

# LANDMINE MONITOR 2024



INTERNATIONAL  
CAMPAIGN TO **BAN**  
**LANDMINES**  
1997 Nobel Peace Prize Co-Laureate

# LANDMINE MONITOR

## 2024

26<sup>TH</sup> ANNUAL EDITION

*Monitoring and Research Committee, ICBL-CMC Governance Board*  
Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines • DanChurchAid  
Human Rights Watch • Humanity & Inclusion • Mines Action Canada  
Research team leaders • ICBL-CMC staff experts

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Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

For more information visit [www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org) or email [monitor@icblcmc.org](mailto:monitor@icblcmc.org).

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor makes every effort to limit the environmental footprint of reports by publishing all of our research products online. This report and detailed country profiles are available online at [www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org).

## INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.

**The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all, including:**

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
- Efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW); and
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.



# PREFACE

## LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR

Peace agreements may be signed, and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. This includes improvised antipersonnel landmines, which constitute improvised explosive devices (IEDs) with those same human-activated characteristics. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person. Landmines are inherently indiscriminate weapons, meaning that, by design, it is not possible for the mine to be deployed to target a specific person. Hence, casualties can occur among whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, as well as anyone nearby.

Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

ERW refers to ordnance that either failed to explode or was abandoned, remaining a danger to anyone who may encounter it. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive items are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) refers to explosive weapons that have not been used during armed conflict but have been left behind and are no longer effectively controlled. Under the international legal definition, ERW consists of UXO and AXO, but not mines. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and also applies to cluster munition remnants. Cluster munitions are defined by the Convention on Cluster Munitions and are subject to a specific set of legal obligations under that convention.

Landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads and footpaths, in farmers' fields, in forests and deserts, along territorial borders, in and around critical infrastructure, in houses and schools, as well as other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. Mines and ERW impede access to food, water, and other basic needs, and restrict freedom of movement. They endanger transit and prevent the safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.



These weapons instill fear in communities. Many residents are unaware of the contamination and its hazards, however, even when aware of potentially mined areas, residents are often forced to take risks just to go on with their lives, having no alternative land to farm for their livelihood or safer routes to access schools. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to mine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, but that they are also a lethal barrier to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global mine problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines.<sup>1</sup> Governments that join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, as well as support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent future incidents.

This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations; and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of landmines and cluster munitions—a world where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine; where children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy; where communities are no longer burdened with the long-term socio-economic impacts of living on or near contaminated land; and where the rights of mine/ERW survivors and persons with similar needs are protected.

## INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The ICBL is a global network of organizations active in more than 100 countries, working for the full universalization and implementation of the treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams, in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty. The campaign includes national and international organizations, as well as multisectoral expertise from the human rights, development, refugee, medical, and humanitarian relief fields. The ICBL works in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance. The campaign calls additionally on non-state armed groups (NSAGs) to abide by the norm against mine use.

The ICBL was founded in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International (now Humanity & Inclusion), Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These organizations witnessed the horrendous impact of landmines on the communities in which they were working across Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, and how mines hampered and prevented development efforts. The solution, they realized, was a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines. More than 30 years on from its founding, the

<sup>1</sup> This report uses “Mine Ban Treaty” to refer to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (1997). The term has been consistently used by civil society in reference to this convention since it was adopted. The treaty is also often referred to as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), including by its Implementation Support Unit (ISU), which serves as the convention’s secretariat. The Monitor makes reference to the APMBC in footnotes that refer to documents and statements held and published by the ISU.

ICBL continues to serve as a decisive and effective model of a civil society-led campaign for disarmament and peace. Its effort to ban landmines led to a whole new approach known as humanitarian disarmament.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign a multisectoral perspective and practical experience on the impact of landmines. In a short time, these core members mobilized a global network of NGOs engaged on this issue. Conferences and outreach events were initially organized worldwide to raise awareness on the global landmine problem and the need for a ban, as well as to provide training to partners for effective advocacy efforts. The call for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines quickly spread throughout the world, and among diverse partners.

Through sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL and effective partnerships with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments, the Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada.

Once the goal of developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel mines was achieved, the attention of the ICBL shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations.

The ICBL's success over three decades speaks to the campaign's ability to evolve with changing circumstances. In January 2011, the ICBL merged with the CMC to become the ICBL-CMC.

## LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL-CMC on the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has become the *de facto* monitoring regime for both treaties, reporting on States Parties' implementation and compliance, and more generally assessing the international community's response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other ERW.

The ICBL created Landmine Monitor in June 1998, for the first time bringing NGOs together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and challenges. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as "the Monitor") to reflect its new reporting on cluster munitions and the merger of the ICBL with the CMC. The Monitor successfully puts into practice the concept of civil society-based verification that is now employed in many similar contexts.

The Monitor system features a global reporting network, country profiles, and annual reports.<sup>2</sup> A Monitoring and Research Committee provides oversight of the plans and outputs of the ICBL-CMC's research and monitoring, including all Monitor publication content, and acts as a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The Monitor Project Manager, under the ICBL-CMC, is responsible for the coordination and management of research, editing, and production of all Monitor research products. To prepare this report, an Editorial Team gathered information with the aid of a network comprising more than a dozen researchers with the assistance of ICBL-CMC campaigners. Unless otherwise specified, all translations in this report were carried out by the Monitor.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly-available information, covering all aspects of

<sup>2</sup> Reports, briefing papers, factsheets, maps, detailed country profiles, and other resources produced by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor are available online at [www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org). Archived Monitor country profiles for the period 2010-2022 are available at [bit.ly/MonitorArchives2](http://bit.ly/MonitorArchives2); and archived Monitor country profiles for the period 1999-2014 are available at [bit.ly/MonitorArchives1](http://bit.ly/MonitorArchives1).

mine action. Although in some cases it does entail field missions, the Monitor does not send researchers into harm's way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

The Monitor complements transparency reporting required of States Parties under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on issues related to landmines and cluster munitions, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of these weapons and the threat from other ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about the issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information.

## ABOUT THIS REPORT

This is the 26<sup>th</sup> annual *Landmine Monitor* report. It is the sister publication to the annual *Cluster Munition Monitor* report, first published in 2010.

*Landmine Monitor 2024* is to be published ahead of the Fifth Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, also known as the Siem Reap-Angkor Summit on a Mine-Free World, to be held in Cambodia on 25–29 November 2024. The report covers mine ban policy, use, production, transfers, and stockpiling globally; assesses the impact of mine contamination and casualties; outlines progress made and challenges faced in efforts to clear contaminated land, provide risk education to affected communities, and assist mine/ERW victims; and reviews international financial assistance and national resources allocated toward mine action efforts.

While outlining developments over the five-year period since the treaty's Fourth Review Conference—which was held in Oslo, Norway in November 2019—as well as over the 25-year period since the treaty entered into force, this report focuses primarily on calendar year 2023, with information included up to October 2024 where possible.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations from around the world contributed to this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of researchers and editors, with the support of a significant number of donors. Country-specific contributions were received from a network of at least 20 Monitor researchers covering more than 30 countries. Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website.<sup>3</sup>

The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed to the research for this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for their crucial assistance in the production, release, distribution, and promotion of Monitor reports.

Content produced by the Monitor was reviewed by members of the Monitoring and Research Committee comprised of five NGOs, as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. At the time of publication, the committee's members were: Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Camilo Serna), DanChurchAid (Lene Rasmussen), Human Rights Watch (Stephen

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<sup>3</sup> See, Monitor website, [www.the-monitor.org/who-are-we](http://www.the-monitor.org/who-are-we).



Goose), Humanity & Inclusion (Eva Maria Fischer and Alma Taslidžan), Mines Action Canada (Erin Hunt), Monitor research team leaders (Ban Policy: Mary Wareham; Impact: Loren Persi Vicentic; and Support for Mine Action: Ruth Bottomley), and relevant senior ICBL-CMC staff (Eléa Boureux, Kasia Derlicka-Rosenbauer, and Tamar Gabelnick).

From January to October 2024, the Monitor's Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and drafted thematic overviews for *Landmine Monitor 2024*. The Editorial Team included:

- **Ban policy:** Mark Hiznay, Mennah Abdelwahab, Susan Aboeid, Stephen Goose, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, and Mary Wareham;
- **Impact:** Loren Persi Vicentic, Katrin Atkins, Eléa Boureux, and Clémentine Tavernier; and;
- **Support for mine action:** Ruth Bottomley.

This edition also builds on earlier contributions from Michael Hart (Publications Consultant) through July 2024.

Anna Lim (Editorial Consultant) provided final editing in October and November 2024 with support from Eléa Boureux (Monitor Project Manager).

Report formatting and cover design was undertaken by Michael Sherwin. Maps were created by Maria Angela Torri. Héliographie Girard printed the report in Switzerland.

The front cover photograph was provided by S. Rae/Humanity & Inclusion. The back cover photograph was provided by So Not/JRS Cambodia. Additional photographs found within *Landmine Monitor 2024* were provided by multiple photographers, cited with each photograph.

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- Holy See

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*\*Specifically for research on contamination, casualties, clearance, risk education, victim assistance, and support for mine action.*

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AXO	abandoned explosive ordnance
BAC	battle area clearance
CCW	1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CHA	confirmed hazardous area
CMC	Cluster Munition Coalition
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
DCA	DanChurchAid
DPO	disabled persons' organization
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EORE	explosive ordnance risk education
ERW	explosive remnants of war
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI	Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	improvised explosive device
IDP	internally displaced person
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
ISU	Implementation Support Unit
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
NGO	non-governmental organization
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NSAG	non-state armed group
SHA	suspected hazardous area
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UXO	unexploded ordnance

## GLOSSARY

**Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO)** – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

**Accession** – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

**Adherence** – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

**“All reasonable effort”** – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.

**Antihandling device** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

**Antipersonnel mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

**Antivehicle mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

**Area cancellation** – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

**Area reduction** – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

**Battle area clearance (BAC)** – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

**Casualty** – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

**Clearance** – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mines/ERW from a specified area to a specified depth.

**Cleared land** – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or the destruction of all specified mines/ERW to a specified depth.

**Cluster munition** – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a cluster munition is “a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets, from fixed dispensers) over a wide area. Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

**Confirmed hazardous area (CHA)** – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.



**Demining** – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mines/ERW, including survey, mapping, marking, clearance, and the handover of cleared land.

**Diversity** – A term that refers to the different aspects that make up a person's social identity, for example: age, (dis)ability, faith, and ethnicity, among others.

**Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)** – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

**Explosive ordnance risk education (EORE)** – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of death and injury from explosive ordnance by raising the awareness of women, girls, boys, and men in accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles, and needs and by promoting behavioral change. This includes public information dissemination, education and training, and community liaison.

**Explosive remnants of war (ERW)** – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Landmines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

**Gender** – A term that refers to the range of characteristics, norms, behaviors, and roles associated with women, men, girls, and boys, as well as relationships with each other, and that are socially constructed. As a social construct, gender varies according to socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts, and can change over time.

**Humanitarian mine action (HMA)** – All activities aimed at significantly reducing or completely eliminating the threat and impact of mines/ERW upon civilians and their livelihoods. This includes the survey, mapping and marking, and clearance of contaminated areas; capacity-building and coordination; risk education; victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and ban advocacy.

**Improvised explosive device (IED)** – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An IED may be victim-activated or command-detonated. IEDs that can be activated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person (victim-activated) are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

**Improvised mine, improvised landmine, or improvised antipersonnel landmine** – An IED acting as a mine, landmine, or antipersonnel landmine.

**International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)** – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles, and in some cases defining international requirements and specifications.

**Intersectionality** – A concept that captures the consequences of two or more combined systems of discrimination, and addresses the manner in which they contribute to creating layers of inequality.

**Land release** – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with minimum possible risk. This involves the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of mine/ERW contaminated areas.

**Mine action center** – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action centers also implement mine action activities.

**Non-state armed group (NSAG)** – For the Monitor's purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

**Non-technical survey** – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to better define where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-

making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

**Persons with disabilities** – Those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers, may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.

**Reduced land** – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.

**Residual risk** – In the context of humanitarian demining, this term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy all mines/ERW from a specified area to a specified depth.

**Submunition** – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.”

**Survivor** – A person who has been directly injured by the explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and has survived the incident.

**Suspected hazardous area (SHA)** – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

**Technical survey** – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to better define where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

**Unexploded cluster submunitions** – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

**Unexploded ordnance (UXO)** – Munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

**Victim** – A person who has suffered physical, emotional, or psychological injury; economic loss; or substantial impairment of the realization of their rights through acts or omissions related to mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. Victims include people injured and killed (casualties), their families, and broader communities affected by mines, cluster munitions, and ERW.

**Victim assistance** – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support, socio-economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of mine/ERW survivors, their families, and communities in society.

## 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

### Table Key

States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of 1 November 2024

Signatory: Signed, but not yet ratified as of 1 November 2024

Non-signatories: Not yet acceded as of 1 November 2024

### The Americas

Antigua & Barbuda	Guyana
Argentina	Haiti
Bahamas	Honduras
Barbados	Jamaica
Belize	Mexico
Bolivia	Nicaragua
Brazil	Panama
Canada	Paraguay
Chile	Peru
Colombia	St. Kitts & Nevis
Costa Rica	Saint Lucia
Dominica	St. Vincent & the
Dominican Rep.	Grenadines
Ecuador	Suriname
El Salvador	Trinidad & Tobago
Grenada	Uruguay
Guatemala	Venezuela
Cuba	United States

### East & South Asia & the Pacific

Afghanistan	Nauru
Australia	New Zealand
Bangladesh	Niue
Bhutan	Palau
Brunei Darussalam	Papua New Guinea
Cambodia	Philippines
Cook Islands	Samoa
Fiji	Solomon Islands
Indonesia	Sri Lanka
Japan	Thailand
Kiribati	Timor-Leste
Malaysia	Tuvalu
Maldives	Vanuatu
Marshall Islands	
China	Myanmar
India	Nepal
Korea, North	Pakistan
Korea, South	Singapore
Lao PDR	Tonga
Micronesia	Vietnam
Mongolia	

### Europe, the Caucasus & Central Asia

Albania	Greece	Norway
Andorra	Holy See	Poland
Austria	Hungary	Portugal
Belarus	Iceland	Romania
Belgium	Ireland	San Marino
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Italy	Serbia
Bulgaria	Latvia	Slovakia
Croatia	Liechtenstein	Slovenia
Cyprus	Lithuania	Spain
Czech Republic	Luxembourg	Sweden
Denmark	Malta	Switzerland
Estonia	Moldova	Tajikistan
Finland	Monaco	Turkey
France	Montenegro	Turkmenistan
Germany	Netherlands	Ukraine
	North Macedonia	United Kingdom
Armenia	Kazakhstan	Russia
Azerbaijan	Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan
Georgia		

### Middle East & North Africa

Algeria	Kuwait	Qatar
Iraq	Oman	Tunisia
Jordan	Palestine	Yemen
Bahrain	Lebanon	Syria
Egypt	Libya	United Arab Emirates
Iran	Morocco	
Israel	Saudi Arabia	

### Sub-Saharan Africa

Angola	Eswatini	Niger
Benin	Ethiopia	Nigeria
Botswana	Gabon	Rwanda
Burkina Faso	Gambia	Sao Tome & Principe
Burundi	Ghana	Senegal
Cameroon	Guinea	Seychelles
Cabo Verde	Guinea-Bissau	Sierra Leone
Central African Rep.	Kenya	Somalia
Chad	Lesotho	South Africa
Comoros	Liberia	South Sudan
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Madagascar	Sudan
Congo, Rep.	Malawi	Tanzania
Côte d'Ivoire	Mali	Togo
Djibouti	Mauritania	Uganda
Equatorial Guinea	Mauritius	Zambia
Eritrea	Mozambique	Zimbabwe
	Namibia	



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In this hazardous area located near the city of Nouadhibou in Mauritania, antipersonnel mines and explosive remnants of war are buried several centimeters deep in the sand, requiring deminers to work by excavation.

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# MAJOR FINDINGS

## BAN POLICY

### STATUS OF THE 1997 MINE BAN TREATY

The Mine Ban Treaty has a total of 164 States Parties, while 33 states have not yet joined. The last countries to accede to the treaty were the State of Palestine and Sri Lanka, both in 2017.

- In 2023, Russia became the first country ever to vote against the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that urges full universalization and the effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

### MINE USE

Antipersonnel landmines were used by states not party Myanmar and Russia, as well as by Iran and North Korea, during the reporting period of mid-2023 through October 2024.

- Russia has used antipersonnel mines extensively in Ukraine since invading the country in February 2022, resulting in an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party.
- As in every year since it was first published in 1999, this annual report documents new use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in Myanmar.

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in at least five states—Colombia, India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Palestine (Gaza)—also used antipersonnel mines during the reporting period. Additionally, new use of landmines has been attributed to NSAGs in countries in or bordering the Sahel region of Africa—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Niger, and Nigeria.

## PRODUCTION

A total of 12 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty remain on the Monitor's list of those who develop, produce, or acquire antipersonnel mines: Armenia, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.

- India, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, and South Korea appear to be actively developing or producing antipersonnel mines. Other states listed as producers are not believed to be actively producing but have yet to commit to never do so in the future.

## STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION AND MINES RETAINED

Of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 94 states have officially completed destruction of their stocks of antipersonnel mines, destroying a combined total of over 55 million antipersonnel landmines.

- States Parties Greece and Ukraine both still possess stocks of antipersonnel landmines. They remain in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having failed to complete stockpile destruction by their respective four-year deadlines: Greece (1 March 2008) and Ukraine (1 June 2010). In 2024, Greece started transferring antipersonnel landmines to Croatia for destruction.
- Another 67 States Parties have confirmed that they have never possessed antipersonnel mines. State Party Tuvalu must provide an initial transparency report to confirm that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines.

A total of 63 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes. Two of these states—Bangladesh and Finland—each retain more than 12,000 mines, while another 23 states retain more than 1,000 mines each.

- In May 2024, Slovakia reported that it no longer retains antipersonnel mines.

## TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

All except one State Party—Tuvalu—have provided an initial Article 7 transparency report, but less than half provide annual reports due by 30 April each year.

A total of 84 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2023, of which most have failed to provide an annual Article 7 report for two or more years. Only 80 States Parties have provided reports for 2023, a slight increase from 2022.

## THE IMPACT

### CASUALTIES

At least 5,757 casualties of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) were recorded (1,983 killed and 3,663 injured) for 2023. The survival status was unknown for 111 casualties.

- In 2023, mine/ERW casualties were identified in 53 states and two other areas. Of these, 38 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.
- Civilians made up 84% (4,335) of all recorded casualties, where the military or civilian status was known. Children accounted for 37% (1,498) of civilian casualties, where the age group was recorded.
- State not party Myanmar recorded the highest number of annual casualties (1,003) for the first time in 2023. This ended the three-year period that state not party Syria had the highest number of annual casualties.
- Syria had the next highest number of casualties (933), followed by States Parties Afghanistan and Ukraine, which both had more than 500 recorded casualties in 2023.

- In 2023, improvised landmines (victim-activated improvised explosive devices) continued to cause the most casualties (2,071).
- In 2023, antipersonnel mines caused 833 casualties, the highest annual number recorded since 2011; and the number of casualties from antivehicle mines (291) almost tripled since 2022, in correlation with increased casualties from this type of mine in Ukraine.

## CONTAMINATION

At least 58 states and other areas are contaminated by antipersonnel mines.

- This includes 33 States Parties with current clearance obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, in addition to 22 states not party and three other areas.
- At least 25 States Parties are believed or known to have contamination arising from improvised mines.
- Croatia and Yemen succeeded in decreasing the extent of their contamination through land release activities in 2023, while the extent of contamination increased in Mauritania and Sri Lanka, due to ongoing efforts to complete a baseline survey.

## CLEARANCE

States Parties reported clearing a total of 281.50km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated land in 2023, resulting in the destruction of 160,566 antipersonnel landmines.

- This total is the largest area cleared by States Parties since the last review conference in 2019 and represents an increase of 62.2km<sup>2</sup> of land cleared compared with 2022.
- Cambodia and Croatia reported the largest clearance totals in 2023, clearing a combined total of more than 209km<sup>2</sup> of land and destroying 24,743 antipersonnel mines. Another nine States Parties each cleared more than 1km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated land in 2023.
- Clearance progress was negligible in many States Parties in 2023—with 11 clearing less than 1km<sup>2</sup>, three not reporting any clearance in 2023, and five not formally reporting on their Article 5 obligations.
- Nineteen States Parties have deadlines to meet their Article 5 clearance obligations before or no later than 2025, while 14 States Parties have deadlines after 2025. Of those States Parties with a 2025 deadline or earlier, only Oman appears to be on track to meet its clearance deadline.

In the first half of 2024, seven States Parties—Afghanistan, Chad, Cyprus, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Peru, and Serbia—requested extensions to their current clearance deadline of 2025 or earlier. As of October 2024, Eritrea had yet to submit a new request to extend its clearance deadline of 31 December 2024.

## RISK EDUCATION

Of the 33 States Parties with clearance obligations, 28 reported providing, or are known to have provided, risk education to populations at risk from antipersonnel mine contamination in 2023.

- At-risk groups included those that moved regularly between different locations, such as nomads, hunters, herders, shepherds, and agricultural workers. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) faced a similar threat.
- People seeking natural resources for their livelihoods, and people deliberately engaging with explosive ordnance—such as scrap metal collectors—were also at risk.
- Children remained at high risk and were a key target group for risk education providers, comprising 67% of all beneficiaries reached in 2023.
- Fourteen States Parties with clearance obligations submitted an annual Article 7 report for 2023 providing detailed information on risk education, including beneficiary data disaggregated by gender and age.



There has been a positive trend in the number of affected States Parties reporting risk education activities since 2019, when the importance of risk education was highlighted in the Oslo Action Plan. While 70% of them reported risk education activities in 2019, this proportion increased to 85% in 2022 and 2023.

## VICTIM ASSISTANCE

In 2023, healthcare and rehabilitation services remained under-funded and faced multiple challenges in many states, particularly regarding accessibility, expertise, and infrastructure.

- Several States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims in need of assistance experienced massive disruption—and in some cases damage and destruction—to their healthcare systems in 2023, including Afghanistan, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen.
- Monitor findings indicate that rehabilitation services have been reduced in many affected States Parties, including those receiving essential support through internationally funded programs. Several of these programs lost their capacity or were otherwise concluded in 2023, such as in Algeria, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jordan, the Philippines, and Rwanda.
- Major gaps remain in access to economic opportunities for mine and ERW survivors in many of the States Parties where livelihood support is most needed. Reporting on this commitment was limited, however.
- While psychological support services were available in a handful of affected States Parties, these services—in particular, community-based peer support—are rarely included in national health budgets, thereby limiting their impact and reach. Survivor networks and NGOs were helping to fill this gap.

## SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

In 2023, global support for mine action totaled US\$1.03 billion. This is the first time that annual funding for mine action has surpassed one billion, due in part to an increase in funding for Ukraine.

- Twenty affected states contributed a combined total of \$227.3 million to their own national mine action programs, representing 22% of global funding.
- Thirty-four donors provided \$798.3 million in international support to mine action, a similar amount to that provided in 2022.
- The donor base remained largely unchanged from recent years. The 15 largest donors provided 96% of all international mine action funding, with a combined total of \$762.4 million. The US, Germany, and the European Union (EU) remained the three largest donors toward mine action.
- The top 10 recipient countries received \$603.8 million, which accounted for 76% of all international assistance. Ukraine headed the list of recipients for the second year in a row, receiving \$308.1 million, representing 39% of all international donor funds. Eight countries in the top 10 saw a decrease in funding, with the decrease particularly significant in Afghanistan and Yemen.
- International assistance to international non-profit organizations accounted for 46% of total funding during 2023, with \$363.5 million received, compared with 37% of total funding in 2022. However, international assistance provided directly to national non-profit organizations accounted for less than 1% (\$4 million).
- Half of international mine action funding went to support clearance and integrated clearance programs. International support earmarked for victim assistance totaled \$47 million, a 25% increase on the 2022 total, yet represented only 6% of total mine action funding. Of those funds directed toward victim assistance, 60% went to just five states—Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

While some affected States Parties have seen substantial support, others have struggled to obtain international funds, which can impact their ability to meet their Article 5 clearance obligations “as soon as possible.”

- States Parties with smaller amounts of mine contamination often lack support. Of the 12 States Parties with less than 5km<sup>2</sup> of contamination, only half—Colombia, the DRC, Palestine, Senegal, Serbia, and Somalia—received funds for clearance in 2023. This amounted to only 5% of the total funds provided for clearance.
- Eight States Parties with clearance obligations did not receive any international funding for clearance in 2023, despite funding requests by four of them—Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Peru, and Türkiye.

# និស្សិតជនមានពិការភាព



Landmine survivor and ICBL Ambassador Tun Channareth speaks at the Third Global Conference on Victim Assistance hosted by Cambodia in October 2023.

© AP Mine Ban Convention ISU, October 2023

# BAN POLICY

## BANNING ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty is one of five core multilateral humanitarian disarmament instruments that each comprehensively prohibit an entire class of weapons.<sup>1</sup> As is the case for its sister treaties, the Mine Ban Treaty's adoption was driven by humanitarian concerns, in this instance over the casualties and human suffering caused by antipersonnel landmines.

Adopted on 18 September 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999. Its 164 States Parties are more than half-way through the third decade of its implementation and will convene in Siem Reap, Cambodia in November 2024 for the treaty's Fifth Review Conference.

This milestone event is a cause for celebration and time to reflect on the gains made under the Mine Ban Treaty, which has seen a massive drop in production of antipersonnel mines, a virtual end to transfers of the weapons, and the destruction of more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

Yet as conflicts deepen and expand around the world, there's no room for complacency. The norm that the Mine Ban Treaty seeks to achieve against any use of antipersonnel mines seems to be coming under threat from new use by major military powers and non-state armed groups (NSAGs).

Russia has used antipersonnel mines extensively in Ukraine since its invasion of the country on 24 February 2022, causing hundreds of casualties and contaminating vast tracts of land. Russia is not a party to the Mine Ban Treaty, but generally did not seek to undermine it until 2023, when it became the first country to ever vote against the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution, which urges full universalization and the effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Previously, Russia had abstained from voting.

Myanmar Armed Forces continued their use of antipersonnel mines in 2023 and into 2024, as they have done every year since the first Landmine Monitor report was published in 1999. Myanmar is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

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<sup>1</sup> The five humanitarian disarmament treaties are the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.



There were several reports and allegations of new use of antipersonnel landmines by the Iranian government's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the second half of 2023 and first half of 2024.

During 2023 and through July 2024, North Korea used antipersonnel mines in its own territory and at locations along its borders with South Korea and China, according to media reports and South Korean authorities.

NSAGs also used antipersonnel mines during the reporting period in States Parties Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Niger, and Nigeria; and in states not party India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Gaza in the State of Palestine. Since 7 October 2023, the Al-Qassam Brigades have stated numerous times that their fighters have used antipersonnel mines in Gaza. Most of these groups use improvised antipersonnel mines made from locally available materials, and which are also known as victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

New mine use in states not party shows the importance of universalizing the Mine Ban Treaty. The last countries to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty did so in December 2017, and the 33 non-signatories made little progress toward joining the treaty in the reporting period, from mid-2023 through October 2024.

The use of antipersonnel mines in States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty highlights the importance of putting appropriate national implementation measures in place, especially legislation, to enforce the treaty's provisions through penal sanctions and fines.

State Party Ukraine is investigating reports that its forces used rocket-delivered PFM antipersonnel mines in and around the city of Iziium during 2022, when it was occupied by Russian forces. Ukraine stockpiles 3.3 million PFM-series antipersonnel mines and made significant progress in stockpile destruction until those efforts stalled in 2020 and came to a complete halt in 2022, after Russia's invasion. Ukraine has since reported that storage sites holding the antipersonnel mine stocks have come "under air and missile attack" by Russian forces.

Greece, along with Ukraine, are the only other State Parties with stockpile destruction obligations left to complete under the Mine Ban Treaty.<sup>2</sup> Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having both failed to complete stockpile destruction by their respective four-year deadlines. Greece had an initial deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine's deadline was 1 June 2010.<sup>3</sup>

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) continues its work to ensure the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, working in close partnership with its dedicated community of states, United Nations (UN) agencies, and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).



PMN-E antipersonnel landmines found during demining operations in Fizuli region, Azerbaijan.

© Hafiz Safikhanov/AzCBL, July 2023

- 2 Tuvalu must provide an initial Article 7 transparency report for the treaty to formally confirm that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines. Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines.
- 3 The Oslo Action Plan urges states that have failed to meet their Article 4 deadlines to "present a time-bound plan for completion and urgently proceed with implementation as soon as possible in a transparent manner." Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, [bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019](https://bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019).



## UNIVERSALIZING THE LANDMINE BAN

There are a total of 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, of which 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 32 acceded.<sup>4</sup>

There are 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. This includes the Marshall Islands, which signed the treaty in December 1997, but never ratified it.

No states have acceded to the treaty since December 2017, with last accessions being that of Palestine and Sri Lanka.

### Mine Ban Treaty membership by regional or security body<sup>5</sup>

Regional body	Support (%)	Support (number of member states)	Non-signatories to the convention
African Union (AU)	94%	51 of 54	Egypt, Libya, Morocco
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	60%	6 of 10	Lao PDR, Myanmar, Singapore, Vietnam
European Union (EU)	100%	27 of 27	
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	97%	31 of 32	United States (US)
Organization of American States (OAS)	94%	32 of 34	Cuba, US
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)	83%	15 of 18	Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Tonga

In September 2024, Lithuania formally deposited its notice to withdraw from the Convention on Cluster Munitions in six months. Unless it reconsiders the move or goes to war, Lithuania will be the first State Party to leave any of the five multilateral humanitarian disarmament treaties. When the Monitor asked if Lithuania was considering leaving the Mine Ban Treaty, its officials said that “Lithuania is fully dedicated to complying with international law, including international humanitarian law.” As a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, “Lithuania is fulfilling all its obligations” and “does not use, stockpile, or produce the prohibited anti-personnel mines.”<sup>6</sup>

## ANNUAL UNGA RESOLUTION

Since 1997, an important annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states outside the Mine Ban Treaty with a way to demonstrate their support for the treaty’s humanitarian rationale and the objective of its universalization. More than a dozen countries have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Since the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states wishing to join can no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must instead accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. The 32 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of “succession.” These are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the treaty’s 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.

<sup>5</sup> The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is an African Union (AU) member, but Western Sahara’s lack of official representation at the United Nations (UN) prevents it from joining the Mine Ban Treaty.

<sup>6</sup> Email from Ambassador Darius Staniulis, Permanent Representative of Lithuania to the United Nations in Geneva, 12 September 2024.

<sup>7</sup> This includes Belarus, Bhutan, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Türkiye.

On 4 December 2023, a total of 170 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 78/45, which urged full universalization and the effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.<sup>8</sup> Russia was the only country to vote no, while 16 countries abstained.<sup>9</sup>

### UNGA Resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty<sup>10</sup>

Year	Resolution	In Favor	Against	Abstained
1997	52/38	142	0	18
1998	53/77	147	0	21
1999	54/54 B	139	0	20
2000	55/33 V	143	0	22
2001	56/24 M	138	0	19
2002	57/74	143	0	23
2003	58/53	153	0	23
2004	59/84	157	0	22
2005	60/80	158	0	17
2006	61/84	161	0	17
2007	62/41	164	0	18
2008	63/42	163	0	18
2009	64/56	160	0	18
2010	65/48	165	0	17
2011	66/29	162	0	18
2012	67/32	165	0	19
2013	68/30	165	0	19
2014	69/34	164	0	17
2015	70/55	168	0	17
2016	71/34	164	0	20
2017	72/53	168	0	16
2018	73/61	169	0	16
2019	74/61	169	0	18
2020	75/52	169	0	17
2021	76/26	169	0	19
2022	77/63	167	0	17
2023	78/45	170	1	16

Support for the annual UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty rose to an all-time high of 170 votes in favor. However, Russia is the first country to ever vote against the annual UNGA resolution since the resolution was first introduced in 1997. States Parties Rwanda and Serbia abstained from the vote and did not explain their reasoning.

<sup>8</sup> “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” UNGA Resolution 78/45, 4 December 2023, [www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/78/45](http://www.undocs.org/en/A/RES/78/45).

<sup>9</sup> The 16 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

<sup>10</sup> See, UN Voting Data on annual resolution titled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” [bit.ly/UNGAResolutionVotingDataMBT](https://bit.ly/UNGAResolutionVotingDataMBT).

Six states not party provided explanations of their vote: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and South Korea.

A core of 13 states not party have consistently abstained from consecutive UNGA resolutions on the Mine Ban Treaty since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, the United States (US), Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.<sup>11</sup>

During the debate, the Netherlands called for continued effort to universalize the Mine Ban Treaty. Ireland and the Philippines condemned all use of the weapon. Australia and Bangladesh specifically condemned use in Myanmar. Australia condemned Russian use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine.<sup>12</sup>

The European Union (EU) Delegation called for universal renunciation of use, stockpiling, and production of antipersonnel landmines and accession to the Mine Ban Treaty by all states not party. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) deplored the use of antipersonnel mines in conflict situations.

Egypt, Israel, and Singapore noted their ongoing moratoriums on the transfer of antipersonnel landmines, and the US noted their ongoing support for mine clearance worldwide.

Overall, delegates made 35 statements that mentioned antipersonnel mines at UNGA First Committee meetings held between 28 September and 3 November 2023. Several, including Angola, Cambodia, Croatia, Mozambique, and Sri Lanka, shared information about their own devastating experiences and efforts to clear mines.<sup>13</sup>

## USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

The Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines during the reporting period by states not party Russia, Myanmar, Iran, and North Korea, as detailed below. Additionally, antipersonnel mines were used by NSAGs in Colombia, Gaza, India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and by some groups in or bordering the Sahel region of Africa during the reporting period.<sup>14</sup>

## USE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES

### UKRAINE

Ukraine is severely contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) from the armed conflict that began in 2014 and escalated with Russia's full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022.<sup>15</sup> Presently, it is not possible to systematically document, survey, and attribute the continuing use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine given available evidence and lack of access to areas where there are active hostilities. However, available data indicates that the use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine by Russia is extensive, with at least 13 types of antipersonnel mines being deployed.

<sup>11</sup> Of these states, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, and the US are party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II on landmines; Cuba and Uzbekistan are party to CCW Protocol II; and Egypt and Vietnam have signed the CCW but are not party to any of its protocols. Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria remain outside of any treaty-based prohibition or regulation on antipersonnel mines.

<sup>12</sup> Notes by the Monitor during the First Committee on Disarmament and International Security meetings, New York, October 2023. See also, Reaching Critical Will, "Statements from First Committee 2023," [bit.ly/RCWFirstCommittee2023](https://bit.ly/RCWFirstCommittee2023).

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the DRC, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. The Monitor has chosen to group reported mine use in the Sahel region collectively due to a lack of reporting, the apparent sporadic nature of the incidents, and access issues for independent verification.

<sup>15</sup> ERW is defined as unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) by Protocol V of the CCW. Ukraine is also affected by mine/ERW contamination remaining from World War I and World War II.

State Party Ukraine is investigating reports that its forces used rocket-delivered PFM antipersonnel mines in and around the city of Iziom during 2022, when it was occupied by Russian forces. In June 2024, Ukraine stated that it is in compliance with its international obligations, including the Mine Ban Treaty, and is investigating the possible use of antipersonnel mines by its military personnel. (*See Use by Ukrainian forces in 2022 section.*)

### Use by Russian forces

Russia has used antipersonnel landmines extensively in Ukraine since it invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, resulting in an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party.

### Antipersonnel landmines used in Ukraine by Russia since February 2022<sup>16</sup>

Name	Origin	Type	Initiation	Notes
MOB	Russia	Fragmentation	Multiple options	Hand-emplaced directional multipurpose mine that can be used in either a command-detonated or victim-activated mode. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.
MON-50	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/command	MON-series hand-emplaced directional multipurpose mines can be used either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.
MON-90	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/command	
MON-100	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/command	
MON-200	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/command	

<sup>16</sup> The numbers associated with each model of the MON family indicate the range, from 50 to 200 meters. According to Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance (2008), each model contains a specific number of pre-formed fragments that are projected horizontally. The MON-50 contains 540 ball bearings or 485 pieces of 5mm chopped steel rod, and the MON-100 contains 400 pieces of 10mm chopped steel rod. Colin King, *Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance 2008-2009* (Croydon: Jane's Information Group, 2008); Trevor Kirton (TJK\_EOD), "Today the @OfficialSOLI EOD team was able to remote pull a live OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mine from a marsh located close to a farming community. This will be destroyed so it no longer presents a danger." 21 April 2023, 14:08 UTC. Tweet, [bit.ly/TrevorKirtonTweet21April2023](https://bit.ly/TrevorKirtonTweet21April2023); Maksim (kms\_d4k), "In this footage, you can see why it is important not to touch any mines. These mines are set with a trap underneath. It is very dangerous to demine them, so the only way is to destroy them right away." 6 February 2023, 13:32 UTC. Tweet, [bit.ly/MaksimTweet6Feb2023](https://bit.ly/MaksimTweet6Feb2023); Mark Hiznay (MarkHiznay), "More PMN-4 antipersonnel mines being cleared. Since Ukraine never stockpiled this type, it doesn't take much to figure out who did it. Now where? @minefreeworld." 20 April 2023, 17:42 UTC. Tweet, [bit.ly/MarkHiznayTweet20April2023](https://bit.ly/MarkHiznayTweet20April2023); Stu M (SM\_EOD), "More anti-personnel mines out of a field today. We have also come across more evidence of POM-2 use which adds another level of complexity to our work. #onemineatatime #minefreeukraine #eod #demining #StandWithUkraine." 21 April 2023, 09:58 UTC. Tweet, [bit.ly/StuMEODTweet21April2023](https://bit.ly/StuMEODTweet21April2023); International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), "Country Profile: Russia: Mine Ban Policy," updated 17 November 2021, [bit.ly/RussiaMineBanPolicy2021](https://bit.ly/RussiaMineBanPolicy2021); and Armament Research Services has produced a detailed technical reference for POM-3 antipersonnel mines. See, Mick F. and N. R. Jenzen-Jones, "Russian POM-3 anti-personnel landmines documented in Ukraine (2022)," Armament Research Services, 15 April 2022.



Name	Origin	Type	Initiation	Notes
OZM-72	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/ command	A multipurpose bounding munition emplaced either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.
PFM-1/ PFM-1S	USSR	Blast	Pressure/ self-destruct	Uniquely shaped and constructed, this plastic-cased mine can be scattered by mine-laying rockets and dispensers mounted on trucks or helicopters. It contains 37 grams of a liquid high explosive. Both Russia and Ukraine stockpile this type.
PMN-2	USSR/Russia	Blast	Pressure	A circular, plastic-cased mine. Ukraine destroyed its stockpile of this type in 2003.
PMN-4	Russia	Blast	Pressure	A modern circular, plastic-cased mine produced by Russia. First publicly displayed by Russia in 1993, it has never been stockpiled by Ukraine.
POM-2/ POM-2R	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/self- destruct	A metal-case bounding mine delivered by helicopter, ground-fired rockets, or other means. POM-2 and POM-2R mines are stockpiled by Russia, Ukraine destroyed its stocks of this mine in 2018.
POM-3	Russia	Fragmentation	Seismic	Used only by Russia, POM-3 mines were first publicly displayed during annual military exercises in 2021. The POM-3 is scattered by rockets or truck-mounted launchers. Ukraine does not possess the POM-3 mine or its delivery system. Markings on an expended delivery canister photographed with POM-3 mines that failed to deploy properly indicate that it was produced in 2021.

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The scale of landmine and ERW contamination in Ukraine represents the most widespread use of landmines in decades. Russian forces have used at least 13 types of antipersonnel mines since 24 February 2022. Factory markings on some of the landmines used by Russia

show that they were manufactured in the Soviet era and subsequently in Russia; some antipersonnel mines were also produced by Russia as recently as 2021.

At least 13 types of antipersonnel mines have been used by Russia in Ukraine since February 2022 and are detailed in the preceding table.

During 2022, Human Rights Watch (HRW) spoke with Ukrainian deminers who were involved in clearance operations in the Kharkivska region, including in Izium, and in parts of the Khersonska region, after the retreat of Russian soldiers from those areas. The deminers identified numerous types of antipersonnel mines that they had found and neutralized in the recently retaken areas. All of the identified types are known to be in Russian stockpiles, including OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines and PMN-series blast mines (both PMN-2 and PMN-4).<sup>17</sup>

Russian forces have also emplaced victim-activated booby-traps around positions they have taken, occupied, or fortified. Deminers told HRW that they have cleared and destroyed multiple victim-activated booby-traps from areas that were formerly under Russian control. The booby-traps were constructed using various types of hand grenades equipped with tripwires, including F-1, RGD-5, and RGN-type grenades. Booby-traps can function as antipersonnel landmines when the fuze that is used is activated unintentionally by a person.

Russian forces posting on social media in late 2023 and into 2024 confirm that they are using drones to emplace several different types of landmines including PFM-1, POM-2, and PMN-4 antipersonnel mines and PTM-3 and PTM-4 antivehicle mines.<sup>18</sup>

Some landmines used by Russia in Ukraine can be used in either a command-detonated or victim-activated mode, including the newly seen MOB, MON-series, and OZM-72 mines.<sup>19</sup> If activated by the victim through a mechanical pull, tension release, seismic fuze, or other means, then these mines are considered to be antipersonnel mines, prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.<sup>20</sup>

## Use by Ukrainian forces in 2022

There is credible information that Ukrainian government forces used antipersonnel mines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty in and around the city of Izium during 2022, when the city was under Russian control.<sup>21</sup> In January 2023, HRW issued a report detailing how 9M27K3 Uragan rockets carrying PFM-series antipersonnel mines were fired into Russian-occupied areas near Russian military facilities in and around Izium during 2022, causing at least 11 civilian casualties.<sup>22</sup> In June 2023, HRW reported additional evidence of Ukrainian use of PFM antipersonnel mines.<sup>23</sup>

In a March 2023 report to the Human Rights Council, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine said that the commission has found instances where

17 HRW, "Ukraine: Banned Landmines Harm Civilians," 31 January 2023, [bit.ly/HRWUkraineLandmines31Jan2023](https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/31/ukraine-landmines).

18 Rob Lee (RALee85), "Video about engineers from Russia's 1st Tank Army who are using UAVs to emplace POM, PMN-4, PTM-3, and PTM-4 mines." 12 December 2023, 20:33 UTC. Tweet, [bit.ly/TweetRobLee12Dec2023](https://twitter.com/RobLee85/status/1724123456789); Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "Both sides drop mines by drones to interdict logistics. Near dusk, a Russian drone drops a cassette of 26 PFM-1 anti-personnel mines on a Ukrainian road. That night a truck loses tires when it hits the mines, and is abandoned. It is destroyed the next day by drone bombing." 27 September 2024, 16:31 UTC. Tweet, [bit.ly/TweetRoy27Sept2024](https://twitter.com/GrandpaRoy2/status/1845678901234).

19 Collective Awareness to UXO, "OZM-72 Landmine: Description," undated, [bit.ly/OZM-72LandmineDescription](https://www.uxo.org/oxo/ozm-72-landmine-description).

20 HRW, "Backgrounder on Antivehicle Landmines," 8 April 2022, [bit.ly/HRWAntivehicleMines8April2022](https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/08/antivehicle-landmines).

21 The Russian military seized Izium and surrounding areas by 1 April 2022 and exercised full control there until 10 September 2022 when Ukrainian forces began a counteroffensive.

22 HRW conducted research in the Izium district from 19 September to 9 October 2022, interviewing over 100 people, including witnesses to mine use, victims of landmines, first responders, doctors, and Ukrainian deminers. Everyone interviewed said they had seen mines on the ground, knew someone who was injured by one, or had been warned about their presence during Russia's occupation of Izium. See, HRW, "Ukraine: Banned Landmines Harm Civilians," 31 January 2023, [bit.ly/HRWUkraineLandmines31Jan2023](https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/31/ukraine-landmines).

23 HRW, "Ukraine Promises Inquiry into Banned Landmine Use," 30 June 2023, [bit.ly/HRWUkraineInquiry30June2023](https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/30/ukraine-landmine-use).

Ukrainian Armed Forces likely used cluster munitions and rocket-delivered antipersonnel mines to carry out attacks in Izium city, Kharkiv region, from March to September 2022, when it was controlled by Russian Armed Forces.<sup>24</sup>

In January 2023, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that HRW's findings "will be duly studied by the competent authorities of Ukraine."<sup>25</sup> In June 2023, Ukraine promised to examine reports that its forces had used antipersonnel mines.<sup>26</sup> At the Mine Ban Treaty's intersessional meetings in June 2024, States Parties received a report from the treaty's Committee on Cooperative Compliance, which "appreciates Ukraine's engagement with the Committee since the allegations surfaced and looks forward to engaging further with Ukraine over the course of this year in the lead up to the Fifth Review Conference to resolve this matter as soon as possible."<sup>27</sup>

At the 2024 intersessional meetings, Ukraine reiterated that it "continues to fully comply with its international obligations, including Ottawa convention [Mine Ban Treaty]" and announced that its security service has opened "a pre-trial investigation" into "the use of anti-personnel mines by unidentified military personnel."<sup>28</sup> Ukraine's delegation told ICBL that a categorical determination about who was responsible for the mine use would not be possible until the investigation concludes.

