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Serbia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam, as well as other area Western Sahara, are known to have conducted clearance of cluster munition contaminated land and/or the destruction of cluster munition remnants. *(For an overview of the situation in these countries, refer back to the section Contamination from Cluster Munition Remnants.)*

RISK EDUCATION

RISK EDUCATION IN STATES PARTIES

Obligations of States Parties regarding risk education

Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions states that each State Party shall “conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by such remnants.” Risk education involves interventions aimed at protecting civilian populations and individuals at the time of cluster munition use, when they fail to function as intended, and when they have been abandoned.

As outlined in the Lausanne Action Plan, States Parties commit to a variety of actions relevant to risk education, including ensuring that civilians are informed of the risks through tailored, context-specific risk education that prioritizes the most at-risk groups and considers gender, age, disability, and community diversity.¹²⁵ States Parties also commit to building capacities to adapt risk education to evolving conditions, including residual contamination and risks linked to climate change and environmental conditions.¹²⁶

At-risk target groups and risk education beneficiaries

In most States Parties with cluster munition remnant contamination, the unexploded submunitions are located in rural areas and directly impact people who rely on the land and natural resources for their livelihoods. Men and boys involved in activities that take them into contaminated areas—such as land cultivation, collection of firewood and other forest products, hunting and fishing, and herding animals—remained the main groups at risk of harm from cluster munition remnants in 2024.


All affected States Parties have a risk education mechanism in place except Chile and Germany, where the cluster munition contaminated areas are on military land that is inaccessible to the public. Risk education activities were implemented in 2024 in all contaminated States Parties, except for Chile and Germany.

Children represented the largest number of direct beneficiaries of risk education in States Parties with cluster munition contamination in 2024. Children, especially boys, are highly vulnerable to cluster munition remnants and other remnants of war because of curiosity and lack of awareness, peer pressure and bravado, as well as desensitization due to prolonged exposure to conflict environments. Such factors can contribute to circumstances in which they interact with dangerous items, particularly in contaminated areas where they travel, play, and engage in other recreation or livelihood activities.

¹²⁵ Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Lausanne Action Plan,” 21 September 2021, Action 28, bit.ly/LausanneActionPlan.

¹²⁶ Ibid., Action 30.

Risk education beneficiaries in cluster munition affected States Parties by age and gender¹²⁷



In **Afghanistan**, communities living near contaminated areas were targeted for risk education, as were returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), nomads, scrap metal collectors, aid workers, and travelers.¹²⁸ In 2024, Afghanistan introduced child-focused risk education materials addressing cluster munitions, along with other ERW and improvised mines. Risk education took into account the specific needs of high-risk groups including returnees, children, farmers, and persons with disabilities.¹²⁹

Nomadic populations, farmers, scrap metal collectors, and displaced persons were among the high-risk groups in many other States Parties, including **Chad**, where nomadic communities are exposed to high risk due to their transit through desert areas that may be contaminated.¹³⁰

In **Iraq**, risk education continued to focus on Bedouin people in the southern governorate of Al-Muthanna and residents of the western Badiya region to address the higher risk of incidents tied to seasonal livelihood activities.¹³¹ In addition to nomadic peoples and herders, risk education targeted farmers, scrap metal collectors, and displaced populations returning to contaminated rural areas.¹³²

Mauritania's risk education targeted communities near contaminated areas, and included nomads, herders, farmers, scrap metal collectors, and IDPs. However, Mauritania faced difficulties implementing activities due to the mobility of some populations and access limitations as a result of harsh terrain and long distances.¹³³

¹²⁷ The data used for this Monitor analysis is indicative of all types of risk education in the affected countries, not strictly that which addresses the risks of cluster munition remnants. It is drawn from risk education beneficiary figures collected by States Parties and international and national agencies, as well as figures provided in Monitor questionnaires and transparency reporting.

¹²⁸ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form G; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mariyampillai Mariyaselvam, Chief Child Protection, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) Afghanistan, 7 July 2024; and by Mohammad Daud Rafi, Planning and Information Officer, The HALO Trust, 21 May 2024.

¹²⁹ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form G.

¹³⁰ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bechir Niam Oumda, Chief of Risk Education, HCND, 22 April 2025.

¹³¹ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2024), Form G; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, DMA, 23 March 2025.

¹³² Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Khatab, Plan Manager, IKMAA, 27 April 2025.

¹³³ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form G; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Khadijetou Tolba, Chief of Risk Education, PNDHD, 1 April 2025.

In **Lao PDR**, risk education remained targeted toward men and boys in particular, as they are the most at-risk groups due to their participation in livelihood activities such as cultivation, the collection of forest products, and hunting and fishing. In 2024, funding constraints continued to affect planning and implementation of risk education. Engagement with high-risk and minority communities remained limited, with persistent challenges including gaining the trust of communities and encouraging their participation. Risk education activities also faced delays due to weather conditions and access issues in remote, mountainous areas.¹³⁴

In **Lebanon**, children, farmers, IDPs, scrap metal collectors, and local communities were targeted for risk education.¹³⁵ Although the recent conflict has disrupted access to affected communities, it also added to the need to sensitize the population in areas newly contaminated (in some cases by cluster munitions) as a result of kick-outs from strikes on Hezbollah ammunition and weapon storehouses. Conflict-related displacement further complicated risk education activities as temporary settlements were in need of targeted outreach.¹³⁶

In **Somalia**, risk education targeted nomadic communities, herders, and children, but also focused heavily on IDPs.¹³⁷ However, risk education efforts were hampered by funding shortages.¹³⁸

In **South Sudan**, risk education in general targeted children, farmers, herders, people who engage in foraging and other livelihood activities in forests, and scrap metal collectors. However, focus was also placed on IDPs and in-country migrants.¹³⁹ South Sudan reported that it lacked the necessary capacities to provide risk education in all areas affected by contamination.¹⁴⁰



Children living in a displacement camp in Idlib district, northwest Syria, attend a risk education session after 1,500 explosive items were discovered in a well in the camp and safely destroyed by The HALO Trust's teams.

© The HALO Trust, September 2024

Risk education delivery methods

Risk education delivery methods in States Parties included face-to-face standalone sessions and emergency response following incidents. Risk education activities were also integrated into mine action (such as survey and clearance) and into other activities such as health or environmental initiatives. Training of trainers was aimed at teachers, community focal points, civil society groups or personnel of civil society groups, security forces, and governmental and non-governmental institutions.

In **Afghanistan**, risk education was integrated into land release activities and delivered as emergency response and as standalone sessions. It was also integrated into the school curriculum, reaching students in Grades 2–12. Furthermore, risk education was included in

¹³⁴ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form G.

¹³⁵ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Makki, EORE Section Head, LMAC, 14 March 2025.

¹³⁶ Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form G.

¹³⁷ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Julia Skinner, Program Officer, The HALO Trust, 22 May 2024.

¹³⁸ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hussein Ibrahim, Project Manager, UNMAS, 26 May 2025.

¹³⁹ Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 4 April 2025; by Ida Hoejgaard, Programme Manager for Humanitarian Response, Resilience and Mine Action, DCA, 4 July 2024; and by James Julius Wani, Community Liaison/Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Manager, Danish Refugee Council, 4 July 2024.

¹⁴⁰ South Sudan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form G; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 4 April 2025.

NGO service packages for child protection that were funded by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Some risk education methods incorporated environmental risk mapping and climate-adaptive messaging.¹⁴¹

In **Chad**, risk education was delivered as part of emergency response following incidents involving explosive ordnance, and as standalone sessions. A train-the-trainer approach was used in IDP camps in Lake Chad province with the aim of establishing community focal points.¹⁴²

In **Iraq**, risk education was integrated into other mine action activities and delivered through standalone sessions and school-based programs.¹⁴³ The Kurdistan Region of Iraq reported facing significant challenges in accessing and addressing high-risk communities due to security concerns, geographical barriers, cultural differences, limited community trust, and a lack of adequate resources and budget.¹⁴⁴

In **Lao PDR**, risk education was integrated into school curricula and teacher training, and delivered through community outreach, mass media campaigns, and printed materials.¹⁴⁵

In **Lebanon**, risk education was provided as standalone sessions and integrated into other mine action activities, but also offered as online sessions for communities that could not be reached otherwise during the recent conflict. Lebanon also launched a national billboard campaign and disseminated leaflets to IDPs.¹⁴⁶ Mine action operators cooperated with other humanitarian actors to integrate risk education into other activities such as child protection and disaster relief.

In **Mauritania**, risk education materials included printed products and signage. Risk education sessions were held in public areas and schools, with additional training provided to local partners.¹⁴⁷

South Sudan delivered standalone sessions and integrated risk education into other mine action and child protection activities, while also liaising with the government to integrate risk education into the school curriculum. Print materials, radio talk shows, and talent shows for children were among the methods and means used to convey the messages. Mine action operators also trained peers and community focal points.¹⁴⁸



An unexploded submunition found in a house in the city of Daret Azza, in Syria's Aleppo governorate.

© White Helmets (Syria Civil Defence), November 2024

Overall, risk education providers used a range of tools, including print material, presentations, and billboards, as well as different entertainment methods such as games, sports activities, theatrical performances, and puppet shows, to disseminate risk education messages. In addition, risk education messages were conveyed via different digital outlets and mass media, including social media channels, TV, radio, the internet, and mobile phones.

¹⁴¹ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form G; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 2 April 2025.

¹⁴² Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bechir Niam Oumda, Chief of Risk Education, HCND, 22 April 2025.

¹⁴³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Haitham F. Lafta, National Focal Point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Operations Manager, RMAC South, DMA, 23 March 2025.

¹⁴⁴ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Khatab, Plan Manager, IKMAA, 27 April 2025.

¹⁴⁵ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form G.

¹⁴⁶ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Makki, EORE Section Head, LMAC, 14 March 2025.

¹⁴⁷ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form G; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Khadijetou Tolba, Chief of Risk Education, PNDHD, 1 April 2025.

¹⁴⁸ South Sudan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form G; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 4 April 2025.

Risk education in signatory states and states not party

Risk education was conducted in two signatory states (Angola and the DRC); in 11 states not party (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Libya, Myanmar, Serbia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Yemen); and in two other areas (Kosovo and Western Sahara), all affected by cluster munition remnant contamination. In some cases, risk education included conflict preparedness and protection (CPP) sessions. CPP complements risk education by focusing on civilian protection during conflict. CPP sessions are community-based activities that aim to help civilians understand the risks they face and take practical steps to protect themselves. CPP provides guidance on how to respond during attacks, reduce exposure to the blast and fragmentation effects, and make safer choices.¹⁴⁹

In Ukraine, humanitarian organizations provided risk education relevant to the threats of both cluster munition remnants and cluster munition attacks through risk education and CPP sessions delivered in schools, community centers, and shelters, and via door-to-door outreach.¹⁵⁰ These methods provided civilians, including children, with practical knowledge to navigate daily dangers.¹⁵¹

In Myanmar, amid ongoing conflict, a devastating earthquake in March 2025 exacerbated risks from unexploded ordnance and mines, requiring increased efforts to educate residents and first responders on how to identify and avoid explosive threats.¹⁵² Ongoing conflict—including airstrikes and drone and mine attacks—in northwest Myanmar posed significant threats to civilians and humanitarian personnel, making the delivery of risk education extremely unsafe. However, some risk education was provided, including CPP. A lack of funding also hampered work in the sector.¹⁵³

Following the change in government in Syria in December 2024, there has been a change in needs concerning the delivery of risk education. Syrians began crossing previous conflict frontlines to return to former homes and resume farming. These activities greatly increased the dangers of interaction with mines and ERW—including cluster munition remnants.¹⁵⁴ As conflict-affected areas receive more returnees, casualties are expected to increase, requiring urgent and focused risk education responses. Furthermore, the Syrian Armed Forces abandoned numerous military sites and munitions stockpiles, which have been left unguarded near populated civilian areas, endangering children in particular.¹⁵⁵



In Le Thuy district, in the Vietnamese province of Quang Binh, a Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) non-technical survey specialist shows two local farmers photos of some of the types of explosive weapons commonly found in the area, while delivering risk education messages.

© NPA, July 2024

¹⁴⁹ Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), "Conflict Preparedness and Protection (CPP)," undated, bit.ly/ConflictPreparednessProtectionNPA.

¹⁵⁰ HI, "Five Things You Should Know About Explosive Ordnance Contamination in Ukraine," 19 February 2025, bit.ly/UkraineHI19Feb2025.

¹⁵¹ NPA, "Helping Children in Ukraine Stay Safe in a Time of War," undated [2025], bit.ly/UkraineNPA2025.

¹⁵² United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), "Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 37," 5 April 2024, p. 6, bit.ly/MyanmarOCHA5Apr2024.

¹⁵³ UNOCHA, "Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 45," 28 March 2025, p. 6, bit.ly/MyanmarOCHA28March2025; and UNOCHA, "Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 44," 19 February 2025, bit.ly/MyanmarOCHA19Feb2025.

¹⁵⁴ Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) Syria Response, "Humanitarian Mine Action—Syria: Situation Report No. 1 (December 2024–January 2025)," 17 February 2025, bit.ly/SyriaSituationReport17Feb2025.

¹⁵⁵ UNOCHA, "Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Response Priorities – January–June 2025," 25 March 2025, bit.ly/SyriaOCHA25March2025.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

VICTIM ASSISTANCE IN STATES PARTIES

The Convention on Cluster Munitions, which entered into force on 1 August 2010, was the first international treaty to obligate all States Parties to provide assistance to victims of a specific prohibited weapon and to establish a formal reporting requirement regarding such assistance. Article 5 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions expanded and clarified international norms for victim assistance that had been established following the adoption of Article 6.3 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions has set the highest standards for victim assistance. It requires States Parties with cluster munition victims to implement specific activities to ensure that adequate assistance is provided. For instance, Article 5 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions requires that States Parties with cluster munition victims implement the following activities:

- Provide adequate assistance, including
 - medical care,
 - rehabilitation,
 - psychological support, and
 - social and economic inclusion;
- Designate a responsible focal point in government, and coordinate victim assistance programs;
- Implement national legislation according to the principles of international law;
- Provide assistance that is gender- and age-sensitive, as well as non-discriminatory;
- Collect relevant data and assess the needs of cluster munition victims;¹⁵⁶
- Actively involve cluster munition victims in victim assistance;
- Develop a national plan, budget, and timeframe for implementation; and
- Report on all aspects of implementation.

Victim assistance is not only a set of obligations written into the Convention on Cluster Munitions under Article 5, it rests at its core. As stated by Norwegian Ambassador Steffen Kongstad, a key figure during the Oslo Process and the development of the convention's text: "It is impossible to separate the question of victims, their rights and needs, from the overall question of how best to tackle the cluster munitions problem."¹⁵⁷

States Parties that have reported responsibility for cluster munition victims

Afghanistan	Lao PDR
Albania	Lebanon
BiH	Mauritania
Chad	Montenegro
Croatia	Sierra Leone
Guinea-Bissau	Somalia
Iraq	South Sudan

¹⁵⁶ Cluster munition victims include survivors (people who were injured by cluster munitions, or their explosive remnants, and lived), other persons directly impacted by cluster munitions, as well as their affected families and communities. Most cluster munition survivors are also persons with disabilities. The term 'cluster munition casualties' is used to refer both to people killed and to people injured as a result of cluster munition use or cluster munition remnants.

¹⁵⁷ Presentation by Amb. Steffen Kongstad, Deputy Director General, Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Victim Assistance and the Oslo Process on Cluster Munitions," European Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions, Brussels, 30 October 2007.

The obligation to provide victim assistance is ongoing, regardless of the status of cluster munition contamination. States Parties Albania, BiH, Croatia, Guinea-Bissau, and Montenegro have completed clearance of cluster munition remnants under their Article 4 obligations, yet still have victim assistance obligations. Similarly, although Sierra Leone has had no known contaminated area, that does not eliminate the obligation to provide victim assistance.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions also stipulates that any differences in the treatment of cluster munition victims with disabilities, as compared to other individuals with disabilities, must be predicated solely on their specific needs.¹⁵⁸ This reflects the general principle of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) prohibiting “discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability.”¹⁵⁹ The Convention on Cluster Munitions’ preamble also makes reference to the CRPD and the protections it seeks to promote.¹⁶⁰

The Lausanne Action Plan’s victim assistance commitments also align closely with obligations that States Parties are required to fulfill under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Action 34 of the Lausanne Action Plan commits States Parties to provide first-aid and long-term medical care to cluster munition victims, as well as to ensure victims can access adequate rehabilitation, psychological, and psychosocial support services as part of a broader public health approach. States Parties should have a national referral mechanism and a directory of services. Victim assistance should be provided in a non-discriminatory manner, and be sensitive to gender, age, and disability.

Action 35 commits States Parties to facilitate the educational and socio-economic inclusion of cluster munition victims. Such measures may take the form of employment referrals, access to micro-finance, livelihood support, and rural development and social protection programs.

Action 37 commits States Parties to endeavor to support the training, development, and official recognition of multidisciplinary, skilled, and qualified rehabilitation professionals.

Medical care

Medical responses provided for cluster munition victims in States Parties during the reporting period included first-aid, field trauma response, emergency evacuation, transport, and immediate medical care, as well as addressing longer-term healthcare needs. However, in many States Parties, medical care was not available or was seriously inadequate where victims live and in communities located near cluster munition remnant contaminated areas.

The availability of emergency medical care for cluster munition survivors during the reporting period was variable across affected countries and often under-resourced.

The ICRC increased local first-aid skills and also supported hospital repairs to maintain emergency services in **Afghanistan**.¹⁶¹ EMERGENCY, an NGO in Afghanistan, operated first-aid posts, primary healthcare centers, and an ambulance service for remote areas.¹⁶² An

¹⁵⁸ Including medical, rehabilitative, psychological, or socio-economic needs. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Article 5.2.e. This is also relevant to international humanitarian law, including Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, with regard to wounded military personnel and direct participants in hostilities: “There shall be no distinction among them founded on any grounds other than medical ones.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, Article 7.2., bit.ly/GenevaProtocolII.

¹⁵⁹ UNGA, “Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,” New York, 13 December 2006, Art. 4, bit.ly/CRPDArt4Dec2006.

¹⁶⁰ The preamble of the Convention on Cluster Munitions states: “Bearing in mind the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which, *inter alia*, requires that States Parties to that Convention undertake to ensure and promote the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability.”