### International reaction

All parties to the conflict in Ukraine are bound by treaties that prohibit or regulate landmines in addition to the general laws of war. The Mine Ban Treaty comprehensively prohibits all types of victim-activated explosive devices, regardless of the technical features and the predicted longevity, delivery method, or type of manufacture (improvised or factory-made). While only Ukraine is party to the Mine Ban Treaty, both Russia and Ukraine are party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), which regulates the use of landmines, booby-traps and other explosive devices.

The final report of the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties, held in November 2023, noted ongoing commitment to achieving a mine-free world and condemnation of "the use of anti-personnel mines anywhere, at any time, and by any actor."<sup>29</sup>

Since March 2022, Ukraine and at least 46 other countries have condemned or expressed concern at Russia's use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US, in addition to the EU.

At the CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties in November 2023, the UK delivered a statement on behalf of itself, Ukraine, and 45 other states that said, "We continue to condemn

<sup>24</sup> Human Rights Council, "Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine," A/HRC/52/62, 15 March 2023, pp. 6–7, [bit.ly/HRCUkraineReport15March2023](https://bit.ly/HRCUkraineReport15March2023).

<sup>25</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, "Comment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Report of the Human Rights Watch," 31 January 2023, [bit.ly/UkraineMoFA31Jan2023](https://bit.ly/UkraineMoFA31Jan2023).

<sup>26</sup> Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2024, [bit.ly/UkraineStatement19June2024](https://bit.ly/UkraineStatement19June2024).

<sup>27</sup> Committee on Cooperative Compliance, "Draft Preliminary Observations," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, 18–20 June 2024, [bit.ly/PreliminaryObservationsComplianceJune2024](https://bit.ly/PreliminaryObservationsComplianceJune2024).

<sup>28</sup> Ukraine shared the case number provided for the investigation (4-2023-00000000245), which indicates that the case was launched by the military prosecutor (as indicated by 4), that the year of investigation is 2023, and that the case is under the SBU (a.k.a. security services). Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2024, [bit.ly/UkraineStatement19June2024](https://bit.ly/UkraineStatement19June2024).

<sup>29</sup> Final Report, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 23 November 2023, p. 6, [www.undocs.org/APLC/MSP.21/2023/18](https://www.undocs.org/APLC/MSP.21/2023/18).

any use of mines, booby traps and other devices prohibited by [CCW] Amended Protocol II and we stress the severe humanitarian crisis that is resulting from Russia's use of such devices."<sup>30</sup>

Landmine use in Ukraine has also been condemned by successive Mine Ban Treaty presidents and the special envoy for universalization.<sup>31</sup>

ICBL has called on all parties to the conflict in Ukraine to ensure that no antipersonnel mines are used by any actor, and to destroy any antipersonnel mines seized or otherwise acquired.<sup>32</sup>

## MYANMAR

Myanmar continues to use antipersonnel landmines, despite voting in favor of an annual UNGA resolution promoting the treaty since 2022.<sup>33</sup> The use of mines appeared to significantly increase in 2023–2024, and the Monitor has documented use of antipersonnel landmines by both the Myanmar Armed Forces and various NSAGs operating in Myanmar. (*See also Use by non-state armed groups in Myanmar section.*)

### Use by the Myanmar Armed Forces

Myanmar's Armed Forces have repeatedly used antipersonnel mines since seizing power in a coup in February 2021. This use represents a significant increase on use in previous years, including use around infrastructure such as mobile phone towers, extractive enterprises, and energy pipelines.

Photographs reviewed by the Monitor indicate that antipersonnel mines manufactured by Myanmar were captured from the Myanmar Armed Forces by NSAGs every month between January 2022 and September 2024, in virtually every part of the country, indicating extensive landmine use.<sup>34</sup> In August 2023, the Myanmar Armed Forces were reported to have increased the destructive power of antipersonnel landmines by placing a mortar projectile underneath them.<sup>35</sup>

30 Statement of the UK on behalf of Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the UK, and the US, as well as the European Union. See, statement of the UK, CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties, Geneva, 16 November 2023, [bit.ly/UKStatement16Nov2023](https://bit.ly/UKStatement16Nov2023).

31 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), "President of the Convention that bans landmines calls for immediate cease of use of this insidious weapon in Ukraine," 5 April 2022, [bit.ly/APMBCUkraine5Apr2022](https://bit.ly/APMBCUkraine5Apr2022).

32 ICBL, "Russia Uses Banned Antipersonnel Mines in Ukraine: ICBL-CMC Calls for International Condemnation and Immediate End to Use," 30 March 2022, [bit.ly/ICBLUkraine30Mar2022](https://bit.ly/ICBLUkraine30Mar2022).

33 See, UN Voting Data on annual resolution titled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," [bit.ly/UNGAResolutionVotingDataMBT](https://bit.ly/UNGAResolutionVotingDataMBT).

34 Mine Free Myanmar, "More antipersonnel landmines seized by armed groups during first 3 months of 2024," 1 June 2024, [bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar1June2024](https://bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar1June2024). For example, on 13 September 2023, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) seized a large quantity of MM1, MM2, and MM6 antipersonnel landmines after capturing a Myanmar Army outpost in Kawkareik township of Kayin State. Facebook post by Shwe Phee Myay News Agency, 15 September 2023, [bit.ly/SPMNFacebookPost15Sept2023](https://bit.ly/SPMNFacebookPost15Sept2023).

35 As the Myanmar Armed Forces withdrew from Thauung Salone village, Shan state, an MM6 mine, placed on top of the fuze and body of a mortar projectile, on a path behind the village medical clinic, was reportedly employed by departing troops. It was later found by returnees. Free Burma Rangers, "Doctors as Targets: Many Killed In Burma Army's Attacks On Medical Facilities," 21 June 2023, [bit.ly/FreeBurmaRangers21June2023](https://bit.ly/FreeBurmaRangers21June2023); and email from David Eubanks, Free Burma Rangers, 5 September 2023.

Attributing the new use of antipersonnel mines is made difficult by the complex conflict situation and the partisan nature of some media sources.<sup>36</sup> Most of the casualties reported during 2023 and 2024 appear to be from antipersonnel mines emplaced within the past two years.

The Myanmar Armed Forces have previously admitted to the Monitor that they use antipersonnel mines in areas where they are under attack.<sup>37</sup>

Examples illustrating the new use of antipersonnel mines are summarized below.<sup>38</sup>

In September 2024, villagers in Gwa township of Rakhine state said that soldiers from the Myanmar Army's 563<sup>rd</sup> Light Infantry Battalion were laying landmines from the mountain behind Taing Kyoe village in southern Gwa to Kyway Chai Kwat Thit village.<sup>39</sup> In May 2024, residents of Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine state, reported that more mines had been laid around the city by the Myanmar Army as the Arakan Army (AA) seized control of more areas.<sup>40</sup>

Mine casualties are often recorded on the outskirts of Myanmar Army camps, which is another indicator of new use. In September 2023, a girl was seriously injured by a mine laid near a Myanmar Army camp in Tedim town in Chin state, whereupon the 269<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion admitted to laying mines around its base and on a nearby ridge.<sup>41</sup> On 30 June 2024, the Myanmar Army warned the villagers not to approach areas where they had laid mines around Kyeintali town in Gwa township in Rakhine state. Villagers attributed the death of one person to these mines.<sup>42</sup>

In May 2024, residents of Kyar MOUNG village of Taungup township in Rakhine state claimed that the Myanmar Armed Forces had laid landmines along a nearby road located above an oil pipeline. A person foraging for food near a Myanmar Army base outside the village was also wounded when she stepped on a landmine.<sup>43</sup>

In March 2024, residents of two villages alleged that the 34<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion and the 542<sup>nd</sup> Light Infantry Battalion, based in Kyaukphyu township of Rakhine state, had planted landmines in fields and along roads used by civilians near Sai Chone Dwain village and Aung Zedi village resulting in several casualties.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Media and data sources tied to the military tend to publish incidents ascribed to anti-military groups. Media and data sources tied to ethnic armed groups or the National Unity Government (NUG) publish incidents ascribed to the Myanmar Armed Forces. Very few publish the same incidents.

<sup>37</sup> "In border areas, if the number of Tatmadaw [Myanmar Armed Forces] is small, they will lay mines around where they reside, but only if their numbers are small. Mines are also laid around infrastructure, such as microwave towers. If these are near villages, we warn them. If there is a Tatmadaw camp in an area controlled by an ethnic armed group where they are sniped at and harassed, they will lay mines around the camp." Monitor meeting with U Min Htike Hein, Assistant Secretary, Union Minister Office for Defense, Ministry of Defense, Naypyitaw, 5 July 2019.

<sup>38</sup> See also, ICBL-CMC, "Country Profile: Myanmar: Mine Ban Policy," 2023, [bit.ly/MyanmarCountryProfile](https://bit.ly/MyanmarCountryProfile).

<sup>39</sup> The villagers said landmines laid by the junta forces are usually located in the ridges behind the villages. The villagers have been asked to avoid foraging, cutting wood and gathering bamboo from the forests and mountains for the time being. Thinzar Nwe, "Junta forces continue to lay landmines in Gwa," *Narinjara News*, 17 September 2024, [bit.ly/NarinjaraNews17Sept2024](https://bit.ly/NarinjaraNews17Sept2024).

<sup>40</sup> "Locals in junta-held Sittwe fear landmines planted by military," *Development Media Group*, 18 May 2024, [bit.ly/DMG18May2024](https://bit.ly/DMG18May2024); and "Rohingya Man Injured in Landmine Explosion in Sittwe," *Rohingya Khobor*, 30 July 2024, [bit.ly/RohingyaKhorbor30July2024](https://bit.ly/RohingyaKhorbor30July2024).

<sup>41</sup> "A child's leg was amputated due to being stepped on by a landmine near the SAC camp in Tedim town," *Myanmar Pressphoto Agency*, 4 October 2023, [bit.ly/MyanmarPressphotoAgency4Oct2023](https://bit.ly/MyanmarPressphotoAgency4Oct2023).

<sup>42</sup> "Kyeintali resident killed in landmine blast," *Development Media Group*, 24 July 2024, [bit.ly/DMG24July2024](https://bit.ly/DMG24July2024).

<sup>43</sup> Thinzar Nwe and Aung Kywe Nyein, "Landmine threats loom in Rakhine State, 3 persons lose legs within 2 days," *Narinjara News*, 9 May 2024, [bit.ly/NarinjaraNews9May2024](https://bit.ly/NarinjaraNews9May2024).

<sup>44</sup> "Two landmine explosions in Kyaukphyu: one man loses leg, another injured," *Narinjara News*, 13 March 2024, [bit.ly/NarinjaraNews13March2024](https://bit.ly/NarinjaraNews13March2024).



In February 2024, two children were seriously injured by a landmine near the base of Mee Thet Kone hill in Mindat city in southern Chin state. Locals allege the mine was laid by the military. The hill is where Myanmar Army 274<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion is based.<sup>45</sup>

In January 2024, two soldiers were killed and another injured as they reportedly stepped on their own mines at the 538<sup>th</sup> Light Infantry Battalion camp in Rathedaung township of Rakhine state.<sup>46</sup> On the previous day, a resident of Rathedaung township's Ball Lone Kwin village was seriously injured by a mine on the banks of the Mayu River, across from the camp of the 537<sup>th</sup> Light Infantry Battalion of the Myanmar Armed Forces.<sup>47</sup>

On 7 December 2023, a displaced person returning to Kyainseikgyi township, Kayin state stepped on a landmine planted on the road near villagers' houses. Villagers said they saw soldiers from the Myanmar Armed Forces 558<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion placing bamboo to block the road leading to their camp, and believe that this battalion laid the mine as it is the only unit patrolling the area.<sup>48</sup>

The Myanmar Armed Forces have reportedly threatened that farmers must pay for antipersonnel mines detonated by their livestock. On 1 January 2024, near Let We Det village, close to Buthidaung town, Myanmar Army soldiers reportedly demanded 1.5 million kyats (US\$707) from an owner of a cow maimed by an antipersonnel mine. The owner could not pay so the soldiers butchered the cow.<sup>49</sup> On 16 May 2023, livestock owned by farmers in Pyint Taw village in Rathedaung township, Rakhine state, were killed by landmines planted by the Myanmar Army near their camp in Ma Nyin Taung village. Subsequently, Myanmar Army officials from the camp summoned villagers and warned that they would have to pay compensation if cattle stepped on mines and caused them to explode.<sup>50</sup>

### *Atrocity/forced labor mine clearance*

The Monitor has found evidence that the Myanmar Armed Forces continues the practice of using civilians as 'guides' to walk in front of its units in mine-affected areas, effectively to detonate landmines. This is a grave violation of international humanitarian and human rights law.<sup>51</sup>

In July 2024, the Myanmar Army allegedly forced local villagers to walk in front of them as they cleared command-detonated mines placed by the local People's Defence Force (PDF) on the Monywa–Mandalay road. The same report states that in June, the Myanmar Armed

45 "Two children injured by landmine blast in Myanmar," *Radio Free Asia*, 5 February 2024, [bit.ly/RadioFreeAsia5Feb2024](https://bit.ly/RadioFreeAsia5Feb2024).

46 "2 junta soldiers killed by their own landmine in Rathedaung," *Narinjara News*, 5 January 2024, [bit.ly/NarinjaraNews5Jan2024](https://bit.ly/NarinjaraNews5Jan2024).

47 "Two individuals lose legs in Rathidaung landmine incidents within a week," *Narinjara News*, 4 January 2024, [bit.ly/NarinjaraNews4Jan2024](https://bit.ly/NarinjaraNews4Jan2024).

48 Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), "KHRG Submission to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), August 2023–August 2024," 22 September 2024.

49 In the incident, two Rohingya farmers had stepped on an antipersonnel mine, one receiving serious injuries, but the other farmer and the cow mildly injured. Online database of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). See, ACLED website, [www.acleddata.com](http://www.acleddata.com). Exchange rate for 1 January 2024: MMK1,000=US\$0.4715. Oanda, [bit.ly/OandaCurrencyConverter](https://bit.ly/OandaCurrencyConverter).

50 "Army warns that owners must pay if planted landmines are exploded by cattle," *Narinjara News*, 7 June 2023, [bit.ly/NarinjaraNews7June2023](https://bit.ly/NarinjaraNews7June2023).

51 For more than two decades, the Monitor has reported disturbing evidence that the Myanmar military has forced civilians to clear antipersonnel mines without training or protective equipment, or forced them to guide or carry equipment for the military in mined areas. Such activities constitute a threat to the right to life, liberty, and security of person. See, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15(c) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1: Myanmar," Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Tenth Session, 18 October 2010, [bit.ly/UPRMyanmar18Oct2010](https://bit.ly/UPRMyanmar18Oct2010).

Forces also made villagers walk ahead of them while removing mines between Myay Hne village in Monywa township and Khin Mon village in Chang-U township, Sagaing region.<sup>52</sup>

On 6 June 2024, a group of locals from in Ahr Lar Kat Pa village, Myinmu township in Sagaing region, were seized by the Myanmar Armed Forces, who forced them to clear landmines planted by local PDF troops near the Shwe Gu Gyi monastery. One villager died and two were severely injured by mines in the process.<sup>53</sup>

On 2 June 2024, a Rohingya youth, who was forcibly conscripted by the military, escaped from the Thone Maing Border Guard Police in Maungdaw town, Rakhine state, and then was severely injured by a mine.<sup>54</sup>

In December 2023, residents of Chang-U town, along with internally displaced persons (IDPs) taking refuge in the local monastery, were forcibly taken by the Myanmar Army to clear mines laid on a road by a PDF group.<sup>55</sup> Also in December, two young men were seized by Myanmar Armed Forces from their farm near Pay Taw village in Seikphyu township, Magway region and seriously injured after they stepped on mines.<sup>56</sup>

In September 2023, the Myanmar Armed Forces seized eight people as human shields in Dabak village, in Waingmaw township of Kachin state, one of whom subsequently was injured after stepping on a landmine.<sup>57</sup>

In May 2023, the Myanmar Armed Forces allegedly seized about 30 people working in fields near Maung Taung village, Hpakamt township, Kachin state to serve as human shields. Two of them and a soldier were wounded after an improvised mine exploded on the road.<sup>58</sup>

In January 2023, an IDP residing in the Kye Nan camp in Momauk township of Kachin state was injured after being forced to guide for the Myanmar Armed Forces on the Bhamo and Loije road.<sup>59</sup>

### *Use on the Bangladesh border*

In early 2024, there was an increase in people injured by landmines in Myanmar along the border with Bangladesh. Villagers attribute this to new mines laid by Myanmar Army border patrols. As conflict shifted to southern Buthidaung in Rakhine state, the Myanmar Army began laying new mines near the town.<sup>60</sup>

In May 2024, the Arakan Army (AA) took control of the Myanmar border with Bangladesh and created routes through border minefields, and were requiring people pay in order to be guided across.<sup>61</sup> In mid-2024, cattle smugglers continued to be victimized by landmines at

52 "Myanmar junta troops use human shields to clear landmines on Monywa–Mandalay Road," *Mizzima*, 7 July 2024, [bit.ly/Mizzima7July2024](https://bit.ly/Mizzima7July2024).

53 Online database of ACLED.

54 Ibid.

55 "Junta troops arrested civilians in Chaung U and forced them to clear landmines," *Myanmar Pressphoto Agency*, 20 December 2023, [bit.ly/MyanmarPressphotoAgency20Dec2023](https://bit.ly/MyanmarPressphotoAgency20Dec2023).

56 Online database of ACLED.

57 Information provided to the Monitor by a source requesting anonymity.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 On 1 January 2024, two Rohingya farmers stepped on an antipersonnel mine in Let We Det village tract on the west side of Buthidaung town in Buthidaung township. One of them lost his right leg and the other received a minor injury. See, online database of ACLED. On 10 January 2024, a resident of Hpon Nyo Leik village of south Buthidaung stepped on a mine at the foot of the Kyauk Yant hill. It was allegedly laid by the 22<sup>nd</sup> Brigade of the Myanmar Army, which has a camp on the top of the hill. See, online database of ACLED.

61 As of May 2024, the AA guide anyone wishing to traverse the border if they pay tax to the AA soldiers controlling the border post. A Rohingya woman, who traveled from north Buthidaung for medical treatment, told the Monitor, "My brother and I paid 20,000MMK (10,000MMK each) [US\$9.42 (\$4.71)] to the AA office near the border. They gave us a pass for one month. The AA soldiers also took us to the border point. They showed us safe passage. We reached Lambochari of Naikongchari [in Bangladesh] easily." Exchange rate for 31 May 2024: MMK1,000=US\$0.4708. Oanda, [bit.ly/OandaCurrencyConverter](https://bit.ly/OandaCurrencyConverter).

this border.<sup>62</sup> In August 2024, Rohingya villagers who were collecting forest products were injured by mines laid near an AA camp.<sup>63</sup>

In July 2024, one person was killed and two others injured, all residents of Bangladesh, while foraging for crabs in the Naf River after having crossed the borderline dividing Bangladesh and Myanmar that cuts through the river. It is not clear who laid the mines.<sup>64</sup>

## IRAN

There were several reports and allegations of new use of antipersonnel mines by the Iranian government's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the second half of 2023 and first half of 2024. The following reports by media outlets and others alleged new mine victims and/or new use of antipersonnel mines by the IRGC in Sistan and Balochistan province, which borders Afghanistan and Pakistan:

- In September 2023, five Afghan refugees were killed or wounded by mines allegedly laid by the IRGC near the border with Pakistan.<sup>65</sup>
- In January 2024, a Baloch human rights organization reported that the IRGC had emplaced mines on the Iranian border with Afghanistan, allegedly to control cross-border transfers of fuel and consumer goods.<sup>66</sup>
- On 29 January 2024, three Afghan migrant workers were killed and two others injured by a landmine allegedly planted by the IRGC near Saravan city, located near the border with Pakistan.<sup>67</sup>
- On 9 February 2024, a mine explosion killed a member of the IRGC and injured three other IRGC personnel, reportedly as they were laying mines near Saravan city. On that same day, a local resident was killed by a landmine reportedly laid by Iranian forces near Zabol city, located near the Afghanistan border.<sup>68</sup>
- On 12 February 2024, two Afghan migrants were killed and two others were seriously injured near Saravan city by a landmine allegedly planted by the IRGC.<sup>69</sup>
- On 21 June 2024, a local woman who was herding livestock was killed by an antipersonnel mine allegedly laid by the IRGC in the Kalagan region of Saravan, located near the border with Pakistan.<sup>70</sup>

In July 2024, HRW reported that some border couriers believe that Iranian security forces have laid mines in recent years along their routes.<sup>71</sup> According to the report, a 33-year-old man from Piranshahr, who lost his leg due to a landmine in November 2020, told HRW:

<sup>62</sup> On 4 May 2024, one cattle smuggler was seriously injured and two others lightly injured by a mine while crossing the border. They left the cattle behind. On the following day they sent two other persons to bring the cattle, who also stepped on a mine. All five were treated in Cox's Bazar hospital. Information provided by informants to the Monitor.

<sup>63</sup> Residents of Kyar Nyo Pyin in Buthidaung township believe landmines laid by the AA were responsible for injury and deaths in their village. They informed the Monitor that on 22 August 2024, seven Rohingya went to a hill to collect bamboo shoots and other vegetables. The hill had been occupied by the AA for the past 4–5 years. When they did not return by noon, their family went to find them. On the hill, two were found, one boy and one man. Both were badly injured by an antipersonnel mine and they had lost their eyes. As they were blind, they couldn't return. No one knows what became of the other five.

<sup>64</sup> "Rohingya man killed, 2 Injured in landmine explosion during crab harvest in Naf River," *The Business Standard*, 8 July 2024, [bit.ly/TheBusinessStandard8July2024](https://bit.ly/TheBusinessStandard8July2024).

<sup>65</sup> Online database of ACLED.

<sup>66</sup> HENGAW Organization for Human Rights, "Mine Explosion in Saravan: Three Individuals Dead and Two More Injured," 31 January 2024, [bit.ly/Hengaw31Jan2024](https://bit.ly/Hengaw31Jan2024).

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Online database of ACLED.

<sup>69</sup> HENGAW Organization for Human Rights, "Explosions of IRGC-Planted Mines Result in Casualties: 4 Afghan Citizens and 4 IRGC Members Killed or Injured," 12 February 2024, [bit.ly/Hengaw12Feb2024](https://bit.ly/Hengaw12Feb2024).