¹⁶¹ ICRC, “Annual Report 2024,” June 2025, pp. 219–220, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2024.

¹⁶² EMERGENCY, “Activity Report 1994–2023,” undated, bit.ly/EMERGENCY1994-2023Report.

extensive survey on access to emergency medical care published by EMERGENCY in 2025 demonstrated that Afghanistan's healthcare system remains critically under-resourced, with limited access to emergency, surgical, and trauma care services. Facilities lack staff and equipment; referral and transport are limited. Gaps in services are especially notable in rural areas.¹⁶³ Restrictive measures by Taliban ruling authorities have greatly affected women and girls, limiting healthcare access and hindering the training of female healthcare workers.¹⁶⁴

In **Iraq** and **Lao PDR**, emergency and continuing medical care were coordinated and/or provided through the health ministries.¹⁶⁵ In 2024, World Education Laos partnered with the National Regulatory Authority for UXO/Mine Action Sector in Lao PDR (NRA) to administer the US Medical Fund for UXO Victims (previously the War Victims Medical Fund).¹⁶⁶ The fund provided emergency assistance, including medical expenses, transport, and funeral expenses, to survivors and their families.¹⁶⁷

In **Lebanon**, formal state-offered victim assistance services were lacking, but charity organizations in the mine action sector reportedly provided limited emergency financial aid and distribution of medicine.¹⁶⁸ The ICRC supported emergency response in Lebanon by training emergency personnel in the treatment of weapon-related injuries. Emergency support was also expanded to additional hospitals in 2024 due to the impact of conflict.¹⁶⁹

Physical rehabilitation

Survivors of cluster munition incidents often acquire long-term impairments resulting in disabilities that require complex rehabilitation, as is the case of injuries involving amputations, severe limb and nerve damage, internal organ trauma, burns, loss of sight and hearing, and chronic pain. This is particularly difficult for children, who are often more vulnerable to injury and frequently require repeated surgeries, regular prosthetic replacements as they grow, and long-term opportunities to access physical rehabilitation and psychological support. Without adequate care for children, complications can worsen, affecting their schooling, social interactions, mental health, and overall wellbeing.

Despite substantial ongoing efforts, and some increases in beneficiary numbers, States Parties continued to face significant challenges in providing adequate, accessible, and affordable rehabilitation during the reporting period. Rehabilitation services included physiotherapy and the provision of assistive devices, along with prosthetics. Rehabilitation services for cluster munition survivors were reported to be available in several countries, but many stakeholders highlighted persistent gaps in funding, staffing, and coverage.

In **Afghanistan**, rehabilitation centers supported by international donors offered prosthetics, physiotherapy, and vocational training, but services remained concentrated in certain provinces and were strained due to a lack of financial resources. The ICRC supported rehabilitation

¹⁶³ EMERGENCY, "Access to Emergency, Critical, and Operative Care in Afghanistan: Perspectives from Afghan People and Healthcare Workers in 11 Provinces," June 2025, bit.ly/AfghanistanEMERGENCYJune2025.

¹⁶⁴ ACAPS, "Afghanistan: Third update on Taliban decrees and directives relevant to the humanitarian response (July–December 2024)," 24 December 2024, bit.ly/AfghanistanACAPS24Dec2024; and HRW, "A Disaster for the Foreseeable Future: Afghanistan's Healthcare Crisis," 12 February 2024, bit.ly/HRWAfghanistanHealthcare12Feb2024.

¹⁶⁵ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H; and Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

¹⁶⁶ "US extends support for UXO accident victims," 9 December 2024, *Vientiane Times*, bit.ly/VientianeTimes9Dec2024.

¹⁶⁷ For United States (US) Fiscal Year 2024 (1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024). See, US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, "U.S. Conventional Weapons Destruction Program in Lao PDR, Fact Sheet," 20 January 2025, bit.ly/LaoUSFactSheet20Jan2025. See also, Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H; and email from Sarah Bruinooge, Country Director, World Education Laos (WEL), 4 March 2022.

¹⁶⁸ Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

¹⁶⁹ ICRC, "Annual Report 2024," June 2025, pp. 358–359, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2024.

centers in seven provinces.¹⁷⁰ A prosthetics workshop was established in Nimroz with funding through ITF Enhancing Human Security.¹⁷¹ The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) provided thousands of people with physiotherapy and orthopedic aids. However, in March 2024, SCA was forced to end its activities following a decree from the ruling government, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, banning aid from Sweden.¹⁷² Subsequently the SCA handed over its centers and changed its name to Solidarity Committee for Afghanistan.¹⁷³

In **Albania**, rehabilitation was part of a broader social inclusion strategy, however, gaps in financial support were identified. Albania reported that the Kukes Regional Hospital mainly provided prosthetics repair services.¹⁷⁴ The Prosthetics Department within the Kukes Regional Hospital, which is located in a cluster munition contaminated area, was previously reported to have deteriorated due to a lack of funding, prosthetics materials, and staff capacity.¹⁷⁵

BiH offered rehabilitation services but lacked a functioning coordination body for victim assistance to ensure survivors could overcome hurdles to accessing services, including gaps in availability of services and bureaucratic barriers to the fulfillment of their rights.¹⁷⁶

Croatia has a rehabilitation framework that is supported by a complex array of legislation and national structures.¹⁷⁷

In **Iraq**, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), through the Ministry of Health, distributed mobility aids and assistive devices, but local resources could not meet demand.¹⁷⁸ ICRC supported three physical rehabilitation centers, including one in Erbil, which opened in 2022, leading to increased capacity.¹⁷⁹

Lao PDR offered rehabilitation services via the national Center for Medical Rehabilitation, operated jointly by the Ministry of Health and Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE), but the sector continued to face difficulties due to a lack of local resources and coordination capacity that was not fully integrated into broader systems. In 2024, 320 survivors received physical rehabilitation, more than double the



Afghan Landmine Survivors Organization (ALSO) conducts an assessment of persons with disabilities' access to their rights in Afghanistan.

© ALSO, December 2024

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 219–220.

¹⁷¹ ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2024,” undated [2025], p. 80, bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2024.

¹⁷² Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), “Suspension of SCA leaves thousands without orthopedic aids,” 9 April 2024, bit.ly/SCA9Apr2024.

¹⁷³ Hadia Ziaei, “Swedish Committee for Afghanistan Stops Operations in Country,” *TOLOnews*, 23 January 2025, bit.ly/TOLOnews25Jan2025; and SCA, “SCA hands over activities to Norwegian organisation,” 19 November 2024, bit.ly/SCA19Nov2024.

¹⁷⁴ Albania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form J.

¹⁷⁵ Albania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H; Albania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form H; and email from Izet Ademaj, Monitor Country Researcher, 9 June 2022.

¹⁷⁶ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Enis Horozović, Director, Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMACE), 14 March 2025.

¹⁷⁷ Croatia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

¹⁷⁸ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

¹⁷⁹ ICRC, “Annual Report 2024,” June 2025, pp. 334–336, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2024.

number that did in 2023 (135).¹⁸⁰ In July 2024, the Okard (Lao for ‘opportunity’) project, which provides victim assistance funding and capacity support in Lao PDR, was extended into Phase II (2024–2027).¹⁸¹ The project is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). However, in the first quarter of 2025, it was reported that the multi-year program had suffered an 80% reduction in staff as a result of US funding cuts and halts to implementation. This development represents a substantial shift in both the availability of services for survivors and the foundational principles guiding redress for harm caused by extensive contamination from cluster munition remnants and other ERW.¹⁸² The US previously prioritized funding to heavily contaminated areas with high casualty rates and locations affected by past US military operations, such as Lao PDR.¹⁸³

In **Lebanon**, persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, received assistive devices and rehabilitation at four ICRC-supported centers and three disability organizations.¹⁸⁴

Mauritania has only one rehabilitation center, located in the capital, far from areas contaminated by cluster munitions.¹⁸⁵ An agreement between the national mine action center and the Ministry of Health was established for the provision of assistive devices.¹⁸⁶ National capacity for rehabilitation and assistive technology provision has however remained inadequate, and increased resources and training are needed.¹⁸⁷

In **South Sudan**, three ICRC-supported rehabilitation centers exist nationwide, however access has been constrained by geography, costs, and lack of funding to scale services. In addition to supporting the services at these centers, the ICRC also provided outreach services to remote areas.¹⁸⁸ While some rehabilitation and assistive devices were available through ICRC and Humanity & Inclusion (HI), national capacity has remained insufficient, especially in terms of trained rehabilitation personnel.¹⁸⁹

Sierra Leone has a national rehabilitation center and four satellite centers, but rehabilitation and prosthetics services remained limited due to material shortages and only one fully trained technician.¹⁹⁰

Ongoing insecurity in **Somalia** made it difficult to provide and access rehabilitation services. Physiotherapy and assistive devices were available at rehabilitation centers run by the Somali

¹⁸⁰ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H; statement of Lao PDR, Convention on Cluster Munitions Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 13 September 2023, bit.ly/LaoPDRStatement13Sept2023; and Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H.

¹⁸¹ United States Agency for International Development (USAID) press release, “United States and Laos Expand Commitment to Disability Inclusion,” 17 July 2024, bit.ly/USAID17July2024.

¹⁸² Talisker Scott Hunter, “In Laos, USAID Freeze Hampers Vital Bomb Removal Efforts: With its sweeping aid cuts, the Trump administration has effectively ended U.S. efforts to address a deadly legacy of the Vietnam War,” *The Diplomat*, 31 March 2025, bit.ly/TheDiplomat31March2025.

¹⁸³ Presentation by Stanley L. Brown, Director, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), US Department of State, “Where’s the Money Going?” Landmine Monitor side event, 22nd International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and United Nations Advisors, Geneva, 5–8 February 2019.

¹⁸⁴ ICRC, “Annual Report 2024,” June 2025, pp. 358–359, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2024.

¹⁸⁵ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Vadel Saleck, Head of Victims’ Unit, PNDHD, 20 May 2024.

¹⁸⁶ Committee on Victim Assistance, “Mauritania, Preliminary Observations: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance,” Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/MauritaniaVACCommitteeJune2025.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ ICRC, “Annual Report 2024,” June 2025, pp. 157–161, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2024.

¹⁸⁹ Committee on Victim Assistance, “South Sudan, Preliminary Observations: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance,” Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/SouthSudanVACCommitteeJune2025.

¹⁹⁰ SwissABILITY, “An orthopedic centre for war survivors in Sierra Leone,” 2 May 2024, bit.ly/SwissABILITY2May2024; and Koalaa Ltd., “Koalaa launches pilot project in Sierra Leone,” 31 August 2023, bit.ly/KoalaaSierraLeone31Aug2023.

Red Crescent Society (SRCS). ICRC gave technical and material support, while the Norwegian Red Cross funded the centers' operations. Services reached remote areas through outreach.¹⁹¹

Psychological and psychosocial support

Psychological services—including professional counselling and psychosocial support such as community-based support groups, survivor networks, and individual peer-to-peer support—continued to be an area of significant unmet need. Peer-to-peer support in particular is considered an important component of psychosocial support due to its inclusivity, targeted approach, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability.

Psychosocial support for cluster munition survivors was available in several States Parties during the reporting period, although access and quality varied widely and reporting on the availability of such services remained limited.

In **Afghanistan**, psychosocial support was coordinated by the Ministry of Public Health and delivered through multidisciplinary teams including trained counselors, with services integrated into national standards and supported by NGOs such as ICRC and Danish Refugee Council. Survivors and their organizations were also consulted in the design and monitoring of support services.¹⁹²

In **Albania**, mental health was prioritized under the 2023–2026 Mental Health Action Plan, with services increasingly delivered at the community level.¹⁹³

BiH has reported that psychological and psychosocial support was made available to survivors.¹⁹⁴

In **Croatia**, psychosocial care was part of a broader, state-supported rehabilitation package regulated through public health legislation.¹⁹⁵

In **Lao PDR**, survivors received psychological support, though broader awareness and service capacity remained limited in 2024.¹⁹⁶

In **South Sudan**, survivors had limited access to psychosocial support, and no formal peer-to-peer support system exists.¹⁹⁷ Psychosocial services were not widely available through government structures, so survivors primarily accessed limited services via ICRC or local NGOs.¹⁹⁸

Socio-economic inclusion and education

Economic inclusion via vocational training, employment programs, and micro-credit and income-generation projects remained an area of great need for cluster munition victims in 2024. Access to inclusive education, and social inclusion through sport, leisure, and cultural activities were also ongoing needs.

¹⁹¹ ICRC, "Annual Report 2024," June 2025, pp. 152–153, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2024.

¹⁹² Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

¹⁹³ Albania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

¹⁹⁴ Committee on Victim Assistance, "Preliminary Observation Bosnia and Herzegovina Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024, bit.ly/MBTObservationVABiHJun2024.

¹⁹⁵ Croatia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

¹⁹⁶ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

¹⁹⁷ Committee on Victim Assistance, "South Sudan, Preliminary Observations: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/SouthSudanVACCommitteeJune2025.

¹⁹⁸ South Sudan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), 4 April 2025.



A workshop on sustainable agriculture and the rights of persons with disabilities organized by the Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munitions (CCBL) in Siem Reap, Cambodia. The workshop aimed at promoting food security and income generation for persons with disabilities.

© CCBL, April 2025

Efforts toward economic inclusion and educational access for cluster munition survivors varied by country, with key progress in work training and inclusive education frameworks in many states. In **Afghanistan** and **Lao PDR**, survivors received vocational training and economic assistance through mine action sector partners and NGOs, though gaps remained due to funding and coordination constraints. Inclusive education in Afghanistan, coordinated by the Ministry of Education, was supported by the national disability strategy.¹⁹⁹ Lao PDR placed greater focus on vocational training and socio-economic support for ERW survivors in its annual workplan. In 2024, more than 600 victims in Lao PDR received such support through partner organizations, a significant increase from under 200 in 2023.²⁰⁰

In **Albania**, legal and financial mechanisms supported the promotion of employment and independent living opportunities.²⁰¹ In

Croatia, survivors had access to employment and training through institutional frameworks implemented by key ministries.²⁰² In **Iraq**, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs provided employment services, vocational training, and loans. Survivors were also provided with monthly salaries and integration programs based on disability.²⁰³ In **Somalia**, some rehabilitation patients also completed vocational training or received cash grants to start businesses. Others participated in amputee-football events; however, due to logistical constraints, planned activities such as wheelchair-basketball were not implemented.²⁰⁴

Lack of adequate income remained a serious issue for victims in **Mauritania**, as did support for reintegration and inclusion.²⁰⁵ Economic inclusion opportunities also remained limited in **South Sudan**, in part due to donor reluctance to fund government-led initiatives. International NGOs, however, provided isolated vocational support and outreach services for persons with disabilities.²⁰⁶

After long debate, **Montenegro** passed legislative amendments in 2025 that gave civilian casualties of the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign against Yugoslavia the right to monthly compensation as victims of conflict. Amendments to

¹⁹⁹ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 2 April 2025.

²⁰⁰ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H; statement of Lao PDR, Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 13 September 2023, bit.ly/LaoPDRStatement13Sept2023; and Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H.

²⁰¹ Albania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

²⁰² Croatia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

²⁰³ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

²⁰⁴ ICRC, "Annual Report 2024," June 2025, pp. 152–153, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2024.

²⁰⁵ Committee on Victim Assistance, "Mauritania, Preliminary Observations: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/MauritaniaVACCommitteeJune2025.

²⁰⁶ Committee on Victim Assistance, "South Sudan, Preliminary Observations: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/SouthSudanVACCommitteeJune2025.

the Law on War Veterans and Disabled Veterans now recognize all citizens of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as civilian war victims, regardless of where they were harmed during the armed conflicts on its territory.²⁰⁷

VICTIM ASSISTANCE IN SIGNATORY STATES, STATES NOT PARTY, AND OTHER AREAS

Victim assistance services were available to some degree in most states and areas with cluster munition casualties. Ongoing conflicts, however, hindered vital victim assistance access and weakened health systems. Services were severely impacted in countries outside the convention that have experienced recent new contamination and casualties from attacks, including in Myanmar, Syria, and Ukraine, as well as in some parts of Yemen.

Ukraine and Yemen are not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and thus have commitments to assist victims. Despite the high numbers of recent recorded casualties, neither country has reported specifically on assistance to cluster munition victims.

In Syria, disruptions in access to emergency medical care and rehabilitation services reduced the availability of treatment and specialized assistance for victims. Reductions in humanitarian aid also affected access to victim assistance services, limiting efforts to deliver trauma care, physical rehabilitation, and psychosocial support.²⁰⁸ A persistent lack of access to rehabilitation, psychosocial support, and job opportunities left survivors and persons with disabilities marginalized, limiting their opportunities to participate in society on an equal basis with others.²⁰⁹

STANDARDS

LAND RELEASE AND RISK EDUCATION

In 2024, States Parties Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan all had national land release and risk education standards in place that were in compliance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).²¹⁰ Chile uses IMAS along with a Joint Demining Manual for its armed forces, while clearance and survey in Germany are conducted according to federal legislation.²¹¹

²⁰⁷ Human Rights Action, “Historic Decision in Montenegro – Civilian War Victims Finally Recognized, Families Granted Right to Social Protection and Promise of Compensation,” 28 February 2025, bit.ly/HumanRightsAction28Feb2025; Human Rights Action, “Protest Against Inadequate Regulation of Civilian War Victim Rights,” 15 January 2025, bit.ly/HumanRightsAction15Jan2025; Human Rights Action, “The Assembly of Montenegro Should Treat All Civil Victims of War Equally,” 22 December 2023, bit.ly/HRA22Dec2023; and Samir Kajosevic, “Montenegro War Victims Legislation Criticised as ‘Discriminatory,’” *BIRN*, 10 May 2023, bit.ly/BIRN10May2023.

²⁰⁸ UNOCHA, “Syrian Arab Republic – 2025: Mine Action AoR,” 25 March 2025, bit.ly/SyriaMAAoR25Mar2025.

²⁰⁹ UNMAS, “Where We Work: Syria,” updated June 2025, www.unmas.org/programmes/syria.