<sup>70</sup> HENGAW Organization for Human Rights, "Baloch Woman Dies from IRGC-Planted Landmine," 24 June 2024, [bit.ly/Hengaw24June2024](https://bit.ly/Hengaw24June2024).

<sup>71</sup> HRW, "Iran: Security Forces Killing Kurdish Border Couriers," 8 July 2024, [bit.ly/HRWIran8July2024](https://bit.ly/HRWIran8July2024).

I had been through the route that I took many times before as a *Kulbar* [border courier] and I knew it well. Even just three nights before, I was there, and there were no mines. There had never been any mines there previously. But on the day, we went, there were mines there. This indicates that just one or two nights before, they had planted mines there, knowing that it was the route used by *Kulbars*. We've traveled these routes so many times, we know where the old mines are and we go through places we're sure of, but they plant new mines.

## NORTH KOREA

During 2023, and through July 2024, North Korea used antipersonnel mines in its own territory and at locations along its borders with South Korea and China, according to media reports and South Korean authorities.

In January 2024, it was reported that North Korean soldiers were observed emplacing landmines around guard posts adjacent to the cross-border rail line since early December 2023.<sup>72</sup> A South Korean military official reported in May 2024 that, since April, North Korean soldiers were observed laying landmines on the three roads through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), along the anticipated invasion route, as well as in adjacent mountains and fields along the northern edge of the Military Demarcation Line.<sup>73</sup> In June 2024, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff stated during a media briefing that several explosions occurred during mine laying operations by North Korea in the DMZ, resulting in multiple casualties, but the mine laying continued despite such incidents.<sup>74</sup>

Antipersonnel mines were also reportedly laid by North Korean forces in 2023 on the country's northern border with China. At least three people were reported killed and another five either killed or injured in September and October 2023, when they detonated landmines along the banks of the Tumen River near the city of Musan in North Hamgyong province while attempting to cross from North Korea into China.<sup>75</sup> The mines were reportedly laid on the North Korean side of the shared border along the Tuman River and Yalu River.<sup>76</sup>

In August 2024, authorities in Changbai in China's Jilin Province, which borders North Korea's Ryanggang Province, warned residents to "not go near the river and report immediately if you see any suspicious objects." A Chinese border patrol official told media about the potential danger posed by landmines shifting from their original locations.<sup>77</sup>

## USE BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

During the reporting period, the Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in at least 12 states: Colombia, Palestine (Gaza), India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and by groups in or bordering the Sahel region, including in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the DRC, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria.

<sup>72</sup> "North Korea redeploys landmine near Gyeongui Line," *The Dong-a Ilbo*, 5 January 2024, [bit.ly/Dong-a5Jan2024](https://bit.ly/Dong-a5Jan2024).

<sup>73</sup> ICBL, "International Campaign to Ban Landmines concerned at reported landmine use by North Korea," 20 May 2024, [bit.ly/ICBLNorthKorea20May2024](https://bit.ly/ICBLNorthKorea20May2024).

<sup>74</sup> Kim Arin, "Landmines kill, hurt North Korean soldiers deployed for 'barren border' project," *The Korea Herald*, 18 June 2024, [bit.ly/KoreaHerald18June2024](https://bit.ly/KoreaHerald18June2024).

<sup>75</sup> Choi Han-bin, "N. Koreans maimed or killed by landmines during defection attempts," *Daily NK*, 7 November 2023, [bit.ly/DailyNK7Nov2023](https://bit.ly/DailyNK7Nov2023).

<sup>76</sup> "<Inside N. Korea> Speaking to a Border Guard, Landmine Burial at the Korea-China Border? 'Even soldiers are afraid because they don't know where they're buried,'" *Asia Press*, 13 November 2023, [bit.ly/AsiaPress13Nov2023](https://bit.ly/AsiaPress13Nov2023).

<sup>77</sup> "Chinese authorities warn of possible North Korean landmine displacement due to floods, notify residents 'Do not go to the riverbank,'" *Asia Press*, 8 August 2024, [bit.ly/AsiaPress8Aug2024](https://bit.ly/AsiaPress8Aug2024).

Since 1997, at least 70 NSAGs have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines.<sup>78</sup> The exact number is difficult to determine as NSAGs frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures. However, there were no new declarations to not use antipersonnel mines by NSAGs from January 2023 through October 2024.

## COLOMBIA

Dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP or FARC), National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), Popular Liberation Army (El Ejército Popular de Liberación, EPL), and other NSAGs in Colombia continue to use antipersonnel landmines.

According to the official government database, in 2023, a total of 895 incidents of mine use were recorded in Colombia, a doubling of mine use incidents compared to 2022. The vast majority of mine use incidents, 645, were attributed to FARC dissidents, 108 incidents to the ELN, 28 to unidentified organized armed groups (Grupos Armados Organizados, GAOs), five to criminal groups, three to drug traffickers, and one incident to organized armed group Clan del Golfo.<sup>79</sup> There was insufficient evidence to attribute the remaining 105 incidents.

During the first seven months of 2024, a total of 537 mine incidents were recorded: 393 were attributed to FARC dissidents, 55 to the ELN, 26 to unidentified GAOs, five to criminal groups, two to Clan del Golfo, and one to an unidentified group. There was insufficient information to attribute responsibility to a specific group for 55 incidents.<sup>80</sup>

The Colombian Army reported that FARC dissidents were responsible for more than 91% of the antipersonnel mines used in Colombia during 2024, while the remainder were laid by ELN, Clan del Golfo, and GAOs.<sup>81</sup>



A seminar organized in Geneva, Switzerland, in June 2024, discussed alternatives to using live antipersonnel mines retained for permitted purposes.

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<sup>78</sup> Of these, 48 NSAGs have committed not to use mines through signing the Geneva Call *Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a total Ban on Anti-personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action*: 20 by self-declaration; four by the Rebel Declaration (two have signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment); and two through a peace accord (in Colombia and Nepal).

<sup>79</sup> Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, sourced from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights database of events by MAP/MUSE, [bit.ly/ColombiaDatabaseAPM](https://bit.ly/ColombiaDatabaseAPM), accessed 25 September 2024.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> FARC dissidents are reported to be responsible for 91% of the antipersonnel mines installed in Colombia during 2024, highlighting the ongoing threat posed by these groups to civilian safety and security. Lina Muñoz Medina, "Dissidents of the FARC would be responsible for 91% of antipersonnel mines installed during 2024 in Colombia," *Infobae*, 13 August 2024, [bit.ly/Infobae13Aug2024](https://bit.ly/Infobae13Aug2024).



## PALESTINE

Since 7 October 2023, Al-Qassam Brigades and its affiliated media outlets have stated numerous times that their fighters have used landmines in Gaza, including antipersonnel mines.<sup>82</sup> For most incidents, limited or no information is available to indicate if the mine is victim-activated. In April 2024, Al Jazeera reported that Al-Qassam Brigades have manufactured and used an antipersonnel mine called Al-Qaffaza which translates to “the glove.”<sup>83</sup> Upon activation, an expelling charge propels the mine roughly one meter into the air before it detonates, with a reported casualty-producing radius of 100 meters.<sup>84</sup> The mine can be victim-activated or command-detonated.

## INDIA

New use of improvised antipersonnel landmines, attributed to NSAGs affiliated with the Maoist insurgency in India, has been reported sporadically since 2017.

There were several reports and allegations in 2023 and early 2024 that the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) and its People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) continued to use pressure plate antipersonnel mines. In July 2024, a 10-year-old boy died after stepping on a landmine allegedly laid by Maoist rebels in Bijapur district of Chhattisgarh state.<sup>85</sup>

The CPI-M admitted responsibility for a landmine which killed a villager and injured two others on 3 June 2024 while they were collecting firewood in a forest in Jayashankar Bhupalpally district of Telangana state.<sup>86</sup> On 14 November 2023, a man collecting firewood in the forest was injured by a landmine allegedly laid by Maoist rebels in West Singhbhum district of Jharkhand state.<sup>87</sup> In May 2023, a man was killed by a mine attributed to Maoist rebels while foraging in Luiya forest in Chaibasa district, Jharkhand state. Several other villagers in Chaibasa district had also been reported killed by landmines in similar incidents

<sup>82</sup> Gaza Now in English, “Breaking | Al-Qassam Brigades: After returning from the front lines west of Jabalia Camp, our fighters prepared a well-planned ambush for an Israeli infantry unit on the past Tuesday. They successfully detonated two anti-personnel mines (‘Raadiya - Television’) on them, then engaged and targeted them from point zero, causing dozens of soldiers to fall, both dead and wounded.” 12 December 2023, 19:40 UTC. Telegram, [bit.ly/Telegram12Dec2023](https://t.me/Telegram12Dec2023); Gaza Now in English, “Al-Qassam Brigades managed to detonate an anti-personnel ‘television’ mine in an Israeli foot force east of Khan Yunis, causing casualties among its members.” 18 December 2023, 14:52 UTC. Telegram, [bit.ly/Telegram18Dec2023](https://t.me/Telegram18Dec2023); Resistant News Network, “Martyr Izz El-Din Al-Qassam Brigades: –In a joint action, the fighters of Al-Qassam Brigades and Saraya Al-Quds succeeded in detonating an explosive landmine on a Zionist Merkava tank in the Al-Maghraqa area in central Gaza Strip.” 21 December 2023, 12:40 UTC. Telegram, [bit.ly/Telegram21Dec2023](https://t.me/Telegram21Dec2023); “Al-Qassam detonates a minefield and targets a Merkava tank in Khan Yunis,” *Islam Times*, 5 January 2024, [bit.ly/IslamTimes5Jan2024](https://www.islamtimes.com/2024/01/05/al-qassam-detonates-a-minefield-and-targets-a-merkava-tank-in-khan-yunis/); Ronnie Rosenman, “First Israeli grandfather to fall in active duty in Gaza becomes a symbol of hope,” *The Jerusalem Post*, 8 July 2024, [bit.ly/JerusalemPost8July2024](https://www.jpost.com/Israel-news/Article-761111); Gaza Now in English, “After their return from the battle lines in the center of the Jabalia camp, the Al-Qassam Mujahideen confirmed that they had caught a Zionist force in a precise ambush inside one of the houses with a ‘television’ device and a ‘T6’ mine left by the enemy. Immediately after the force entered the house and searched one of the rooms, the device that the Mujahideen had exploded it on them. This left the entire force dead and wounded, and one of the soldiers was converted to pieces as a result of the explosion.” 3 June 2024, 17:26 UTC. Telegram, [bit.ly/Telegram3June2024](https://t.me/Telegram3June2024); “Al Qassam ‘Entraps And Kills’ Israeli Soldiers Using T6 Mine; Dramatic Operation On Cam,” *Times of India*, 3 June 2024, [bit.ly/TimesOfIndia3June2024](https://timesofindia.com/2024/06/03/al-qassam-entraps-and-kills-israeli-soldiers-using-t6-mine-dramatic-operation-on-cam/); and “ Hamas fighters use Israeli mines to explode tank in Gaza,” *Middle East Monitor*, 27 June 2024, [bit.ly/MiddleEastMonitor27June2024](https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/2024/06/27/hamas-fighters-use-israeli-mines-to-explode-tank-in-gaza/).

<sup>83</sup> “Exclusive Report of Qassam Brigades [Hamas] members Booby-Trapping A Tunnel in Gaza,” *Al Jazeera*, 29 April 2024, [bit.ly/AUzazeera29Apr2024](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/29/exclusive-report-qassam-brigades-hamas-members-booby-trapping-tunnel-gaza/).

<sup>84</sup> Email from Steve Cox, Fenix Insight, 3 July 2024; and Fenix Insight, “Al-Qaffaza,” undated, [bit.ly/FenixInsightAl-Qaffaza](https://fenixinsight.com/al-qaffaza/).

<sup>85</sup> “10-Year-Old Boy Killed In Naxal Land Mine Explosion,” *Ommcom News*, 28 July 2024, [bit.ly/OmmcomNews28July2024](https://www.ommcomnews.com/2024/07/28/10-year-old-boy-killed-in-naxal-land-mine-explosion/).

<sup>86</sup> “Maoists regret death of villager in landmine explosion,” *Telangana Today*, 6 June 2024, [bit.ly/TelanganaToday6June2024](https://www.telanganatoday.com/2024/06/06/maoists-regret-death-of-villager-in-landmine-explosion/).

<sup>87</sup> “35-year-old man injured in IED blast in Jharkhand’s West Singhbhum,” *PSU Watch*, 15 November 2023, [bit.ly/PSUWatch15Nov2023](https://www.psuwatch.com/2023/11/15/35-year-old-man-injured-in-ied-blast-in-jharkhand-s-west-singhbhum/).

in the first months of 2023.<sup>88</sup> In January 2023, the Maoist insurgents sent leaflets to villages in Kolhan division, Jharkhand state, warning that they had laid explosives in the area.<sup>89</sup>

There have been no reports or allegations of landmine use by insurgents in India's northeastern states, or in Jammu and Kashmir, in recent years, however landmines attributed to Burmese insurgents laid on the India–Myanmar border have claimed victims in some villages in Manipur state.<sup>90</sup> Previously, some NSAGs operating in India committed to ban antipersonnel mine use, but none have done so in the past decade.<sup>91</sup>

## MYANMAR

Ethnic armed groups have engaged in conflict with the central authorities in Myanmar for decades and Landmine Monitor has documented mine use by such groups for more than 25 years. Several militias sanctioned by the Myanmar Armed Forces, including Pyusawhti, the People's Militia Forces (PMF), and the Border Guard Forces (BGF), act under the military's direction and sometimes independently.

Since the military coup in February 2021, more local anti-military resistance groups have been established, some of which identify as People's Defence Forces (PDF). PDF groups often declare allegiance to the National Unity Government (NUG).<sup>92</sup> Local media often report the use of "landmines" by such groups. Many of these devices are command-detonated roadside bombs, but some are victim-activated landmines.

Given the number of NSAGs operating in Myanmar, it is often difficult to assign responsibility for use to a specific NSAG. Yet many have used mines since the Monitor started reporting in 1999.<sup>93</sup> The Monitor has reviewed the following incidents attributed to NSAGs in the second half of 2023 and through August 2024.

On 29 August 2024, one villager was injured and another died from landmines that locals said were laid by the PDF in Yay Pya village tract, Kyaukkyi township, Bago region.<sup>94</sup>

On 8 July 2024, a man was seriously injured after stepping on a landmine allegedly planted by the Arakan Army (AA) in Valangte village, Matupi township in Chin state.<sup>95</sup>

On 14 June 2024, a man was seriously injured by a mine that other locals claim was planted by the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) near Loi Kan village in Lawksawk township of Shan state.<sup>96</sup>

88 "Jharkhand: 1 Killed In Landmine Blast By Maoists," *Ommcom News*, 25 May 2023, [bit.ly/OmmcomNews25May2023](https://bit.ly/OmmcomNews25May2023).

89 "Maoists 'impose' 12 hr curfew in Jharkhand's Kolhan," *WebIndia123*, 18 January 2023, [bit.ly/WebIndia18January2023](https://bit.ly/WebIndia18January2023).

90 "Landmines kill, maim many on Indo-Myanmar border," *The Sangai Express*, 2 August 2024, [bit.ly/SangaiExpress2Aug2024](https://bit.ly/SangaiExpress2Aug2024).

91 In March 2009, the Zomi Re-unification Organisation renounced mine use by signing Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment; as did the Kuki National Organization in Manipur in August 2006, and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak/Muivah in Nagaland in October 2003. In October 2007, the United Jihad Council, a coalition of 18 organizations in Kashmir, issued a Declaration of a Total Ban on Antipersonnel Mines in Kashmir.

92 As of May 2023, the NUG claimed that there were over 300 PDF groups organized in 250 townships across Myanmar. The exact figure is difficult to verify. See, "The PDF has established 300 battalions and columns in 2 years," *People's Spring*, 5 May 2023, [bit.ly/PeoplesSpring5May2023](https://bit.ly/PeoplesSpring5May2023).

93 On 15 October 2015, eight ethnic armed groups signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the government, committing to "end planting of mines" and "cooperate on the process of clearing all landmines." Since the February 2021 military coup, this commitment no longer appears to be operational.

94 KHRG, "KHRG Submission to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), August 2023–August 2024," 22 September 2024.

95 Online database of ACLED.

96 Ibid.

In May 2024, there were several landmine casualties in Tamu township of Sagaing region on Myanmar's border with India between border pillars 91–94 that locals said were due to mines laid by various armed groups.<sup>97</sup>

On 8 March 2024, one farmer was killed and another injured by a landmine planted by the Chin National Army (CNF/CNA) near Lalengpi town in Matupi township, Chin state.<sup>98</sup>

On 24 and 25 October 2023, two locals were injured by landmines in Thayetchaung township in Tanintharyi region in an area that was the scene of fighting between the Kaw Thoo Lei Army (KTLA) and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA).<sup>99</sup> Earlier, on 15 October 2023, a man was shot at by the KTLA and then seriously injured by a landmine in Hseh Phyu Taing village tract of Thayetchaung township in Tanintharyi region.<sup>100</sup>

On 4 August 2023, a villager from Th'Myit Aye Kone village tract, Kyaukkyi township, Bago region stepped on a landmine laid by the KNLA, which had issued a warning not to enter the area.<sup>101</sup>

On 20 June 2023, a female farm worker was injured by a landmine planted by a local PDF near Nat Pay village in Kanbalu township in Sagaing region, and the two people who came to help her were injured by another mine explosion.<sup>102</sup>

On 7 July 2023, a man was killed by a landmine allegedly planted by a PDF group near Mya Taung village in Tigyaing township, Sagaing region.<sup>103</sup> Also on 7 July 2023, two men collecting bamboo were injured by an improvised mine allegedly planted by PDF near Se Gyi village in Kanbalu township, Sagaing region.<sup>104</sup>

On 23 July 2023, a man was killed after stepping on a landmine that locals claimed was planted by the RCSS west of Nam Par Tet village in Mawkmai township, Shan state.<sup>105</sup>

A significant number of incidents involving explosive devices planted on berms of roadways and then triggered by motor scooters were attributed to resistance groups. The devices were likely antipersonnel mines, as these incidents almost always involved injury rather than death.<sup>106</sup>

The Monitor continued to record incidents in 2023 and early 2024 involving the use of victim-activated booby-traps or explosive devices in urban areas. Most mine victims were engaged in trash collection or searching rubbish for something to sell.<sup>107</sup>

## PAKISTAN

In 2023 and early 2024, as in previous years, military personnel and civilians were killed or injured in incidents resulting from new landmine use, but media articles consistently fail to identify which groups laid these mines. In the first half of 2024, local media reported incidents in which civilians became landmine victims while going about ordinary tasks in areas they regularly visit in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, South Waziristan, and Baluchistan

<sup>97</sup> "Landmines kill, maim many on Indo-Myanmar border," *The Sangai Express*, 2 August 2024, bit.ly/SangaiExpress2Aug2024.

<sup>98</sup> Online database of ACLED.

<sup>99</sup> KHRG, "KHRG Submission to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), August 2023–August 2024," 22 September 2024.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Online database of ACLED.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> The Monitor recorded 68 incidents in Bago, Magway, Mandalay, and Sagaing regions, as well as in Chin, Mon, Kachin, and Shan states.

<sup>107</sup> The Monitor recorded at least 30 injuries or deaths among trash collectors or scavengers in towns in the Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi, and Yangon regions, and Rakhine state between January 2023 and March 2024.

provinces.<sup>108</sup> Media monitoring by the Sustainable Peace and Development Organization (SPADO) found a fourfold increase in 2023 of incidents attributed to antipersonnel mines when compared to 2022.<sup>109</sup> NSAGs in Pakistan have also used antivehicle landmines. Civilian and military casualties resulting from use of IEDs and landmines by NSAGs in Pakistan continued to be documented into 2024.<sup>110</sup>

## IMPROVISED ANTIPERSONNEL MINE USE IN THE SAHEL REGION

NSAGs have used victim-activated improvised explosive devices in 2023 and 2024 in States Parties located in and around Africa's Sahel region, but it is challenging to document such use and confirm if the devices were victim-activated. Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) reportedly used improvised mines in Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.<sup>111</sup>

Islamic State West African Province/Boko Haram (ISWAP/BH) used the devices in Nigeria.<sup>112</sup> Other possible use was recorded in Cameroon, Central African Republic, and the DRC.<sup>113</sup>

## PRODUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

More than 50 states produced antipersonnel landmines at some point in the past.<sup>114</sup> As many as 40 states have ceased production, including four states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty:

- <sup>108</sup> These media reports do not state when the explosive device was placed there. While use of landmines has been longstanding in these areas, new use was suspected as the victims were undertaking activities in areas they were known to frequent. See, for example, "Girl killed in Khyber landmine blast," *Dawn*, 12 July 2024, [bit.ly/Dawn12July2024](https://bit.ly/Dawn12July2024). Also, in April 2024, three children were killed by a landmine while walking on a path to a volleyball tournament. "Three children killed in Waziristan landmine explosion," *Dawn*, 13 April 2024, [bit.ly/Dawn13Apr2024](https://bit.ly/Dawn13Apr2024).
- <sup>109</sup> Email from Raza Shah Khan, Chief Executive, SPADO, 9 September 2024. Twenty-two incidents were attributed to antipersonnel landmines in 2023, compared to five in 2022.
- <sup>110</sup> For example, in July 2024, a woman and two children stepped on a landmine near their home in Gabeen village in Kech district of Balochistan. Saadullah Akhter, "Woman, two children killed in land mine blast in Pakistan's remote southwest," *Arab News Pakistan*, 1 July 2024, [bit.ly/ArabNewsPakistan1July2024](https://bit.ly/ArabNewsPakistan1July2024). A 12-year-old boy died after stepping on a mine while herding goats in Tehsil Dattakhel, and two girls died after stepping on a mine while shepherding in Shawalikot Tehsil, both in South Waziristan. "[Twelve]-year-old boy killed in landmine blast," *News Cloud*, 9 June 2023, [bit.ly/NewsCloud9June2023](https://bit.ly/NewsCloud9June2023). In August 2023, a 10-year-old boy died after stepping on a landmine while herding in Ghulam Khan, in North Waziristan. "In Ghulam Khan, North Waziristan, a 10-year-old child was injured by a landmine," *News Cloud*, 27 August 2023, [bit.ly/NewsCloud27Aug2023](https://bit.ly/NewsCloud27Aug2023).
- <sup>111</sup> In Benin, two men were killed in Koabago in Atakora Department of northwestern Benin on 4 May 2023 by a homemade explosive reportedly placed by presumed JNIM militants under the body of a woman, who died in an attack a day earlier. In Burkina Faso, a civilian who was herding cattle in the northwest village of Tonkoroni was killed on 18 May 2024 by an IED likely planted by JNIM militants. In Mali, a man was killed when his bicycle struck an IED likely planted by JNIM militants in the village of Pegue in the commune of Dogofry on 14 February 2024. In Niger, a cyclist was killed by the explosion of an IED likely planted by JNIM militants near Tchelol Befi on 5 January 2024. See, online database of ACLED. Also in Burkina Faso, on 1 May 2024, a motor tricycle traveling from Arbinda, a town under siege by the JNIM forces, struck a victim-activated improvised explosive device, killing a 26-year-old woman and injuring four other women nearby. HRW, "Burkina Faso: Islamist Armed Groups Terrorize Civilians," 18 September 2024, [bit.ly/HRWBurkinaFaso18Sept2024](https://bit.ly/HRWBurkinaFaso18Sept2024).
- <sup>112</sup> A Fulani livestock herder died on 6 January 2024 after stepping on an improvised explosive device that Islamic State West African Province/Boko Haram forces reportedly laid around Musari village near Monguno in Nigeria's northeastern state of Borno. See, online database of ACLED.
- <sup>113</sup> In Cameroon, two civilians who had been forced to find improvised explosive devices with their bare hands were killed by an IED planted by an unidentified armed group in Melim on 19 June 2024. In Central African Republic, two children herding cattle were wounded by an improvised explosive device planted by an unidentified armed group near Beninga on 6 March 2023. In the DRC, two boys were killed on 10 July 2024 after they stepped on an improvised explosive device laid by an unidentified armed group in the village of Bitongi. See, online database of ACLED.
- <sup>114</sup> There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included within that list are five States Parties that some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear whether Syria produced antipersonnel mines.

Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and the US.<sup>115</sup> The Monitor removed the US from the list of producers after its June 2022 prohibition of the production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines.<sup>116</sup>

A total of 12 countries—all states not party—produce antipersonnel mines: Armenia, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.

Of these states, India, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, and South Korea appear to be actively producing antipersonnel mines. The rest are not known to be actively producing but have yet to commit to never do so in the future.<sup>117</sup>

Claims made in August and September 2022 that antipersonnel mines were being produced by Armenia were initially difficult to confirm via non-Azerbaijani sources.<sup>118</sup> Armenia denied these claims and stated in a letter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), dated 13 September 2022, that Azerbaijan was “disseminating false information...in preparation for launching armed aggression.”<sup>119</sup> However, since these allegations emerged, reputable technical sources listed the PMN-E antipersonnel mine and attributed its production to Armenia.<sup>120</sup> While many questions remain about the origin and specific production details of the PMN-E mine, the Monitor considers that “production” could also include modifying the original manufacturer’s product for improved performance in combat and then re-loading, re-assembling, and re-packaging the items into a condition suitable for storage or use.

Russia continues to research, develop, and produce both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.<sup>121</sup> Some of the new landmine types were first seen publicly during annual military exercises in 2021, including POM-3 rocket-delivered antipersonnel mines, which had been

<sup>115</sup> Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, Uganda, the UK, and Zimbabwe.

<sup>116</sup> The US was previously removed from the list of producers in 2014, only to be added back on to the list in 2020 following a decision by the administration of President Donald Trump to roll back the ban on US mine production.

<sup>117</sup> For example, Singapore’s only known producer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, a government-linked corporation, said in November 2015 that it “is now no longer in the business of designing, producing and selling of anti-personnel mines.” See, PAX, “Singapore Technologies Engineering stops production of cluster munitions,” 19 November 2015, [bit.ly/PAXSingapore19Nov2015](https://bit.ly/PAXSingapore19Nov2015).

<sup>118</sup> In September 2022, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense released a statement, along with a video, claiming to have found 100 Armenian-made PMN-E antipersonnel mines, eight PMN-2 antipersonnel mines, and 10 antivehicle landmines. See, Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, “Mines buried by provocateurs of the Armenian armed forces were detected,” 17 September 2022, [bit.ly/AzerbaijanMoD17Sept2022](https://bit.ly/AzerbaijanMoD17Sept2022); and Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, “Liberated territories of Azerbaijan are being cleared of Armenian mines,” 8 September 2022, [bit.ly/AzerbaijanMoD8Sept2022](https://bit.ly/AzerbaijanMoD8Sept2022). In August 2022, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense claimed to have cleared a total of 1,318 PMN-E antipersonnel mines in the Lachin region. See, Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, “Uchdik-Girkhgiz-Saribaba high grounds are cleared of Armenian mines,” 22 August 2022, [bit.ly/AzerbaijanMoD22Aug2022](https://bit.ly/AzerbaijanMoD22Aug2022).

<sup>119</sup> Letter from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the UN, addressed to the President of the UNSC, 13 September 2022, [bit.ly/ArmeniaLetterUNSC13Sept2022](https://bit.ly/ArmeniaLetterUNSC13Sept2022).

<sup>120</sup> Fenix Insight, “PMN-E: Mine,” undated, [bit.ly/FenixInsightPMN-EMine](https://bit.ly/FenixInsightPMN-EMine).

<sup>121</sup> Several types of never-before-seen Russian produced antipersonnel mines have been documented. See, HRW, “Background Briefing on Landmine Use in Ukraine,” 15 June 2022, [bit.ly/HRWUkraine15June2022](https://bit.ly/HRWUkraine15June2022). In 2004, Russia said that it had spent or planned to spend RUB3.33 billion (US\$115.62 million) on research, development, and production of new engineer munitions, including alternatives to antipersonnel mines. Statement by Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defense, parliamentary hearings on the ratification of CCW Amended Protocol II, 23 November 2004. Average exchange rate for 2004: RUB1=US\$0.03472. Oanda, [bit.ly/OandaCurrencyConverter](https://bit.ly/OandaCurrencyConverter).



in development since at least 2015.<sup>122</sup> Russia also tested newly developed antivehicle mines in 2021, such as the PTKM-1R mine.<sup>123</sup>

Russian forces are modifying antipersonnel mines for deployment by drones.<sup>124</sup>

Markings on some of the landmines used by Russia in Ukraine since 2022 indicate that they were manufactured as recently as 2021, including POM-3 antipersonnel mines.<sup>125</sup> Another antipersonnel mine used in Ukraine by Russia is the PMN-4 blast mine, developed and produced in the early 1990s, after Ukraine achieved its independence.<sup>126</sup> Ukrainian forces also displayed a new directional fragmentation Claymore-type mine, called MOB, in October 2022, which they claimed to have captured from Russian forces.<sup>127</sup>

Historically, Russia has produced at least 13 types of antipersonnel landmines since 1992, including blast mines (PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, and PFM-1S) and fragmentation mines (POM-2, POM-3, POMZ-2, OZM-72, MOB, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, and MON-200). Russia has stated on several occasions that it halted production of blast mines in 1997.<sup>128</sup>

Since 2016, India produces antipersonnel landmines through the state-owned and controlled Munitions India Limited (a reorganization of the previous Indian Ordnance Factories).<sup>129</sup> In August 2020, India announced plans to increase domestic production of antipersonnel mines and end their importation.<sup>130</sup> The Indian Armed Forces reportedly received the first of 700,000 domestically produced “Nipun” antipersonnel blast mines at the end of 2021, which were designed to replace the M-14 antipersonnel mine.<sup>131</sup>

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- 122 Roman Kretsul and Anna Cherepanova, “Fire and ‘Tick’: Russia tested a new system of minefields,” *Izvestia*, 6 September 2021, [bit.ly/Izvestia6Sept2021](https://bit.ly/Izvestia6Sept2021). In 2015, the POM-3 mine’s design engineers claimed that the seismically activated POM-3 would be able to distinguish between combatants and civilians as it is activated by a sensor that detects the footfall of an individual, characterizes it against known signatures, and fires its warhead into the air. Directors Igor Smirnov and Mikhail Zhukov of the Scientific Research Institute of Engineering’s Department of Munitions, Mining, and Demining, interviewed on *Zvezda TV*, 20 November 2015, cited in “Russia Develops Landmine With ‘Electronic Brain,’” *Defense World*, 20 November 2015. See also, “Perspective Anti-Personnel Mine POM-3 ‘Medallion,’” *Military Review*, 30 November 2015, [bit.ly/MilitaryReview30Nov2015](https://bit.ly/MilitaryReview30Nov2015).
- 123 Landmine delivery systems Zemledeliye and UMZ-K Klesh-G, as well as antivehicle mine PTKM-1R. See, Rob Lee (RALee85), “UMZ-K Klesh-G and Zemledeliye minelayers at the Mulino training area,” 31 July 2021, 21:53 UTC. Tweet, [bit.ly/RobLeeTweet31July2021](https://bit.ly/RobLeeTweet31July2021); and Roman Kretsul and Anna Cherepanova, “Fire and ‘Tick’: Russia tested a new system of minefields,” *Izvestia*, 6 September 2021, [bit.ly/Izvestia6Sept2021](https://bit.ly/Izvestia6Sept2021).
- 124 Frederic Gras (fredgrs), “Remote mining with a drone. It is made on the basis of a POM-2 mine (without a cup), a rotating mechanism and a stabilizer printed on a 3D printer,” 4 November 2023, 16:12 UTC. Tweet, [bit.ly/TweetFredericGras4Nov2023](https://bit.ly/TweetFredericGras4Nov2023); Frederic Gras (fredgrs), “In the locally made series, PTM 3 launched using PG motor Rocket,” 24 September 2023, 13:37 UTC. Tweet, [bit.ly/TweetFredericGras24Sept2023](https://bit.ly/TweetFredericGras24Sept2023); Rob Lee (RALee85), “Video about engineers from Russia’s 1st Tank Army who are using UAVs to emplace POM, PMN-4, PTM-3, and PTM-4 mines,” 12 December 2023, 20:33 UTC. Tweet, [bit.ly/TweetRobLee12Dec2023](https://bit.ly/TweetRobLee12Dec2023).
- 125 The POM-3 mine is equipped with a sensitive seismic fuze that makes it prone to detonate when approached, as well as a self-destruct feature. Collective Awareness to UXO, “POM-3 Landmine: Description,” undated, [bit.ly/POM-3Landmine](https://bit.ly/POM-3Landmine); and HRW, “Ukraine: Russia Uses Banned Antipersonnel Landmines,” 29 March 2022, [bit.ly/HRWRussia29March2022](https://bit.ly/HRWRussia29March2022).
- 126 Collective Awareness to UXO, “PMN-4 Landmine: Description,” undated, [bit.ly/PMN-4LandmineDescription](https://bit.ly/PMN-4LandmineDescription).
- 127 Ukraine Weapons Tracker (UAWeapons), “#Ukraine: A previously unseen Russian MOB AP directional mine was captured by the AFU. Apparently, this type is modular - up to 3 units can be connected to each other. They can also be fitted with additional preformed fragmentation blocks and various aiming and mounting devices.” 3 October 2022, 13:19 UTC. Tweet, [bit.ly/UAWeaponsTweet3Oct2022](https://bit.ly/UAWeaponsTweet3Oct2022).
- 128 See, for example, statement of Russia, CCW Amended Protocol II Tenth Annual Conference of States Parties, Geneva, 12 November 2008.
- 129 Monitor meeting with Cmdr. Kumar, Ministry of External Affairs, and Col. Kabthiyal, Ministry of Defence, CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), Geneva, 27 August 2018.
- 130 Rajat Pandit, “India announces progressive arms embargo list in a bid to boost domestic defense production,” *The Times of India*, 10 August 2020, [bit.ly/TimesOfIndia10Aug2020](https://bit.ly/TimesOfIndia10Aug2020).
- 131 Shankhyaneel Sarkar, “Nipun anti-personnel mines: Army gets weapons boost for Pakistan, China borders,” *Hindustan Times*, 21 December 2021, [bit.ly/HindustanTimes21Dec2021](https://bit.ly/HindustanTimes21Dec2021).

At least two other mines are reportedly under development, including “Ulka,” a bounding fragmentation antipersonnel mine and “Parth,” a directional antipersonnel landmine.<sup>132</sup>

Munitions India Limited has produced the M-14 and M-16 antipersonnel mines, which are copies of earlier US designs.<sup>133</sup> Tender records retrieved from a publicly accessible online government procurement database from 2016–2023 show that Munitions India Limited has listed tenders for components of M-14, M-16, and APER-1B antipersonnel landmines.<sup>134</sup> Components produced under these contracts have previously been supplied to Ammunition Factory Khadki and Ordnance Factory Chandrapur in Maharashtra state, and to Ordnance Factory Dum Dum in West Bengal state.<sup>135</sup>

India also produces the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher, with warheads that can lay antipersonnel landmines. In September 2022, it was reported that Armenia had ordered the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher from private companies in India, though it is not known if this order included the antipersonnel mine laying variant of the system.<sup>136</sup>

South Korean company Korea Defense Industry opened in 2020, and its website advertises “155mm FASCAM (Family of Scatterable Mines),” which it describes as “a weapon system that fires 155mm artillery shells loaded with anti-personnel [munitions] to maximize the area denial.”<sup>137</sup> It is unclear if any orders for this weapon have been received or if the company is actively constructing any of these systems.

NSAGs have produced improvised mines that are victim-activated in Colombia, Egypt, Palestine (Gaza), India, Myanmar, and Yemen.<sup>138</sup>

In Gaza, Al-Qassam Brigades have manufactured and used an antipersonnel mine called Al-Qaffaza which translates to “the glove.”<sup>139</sup>

<sup>132</sup> “New Family of Munitions (NFM),” *Bharat Rakshak*, 19 January 2020, [bit.ly/BharatRakshak19Jan2020](http://bit.ly/BharatRakshak19Jan2020). Also detailed are three new models of antivehicle mines.

<sup>133</sup> Email reply from Ordnance Factory Board, Ministry of Defence, to Right to Information Request made by Control Arms Foundation of India, 5 May 2011.

<sup>134</sup> The Monitor has reviewed annually the listing on Munitions India Limited/Indian Ordnance Factories BidAssist website (previously the e-Procurement website, titled “current contracts”). BidAssist provides a tender number, opening and closing dates, and a detailed description of the item to be manufactured. Contracts have been concluded with Ordnance Factories in Maharashtra or West Bengal, where mines are assembled with components from private companies. The site shows a tender awarded to Munitions India Limited for components for M-14 mines in September 2023, which was to run until March 2024. See, BidAssist website, [bit.ly/IndiaBidAssistTenders](http://bit.ly/IndiaBidAssistTenders).

<sup>135</sup> The following companies were previously listed as having contracts listed for production of components of antipersonnel mines on the Indian Ordnance Factories Purchase Orders webpage, between October 2016 and November 2017: Sheth & Co., Supreme Industries Ltd., Pratap Brothers, Brahm Steel Industries, M/s Lords Vanjya Pvt. Ltd., Sandeep Metalkraft Pvt Ltd., Milan Steel, Prakash Machine Tools, Sewa Enterprises, Naveen Tools Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd., Shyam Udyog, and Dhruv Containers Pvt. Ltd. See, Indian Ordnance Factories website, [bit.ly/IndianOrdnanceFactoriesPurchaseOrders](http://bit.ly/IndianOrdnanceFactoriesPurchaseOrders). In addition, the following companies had established contracts for the manufacture of mine components: Ashoka Industries, Alcast, Nityanand Udyog Pvt. Ltd., Miltech Industries, Asha Industries, and Sneh Engineering Works. Mine types indicated were either M-14, M-16, APERS 1B, or “APM” [antipersonnel] mines. Information obtained from searching Indian Ordnance Factories webpage, “List of Registered Vendors,” undated, [bit.ly/IndianOrdnanceFactoriesPortal2020](http://bit.ly/IndianOrdnanceFactoriesPortal2020).

<sup>136</sup> Joseph P. Chacko, “Israeli suicide drone HAROP to meet Indian Pinaka MRLS in Nagorno-Karabakh amid Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict,” *Frontier India*, 30 September 2022, [bit.ly/FrontierIndia30Sept2022](http://bit.ly/FrontierIndia30Sept2022); and “DRDO tests Pinaka Mark-II guided rocket system,” *Frontier India*, 5 November 2020, [bit.ly/FrontierIndia5Nov2020](http://bit.ly/FrontierIndia5Nov2020).

<sup>137</sup> “155mm FASCAM (Family of Scatterable Mines),” Korea Defense Industry, undated, [bit.ly/KDInd155mmFASCAM](http://bit.ly/KDInd155mmFASCAM).

<sup>138</sup> Previous lists of states with NSAG producers have included Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Low level production of victim-activated IEDs by Islamist groups in the Sahel, and in some other regions, is suspected.

<sup>139</sup> “Exclusive Report of Qassam Brigades [Hamas] members Booby-Trapping A Tunnel in Gaza,” *Al Jazeera*, 29 April 2024, [bit.ly/AUJazeera29Apr2024](http://bit.ly/AUJazeera29Apr2024).

## TRANSFERS OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

A *de facto* global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel landmines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the Mine Ban Treaty. The Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing the annual Landmine Monitor report in 1999.

At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted a formal moratorium on exports of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters, including Cuba and Vietnam, have made statements declaring that they have stopped exporting antipersonnel mines. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting mines in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.<sup>140</sup>

## STOCKPILED ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

### STATES NOT PARTY

The Monitor estimates that as many as 30 of the 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have stockpiled antipersonnel landmines.<sup>141</sup> In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines. Today, the collective total in the stocks of states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty may be less than 50 million.<sup>142</sup>

It is unclear whether all 30 states not party thought to stockpile antipersonnel mines are currently doing so. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they possess only small stockpiles, which are used solely for training in clearance and detection techniques.

States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as part of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.

### Largest stockpiles of antipersonnel mines

State	Mines stockpiled
Russia	26.5 million
Pakistan	6 million (estimated)
India	4–5 million (estimated)
China	“less than” 5 million
US	3 million
<b>Total</b>	<b>approximately 45 million</b>

### States not party that have stockpiled antipersonnel mines

Armenia	Kazakhstan	Nepal
Azerbaijan	Korea, North	Pakistan
Bahrain	Korea, South	Russia
China	Kyrgyzstan	Saudi Arabia
Cuba	Lao PDR	Singapore
Egypt	Lebanon	Syria
Georgia	Libya	UAE
India	Mongolia	US
Iran	Morocco	Uzbekistan
Israel	Myanmar	Vietnam

<sup>140</sup> The Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that deminers in Afghanistan were clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date-stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to the Monitor by The HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group (DDG), and other demining operators working in Afghanistan. Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.

<sup>141</sup> Three states not party, all in the Asia-Pacific region, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: signatory the Marshall Islands, in addition to non-signatories Micronesia and Tonga.

<sup>142</sup> In 2014, China informed the Monitor that its stockpile was “less than” five million, though there is a degree of uncertainty about the method China used to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, an estimate by the Monitor indicated that China had 110 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.

## STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION BY STATES PARTIES

Of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 161 do not stockpile antipersonnel mines.<sup>143</sup> This includes 94 states that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction, collectively destroying more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines under the treaty. Sri Lanka was the last State Party to complete its obligation to destroy its stocks in October 2021.<sup>144</sup>

Another 67 States Parties have confirmed that they never possessed antipersonnel mines, except for, in some cases, training in detection and clearance techniques.

Two States Parties possess a combined total of 3.7 million antipersonnel mines left to destroy: Ukraine (3,364,433) and Greece (334,938).

Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having both failed to complete stockpile destruction by their respective four-year deadlines. Greece had an initial deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine's deadline was 1 June 2010.<sup>145</sup>

Greece initially reported a stockpile of 1,568,167 mines in 2013 that it has been progressively destroying despite numerous challenges and setbacks. In May 2024, Greece signed an agreement with a Croatian company to destroy the remaining stocks. It has transferred 8,475 mines to Croatia for destruction.<sup>146</sup>

Ukraine has destroyed 3,438,948 antipersonnel landmines to date, constituting more than half of its total stocks. In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report covering 2023, Ukraine declared a stockpile 3,364,433 antipersonnel mines, comprised of 3,363,828 PFM-series mines and 605 OZM-4 mines.<sup>147</sup>

The OZM-4 mines were stored in Crimea, which was seized by Russia in 2014. In June 2024, Ukraine told States Parties at the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty that “conducting an inventory and determining the actual remains of PFM-1C is not considered possible until the complete and unconditional withdrawal of all military forces of the Russian Federation from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.”<sup>148</sup> Ukraine reported in April 2023 and 2024 that the stockpiled antipersonnel mines stored in military warehouses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine “will be destroyed in accordance with the commitments made after the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” However, Ukraine also noted that, “if the warehouses and arsenals where anti-personnel mines are stored are located in the territories occupied by Russia, or they have been subjected to air and missile strikes by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, then information about such mines can be obtained only after the territory has been liberated, cleared and [after] carrying out relevant inspections.”<sup>149</sup>

<sup>143</sup> Data on stockpiles, retention for training and research, and destruction is based primarily on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports.

<sup>144</sup> In its initial Article 7 report, submitted on 28 November 2018, Sri Lanka declared a total stockpile of 77,865 antipersonnel mines. Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), section 3, table 2. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, [bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT](http://bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT).

<sup>145</sup> The Oslo Action Plan urges states that have failed to meet their Article 4 deadlines to “present a time-bound plan for completion and urgently proceed with implementation as soon as possible in a transparent manner.” Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, [bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019](http://bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019).

<sup>146</sup> Greece Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023).

<sup>147</sup> This quantity is the same amount reported to be in Ukraine's stockpile in 2020. Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form B.

<sup>148</sup> Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, 20 June 2024, [bit.ly/UkraineStatement20June2024](http://bit.ly/UkraineStatement20June2024).

<sup>149</sup> Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form B, p. 3; and Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form B, p. 3.

Tuvalu must provide an initial Article 7 report for the treaty, to formally confirm that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines.<sup>150</sup>

Some NSAGs possess stockpiles of improvised antipersonnel mines. NSAGs in Myanmar now possess a very large quantity of antipersonnel landmines seized through military operations since the 2021 military coup.<sup>151</sup>

## MINES RETAINED FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows States Parties to retain or transfer “a number of antipersonnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques...The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 63 States Parties retain antipersonnel landmines for training and research purposes. Finland tops the list with more than 15,000 mines, followed by Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Twenty-two more States Parties retain between 1,000 mines and 6,000 mines each.<sup>152</sup>

Thirty-eight States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines. Another 100 States Parties do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 45 states that stockpiled or retained landmines in the past.<sup>153</sup> Slovakia initially declared 7,000 retained mines in 1999 and progressively reduced that number to 590 in 2022, then reported in May 2024 that it no longer retains antipersonnel mines.<sup>154</sup>

In addition to those listed in the following table, the 38 States Parties each retaining fewer than 1,000 mines collectively possess a total of 13,501 mines.<sup>155</sup> Thirteen states consumed a combined total of 1,865 retained antipersonnel mines in 2023.<sup>156</sup> Sixteen States Parties that retain under 1,000 mines have not yet submitted an updated Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2023 as of 15 October 2024.<sup>157</sup>

<sup>150</sup> Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines.