²¹⁰ The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) framework is a set of standards, guidelines, and technical notes developed by the UN together with global mine action sector representatives to ensure that activities are carried out safely and effectively. **Afghanistan:** DMAC, “AMAS,” undated, www.dmac.gov.af/amas. **Chad:** Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 9 January 2024, p. 3, bit.ly/ChadArt4ExtRequest2024. **Iraq:** Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form A. **Lao PDR:** National Regulatory Authority for UXO/Mine Action Sector in Lao PDR (NRA), “National Standard,” undated, bit.ly/NRAStandards. **Lebanon:** LMAC, “NMAS,” undated, bit.ly/LMACStandards. **Mauritania:** Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 19 March 2025, p. 8, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt4ExtRequest2025. **Somalia:** Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Workplan (revised), 2 June 2023, pp. 26–31, bit.ly/SomaliaMBTArt5Workplan2023. **South Sudan:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 4 April 2025.

²¹¹ **Chile:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Chile Ministry of National Defense, 17 March 2025. **Germany:** Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Construction, and Nuclear Safety, and Federal Ministry of Defence, “Working Guidelines for Clearance of Explosive Ordnance,” July 2014, bit.ly/GermanyClearanceGuidelines2014.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Under Action 32 of the Lausanne Action Plan, States Parties committed to consider IMAS 13.10 on Victim Assistance when integrating victim assistance into broader strategies and plans. IMAS 13.10 reminds all actors that victim assistance is to be implemented as an equal pillar of mine action, and that the mine action sector is responsible for providing assistance and facilitating access to services. National mine action authorities and centers can, and should, play a role in monitoring and facilitating multisectoral efforts to address the needs of cluster munition survivors. National authorities should also assist with including survivors and indirect victims of cluster munitions, as well as their views, in the development of relevant national legislation and policies. IMAS 13.10 notes that national mine action authorities are well placed to gather data on victims and their needs, provide information on services, and refer victims for support.

Iraq has fully adapted IMAS 13.10 as a set of national standards.²¹² Lao PDR and Lebanon are working to update their respective national victim assistance standards in line with IMAS 13.10.²¹³ BiH reported that it needs to adopt IMAS 13.10 in order to revise the roles and responsibilities of mine action in victim assistance.²¹⁴

REPORTING

Under Article 7 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, States Parties with cluster munition contamination must report annually on the location and size of areas under their jurisdiction or control that are contaminated by cluster munition remnants, as well as on progress in clearance and the destruction of cluster munition remnants. States Parties must submit an updated transparency report by 30 April each year.

As of 1 August 2025, all States Parties with clearance obligations submitted updated Article 7 reports covering calendar year 2024 except Somalia.

States Parties also have an obligation to report on risk education.²¹⁵ Action 29 of the Lausanne Action Plan commits States Parties to provide data on risk education beneficiaries disaggregated by gender, age, and disability in their transparency reports. In 2024, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritania, and South Sudan submitted Article 7 reports that included complete beneficiary data disaggregated by gender and age. However, only Afghanistan and South Sudan reported how many persons with disabilities were amongst the annual beneficiaries.

Lao PDR provided a summary of all risk education activities but disaggregated the beneficiary data of social media campaigns only by gender, not by age.²¹⁶

Chad did not provide beneficiary figures and reported that risk education activities were implemented in Bart-El-Gazal, Lake Chad, and North Kanem provinces but focused on the threat posed by mines, ERW, and improvised explosive devices (IED), not on cluster munitions and cluster munition victims.²¹⁷

²¹² HI, “Towards an effective implementation of the Lausanne Action Plan: operationalizing International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 13.10 on Victim Assistance in Mine Action: the case of Iraq,” side event, Convention on Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 12 September 2023.

²¹³ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H; and Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

²¹⁴ Committee on Victim Assistance, “Bosnia and Herzegovina, Preliminary Observations: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance,” Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/BiHVACCommitteeJune2025.

²¹⁵ Reporting on “measures taken to provide risk reduction education and, in particular, an immediate and effective warning to civilians living in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control” is allocated to Form G of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 transparency report.


²¹⁶ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2024), Form G.

²¹⁷ Chad Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2024), p. 5.


Regarding the obligation to report on implementation of their victim assistance obligations under Article 5 for States Parties with responsibility for cluster munition victims, as of 1 August 2025, BiH, Croatia, Guinea-Bissau, and Montenegro had not submitted a report in 2025 covering 2024 victim assistance activities, and Somalia had not submitted its annual updated report covering activities in 2023 and 2024. Sierra Leone submitted an annual update in 2025 but did not report undertaking victim assistance activities in 2024.²¹⁸

²¹⁸ In its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report for calendar year 2024, Sierra Leone stated that it does not have “specific victims of cluster munition [*sic*].” See, Sierra Leone Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for calendar year 2024), Form H. However, Sierra Leone has been reported to have cluster munition victims from attacks during the intervention of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1998 and 1999 during Sierra Leone’s civil war. See, HI, *Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities* (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 54, bit.ly/MonitorHICircleofImpact2007; and statement of Sierra Leone, Accra Regional Conference on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Accra, 28–30 May 2012, bit.ly/SierraLeoneStatementMay2012. In 2024, Convention on Cluster Munitions reporting continued to note Sierra Leone as having cluster munition victims. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions, “Sierra Leone: Country Profile,” updated 29 October 2024, bit.ly/SierraLeoneCCMProfile.

CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION



CLUSTER MUNITION CASUALTIES



MAP KEY

- Casualties recorded from cluster munitions in 2024
■ Cluster munition casualties recorded prior to 2024
■ No recorded cluster munition casualties

Note: **States Parties** to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are **bold**, signatories are underlined, states not party are plain text, *other areas* are *italics*.

DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.



A deminer from Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) excavates around two BLU-63 submunitions in Basra governorate, Iraq.

© Nizar Abdul Bari/NPA, May 2025

STATUS OF THE CONVENTION

2008 CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Under Article 15, the convention was open for signature from 3 December 2008 until its entry into force on 1 August 2010. Since the convention's entry into force, states can no longer sign it but can join through a one-step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16(2), the convention is open for accession by any state that has not signed. In the following list of states, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Accession is indicated with (a).

As of 1 August 2025, there were 111 States Parties and 12 signatories.

STATES PARTIES

Afghanistan 3 Dec 08; 8 Sep 11	Burundi 3 Dec 08; 25 Sep 09
Albania 3 Dec 08; 16 Jun 09	Cameroon 15 Dec 09; 12 Jul 12
Andorra 9 Apr 13 (a)	Canada 3 Dec 08; 16 Mar 15
Antigua and Barbuda 16 Jul 10; 23 Aug 10	Cabo Verde 3 Dec 08; 19 Oct 10
Australia 3 Dec 08; 8 Oct 12	Chad 3 Dec 08; 26 Mar 13
Austria 3 Dec 08; 2 Apr 09	Chile 3 Dec 08; 16 Dec 10
Belgium 3 Dec 08; 22 Dec 09	Colombia 3 Dec 08; 10 Sep 15
Belize 2 Sep 14 (a)	Comoros 3 Dec 08; 28 Jul 10
Benin 3 Dec 08; 10 Jul 17	Congo, Republic of 3 Dec 08; 2 Sep 14
Bolivia 3 Dec 08; 30 Apr 13	Cook Islands 3 Dec 08; 23 Aug 11
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 08; 7 Sep 10	Costa Rica 3 Dec 08; 28 Apr 11
Botswana 3 Dec 08; 27 Jun 11	Côte d'Ivoire 4 Dec 08; 12 Mar 12
Bulgaria 3 Dec 08; 6 Apr 11	Croatia 3 Dec 08; 17 Aug 09
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 08; 16 Feb 10	Cuba 6 Apr 16 (a)