<sup>151</sup> Since January 2022, in a non-exhaustive review of media photographs by Mine Free Myanmar, over 50 instances of weapons captures by NSAGs have been posted online, amounting to hundreds of antipersonnel landmines, types MM1 (fragmentation), MM2 (blast), MM5 (directional) and MM6 (non-detectable blast), in Bago, Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states, and the Sagaing and Tanintharyi regions. See, Mine Free Myanmar, “More antipersonnel landmines seized by armed groups during first 3 months of 2024,” 1 June 2024, [bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar1June2024](https://bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar1June2024).

<sup>152</sup> States retaining between 1,000 to 6,000 mines: Türkiye (5719), Greece (5507), Sweden (5161), Venezuela (4874), Belarus (4492), Tunisia (4320), Yemen (3760), Croatia (3636), Bulgaria (3437), Serbia (3134), Djibouti (2996), Indonesia (2050), Oman (2000), Romania (1836), Tanzania (1780), France (1777), Czech Republic (1740), Uganda (1660), Namibia (1634), Canada (1475), Cambodia (1464), and Kenya (1020).

<sup>153</sup> Tuvalu has not submitted an initial Article 7 report so is not reflected in these figures.

<sup>154</sup> Slovakia reported a change to “0” retained mines, but did not detail how the mines were consumed or destroyed. Slovakia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, p. 3. Previously, in 2023, it reported retaining 590 mines for research purposes. See, Slovakia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form D, p. 3.

<sup>155</sup> States Parties retaining under 1,000 mines for research and training: Belgium (934), Spain (923), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Mozambique (900), Honduras (826), BiH (817), Mauritania (658), Japan (617), Italy (563), South Africa (545), Angola (511), Peru (482), Zimbabwe (450), Togo (436), Guyana (360), Cyprus (357), Republic of the Congo (322), Côte d’Ivoire (290), Slovenia (219), the Netherlands (204), Suriname (150), Cabo Verde (120), Germany (113), Tajikistan (113), Eritrea (101), Jordan (100), Gambia (100), Denmark (92), Ecuador (90), Bhutan (66), Rwanda (65), Senegal (50), Sudan (50), Ireland (49), Guinea-Bissau (9), South Sudan (8), and Burundi (4).

<sup>156</sup> States Parties which retained under 1,000 mines and reported consumption of retained mines in 2023: Slovakia (590), Peru (482), Sudan (248), Germany (158), Bhutan (80), Mauritania (70), South Africa (62), Cyprus (53), Spain (53), Angola (25), Belgium (24), Ecuador (10), and Slovenia (10).

<sup>157</sup> States Parties retaining less than 1,000 mines that did not submit an Article 7 report for 2023, as of 15 October 2024: Burundi, Cabo Verde, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Gambia, Guyana, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Togo, and Zambia.



States Parties retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines<sup>158</sup>

State	Last declared total (for year)	Initial declaration	Consumed during 2023	Year of last declared consumption	Total quantity reduced as excess to need
Finland	15,591 (2023)	16,500	74	2023	-
Bangladesh	12,050 (2023)	15,000	0	2013	-
Sri Lanka	7,339 (2023)	21,153	2,336	2023	-
Türkiye	5,719 (2023)	16,000	9	2023	5,159
Greece	5,507 (2023)	7,224	20	2023	-
Sweden	5,161 (2023)	13,948	12	2023	-
Venezuela	4,874 (2011)	4,960	N/R	2010	-
Belarus	4,492 (2023)	7,530	0	2022	1,484
Tunisia	4,320 (2023)	5,000	10	2023	-
Yemen	3,760 (2023)	4,000	0	2008	-
Croatia	3,636 (2023)	17,500	111	2023	-
Bulgaria	3,437 (2023)	10,466	8	2023	6,446
Serbia	3,134 (2023)	5,000	0	2017	1,970
Djibouti	2,996 (2004)	2,996	N/R	Unclear	-
Indonesia	2,050 (2020)	4,978	N/R	2009	2,524
Oman	2,000 (2020)	2,000	0	None ever	-
Romania	1,836 (2022)	4,000	0	2022	1,500
Tanzania	1,780 (2008)	1,146	N/R	2007	-
France	1,777 (2023)	4,539	0	2022	-
Czech Rep.	1,740 (2023)	4,859	362	2023	-
Uganda	1,660 (2023)	2,400	0	2022	-
Namibia	1,634 (2009)	9,999	N/R	2009	-
Canada	1,475 (2023)	1,781	0	2022	-
Cambodia	1,464 (2023)	2,035	0	Unclear	-
Kenya	1,020 (2007)	3,000	N/R	2007	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>100,452</b>	<b>188,014</b>	<b>2,942</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>19,083</b>

Note: N/R=not reported.

The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that retain mines but are apparently not using them for the permitted purposes. For these states, the number of retained mines has stayed the same each year, indicating that none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research. No other details have been provided about how these mines are being used.

Five States Parties have never reported consuming landmines retained for the permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them:

- Djibouti and Oman (each retaining more than 1,000 mines); and
- Burundi, Cabo Verde, and Togo (each retaining less than 1,000 mines).

<sup>158</sup> Both France and Cambodia reported a higher number of retained mines than previously, in 2022. France reported acquiring an additional seven mines during 2023. See, France Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D. It is unclear why Cambodia has reported an additional 166 retained mines. See, Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 3.

The Oslo Action Plan requires each State Party that retains antipersonnel mines under Article 3 to “annually review the number of mines retained to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes,” and to “destroy all antipersonnel mines that exceed that number.”<sup>159</sup>

States Parties agreed to Action 49, whereby the president of the Mine Ban Treaty is given a new role in ensuring compliance with Article 3. This has been described by some as an “early warning mechanism.” Action 49 states that “if no information on implementing the relevant obligations [of Articles 3, 4, or 5] for two consecutive years is provided, the President will assist and engage with the States Parties concerned.”<sup>160</sup>

While laudable in terms of transparency, several States Parties still report retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel landmine. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty. At least 13 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines in this condition.<sup>161</sup>

## TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on developments during the preceding calendar year.

Tuvalu is the only State Party that has not provided an initial transparency report, after missing its 28 August 2012 deadline.

As of 15 October 2024, only 80 States Parties (49%) had submitted their annual Article 7 reports for calendar year 2023.<sup>162</sup> A total of 84 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2023, of which most have failed to provide an annual transparency report for two or more years.<sup>163</sup> The submission rate of reports for calendar year 2023 was slightly more than that of 2022.

<sup>159</sup> Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, Action 16, [bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019](https://bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019).

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, Action 49.

<sup>161</sup> States Parties retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine: Afghanistan, Australia, BiH, Canada, Eritrea, France, Gambia, Germany, Lithuania, Mozambique, Senegal, Serbia, and the UK.

<sup>162</sup> The 80 States Parties that submitted an Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2023 (as of 15 October 2024): Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, BiH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the DRC, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Hungary, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Mozambique, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Palestine, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, the UK, Uruguay, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

<sup>163</sup> The 84 States Parties that have not submitted Article 7 reports for calendar year 2023, as of 15 October 2024 (those that have not submitted reports for two or more years are noted in *italics*): Afghanistan, Andorra, *Antigua and Barbuda*, Austria, *Bahamas*, *Barbados*, *Belize*, *Bolivia*, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, *Cameroon*, *Cabo Verde*, *Central African Republic*, *Comoros*, *Republic of the Congo*, *Cook Islands*, Costa Rica, *Côte d'Ivoire*, *Djibouti*, *Dominica*, *Dominican Republic*, *Equatorial Guinea*, *Eritrea*, *Eswatini*, *Fiji*, *Gabon*, *Gambia*, *Ghana*, *Grenada*, Guatemala, *Guinea*, Guyana, *Haiti*, *Honduras*, *Iceland*, *Indonesia*, Ireland, Italy, *Jamaica*, Kenya, *Kiribati*, *Kuwait*, *Lesotho*, *Liberia*, *Madagascar*, *Malawi*, Malaysia, *Maldives*, Malta, Monaco, *Namibia*, *Nauru*, Nigeria, *Niue*, *North Macedonia*, Norway, *Oman*, *Palau*, *Panama*, *Papua New Guinea*, *Paraguay*, *the Philippines*, *Rwanda*, *Saint Kitts and Nevis*, *Saint Lucia*, *Saint Vincent and the Grenadines*, *Samoa*, *Sao Tome and Principe*, *Seychelles*, *Sierra Leone*, *Solomon Islands*, *South Africa*, *Sudan*, *Suriname*, *Tanzania*, *Timor-Leste*, *Togo*, *Trinidad and Tobago*, *Turkmenistan*, *Tuvalu*, *Vanuatu*, *Venezuela*, and *Zambia*.

Morocco, a state not party, has submitted 16 voluntary transparency reports since 2006.<sup>164</sup> States not party Azerbaijan (2008–2009), Lao PDR (2011), and Mongolia (2007) have also previously provided voluntary reports.<sup>165</sup> Palestine (2012–2013) and Sri Lanka (2005) also submitted voluntary reports prior to acceding to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic provided a voluntary Article 7 report for Western Sahara in 2019.<sup>166</sup>


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<sup>164</sup> Morocco submitted voluntary transparency reports in 2006, 2008–2011, 2013, and 2016–2023. Coverage period of those reports varied.

<sup>165</sup> Coverage period varies greatly for voluntary reports.

<sup>166</sup> The sovereignty of Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between Morocco and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro (Polisario). Polisario's Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member of the African Union (AU) but is not universally recognized. It has no official representation in the UN, which prevents formal accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.

# STATUS OF THE 1997 MINE BAN TREATY



## MAP KEY

- States Parties (164)
- Signatories (1)
- Non-signatories (32)

## DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.







The first brick is laid of a new orthopedic center—a project led by the local mine survivors' association ISAD-ASVM—in Ziguinchor, in Senegal's Casamance region.

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# THE IMPACT

## INTRODUCTION

This chapter highlights developments and challenges in addressing the negative impact caused by the use of antipersonnel landmines. It assesses and reflects on progress towards meeting the Mine Ban Treaty's obligations and the objectives contained in the five-year Oslo Action Plan, adopted at the treaty's Fourth Review Conference in November 2019.

The first part of this overview presents the impact in terms of landmine contamination and casualties of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), while the second part focuses on efforts to address that impact through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. This report presents data on the situation in 2023 and, where relevant, includes updates as of the end of October 2024. It also looks at progress made in the five-year period since the States Parties committed to the Oslo Action Plan in 2019, as well as notable developments over the past 25 years, since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999.

According to available data, at least 5,757 people were killed or injured by landmines and ERW worldwide in 2023. This represents an increase of 22% (1,048) from the 4,709 casualties recorded in 2022.<sup>1</sup> New mine/ERW casualties were recorded in 55 states and other areas in 2023. Civilians represented 84% of recorded casualties in 2023 where the civilian status was known, while children accounted for 37% of all civilian casualties for whom the age group was known. Improvised mines continued to cause the most casualties of all types of mines and ERW in 2023. For 2023, the Monitor is reporting the highest recorded number of antipersonnel mine casualties since 2011. Casualties due to antivehicle mines nearly tripled since 2022, with 60% of those casualties occurring in Ukraine. Although casualty numbers remained high in Syria, Myanmar was the country with the largest number of new annual casualties globally in 2023. This is the first time that Myanmar has had the highest reported annual casualties globally, even though the Monitor has reported high numbers of casualties for Myanmar every year since recording began in 1999.

<sup>1</sup> The 2022 casualty total was adjusted with the inclusion of new data since *Landmine Monitor 2023* was published. See, International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), *Landmine Monitor 2023* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2023).

As of October 2024, at least 58 states and other areas were contaminated by antipersonnel mines, of which 33 are States Parties with current clearance obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, 22 are states not party, and three are other areas. Of the affected States Parties, Croatia and Yemen succeeded in decreasing their extent of contamination through land release activities in 2023, while the extent of contamination increased in Mauritania and Sri Lanka due to ongoing efforts to complete a baseline survey.

Significant progress was observed in addressing the impact of landmines in 2023: 693.91km<sup>2</sup> of land known or suspected to be contaminated by antipersonnel landmines was released by States Parties with clearance obligations.<sup>2</sup> This is almost 40% more land released than in 2022 (497.34km<sup>2</sup>), and a 150% increase compared to figures reported in 2021 (276km<sup>2</sup>). Of the land released in 2023, 281.50km<sup>2</sup> was cleared, 183.82km<sup>2</sup> was reduced via technical survey, and 228.59km<sup>2</sup> was canceled through non-technical survey. The mined area cleared in 2023 exceeds clearance reported in 2022 by over 28% and is the largest area cleared by States Parties since the last review conference in 2019.

A total of 160,566 antipersonnel mines were cleared and destroyed during clearance activities in 2023, a decrease from the 169,276 destroyed in 2022. Four States Parties with clearance obligations did not undertake any clearance activities in 2023, while another five did not formally report on their Article 5 obligations.

Despite progress, a mine-free world is not in sight. While 30 States Parties have completed clearance since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999, 33 States Parties still have clearance obligations. Nineteen States Parties have deadlines to meet their obligations under Article 5 of the treaty either before or during 2025, but only State Party Oman is on track to meet the current 2025 deadline. Seven of these States Parties have already requested an extension beyond 2025.

The increased use of improvised mines has further complicated survey and clearance. As of October 2024, at least 25 States Parties are believed or known to have improvised mine contamination.<sup>3</sup>

Risk education to address the threat posed by mines and ERW is a crucial intervention, as people continue to live and work in or near contaminated areas. Of the 33 States Parties with clearance obligations, 28 reported providing, or are known to have provided, risk education during 2023.<sup>4</sup> Children and men remained the primary at-risk groups. In line with Actions 28 and 31 of the Oslo Action Plan, the integration of risk education into other humanitarian, development, and protection initiatives, and national capacity-building—often via training of trainers programs—has increased since the treaty's Fourth Review Conference in 2019. Digital risk education means have also increased particularly since their use during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Victim assistance remains a vital but deplorably underfunded area of mine action. There has been notable progress in some aspects of implementation, yet persistent gaps remain, and significant new challenges have arisen in the past five years.

Rehabilitation services are being implemented in most states, and psychosocial support and socio-economic inclusion endeavors have seen some new initiatives. Referral systems, community-based rehabilitation, and outreach programs provide much-needed support to remote and underserved areas.

However, many programs are constrained by limited resources. And in several States Parties, health systems are strained or disrupted by conflict and economic crises, impacting the availability and accessibility of essential services for victims.

<sup>2</sup> The contamination and clearance figures presented in this report are rounded to the nearest hundredth. As such, some individual figures, for instance confirmed and suspected hazardous areas, when combined after rounding will not equal the reported total.

<sup>3</sup> Afghanistan, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Somalia, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Türkiye, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yemen.

<sup>4</sup> Argentina, Cyprus, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, and Oman did not report any risk education activities in 2023.

Overall, while progress has been made in delivering services and improving outcomes for victims, long-term sustainability remains a challenge, as integration of services is not keeping pace with the conclusion of internationally funded programs. Increased and sustained funding, better integration of victim assistance into national health systems, and continued advocacy for survivors' rights are essential to further improving quality of life and ensuring the full inclusion of survivors, families, and communities.

## ASSESSING THE IMPACT

### CASUALTIES

Monitor casualty records include people killed or injured in incidents involving explosive devices detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle.

Antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines, including improvised types, cluster munition remnants, and ERW<sup>5</sup>—henceforth mines/ERW—continue to kill and injure thousands of civilians every year.

### CASUALTIES RECORDED SINCE 1999

An evident downward trend in annual casualties is apparent across most States Parties since 1999. This decline is especially prominent in many countries that initially reported the highest casualty rates at the time of the treaty's entry into force in 1999. Declining casualty rates have been recorded over time, as in Cambodia, from 858 casualties in the year 2000 down to 32 in 2023; and for Colombia, down from a peak of 1,228 casualties in 2006 to 99 casualties in 2023.

For the period 1999 through 2023, the Monitor has recorded 159,445 mine/ERW casualties, of which 45,959 people were killed and 109,270 injured. For 4,216 casualties, it was not reported if they survived.

Civilians represented the vast majority of casualties compared to military and other security forces.<sup>6</sup>

### Mine/ERW casualties by civilian status, where recorded: 1999–2023<sup>7</sup>

Status	Casualties	Percentage
Civilian	91,011	80%
Deminer	2,050	2%
Military	21,167	19%

<sup>5</sup> Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor global mine/ERW casualty data. Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are reported in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information on casualties caused by cluster munitions see, Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), *Cluster Munition Monitor 2024* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2024), [www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org).

<sup>6</sup> The category "military" includes all armed forces, as well as police forces and private security forces when active in combat roles. It also includes members of non-state armed groups, militias, and mercenaries. Direct participation in armed conflict, also called direct participation in hostilities, distinguishes persons who are not civilians in accordance with international humanitarian law, whereby "those involved in the fighting must make a basic distinction between combatants, who may be lawfully attacked, and civilians, who are protected against attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities." International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "Direct participation in hostilities: questions & answers," 2 June 2009, [bit.ly/ICRCDirectParticipationFAQ2009](http://bit.ly/ICRCDirectParticipationFAQ2009).


<sup>7</sup> The total number of casualties where the civilian status was reported was 114,228. For 45,217 casualties, 28% of the overall total, the civilian status was not reported.

Women and girls made up 16% of civilian casualties during the period 1999–2023, where the sex was recorded. Men and boys made up 84%.<sup>8</sup>

Children made up almost half (43%) of all civilian casualties recorded since 1999, where the age group was known.<sup>9</sup>

For each consecutive year since 2016, improvised mines caused the highest number of annual casualties.

### Mine/ERW casualties annually: 1999–2023



### CASUALTIES SINCE 2019

The annual number of casualties has remained significant since the treaty's Fourth Review Conference in 2019. Additionally, in terms of human suffering, there has been a steady increase in the cumulative total of casualties and victims worldwide since 2019, driven by newly recorded casualties and/or updates to existing casualty figures based on newly available information.

Over the past five years (2019–2023), at least 28,957 individuals were killed or injured by mines/ERW. Many more people (i.e., families and communities) suffered as indirect victims as a result of these incidents but are not statistically represented in the data.

Mine/ERW casualty trends in the period since the treaty's 2019 Review Conference also highlight the significant impact of conflict on specific countries. For example, in 2019, Afghanistan recorded the highest annual number of casualties. The following year in 2020, Syria topped the list due to a significant increase in casualties, with 2,729 reported. Syria remained the country with the highest number of casualties, despite decreased numbers in 2021 and 2022. In 2023, Myanmar, which has had casualties recorded each year since Monitor reporting began, emerged as the country with the highest annual casualties globally for the first time.

### Countries with the most annual casualties reported: 2019–2023

Year	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Country	<b>Afghanistan</b>	Syria	Syria	Syria	Myanmar
Annual casualties	1,824	2,729	1,227	834	1,003

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**.

<sup>8</sup> Men and boys made up 88% of casualties since 1999, and women and girls 12% of all casualties where the sex was recorded. The sex of 106,643 casualties was recorded, with another 52,802 unknown.

<sup>9</sup> Of the total casualties recorded since 1999, 32% (34,453) were children where the age was known. The age group was known for 107,248 casualties, with another 52,197 unknown.



## CASUALTIES IN 2023

There were at least 5,757 mines/ERW casualties in 2023. Of that total, at least 1,983 people were killed and another 3,663 were injured. For 111 casualties, their survival was not known. Mine/ERW casualties were identified in a total of 53 states and two other areas in 2023.

### States/areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2023

Sub-Saharan Africa	Americas	East and South Asia and the Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa
<b>Angola</b> <b>Burundi</b> <b>Benin</b> <b>Burkina Faso</b> <b>Chad</b> <b>Central African Republic</b> <b>Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</b> <b>Ethiopia</b> <b>Mali</b> <b>Mauritania</b> <b>Mozambique</b> <b>Niger</b> <b>Nigeria</b> <b>Senegal</b> <b>Somalia</b> <b>South Sudan</b> <b>Sudan</b> <b>Togo</b> <b>Zimbabwe</b> <i>Somaliland</i>	<b>Colombia</b> <b>Chile</b> <b>Mexico</b>	<b>Afghanistan</b> <b>Bangladesh</b> <b>Cambodia</b> India <b>Indonesia</b> Lao PDR Myanmar Nepal Pakistan South Korea Sri Lanka <b>Thailand</b>	Azerbaijan <b>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</b> <b>Croatia</b> Russia <b>Tajikistan</b> <b>Türkiye</b> <b>Ukraine</b>	<b>Algeria</b> Egypt Iran <b>Iraq</b> Israel <b>Kuwait</b> Lebanon Libya <b>Palestine</b> Syria <b>Tunisia</b> <b>Yemen</b> <i>Western Sahara</i>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated in *italics*.

The country with the most recorded total casualties in 2023 was state not party Myanmar with over a thousand casualties, followed by state not party Syria. More than 500 casualties were reported in States Parties Afghanistan and Ukraine.

### Ten countries with the most casualties recorded in 2023<sup>10</sup>

Country	Casualties
Myanmar	1,003
Syria	933
<b>Afghanistan</b>	651
<b>Ukraine</b>	580
<b>Yemen</b>	499
<b>Nigeria</b>	343
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	308
<b>Mali</b>	174
<b>Ethiopia</b>	106
<b>Iraq</b>	102

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**.

<sup>10</sup> More information can be found in country profiles on the Monitor website, [www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org).

## Casualty demographics

The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status of mine/ERW casualties to the extent that data is available and disaggregated.

Civilians represented 84% of recorded casualties in 2023, where the civilian status was known (4,335 of 5,159).<sup>11</sup> Another 809 military casualties were recorded in 2023.<sup>12</sup> The Monitor identified 15 casualties among deminers in three countries.<sup>13</sup>


There were at least 1,498 child casualties from mines and ERW in 2023, which accounted for 37% of all civilian casualties for whom the age group was known (4,007).<sup>14</sup> Of the 1,498 child casualties, 470 were killed and 994 were injured by mines/ERW in 30 states and other areas in 2023.<sup>15</sup> As in previous years, in 2023, the vast majority of child casualties where the sex was known were boys (82%).<sup>16</sup> Over half of all child casualties (816, or 54%) were caused by ERW, and correspondingly, 70% of all ERW casualties were children, where the age group was recorded.

In 2023, consistent with all past years, men and boys made up the vast majority of casualties, accounting for 88% of all casualties for which the sex was known (4,163 of 4,710).<sup>17</sup> Women and girls made up 12% of all casualties for which the sex was known (547).

## Mine/ERW types resulting in casualties

In 2023, landmines caused at least 3,546 casualties, including those recorded as caused by antipersonnel mines (833), improvised mines (2,071), antivehicle mines (291), and other unspecified mine types (351).

## Casualties by type of mine/ERW in 2023



Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; AVM=antivehicle mines; CMR=cluster munition remnants; ERW=explosive remnants of war.

- 11 The status was unknown for 598 casualties.
- 12 In 2023, military casualties were recorded in Azerbaijan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Türkiye, and Ukraine, and other area Western Sahara.
- 13 In 2023, casualties among deminers occurred in Türkiye, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe.
- 14 Child casualties are defined as all casualties where the victim is less than 18 years of age at the time of the incident, or reported as a 'child'.
- 15 For 34 child casualties their survival was not reported. In 2023, child casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, the DRC, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.
- 16 There were 1,145 boys and 251 girls recorded as casualties in 2023; the sex of 102 child casualties was not recorded.
- 17 For 1,047 casualties, the sex was not reported.

### Landmine casualties

Casualties caused by antipersonnel mines (not including improvised mines) were documented in 19 states and one other area in 2023.<sup>18</sup> The 2023 total of 833 marked the highest annual number of casualties from antipersonnel mines recorded in Monitor data since 2011.<sup>19</sup> The increase in 2023 was largely attributable to high numbers of antipersonnel mine casualties reported for Myanmar (553) and Ukraine (151).

Improvised mines are types of victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs are “homemade”—or assembled—explosive weapons that are designed to cause death or injury. Improvised mines are IEDs that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact



Survey operators conduct non-technical survey in Tiahynka hromada, in Ukraine’s Kherson oblast.

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of a person or a vehicle. Improvised antipersonnel mines that can be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person fit the definition of antipersonnel landmines and are therefore prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.<sup>20</sup> Available information indicates that, worldwide, the fusing of most improvised mines causing casualties allows them to be activated by a person, thus effectively making them prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.<sup>21</sup>

Casualties from improvised mines (2,071) were identified in 23 states in 2023 and, for the eighth consecutive year, remained the type of mine/ERW causing the most casualties.<sup>22</sup>

In 2023, antivehicle mines caused 291 casualties in 12 states and one other area.<sup>23</sup>

Ukraine accounted for almost 60% of

the casualties from antivehicle mines (172 of 291) in the Monitor’s global data for 2023. In Ukraine, numerous incidents involved farmers using tractors and other civilians, often families, traveling by car.

- 18 In 2023, antipersonnel mine casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, BiH, Croatia, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Lebanon, Mauritania, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe, and other area Western Sahara.
- 19 An antipersonnel mine is a munition designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, and therefore prohibited under by the Mine Ban Treaty. For 2011, 1,277 casualties from antipersonnel mines were recorded. However, the annual total reported in *Landmine Monitor 2012* included 521 casualties from improvised antipersonnel mines in Colombia. See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Colombia: Casualties and Victim Assistance,” updated 8 November 2012, [bit.ly/ColombiaVA2012](http://bit.ly/ColombiaVA2012). The updated Monitor database records 906 casualties from antipersonnel mines in 2011. Between then and 2022, the annual figures for casualties from antipersonnel mines have been between 332 and 748.
- 20 These landmines are sometimes referred to in reporting and data as victim-activated IEDs, artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs (VO-IEDs), or by the type of construction, such as pressure plate IEDs (PP-IEDs) and crush wire IEDs.
- 21 These include booby-traps. A booby-trap is an antipersonnel explosive device deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is performed.
- 22 In 2023, casualties from improvised mines occurred in Afghanistan, Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Colombia, the DRC, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Türkiye, and Yemen.
- 23 Also referred to as “antitank mines,” and included among Mines Other Than Antipersonnel Mines (MOTAPM) on the agenda of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), these antivehicle mines are designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to that of a person. They tend to contain a larger explosive charge than antipersonnel mines. Antivehicle mines are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty unless they are fitted with fuses that can be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. In 2023, casualties from antivehicle mines were identified in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Chile, Israel, Mauritania, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, South Korea, Ukraine, and Yemen, and other area Western Sahara.

Another 351 casualties were recorded in seven states and one other area under the category of other unspecified mine types.<sup>24</sup> This category is used for casualties reported as occurring due to “mine” or “landmine” incidents, where it is not specified if the mine was antipersonnel, antivehicle, or improvised.

### *Casualties from cluster munition remnants and other ERW*

Cluster munition remnants, primarily unexploded submunitions, caused 101 casualties in eight states during 2023.<sup>25</sup> There were 1,173 casualties from other types of ERW in 24 states and two other areas in 2023.<sup>26</sup>

### *Other mine and ERW casualties*

In 2023, a total of 937 casualties were the result of mine/ERW items that were detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle, but where the type of device was either not specifically identified initially, was otherwise undifferentiated or remained unknown during casualty recording, or was not disaggregated when recorded in data systems.<sup>27</sup>

## ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION

### MINE CONTAMINATION SINCE 1999

In its first report in 1999, the Monitor reported that “landmines are a global problem, but the exact magnitude of the problem is difficult to measure,” and that “the need for coordinated surveys has become clear.”<sup>28</sup> A decade later, it reported that reliable determination of the size of the global landmine problem still does not exist, but that 67 states—including 43 States Parties—and seven other areas were known or suspected to be mine-affected.<sup>29</sup> In 2019, the Monitor reported 59 states and other areas contaminated with antipersonnel mines including 33 States Parties with current clearance obligations.<sup>30</sup>

24 In 2023, unspecified mine casualties were recorded in Central African Republic, Iran, Iraq, Myanmar, Russia, Sudan, and Ukraine, and other area Western Sahara.

25 Cluster munition remnants are primarily submunitions or bomblets dispersed or released by, or otherwise separated from, a cluster munition and failed to explode or that have not been used and that have been left behind or abandoned. In 2023, casualties from cluster munition remnants were recorded in Azerbaijan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen. For more information on casualties caused by unexploded submunitions and the annual increase in those casualties recorded for the year 2023, see ICBL-CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2024* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2024), [www.the-monitor.org](http://www.the-monitor.org).

26 ERW consist of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO): UXO are explosive weapons that have been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for use or used. It may have been fired, dropped, launched, or projected yet remained unexploded, including unexploded command-detonated IEDs. AXO are explosive weapons that have not been used during an armed conflict, which have been left behind or dumped, including abandoned command-detonated IEDs. In 2023, ERW casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Burundi, the DRC, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lao PDR, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Yemen, and other areas Somaliland and Western Sahara.

27 Casualties from unknown mine/ERW items were recorded in: Angola, China, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Vietnam.

28 ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World* (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 1999), [bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports](http://bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports).

29 ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2010*, (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), [bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports](http://bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports).

30 ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2019*, (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2019), [bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports](http://bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports).

## Number of states and other areas affected by antipersonnel mines since 1999<sup>31</sup>

Affected states	1999	2010	2019	2024
All states and other areas with contamination	99	74	59	58
States Parties with clearance obligations	33	43	33	33

Because of the time-bound and comprehensive provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty, the first decade of its implementation helped to create a better understanding of the number of mine-affected states and the extent of contamination at a global level. The second decade of implementation (between 2009 and 2019) was marked by steady progress in survey and clearance efforts, with 18 states declaring fulfillment of their Article 5 clearance obligations.

Between 2019 and 2024, the progress slowed down significantly. As of October 2024, at least 55 states, including 33 States Parties, and three other areas are still contaminated by antipersonnel mines. Remaining contamination in terrain that is difficult to survey and clear, the discovery of previously unknown mined areas, ongoing conflicts, disputes over mined territory in border areas, and shifting donor priorities have all impacted progress towards meeting the goals outlined in the treaty's Oslo Action Plan.

## MINE CONTAMINATION AS OF THE END OF 2023

### States Parties contaminated by antipersonnel mines

#### *States Parties with Article 5 obligations*

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties with contamination are required to clear and destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the treaty for that country.

As of October 2024, a total of 33 States Parties had current Article 5 clearance obligations, having reported mined areas under their jurisdiction or control. This is the same number of States Parties as in 2019, although the list of states has changed. While Chile and the UK were removed from the list following the completion of their clearance obligations, Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania—after initially declaring completion of clearance in 2012 and 2018 respectively—were added again following the discovery of previously unknown mined areas.



A deminer conducts manual clearance operations in a mountainous area in Khan Abad district, Afghanistan.

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<sup>31</sup> ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 2000: Toward a Mine-Free World* (New York: Human Rights Watch, August 2000); ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2010*, (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010); and ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2019* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2019), [bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports](https://bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports).



## States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations as of October 2024

State Party	Current Deadline	State Party	Current Deadline
Afghanistan	1 March 2025	Nigeria	31 December 2025
Angola	31 December 2025	Oman	1 February 2025
Argentina*	1 March 2026	Palestine	1 June 2028
BiH	1 March 2027	Peru	31 December 2024
Cambodia	31 December 2025	Senegal	1 March 2026
Chad	1 January 2025	Serbia	31 December 2024
Colombia	31 December 2025	Somalia	1 October 2027
Croatia	1 March 2026	South Sudan	9 July 2026
Cyprus**	1 July 2025	Sri Lanka	1 June 2028
DRC	31 December 2025	Sudan	1 April 2027
Ecuador	31 December 2025	Tajikistan	31 December 2025
Eritrea	31 December 2024	Thailand	31 December 2026
Ethiopia	31 December 2025	Türkiye	31 December 2025
Guinea-Bissau	31 December 2024	Ukraine	1 December 2033
Iraq	1 February 2028	Yemen	1 March 2028
Mauritania	31 December 2026	Zimbabwe	31 December 2025
Niger	31 December 2024		

\*Argentina was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/ Islas Malvinas. The United Kingdom (UK), which also claims sovereignty and exercises control over the territory, announced completion of mine clearance in 2020. Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.

\*\*Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control.

### *States Parties that have completed clearance*

No States Parties reported completing the clearance of antipersonnel mines in 2023. Since the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, a total of 30 States Parties completed clearance of all antipersonnel mines from their territory.<sup>32</sup> The last ones to do so were Chile and the UK in 2020.

Nigeria reported completion in 2011, Guinea-Bissau in 2012, and Mauritania in 2018 but no longer figure among the 30 States Parties that have completed clearance. All have since reported newly discovered mined areas under their jurisdiction or control and submitted extension requests.<sup>33</sup>

### *Extent of contamination in States Parties*

One would expect to see a clear, continuous trend towards the decline of mine contamination in affected States Parties over the years, as states undertake land release in accordance with Article 5 clearance obligations. However, the reality is more complicated. Newly discovered mined areas, ongoing efforts to better identify the extent of contamination through non-technical and technical survey, as well as the reconciliation of information within existing databases, affects States Parties' progress towards their clearance deadlines. Over the past five years, many of the affected States Parties have experienced circumstances that led to a temporary increase of their mine contaminated areas despite ongoing land release activities.

<sup>32</sup> State Party El Salvador completed mine clearance in 1994, before the treaty entered into force, and thus is not included in the list of 30 States Parties.

<sup>33</sup> Previously unknown mined areas are often identified through reports of incidents and casualties, or after reports of possible contamination from civilians living close to the areas.

## States Parties that have declared fulfillment of clearance obligations since 1999<sup>34</sup>

1999	Bulgaria	2010	Nicaragua*
2002	Costa Rica	2012	Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Gambia, Jordan, Uganda
2004	Djibouti, Honduras	2013	Bhutan, Germany, Hungary, Venezuela*
2005	Guatemala, Suriname	2014	Burundi
2006	North Macedonia	2015	Mozambique*
2007	Eswatini	2017	Algeria*
2008	France, Malawi	2020	Chile, UK**
2009	Albania, Greece, Rwanda, Tunisia*, Zambia		

\*Algeria, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Tunisia have reported, or are suspected to have, residual contamination. Mozambique, Tunisia, and Venezuela are also suspected to have improvised mine contamination.

\*\*In November 2023, a media article reported that the government of the Falkland Islands/Islands Malvinas had announced new mines found on the beach of Hell's Kitchen on the Murrell Peninsula. Following this, through clearance activities, three antipersonnel mines were discovered and destroyed in an area bordering previously cleared land.<sup>35</sup>

In 2023, seven States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty—Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Türkiye, and Ukraine—have reported massive antipersonnel landmine contamination (more than 100km<sup>2</sup>), as shown in the following table. However, the extent of contamination in Ethiopia and Ukraine cannot be reliably determined until comprehensive survey has been conducted.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, in Ukraine, the ongoing conflict is adding to the extent of contamination and contributing to the challenges of undertaking survey.

Large contamination by antipersonnel landmines (20–99km<sup>2</sup>) is reported in seven States Parties: Angola, Chad, Croatia, Eritrea, Mauritania, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Mauritania and Sri Lanka were listed as having medium contamination in 2022, but both declared a large extent of contamination in 2023 due to newly discovered contaminated areas. Croatia, which was previously considered to have massive contamination, has now been listed as having large contamination as a result of the release of a substantial amount of land in 2023.

Medium contamination (5–19km<sup>2</sup>) is reported in five States Parties: South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Yemen, listed as having a large contamination in 2022, reported a medium extent as of the end of 2023 due to ongoing efforts to complete a baseline survey.

Twelve States Parties have reported less than 5km<sup>2</sup> of contamination: Colombia, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Oman, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, and Somalia.

The extent of contamination in Nigeria—predominantly consisting of improvised mines—remains unknown.

<sup>34</sup> Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), “Clearing mined areas: Status of Article 5 implementation,” undated, [bit.ly/MBTStatusA5Implementation](https://bit.ly/MBTStatusA5Implementation).

<sup>35</sup> “Falklands: mines discovered on a beach in Murrell Peninsula, north of Stanley,” *MercoPress, South Atlantic News Agency*, 29 November 2023, [bit.ly/MercoPress29Nov2023](https://bit.ly/MercoPress29Nov2023); Evelina Mezennaja, “Clearance of Unexpected Mines at Hell’s Kitchen Underway,” *Falkland Islands Television*, 25 March 2024, [bit.ly/FITV25Mar2024](https://bit.ly/FITV25Mar2024); and Evelina Mezennaja, “Hell’s Kitchen on the Murrell Peninsula is mine free,” *Falkland Islands Television*, 13 April 2024, [bit.ly/FITV13Apr2024](https://bit.ly/FITV13Apr2024).

<sup>36</sup> African Union (AU), “Agreement for lasting peace through a permanent cessation of hostilities between the government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF),” 2 November 2022, [bit.ly/EthiopiaTPLF2Nov2022](https://bit.ly/EthiopiaTPLF2Nov2022). In Ethiopia, it is expected that the contamination estimate will be significantly reduced after survey.

## Estimated antipersonnel mine contamination in States Parties

Massive (more than 100km <sup>2</sup> )	Large (20–99km <sup>2</sup> )	Medium (5–19km <sup>2</sup> )	Small (less than 5km <sup>2</sup> )	Unknown
Afghanistan BiH Cambodia Ethiopia* Iraq Türkiye Ukraine*	Angola Chad Croatia Eritrea Mauritania Sri Lanka Thailand	South Sudan Sudan Tajikistan Yemen Zimbabwe	Colombia Cyprus** DRC Ecuador Guinea-Bissau Niger Oman Palestine Peru Senegal Serbia Somalia	Nigeria

\*Ethiopia and Ukraine have reported massive contamination, though this cannot be reliably verified until survey has been conducted.

\*\*Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control but claims that there are 21 minefields of unknown size and contamination type in Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus and in the buffer zone.

### Americas

As of the end of 2023, Colombia reported 4.47km<sup>2</sup> of antipersonnel mine contamination across 71 municipalities in 14 departments.<sup>37</sup> The contamination, mostly from improvised landmines, covered 274 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totaling 2.27km<sup>2</sup> and 317 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) totaling 2.21km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>38</sup> Despite the release of 29 hazardous areas across 27 municipalities in 2023, this is an increase from the 3.81km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated area reported in 2022 due to the discovery of new, previously unknown mined areas throughout 2023.<sup>39</sup> Additional municipalities in Colombia were known or suspected to be affected by antipersonnel landmines but land release activities in those locations were on hold for security reasons.<sup>40</sup>

**Ecuador** and **Peru** each have a very small amount of remaining mine contamination. At the end of 2023, Ecuador had 0.03km<sup>2</sup> of confirmed contaminated land, containing approximately 2,866 mines.<sup>41</sup> The remaining mine contamination in Peru totaled 0.3km<sup>2</sup> across 60 SHAs located in the sectors of Achuime, Cenepa, Santiago, and PV Gutierrez.<sup>42</sup>

### East and South Asia and the Pacific

**Afghanistan** reported antipersonnel mine contamination totaling 176.33km<sup>2</sup> (159.64km<sup>2</sup> CHA and 16.69km<sup>2</sup> SHA) as of the end of 2023, of which 73.26km<sup>2</sup> is contaminated by

<sup>37</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Maicol Velásquez, Information Management Coordinator, Mine Action Group, 20 April 2024; and Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, pp. 27–29. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, [bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT](http://bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT).

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, pp. 25–29 and 35; Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form D, pp. 38–44; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Angela Patricia Cortes Sanchez, Advisor, Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonales, AICMA), 24 May 2023.

<sup>40</sup> Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, pp. 25–26.

<sup>41</sup> Ecuador Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar years 2022 and 2023), Form C, p. 9, [bit.ly/EcuadorMBTArt7Report2022-2023](http://bit.ly/EcuadorMBTArt7Report2022-2023).

<sup>42</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Felipe Guevara Salazar, Demining/EOD Specialist, Peruvian Mine Action Centre (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS).

improvised mines. Afghanistan also reported 30.89km<sup>2</sup> of mixed contamination from antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and ERW.<sup>43</sup>

As of the end of 2023, **Cambodia** reported 4,330 SHAs with landmine contamination totaling 435.06km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>44</sup> The northwest region bordering Thailand is heavily affected, while other parts of the country in the east and northeast are primarily affected by ERW, including cluster munition remnants. Much of the remaining mine contamination in Cambodia and Thailand is along their shared border where, despite improved cross-border cooperation between the two states, access remains a challenge due to a lack of border demarcation.<sup>45</sup> In June 2024, Cambodia announced plans to conduct a comprehensive survey of minefields in the border area, commencing in July 2024 with the goal of completing the survey by the end of 2024.<sup>46</sup>

Landmine contamination in **Sri Lanka** is in the Northern and Eastern provinces and has increased due to newly identified, previously unknown mined areas, resulting from its ongoing National Mine Action Completion Survey that commenced in March 2023.<sup>47</sup> As of the end of 2023, Sri Lanka reported 21.58km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated land covering 654 CHAs (16.83km<sup>2</sup>) and 171 SHAs (4.74km<sup>2</sup>).<sup>48</sup> The most significant mine contamination (20.09km<sup>2</sup>) is found in five districts of Northern province that were sites of intense fighting during the civil war.<sup>49</sup>

**Thailand** reported 21.79km<sup>2</sup> of contamination in six provinces (13.38km<sup>2</sup> CHA and 8.4km<sup>2</sup> SHA).<sup>50</sup> Some contamination is on the border with Cambodia, affecting land yet to be demarcated, though continuing efforts were made in 2023 to strengthen bilateral cooperation on demining.<sup>51</sup> Thailand has experienced the use of improvised mines by NSAGs in the south, but the extent of contamination is unknown as it has not been recorded by the Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC).<sup>52</sup>

### *Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia*

As of the end of 2023, **BiH** reported antipersonnel mine contamination totaling 838.29km<sup>2</sup> (17.91km<sup>2</sup> CHA and 820.38km<sup>2</sup> SHA), a reduction of 31.32km<sup>2</sup> from the 869.61km<sup>2</sup> reported in 2022.<sup>53</sup> BiH has also reported contamination from improvised antipersonnel mines in the Goraždanka and Čapljinka areas.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Hamid Wardak, Operations/EOD Manager, Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), 27 April 2024.

<sup>44</sup> Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 5; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Kimsin Hean, Director of Social-Economic Planning and Database Department (SEPD), Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA), 22 August 2024.

<sup>45</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kimsin Hean, Director of SEPD, CMAA, 22 August 2024; and statement of Thailand, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2023, [bit.ly/ThailandStatement19June2023](https://bit.ly/ThailandStatement19June2023).

<sup>46</sup> Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, pp. 1–2, [bit.ly/CambodiaStatement18June2024](https://bit.ly/CambodiaStatement18June2024).

<sup>47</sup> Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 5–7.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>49</sup> The five districts are: Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya.

<sup>50</sup> Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 2. The six provinces are: Buri Ram, Sa Kaeo, Si Sa Ket, Surin, Trat, and Ubon Ratchathani.

<sup>51</sup> Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 2. During the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Phnom Penh in November 2022, the leaders of Cambodia and Thailand agreed to move forward with demining operations without having to wait for joint survey and demarcation. Statement of Thailand, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2023, p. 2, [bit.ly/ThailandStatement21June2023](https://bit.ly/ThailandStatement21June2023).

<sup>52</sup> Marisa Chimprabha, “Eight volunteers injured in two explosions in Narathiwat province,” *Thai Public Broadcasting Service*, 20 May 2024, [bit.ly/ThaiPBS20May2024](https://bit.ly/ThaiPBS20May2024); and “Thailand: Authorities responding to three explosions in Pattani Aug. 9,” *Crisis24*, 9 August 2024, [bit.ly/Crisis24-9Aug2024](https://bit.ly/Crisis24-9Aug2024).

<sup>53</sup> BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C, p. 8.

<sup>54</sup> Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Article 5 Implementation, “Preliminary Observations on the Implementation of Article 5 by Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 18 June 2024, [bit.ly/PreliminaryObservationsBiHJune2024](https://bit.ly/PreliminaryObservationsBiHJune2024).