Czech Republic 3 Dec 08; 22 Sep 11
 Denmark 3 Dec 08; 12 Feb 10
 Dominican Republic 10 Nov 09; 20 Dec 11
 Ecuador 3 Dec 08; 11 May 10
 El Salvador 3 Dec 08; 10 Jan 11
 Eswatini 13 Sep 11 (a)
 Fiji 3 Dec 08; 28 May 10
 France 3 Dec 08; 25 Sep 09
 Gambia 3 Dec 08; 11 Dec 18
 Germany 3 Dec 08; 8 Jul 09
 Ghana 3 Dec 08; 3 Feb 11
 Grenada 29 Jun 11 (a)
 Guatemala 3 Dec 08; 3 Nov 10
 Guinea 3 Dec 08; 21 Oct 14
 Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 08; 29 Nov 10
 Guyana 31 Oct 14 (a)
 Holy See 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
 Honduras 3 Dec 08; 21 Mar 12
 Hungary 3 Dec 08; 3 Jul 12
 Iceland 3 Dec 08; 31 Aug 15
 Iraq 12 Nov 09; 14 May 13
 Ireland 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
 Italy 3 Dec 08; 21 Sep 11
 Japan 3 Dec 08; 14 Jul 09
 Lao PDR 3 Dec 08; 18 Mar 09
 Lebanon 3 Dec 08; 5 Nov 10
 Lesotho 3 Dec 08; 28 May 10
 Liechtenstein 3 Dec 08; 4 Mar 13
 Luxembourg 3 Dec 08; 10 Jul 09
 Madagascar 3 Dec 08; 20 May 17
 Malawi 3 Dec 08; 7 Oct 09
 Maldives 27 Sep 19 (a)
 Mali 3 Dec 08; 30 Jun 10
 Malta 3 Dec 08; 24 Sep 09
 Mauritania 19 Apr 10; 1 Feb 12
 Mauritius 1 Oct 15 (a)
 Mexico 3 Dec 08; 6 May 09
 Moldova 3 Dec 08; 16 Feb 10
 Monaco 3 Dec 08; 21 Sep 10
 Montenegro 3 Dec 08; 25 Jan 10
 Mozambique 3 Dec 08; 14 Mar 11
 Namibia 3 Dec 08; 31 Aug 18
 Netherlands 3 Dec 08; 23 Feb 11
 Nauru 3 Dec 08; 4 Feb 13
 New Zealand 3 Dec 08; 22 Dec 09
 Nicaragua 3 Dec 08; 2 Nov 09
 Niger 3 Dec 08; 2 Jun 09
 Nigeria 12 Jun 09; 28 Feb 23
 Niue 6 Aug 20 (a)
 North Macedonia 3 Dec 08; 8 Oct 09
 Norway 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
 Palau 3 Dec 08; 19 Apr 16
 Palestine 2 Jan 15 (a)
 Panama 3 Dec 08; 29 Nov 10
 Paraguay 3 Dec 08; 12 Mar 15
 Peru 3 Dec 08; 26 Sep 12
 Philippines 3 Dec 08; 3 Jan 19
 Portugal 3 Dec 08; 9 Mar 11
 Rwanda 3 Dec 08; 25 Aug 15
 Saint Kitts and Nevis 13 Sep 13 (a)
 Saint Lucia 15 Sep 20 (a)
 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
 23 Sep 09; 29 Oct 10
 Samoa 3 Dec 08; 28 Apr 10
 San Marino 3 Dec 08; 10 Jul 09
 Sao Tome and Principe 3 Dec 08; 27 Jan 20
 Senegal 3 Dec 08; 3 Aug 11
 Seychelles 13 Apr 10; 20 May 10
 Sierra Leone 3 Dec 08; 3 Dec 08
 Slovakia 24 Jul 15 (a)
 Slovenia 3 Dec 08; 19 Aug 09
 Somalia 3 Dec 08; 30 Sep 15
 South Africa 3 Dec 08; 28 May 15
 South Sudan 3 Aug 23 (a)
 Spain 3 Dec 08; 17 Jun 09
 Sri Lanka 1 Mar 2018 (a)
 Sweden 3 Dec 08; 23 Apr 12
 Switzerland 3 Dec 08; 17 Jul 12
 Togo 3 Dec 08; 22 Jun 12
 Trinidad and Tobago 21 Sep 11 (a)
 Tunisia 12 Jan 09; 28 Sep 10
 United Kingdom 3 Dec 08; 4 May 10
 Uruguay 3 Dec 08; 24 Sep 09
 Zambia 3 Dec 08; 12 Aug 09

SIGNATORIES

Angola 3 Dec 08
 Central African Republic 3 Dec 08
 Cyprus 23 Sep 09
 Democratic Republic of the Congo
 18 Mar 09
 Djibouti 30 Jul 10
 Haiti 28 Oct 09

Indonesia 3 Dec 08
 Jamaica 12 Jun 09
 Kenya 3 Dec 08
 Liberia 3 Dec 08
 Tanzania 3 Dec 08
 Uganda 3 Dec 08

STATES NOT PARTY

Algeria
 Argentina
 Armenia
 Azerbaijan
 Bahamas
 Bahrain
 Bangladesh
 Barbados
 Belarus
 Bhutan
 Brazil
 Brunei Darussalam
 Cambodia
 China
 Dominica
 Egypt
 Equatorial Guinea
 Eritrea
 Estonia
 Ethiopia
 Finland
 Gabon
 Georgia
 Greece
 India
 Iran
 Israel
 Jordan
 Kazakhstan
 Kiribati
 Korea, North
 Korea, South
 Kuwait
 Kyrgyzstan
 Latvia
 Libya
 Lithuania [withdrew on 6 Mar 25]

Malaysia
 Marshall Islands
 Micronesia
 Mongolia
 Morocco
 Myanmar/Burma
 Nepal
 Oman
 Pakistan
 Papua New Guinea
 Poland
 Qatar
 Romania
 Russia
 Saudi Arabia
 Serbia
 Singapore
 Solomon Islands
 Sudan
 Suriname
 Syria
 Tajikistan
 Thailand
 Timor-Leste
 Tonga
 Türkiye
 Turkmenistan
 Tuvalu
 Ukraine
 United Arab Emirates
 United States
 Uzbekistan
 Vanuatu
 Venezuela
 Vietnam
 Yemen
 Zimbabwe

CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE ADOPTION OF A CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

DUBLIN 19-30 MAY 2008

CCM/77

CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

The States Parties to this Convention,

Deeply concerned that civilian populations and individual civilians continue to bear the brunt of armed conflict,

Determined to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions at the time of their use, when they fail to function as intended or when they are abandoned,

Concerned that cluster munition remnants kill or maim civilians, including women and children, obstruct economic and social development, including through the loss of livelihood, impede post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, delay or prevent the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, can negatively impact on national and international peace-building and humanitarian assistance efforts, and have other severe consequences that can persist for many years after use,

Deeply concerned also at the dangers presented by the large national stockpiles of cluster munitions retained for operational use and *determined* to ensure their rapid destruction,

Believing it necessary to contribute effectively in an efficient, coordinated manner to resolving the challenge of removing cluster munition remnants located throughout the world, and to ensure their destruction,

Determined also to ensure the full realisation of the rights of all cluster munition victims and *recognising* their inherent dignity,

Resolved to do their utmost in providing assistance to cluster munition victims, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as providing for their social and economic inclusion,

Recognising the need to provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance to cluster munition victims and to address the special needs of vulnerable groups,

Bearing in mind the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which, *inter alia*, requires that States Parties to that Convention undertake to ensure and promote the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability,

Mindful of the need to coordinate adequately efforts undertaken in various fora to address the rights and needs of victims of various types of weapons, and *resolved* to avoid discrimination among victims of various types of weapons,

Reaffirming that in cases not covered by this Convention or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law, derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience,

Resolved also that armed groups distinct from the armed forces of a State shall not, under any circumstances, be permitted to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party to this Convention,

Welcoming the very broad international support for the international norm prohibiting anti-personnel mines, enshrined in the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,

Welcoming also the adoption of the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and its entry into force on 12 November 2006, and *wishing* to enhance the protection of civilians from the effects of cluster munition remnants in post-conflict environments,

Bearing in mind also United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1612 on children in armed conflict,

Welcoming further the steps taken nationally, regionally and globally in recent years aimed at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the global call for an end to civilian suffering caused by cluster munitions and *recognising* the efforts to that end undertaken by the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Cluster Munition Coalition and numerous other non-governmental organisations around the world,

Reaffirming the Declaration of the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, by which, *inter alia*, States recognised the grave consequences caused by the use of cluster munitions and committed themselves to conclude by 2008 a legally binding instrument that would prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, and would establish a framework for cooperation and assistance that ensures adequate provision of care and rehabilitation for victims, clearance of contaminated areas, risk reduction education and destruction of stockpiles,

Emphasising the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalisation and its full implementation,

Basing themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, and the rules that the parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly direct their operations against military objectives only, that in the conduct of military operations constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects and that the civilian population and individual civilians enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1

General obligations and scope of application

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
 - a. Use cluster munitions;
 - b. Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions;
 - c. Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to explosive bomblets that are specifically designed to be dispersed or released from dispensers affixed to aircraft.
3. This Convention does not apply to mines.

ARTICLE 2

Definitions

For the purposes of this Convention:

1. **“Cluster munition victims”** means all persons who have been killed or suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalisation or substantial impairment

of the realisation of their rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. They include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected families and communities;

2. **“Cluster munition”** means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions. It does not mean the following:
 - a. A munition or submunition designed to dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics or chaff; or a munition designed exclusively for an air defence role;
 - b. A munition or submunition designed to produce electrical or electronic effects;
 - c. A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following characteristics:
 - i. Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions;
 - ii. Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms;
 - iii. Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a single target object;
 - iv. Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-destruction mechanism;
 - v. Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-deactivating feature.
3. **“Explosive submunition”** means a conventional munition that in order to perform its task is dispersed or released by a cluster munition and is designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or after impact;
4. **“Failed cluster munition”** means a cluster munition that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or otherwise delivered and which should have dispersed or released its explosive submunitions but failed to do so;
5. **“Unexploded submunition”** means an explosive submunition that has been dispersed or released by, or otherwise separated from, a cluster munition and has failed to explode as intended;
6. **“Abandoned cluster munitions”** means cluster munitions or explosive submunitions that have not been used and that have been left behind or dumped, and that are no longer under the control of the party that left them behind or dumped them. They may or may not have been prepared for use;
7. **“Cluster munition remnants”** means failed cluster munitions, abandoned cluster munitions, unexploded submunitions and unexploded bomblets;
8. **“Transfer”** involves, in addition to the physical movement of cluster munitions into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over cluster munitions, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing cluster munition remnants;
9. **“Self-destruction mechanism”** means an incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which is in addition to the primary initiating mechanism of the munition and which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated;
10. **“Self-deactivating”** means automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of the irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example a battery, that is essential to the operation of the munition;
11. **“Cluster munition contaminated area”** means an area known or suspected to contain cluster munition remnants;
12. **“Mine”** means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle;
13. **“Explosive bomblet”** means a conventional munition, weighing less than 20 kilograms, which is not self-propelled and which, in order to perform its task, is dispersed or released by a dispenser, and is designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or after impact;
14. **“Dispenser”** means a container that is designed to disperse or release explosive bomblets and which is affixed to an aircraft at the time of dispersal or release;
15. **“Unexploded bomblet”** means an explosive bomblet that has been dispersed, released or otherwise separated from a dispenser and has failed to explode as intended.

ARTICLE 3

Storage and stockpile destruction

1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with national regulations, separate all cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control from munitions retained for operational use and mark them for the purpose of destruction.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as soon as possible but not later than eight years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party. Each State Party undertakes to ensure that destruction methods comply with applicable international standards for protecting public health and the environment.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within eight years of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party it may submit a request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such cluster munitions by a period of up to four years. A State Party may, in exceptional circumstances, request additional extensions of up to four years. The requested extensions shall not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for that State Party to complete its obligations under paragraph 2 of this Article.
4. Each request for an extension shall set out:
 - a. The duration of the proposed extension;
 - b. A detailed explanation of the proposed extension, including the financial and technical means available to or required by the State Party for the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and, where applicable, the exceptional circumstances justifying it;
 - c. A plan for how and when stockpile destruction will be completed;
 - d. The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions held at the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and any additional cluster munitions or explosive submunitions discovered after such entry into force;
 - e. The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions destroyed during the period referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article; and
 - f. The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions remaining to be destroyed during the proposed extension and the annual destruction rate expected to be achieved.
5. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension. The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension than that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as appropriate. A request for an extension shall be submitted a minimum of nine months prior to the Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference at which it is to be considered.
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the retention or acquisition of a limited number of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions for the development of and training in cluster munition and explosive submunition detection, clearance or destruction techniques, or for the development of cluster munition counter-measures, is permitted. The amount of explosive submunitions retained or acquired shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for these purposes.
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the transfer of cluster munitions to another State Party for the purpose of destruction, as well as for the purposes described in paragraph 6 of this Article, is permitted.
8. States Parties retaining, acquiring or transferring cluster munitions or explosive submunitions for the purposes described in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this Article shall submit a detailed report on the planned and actual use of these cluster munitions and explosive submunitions and their type, quantity and lot numbers. If cluster munitions or explosive submunitions are transferred to another State Party for these purposes, the report shall include reference to the receiving party. Such a report shall be prepared for each year during which a State Party retained, acquired or transferred cluster munitions or explosive submunitions and shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 30 April of the following year.

ARTICLE 4

Clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and risk reduction education

1. Each State Party undertakes to clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, as follows:
 - a. Where cluster munition remnants are located in areas under its jurisdiction or control at the date of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, such clearance and destruction shall be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years from that date;
 - b. Where, after entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control, such clearance and destruction must be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the end of the active hostilities during which such cluster munitions became cluster munition remnants; and
 - c. Upon fulfilling either of its obligations set out in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, that State Party shall make a declaration of compliance to the next Meeting of States Parties.
2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, each State Party shall take the following measures as soon as possible, taking into consideration the provisions of Article 6 of this Convention regarding international cooperation and assistance:
 - a. Survey, assess and record the threat posed by cluster munition remnants, making every effort to identify all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control;
 - b. Assess and prioritise needs in terms of marking, protection of civilians, clearance and destruction, and take steps to mobilise resources and develop a national plan to carry out these activities, building, where appropriate, upon existing structures, experiences and methodologies;
 - c. Take all feasible steps to ensure that all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. Warning signs based on methods of marking readily recognisable by the affected community should be utilised in the marking of suspected hazardous areas. Signs and other hazardous area boundary markers should, as far as possible, be visible, legible, durable and resistant to environmental effects and should clearly identify which side of the marked boundary is considered to be within the cluster munition contaminated areas and which side is considered to be safe;
 - d. Clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control; and
 - e. Conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by such remnants.
3. In conducting the activities referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, each State Party shall take into account international standards, including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
4. This paragraph shall apply in cases in which cluster munitions have been used or abandoned by one State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and have become cluster munition remnants that are located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party at the time of entry into force of this Convention for the latter.
 - a. In such cases, upon entry into force of this Convention for both States Parties, the former State Party is strongly encouraged to provide, *inter alia*, technical, financial, material or human resources assistance to the latter State Party, either bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third party, including through the United Nations system or other relevant organisations, to facilitate the marking, clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants.

- b. Such assistance shall include, where available, information on types and quantities of the cluster munitions used, precise locations of cluster munition strikes and areas in which cluster munition remnants are known to be located.
5. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy or ensure the clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within ten years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, it may submit a request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants by a period of up to five years. The requested extension shall not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for that State Party to complete its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article.
6. A request for an extension shall be submitted to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference prior to the expiry of the time period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article for that State Party. Each request shall be submitted a minimum of nine months prior to the Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference at which it is to be considered. Each request shall set out:
 - a. The duration of the proposed extension;
 - b. A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including the financial and technical means available to and required by the State Party for the clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants during the proposed extension;
 - c. The preparation of future work and the status of work already conducted under national clearance and demining programmes during the initial ten year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and any subsequent extensions;
 - d. The total area containing cluster munition remnants at the time of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and any additional areas containing cluster munition remnants discovered after such entry into force;
 - e. The total area containing cluster munition remnants cleared since entry into force of this Convention;
 - f. The total area containing cluster munition remnants remaining to be cleared during the proposed extension;
 - g. The circumstances that have impeded the ability of the State Party to destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control during the initial ten year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, and those that may impede this ability during the proposed extension;
 - h. The humanitarian, social, economic and environmental implications of the proposed extension; and
 - i. Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
7. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article, including, *inter alia*, the quantities of cluster munition remnants reported, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension. The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension than that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as appropriate.

Such an extension may be renewed by a period of up to five years upon the submission of a new request, in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of this Article. In requesting a further extension a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken during the previous extension granted pursuant to this Article.

ARTICLE 5

Victim assistance

1. Each State Party with respect to cluster munition victims in areas under its jurisdiction or control shall, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion. Each State Party shall make every effort to collect reliable relevant data with respect to cluster munition victims.

2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article each State Party shall:
 - a. Assess the needs of cluster munition victims;
 - b. Develop, implement and enforce any necessary national laws and policies;
 - c. Develop a national plan and budget, including timeframes to carry out these activities, with a view to incorporating them within the existing national disability, development and human rights frameworks and mechanisms, while respecting the specific role and contribution of relevant actors;
 - d. Take steps to mobilise national and international resources;
 - e. Not discriminate against or among cluster munition victims, or between cluster munition victims and those who have suffered injuries or disabilities from other causes; differences in treatment should be based only on medical, rehabilitative, psychological or socio-economic needs;
 - f. Closely consult with and actively involve cluster munition victims and their representative organisations;
 - g. Designate a focal point within the government for coordination of matters relating to the implementation of this Article; and
 - h. Strive to incorporate relevant guidelines and good practices including in the areas of medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as social and economic inclusion.

ARTICLE 6

International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance.
2. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties affected by cluster munitions, aimed at the implementation of the obligations of this Convention. Such assistance may be provided, *inter alia*, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organisations or institutions, non-governmental organisations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis.
3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision and receipt of clearance and other such equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.
4. In addition to any obligations it may have pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 4 of this Convention, each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and information concerning various means and technologies related to clearance of cluster munitions, as well as lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and related activities.
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions, and shall also provide assistance to identify, assess and prioritise needs and practical measures in terms of marking, risk reduction education, protection of civilians and clearance and destruction as provided in Article 4 of this Convention.
6. Where, after entry into force of this Convention, cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, each State Party in a position to do so shall urgently provide emergency assistance to the affected State Party.
7. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the implementation of the obligations referred to in Article 5 of this Convention to adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for social and economic inclusion of cluster munition victims. Such assistance may be provided, *inter alia*, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organisations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organisations or on a bilateral basis.
8. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance to contribute to the economic and social recovery needed as a result of cluster munition use in affected States Parties.

9. Each State Party in a position to do so may contribute to relevant trust funds in order to facilitate the provision of assistance under this Article.
10. Each State Party that seeks and receives assistance shall take all appropriate measures in order to facilitate the timely and effective implementation of this Convention, including facilitation of the entry and exit of personnel, materiel and equipment, in a manner consistent with national laws and regulations, taking into consideration international best practices.
11. Each State Party may, with the purpose of developing a national action plan, request the United Nations system, regional organisations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental institutions to assist its authorities to determine, *inter alia*:
 - a. The nature and extent of cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control;
 - b. The financial, technological and human resources required for the implementation of the plan;
 - c. The time estimated as necessary to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control;
 - d. Risk reduction education programmes and awareness activities to reduce the incidence of injuries or deaths caused by cluster munition remnants;
 - e. Assistance to cluster munition victims; and
 - f. The coordination relationship between the government of the State Party concerned and the relevant governmental, intergovernmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the plan.
12. States Parties giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programmes.

ARTICLE 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, on:
 - a. The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9 of this Convention;
 - b. The total of all cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of this Convention, to include a breakdown of their type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type;
 - c. The technical characteristics of each type of cluster munition produced by that State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for it, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by it, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of cluster munitions; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information that may facilitate the clearance of cluster munition remnants;
 - d. The status and progress of programmes for the conversion or decommissioning of production facilities for cluster munitions;
 - e. The status and progress of programmes for the destruction, in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention, of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, with details of the methods that will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
 - f. The types and quantities of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, destroyed in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention, including details of the methods of destruction used, the location of the destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards observed;
 - g. Stockpiles of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, discovered after reported completion of the programme referred to in sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph, and plans for their destruction in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention;

- h. To the extent possible, the size and location of all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of cluster munition remnant in each such area and when they were used;
 - i. The status and progress of programmes for the clearance and destruction of all types and quantities of cluster munition remnants cleared and destroyed in accordance with Article 4 of this Convention, to include the size and location of the cluster munition contaminated area cleared and a breakdown of the quantity of each type of cluster munition remnant cleared and destroyed;
 - j. The measures taken to provide risk reduction education and, in particular, an immediate and effective warning to civilians living in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control;
 - k. The status and progress of implementation of its obligations under Article 5 of this Convention to adequately provide age- and gender- sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for social and economic inclusion of cluster munition victims and to collect reliable relevant data with respect to cluster munition victims;
 - l. The name and contact details of the institutions mandated to provide information and to carry out the measures described in this paragraph;
 - m. The amount of national resources, including financial, material or in kind, allocated to the implementation of Articles 3, 4 and 5 of this Convention; and
 - n. The amounts, types and destinations of international cooperation and assistance provided under Article 6 of this Convention.
2. The information provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the previous calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.
 3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

ARTICLE 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to a matter of compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information that would assist in clarifying the matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.
4. Pending the convening of any Meeting of States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
5. Where a matter has been submitted to it pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, the Meeting of States Parties shall first determine whether to consider that matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. If it does so determine, the Meeting of States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means further

to clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6 of this Convention.

6. In addition to the procedures provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 of this Article, the Meeting of States Parties may decide to adopt such other general procedures or specific mechanisms for clarification of compliance, including facts, and resolution of instances of non-compliance with the provisions of this Convention as it deems appropriate.

ARTICLE 9

National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 10

Settlement of disputes

1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention, the States Parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of their choice, including recourse to the Meeting of States Parties and referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
2. The Meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

ARTICLE 11

Meetings of States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
 - a. The operation and status of this Convention;
 - b. Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
 - c. International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6 of this Convention;
 - d. The development of technologies to clear cluster munition remnants;
 - e. Submissions of States Parties under Articles 8 and 10 of this Convention; and
 - f. Submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention.
2. The first Meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.

ARTICLE 12

Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
 - a. To review the operation and status of this Convention;
 - b. To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11 of this Convention; and
 - c. To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention.
3. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.

ARTICLE 13

Amendments

1. At any time after its entry into force any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to all States.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for States Parties that have accepted the amendment on the date of deposit of acceptances by a majority of the States which were Parties at the date of adoption of the amendment. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

ARTICLE 14

Costs and administrative tasks

1. The costs of the Meetings of States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not party to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 of this Convention shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
3. The performance by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of administrative tasks assigned to him or her under this Convention is subject to an appropriate United Nations mandate.

ARTICLE 15

Signature

This Convention, done at Dublin on 30 May 2008, shall be open for signature at Oslo by all States on 3 December 2008 and thereafter at United Nations Headquarters in New York until its entry into force.

ARTICLE 16

Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State that has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

ARTICLE 17

Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 18

Provisional application

Any State may, at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force for that State.

ARTICLE 19

Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 20

Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating withdrawal.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

ARTICLE 21

Relations with States not Party to this Convention

1. Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Convention to ratify, accept, approve or accede to this Convention, with the goal of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention.
2. Each State Party shall notify the governments of all States not party to this Convention, referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, of its obligations under this Convention, shall promote the norms it establishes and shall make its best efforts to discourage States not party to this Convention from using cluster munitions.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention and in accordance with international law, States Parties, their military personnel or nationals, may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.
4. Nothing in paragraph 3 of this Article shall authorise a State Party:
 - a. To develop, produce or otherwise acquire cluster munitions;
 - b. To itself stockpile or transfer cluster munitions;
 - c. To itself use cluster munitions; or
 - d. To expressly request the use of cluster munitions in cases where the choice of munitions used is within its exclusive control.

ARTICLE 22

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

ARTICLE 23

Authentic texts

The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Convention shall be equally authentic.

GLOSSARY

Battle area clearance (BAC) – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mines/ERW from a specified area to a specified depth.

Cluster bomb – Air-dropped cluster munition.

Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a cluster munition is “a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets, from fixed dispensers) over a wide area. Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

Cluster munition remnants – These include abandoned cluster munitions, unexploded submunitions, and unexploded bomblets, as well as failed cluster munitions. Abandoned cluster munitions are unused explosive submunitions or whole cluster munitions that have been left behind or dumped. Cluster munitions are also a type of ERW.

Confirmed hazardous area (CHA) – An area where the presence of landmines, submunitions or bomblets, or other ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of unexploded ordnance.

Convention on Cluster Munitions – An international convention adopted in May 2008 and opened for signature in December 2008, which entered into force on 1 August 2010. The UN Secretary-General is the depository. The convention prohibits the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions. It also requires stockpile destruction, clearance, and victim assistance.

Diversity – A term that refers to the different aspects that make up a person’s social identity, for example: age, (dis)ability, faith, and ethnicity, among others.

Dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) – A type of cluster munition that can be used against both personnel and material targets, including armor.

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) – Under Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Landmines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

Gender – A term that refers to the range of characteristics, norms, behaviors, and roles associated with women, men, girls, and boys, as well as their relationships with each other, and that are socially constructed. As a social construct, gender varies according to socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts, and can change over time.

Humanitarian mine action – All activities aimed at significantly reducing or completely eliminating the threat and impact of mines/ERW upon civilians and their livelihoods. This includes the survey, mapping and marking, and clearance of contaminated areas; capacity-building and coordination; risk education; victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and ban advocacy.

Interoperability – In relation to Article 21 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, interoperability refers to joint military operations with states not party to the convention.

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles, and in some cases defining international requirements and specifications.

Intersectionality – A concept that captures the consequences of two or more combined systems of discrimination, and addresses the manner in which they contribute to creating layers of inequality.

Land release – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with minimum possible risk. This involves the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of mine/ERW contaminated areas.

Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action centers also implement mine action activities.

Non-state armed group (NSAG) – For the Monitor’s purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

Non-technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to better define where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

Oslo Process – The diplomatic process undertaken from 2006–2008 that led to the negotiation, adoption, and signing of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Persons with disabilities – Those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers, may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.

Risk education (also known as risk reduction education and awareness in the Convention on Cluster Munitions and more broadly as Explosive Ordnance Risk Education, EORE) – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of death and injury from explosive hazards by raising the awareness of women, girls, men, and boys in accordance with the nature of the risks and their different vulnerabilities, roles, and needs and by promoting behavioral change. This includes public information dissemination, education and training, and community liaison.

Self-destruct mechanism – Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, an “incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which is in addition to the primary initiating mechanism of the munition and which secures the destruction of the munition into which it is incorporated.”

Self-deactivating – Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, automatically rendering a munition inoperable by making an essential component (e.g. a battery) non-functional.

Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. When ground launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.”

Survivor – A person who has been directly injured by the explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and has survived the incident.

Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to better define where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

Unexploded submunitions and **unexploded bomblets** – Submunitions and bomblets that have failed to explode as intended at the time of use, becoming unexploded ordnance.

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Munitions that were used or primed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

Victim – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, “all persons who have been killed or suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalization or substantial impairment of the realization of their rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. They include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected families and communities.”

Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support, socio-economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure the full inclusion and equal participation in society of mine/ERW survivors and affected families and communities.

CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR 2025



Cluster Munition Monitor 2025 examines how states are working to join and implement the ban on cluster munitions, ensure clearance of cluster munition remnants, provide risk education, and assist victims of these indiscriminate weapons. Using the Convention on Cluster Munitions as its principal frame of reference, the report focuses on calendar year 2024 with information included up to August 2025 where possible. It covers cluster munition ban policy, use, production, transfers, and stockpiling globally, and contains information on developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of cluster munition contamination and the needs of survivors through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. Profiles published online provide additional country-specific findings on these topics.

This report was prepared by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

Front Cover: A deminer from DanChurchAid (DCA) prepares for the destruction of an unexploded submunition in Ras El Ein village in South Lebanon. © Rashad Siblini/DCA, April 2025

Top left: An unexploded Russian AO-2.5 RT submunition found by Humanity & Inclusion (HI) during clearance operations in Syria's Raqqah governorate. © HI, May 2025

Top right: A Humanity & Inclusion (HI) clearance team heads to a clearance site in a fertile area of Salah al-Dinh governorate in Iraq, where contamination from explosive remnants of war, including cluster munitions, is preventing local communities from cultivating their land or returning to their homes. © HI, April 2025

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