**Croatia** reported mine contamination totaling 92.13km<sup>2</sup> (78.57km<sup>2</sup> CHA and 13.56km<sup>2</sup> SHA) across four of its 21 counties—a reduction of more than 38% from the 149.68km<sup>2</sup> reported as of the end of 2022. While 1.3% of the hazardous areas are categorized as agricultural areas, the remaining 98.7% are classified as forest areas, which fall under conservation and nature protection regulations in order to be cleared.<sup>55</sup> Croatia reported another 18.9km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated land under military control.<sup>56</sup>

Since 2013, **Cyprus** has reported that there are no antipersonnel mines on the territory under its effective control, but it claims there are 21 minefields of unknown size and contamination type in Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus and in the buffer zone.<sup>57</sup> The latest information from the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) indicates that 1.52km<sup>2</sup> across 29 SHAs may be contaminated with mines and/or ERW.<sup>58</sup>

**Serbia** reported 0.27km<sup>2</sup> of mine contamination across three areas in Bujanovac municipality, all classified as SHA.<sup>59</sup> The areas suspected to be contaminated were first signaled by explosions that occurred during forest fires in 2019 and 2021, and have not yet been surveyed due to ongoing security concerns. However, a project plan is in place and funding has been approved. The project is set to commence in the second half of 2024.<sup>60</sup>

**Tajikistan** reported 7.54km<sup>2</sup> of antipersonnel mine contamination (6.59km<sup>2</sup> CHA and 0.95km<sup>2</sup> SHA) as of the end of 2023. The minefields are located in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous region, the Khatlon region, and the Central region of the Republic of Tajikistan.<sup>61</sup>

**Türkiye** reported 225.37km<sup>2</sup> (92.81km<sup>2</sup> CHA and 132.56km<sup>2</sup> SHA) across 3,659 areas in 2023. Most contaminated areas are located on its borders with Iraq, Iran, and Syria, while 841 areas are not in border regions.<sup>62</sup> Türkiye completed its national non-technical survey project in 2023, with activities conducted by commercial contractors in 3,451 mined areas.<sup>63</sup> In addition to mines laid by Turkish security forces before joining the treaty, there is contamination from improvised mines used by NSAGs.<sup>64</sup>

**Ukraine** has experienced significant new contamination since Russia's full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022.<sup>65</sup> While Ukraine had identified 50km<sup>2</sup> of mine/ERW contamination in March 2023, it reported 23.34km<sup>2</sup> of confirmed and 11.88km<sup>2</sup> of suspected antipersonnel mine contamination totaling 35.22km<sup>2</sup> as of the end of 2023.<sup>66</sup> Clearance efforts have mainly focused on the de-occupied regions of Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Kherson,

55 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ph.D. Damir Trut, Director, Civil Protection Directorate (CPD), 11 June 2024.

56 Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C, p. 9; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Ph.D. Damir Trut, Director, CPD, 11 June 2024.

57 Cyprus Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C, p. 5; and Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations on the Implementation of Article 5 by Cyprus," 18 June 2024, [bit.ly/PreliminaryObservationsCyprusJune2024](https://bit.ly/PreliminaryObservationsCyprusJune2024).

58 United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), "Where We Work: Cyprus," updated March 2023, [bit.ly/UNMASCyprusMarch2023](https://bit.ly/UNMASCyprusMarch2023).

59 Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, p. 1.

60 Ibid., pp. 1–2; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Slađana Košutić, Senior Advisor for Planning, International Cooperation and European Integrations, Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC), 8 April 2024.

61 Tajikistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, p. 6; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC), 30 April 2024.

62 Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, p. 3.

63 Ibid., p. 6.

64 Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2021, p. 5, [bit.ly/TurkiyeMBTSecondArt5ExtRequest2021](https://bit.ly/TurkiyeMBTSecondArt5ExtRequest2021).

65 Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Background Briefing on Landmine Use in Ukraine," 15 June 2022, [bit.ly/HRWUkraineBriefing15June2022](https://bit.ly/HRWUkraineBriefing15June2022).

66 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2023, pp. 2–3, [bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2023](https://bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2023); and Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, pp. 5–21.



Donetsk, Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy.<sup>67</sup> In April 2024, the country's National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) reported that 156,000km<sup>2</sup> of Ukrainian territory had been exposed to conflict and would require survey.<sup>68</sup> Before the current conflict, Ukraine provided an estimate in 2018 of 7,000km<sup>2</sup> of undifferentiated contamination, including from antipersonnel mines, in government-controlled areas within the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, and another 14,000km<sup>2</sup> in areas not controlled by the government.<sup>69</sup> Ukraine is also contaminated by improvised mines.<sup>70</sup>

### Middle East and North Africa

**Iraq** has legacy mine contamination from the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by a United States (US)-led coalition, as well as contamination from improvised mines used by the Islamic State armed group between 2014 and 2017. As of the end of 2023, Iraq reported 1,194.43km<sup>2</sup> of antipersonnel mine contamination, and another 441.28km<sup>2</sup> of contamination from IEDs, including improvised mines.<sup>71</sup> This is a slight increase from the antipersonnel mine contamination reported in 2022 (1,189.09km<sup>2</sup>) and a significant decline from the IED contamination reported in 2022 (530.8km<sup>2</sup>). Most contamination is reportedly located in territory controlled by the government of Federal Iraq.<sup>72</sup>

**Oman** reported the clearance of 0.13km<sup>2</sup> in the Al-Maghseel area in 2019, and that it had “re-inspected” suspected mined areas in Dhafar and verified that these areas were free from antipersonnel mines.<sup>73</sup> In 2021, Oman developed a workplan to release its remaining 0.51km<sup>2</sup> of suspected mined areas by April 2024, without providing further details on this estimate.<sup>74</sup> As of October 2024, Oman had not submitted an Article 7 report to update on its progress. However, at the intersessional meetings in June 2024, Oman indicated that it should be in a position to declare completion by its 1 February 2025 deadline.<sup>75</sup>

For 2023, **Palestine** reported the same extent of contamination as for 2022: 0.32km<sup>2</sup>, of which 0.25km<sup>2</sup> was contaminated with antipersonnel mines and 0.07km<sup>2</sup> was mixed contamination, comprising both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. The remaining legacy minefields are located in Jenin and the Jordan Valley.<sup>76</sup> The ongoing conflict with Israel is expected to add new contamination with ERW on Palestinian territory.

Until 2022, the scale and impact of the conflict in **Yemen** had prevented a clear understanding of the level of mine contamination, which initially was estimated to be massive. As of the end of 2023, through a baseline survey that started in 2022, Yemen reduced its estimate to that of medium level contamination. The new total, covering land contaminated with antipersonnel mines and improvised mines, was estimated to be 5.41km<sup>2</sup>. The baseline survey was, however, still ongoing as of the end of 2023.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>67</sup> Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 26.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., pp. 21–22.

<sup>69</sup> Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 27 August 2020, p. 2 (*bis*), [bit.ly/UkraineAdditionalInformation2020](https://bit.ly/UkraineAdditionalInformation2020); and response to Monitor questionnaire by Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe-Project Coordinator in Ukraine (OSCE-PCU), 10 April 2020.

<sup>70</sup> Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 26.

<sup>71</sup> Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C, pp. 10–23.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. The territory not under the government of Federal Iraq is the Kurdistan Region.

<sup>73</sup> Committee on Article 5 Implementation, “Preliminary Observations Committee on Article 5 Implementation by Oman,” Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, held virtually, 30 June–2 July 2020, p. 1, [bit.ly/OmanArt5Committee2020](https://bit.ly/OmanArt5Committee2020); and Oman Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 18.

<sup>74</sup> Oman Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 14.

<sup>75</sup> Statement of Oman, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, [bit.ly/OmanStatement18June2024](https://bit.ly/OmanStatement18June2024).

<sup>76</sup> Palestine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 44–45.

<sup>77</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ameen Saleh Alaqili, Director, Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC), 22 May 2023; Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form D, p. 9; and Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, pp. 6–9.

### Sub-Saharan Africa

As of the end of 2023, **Angola** reported a total antipersonnel mine contamination of 67.43km<sup>2</sup> across 936 areas in 16 provinces (65.16km<sup>2</sup> CHA and 2.27km<sup>2</sup> SHA). Cuando Cubango and Moxico remain the most heavily contaminated provinces with 20.87km<sup>2</sup> and 11.52km<sup>2</sup>, respectively.<sup>78</sup>

In **Chad**, the total extent of the reported contamination remained the same as in 2022 (77.69km<sup>2</sup>). Chad has identified a total of 119 contaminated areas (71 CHAs and 48 SHAs) in the provinces of Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti. Contamination was reported to be mixed and includes improvised mines.<sup>79</sup>

In the **DRC**, the remaining mine contamination is limited. In March 2022, after a national survey and clean-up of the national database, the DRC reported contamination totaling 0.4km<sup>2</sup> across 37 CHAs, but highlighted that it still had areas left to survey on the borders with South Sudan and Uganda.<sup>80</sup> Improvised mine contamination has been identified in Ituri and North-Kivu provinces.<sup>81</sup> As of the end of 2023, the DRC reported a total of 0.35km<sup>2</sup> of land contaminated with antipersonnel mines across six SHAs (0.079m<sup>2</sup>) and 23 CHAs (0.27m<sup>2</sup>).<sup>82</sup>

**Eritrea** last reported on the extent of its contamination in 2014, when it was estimated to have 33.43km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated land.<sup>83</sup> After missing its 2020 clearance deadline, Eritrea submitted a fourth request to extend its mine clearance deadline on 16 November 2023. The request was granted at the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties and the new deadline is 31 December 2024.<sup>84</sup>

In June 2024, **Ethiopia** reported contamination of 726.07km<sup>2</sup> across 152 areas—the same figure reported as of March 2022. Of this, 29 areas were classified as CHA (3.52km<sup>2</sup>) and 123

<sup>78</sup> Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C, p. 4.

<sup>79</sup> The information provided in Chad's Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report for calendar year 2023 and in its Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request submitted on 16 June 2024 differ in terms of the number and location of hazardous areas. The Monitor has taken the most recent figure provided in the extension request. Chad Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 2; and Chad Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Summary, 16 June 2024, p. 1, [bit.ly/ChadArt5ExtRequest2024](https://bit.ly/ChadArt5ExtRequest2024).

<sup>80</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Cyprien Kasembe Okenge, Head of Program and Victim Assistance Coordinator, Congolese Mine Action Center (Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM), 24 March 2022; DRC Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 1 January 2019 to 31 March 2022), Form C, pp. 2–4; DRC Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Summary, 16 September 2021, pp. 1–2, [bit.ly/DRCart5ExtRequest2021Summary](https://bit.ly/DRCart5ExtRequest2021Summary); and CCLAM, "Answers to questions regarding the extension request submitted by DRC to the Committee on Article 5," 24 September 2021, pp. 2–3, [bit.ly/CCLAMA5ExtSept2021](https://bit.ly/CCLAMA5ExtSept2021).

<sup>81</sup> "DRC-Beni: for fear of artisanal bombs, farmers hesitate to work in their fields," *Actualite CD*, 16 November 2021, [bit.ly/ActualiteCD16Nov2021](https://bit.ly/ActualiteCD16Nov2021); "DRC-ADF: the Army alerts on the presence of explosive ordnance in Kainama, Beni," *Actualite CD*, 1 March 2021, [bit.ly/ActualiteCD1March2021](https://bit.ly/ActualiteCD1March2021); response to Monitor questionnaire by Christophe Wembelumbe Lomani, Head of Quality Management Department, CCLAM, 14 June 2024; UNMAS, "Annual Report 2023," 26 April 2024, p. 48, [bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2023](https://bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2023); and statement of DRC, Regional Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Impact of Improvised Anti-Personnel Mines within the Framework of the Convention, 13 February 2024, p. 2, [bit.ly/DRCStatement13Feb2024](https://bit.ly/DRCStatement13Feb2024).

<sup>82</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Christophe Wembelumbe Lomani, Head of Quality Management Department, CCLAM, 14 June 2024; and DRC Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 3.

<sup>83</sup> Eritrea Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 8, [bit.ly/EritreaSecondArt5ExtRequest2014](https://bit.ly/EritreaSecondArt5ExtRequest2014).

<sup>84</sup> Eritrea Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 November 2023, [bit.ly/EritreaArt5ExtRequest2023](https://bit.ly/EritreaArt5ExtRequest2023); and Final Report, Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 November 2023, pp. 7–8, [undocs.org/APLC/MSP.21/2023/18](https://undocs.org/APLC/MSP.21/2023/18).

areas as SHA (722.55km<sup>2</sup>).<sup>85</sup> Most SHAs are located in the Somali region of Ethiopia. The baseline figure is believed to be an overestimate and that only 2% of these areas may contain landmines.<sup>86</sup> Conflict in northern Ethiopia since late 2020 has resulted in new contamination from mines/ERW, though the extent and type is yet to be fully established.<sup>87</sup> Separate armed conflicts causing contamination with mines/ERW are ongoing in other regions of Ethiopia, particularly in Oromia.<sup>88</sup>

**Guinea-Bissau** declared the completion of its clearance obligations in December 2012. However, in 2021, it reported the presence of “previously unknown mined areas” containing antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and ERW. A total of nine CHAs were reported across the northern provinces of Cacheu and Oio, and the southern provinces of Quebo and Tombali. An additional 43 areas were suspected to contain both mines and ERW.<sup>89</sup> For calendar years 2022 and 2023, Guinea-Bissau reported that the nine CHAs totaled 1.09km<sup>2</sup>, with no further progress made on surveying 43 previously reported SHAs.<sup>90</sup> Guinea-Bissau may also be contaminated by improvised mines.<sup>91</sup>

**Mauritania** declared clearance of all known contamination in 2018 but later identified new mined areas.<sup>92</sup> As of the end of 2023, after identifying six previously unknown minefields, Mauritania reported 22.37km<sup>2</sup> of confirmed landmine contamination but emphasized that these areas also contain antivehicle mines and ERW.<sup>93</sup> The contamination is an increase on the 16km<sup>2</sup> reported in 2022.<sup>94</sup>

**Niger** presented its fifth Article 5 extension request on 30 March 2024 to allow it to clear 0.18km<sup>2</sup> of CHA adjacent to a military post in Madama in the Agadez region.<sup>95</sup> This figure has

<sup>85</sup> Statement of Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, [bit.ly/EthiopiaStatement18June2024](https://bit.ly/EthiopiaStatement18June2024); and Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period January–March 2022), Form C, p. 6.

<sup>86</sup> Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2019, p. 35, [bit.ly/EthiopiaArtExtRequestMarch2019](https://bit.ly/EthiopiaArtExtRequestMarch2019).

<sup>87</sup> The conflict in Tigray that began in November 2020 spilled into the neighboring regions of Afar and Amhara in 2021. See, Protection Cluster Ethiopia, “Protection Analysis Update: Ethiopia,” June 2022, p. 9, [bit.ly/ProtectionClusterEthiopiaMarch2024](https://bit.ly/ProtectionClusterEthiopiaMarch2024); Global Protection Cluster, “Mine Action Mission to Ethiopia,” 1 October 2021, [bit.ly/ProtectionClusterEthiopiaOct2021](https://bit.ly/ProtectionClusterEthiopiaOct2021); and HRW, “Ethiopia: Ethnic Cleansing Persists Under Tigray Truce,” 1 June 2023, [bit.ly/HRWEthiopia1June2023](https://bit.ly/HRWEthiopia1June2023).

<sup>88</sup> Protection Cluster Ethiopia, “Ethiopia: Protection Analysis Update,” March 2024, pp. 3–4, [bit.ly/ProtectionClusterEthiopiaJune2022](https://bit.ly/ProtectionClusterEthiopiaJune2022); and UNMAS, “Mine Action in Ethiopia,” 29 April 2024, p. 15, [bit.ly/UNMASEthiopia29Apr2024](https://bit.ly/UNMASEthiopia29Apr2024).

<sup>89</sup> Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 May 2021, pp. 7, 9–11, [bit.ly/Guinea-BissauMBTArt5ExRequest2021](https://bit.ly/Guinea-BissauMBTArt5ExRequest2021); Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 22 April 2022, pp. 3, 29–31, [bit.ly/Guinea-BissauMBTArt5ExRequest2022](https://bit.ly/Guinea-BissauMBTArt5ExRequest2022); and response to Monitor questionnaire by Nautan Mancabu, Director, National Mine Action Coordination Center (Centro Nacional de Coordenação da Ação Anti-Minas, CAAMI), 24 March 2021.

<sup>90</sup> Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, pp. 3–5; Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form D, pp. 4–5; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Nautan Mancabu, Director, CAAMI, 7 April 2023.

<sup>91</sup> Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 22 April 2022, pp. 6, [bit.ly/Guinea-BissauMBTArt5ExRequest2022](https://bit.ly/Guinea-BissauMBTArt5ExRequest2022).

<sup>92</sup> Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 January 2020, pp. 2–3, [bit.ly/MauritaniaThirdArt5ExtRequest2020](https://bit.ly/MauritaniaThirdArt5ExtRequest2020).

<sup>93</sup> Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 3–4; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Houssein Neya, Database Manager, National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD), 14 June 2024.

<sup>94</sup> Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), p. 6.

<sup>95</sup> Niger Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 8–9; and Niger Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 March 2024, p. 8, [bit.ly/NigerArt5ExtRequestMar2024](https://bit.ly/NigerArt5ExtRequestMar2024).

not changed since its third Article 5 extension request was granted in 2020.<sup>96</sup> Niger is also contaminated by improvised mines.<sup>97</sup>

**Nigeria** has continuously reported improvised mine contamination since 2019.<sup>98</sup> The contamination affects mainly the three northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe.<sup>99</sup> Nigeria was granted a second extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline in 2021. As of February 2024, Nigeria had not yet been able to conduct a comprehensive survey to determine the full extent of contamination.<sup>100</sup>

**Senegal** reported that a total of 37 hazardous areas, covering 0.49km<sup>2</sup>, had been identified, after non-technical survey was undertaken in 2020.<sup>101</sup> As of the end of 2023, Senegal reported that 27 CHAs covering an area of 0.34km<sup>2</sup> remained to be addressed—six CHAs totaling 0.13km<sup>2</sup> more than as of the end of 2022 following non-technical survey.<sup>102</sup> Areas with known contamination were located in Bignona, Goudomp, Oussouye, and Ziguinchor departments. In addition, 11 SHAs of unknown size were reported but had not yet been surveyed due to insecurity.<sup>103</sup> Another 112 localities also remained to be surveyed, including 101 areas in Bignona, seven in Ziguinchor, and four in Oussouye.<sup>104</sup>

In September 2021, **Somalia** reported 6.1km<sup>2</sup> of antipersonnel mine contamination within its total 161.8km<sup>2</sup> of mixed contamination, which also included antivehicle landmines.<sup>105</sup> In its workplan from April 2023, and referring to its data from December 2022, Somalia reported a total of 124.23km<sup>2</sup> of mixed contamination including antipersonnel mines (55.47km<sup>2</sup> CHA and 68.76km<sup>2</sup> SHA).<sup>106</sup> In October 2024, Somalia reported antipersonnel mine contamination across 212 CHAs (37.06km<sup>2</sup>) and 243 SHAs (71.51km<sup>2</sup>) totaling 108.57km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>107</sup> It is believed,

96 Niger Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 March 2020, p. 5, [bit.ly/NigerArt5ExtRequestMar2020](https://bit.ly/NigerArt5ExtRequestMar2020).

97 The Monitor recorded 63 casualties of improvised mines in Niger in 2023 and recorded such casualties each year since 2018. Monitor analysis of Armed Conflict and Location Event Data Project (ACLED) data for Niger for 2018–2023. See, ACLED website, [www.acleddata.com](http://www.acleddata.com). See also, United Nations Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), “Weapons and Ammunition Dynamics in the Lake Chad Basin,” 11 October 2022, pp. 19 and 32, [bit.ly/UNLakeChadBasinOct2022](https://bit.ly/UNLakeChadBasinOct2022); United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Niger: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022,” February 2022, p. 33, [bit.ly/OCHANigerFeb2022](https://bit.ly/OCHANigerFeb2022); UNOCHA “Niger: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023,” February 2023, pp. 11 and 41, [bit.ly/UNOCHANigerFeb2023](https://bit.ly/UNOCHANigerFeb2023); Protection Cluster Niger, “Advocacy Note: A Crucial Need to Reinforce Actions against the Growing Threat of Explosive Devices (ED) in Niger,” July 2023, pp. 3–6, [bit.ly/ProtectionClusterNiger3Aug2023](https://bit.ly/ProtectionClusterNiger3Aug2023); UNMAS, “Niger,” October 2022, [bit.ly/UNMASNigerProgramme](https://bit.ly/UNMASNigerProgramme).

98 Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019, [bit.ly/StatementNigeriaNovember2019](https://bit.ly/StatementNigeriaNovember2019); Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 13 August 2021, p. 4, [bit.ly/NigeriaRevisedArt5ExtRequest2021](https://bit.ly/NigeriaRevisedArt5ExtRequest2021); response to Monitor questionnaire by Edwin Faigmane, Chief Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, 30 May 2023; and presentation of Nigeria, Regional Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Impact of Improvised Anti-Personnel Mines within the Framework of the Convention, 13 February 2024, p. 4, [bit.ly/PresentationNigeria13Feb2024](https://bit.ly/PresentationNigeria13Feb2024).

99 Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 13 August 2021, p. 4, [bit.ly/NigeriaRevisedArt5ExtRequest2021](https://bit.ly/NigeriaRevisedArt5ExtRequest2021); and presentation of Nigeria, Regional Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Impact of Improvised Anti-Personnel Mines within the Framework of the Convention, 13 February 2024, p. 7, [bit.ly/PresentationNigeria13Feb2024](https://bit.ly/PresentationNigeria13Feb2024).

100 Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, [bit.ly/NigeriaStatement18June2024](https://bit.ly/NigeriaStatement18June2024).

101 Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form D, pp. 3–4.

102 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mamadou Diallo, Head of operations, National Mine Action Center in Senegal (Centre National d’Action Antimines au Sénégal, CNAMS), 12 July 2024; Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 3–4; and Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), pp. 3–4 and 8–10.

103 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mamadou Diallo, Head of operations, CNAMS, 12 July 2024; and Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 3–4.

104 Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 3.

105 Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 September 2021, p. 9, [bit.ly/SomaliaArt5RevisedExtRequest2021](https://bit.ly/SomaliaArt5RevisedExtRequest2021).

106 Somalia, “The Federal Republic of Somalia Work Plan for the period from October 2022 to October 2027,” 30 April 2023, pp. 18–19, [bit.ly/SomaliaMBTArt5Workplan2023](https://bit.ly/SomaliaMBTArt5Workplan2023).

107 Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 4.

however, that this also represents mixed contamination, but the extent of antipersonnel mine contamination has yet to be identified.

**South Sudan** reported 114 landmine contaminated areas totaling 5.32km<sup>2</sup> (2.99km<sup>2</sup> CHA and 2.33km<sup>2</sup> SHA) in eight states as of the end of 2023. Central Equatoria province had the largest extent of contamination at 1.88km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>108</sup> Despite newly discovered mine contaminated areas in three provinces in 2023 totaling 0.18km<sup>2</sup>, South Sudan succeeded in reducing its landmine contamination by 5.41km<sup>2</sup> since 2022 through land release.<sup>109</sup> However it also highlighted that survey was still ongoing and that climate change affected the efficiency of mine action activities, including survey, due to extended rain and flooding periods.<sup>110</sup>

**Sudan** last provided an update on the extent of antipersonnel mine contamination in 2021, when it reported 13.28km<sup>2</sup> of antipersonnel mine contamination (3.31km<sup>2</sup> CHA and 9.96km<sup>2</sup> SHA) in the states of Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and West Kordofan.<sup>111</sup> The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) reported the identification of 255 new SHAs and CHAs during 2022.<sup>112</sup> The last progress update before the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) erupted on 15 April 2023 was provided by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in March 2023, which reported that 138.09km<sup>2</sup> of a recorded 172km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated land had been released since 2002.<sup>113</sup> UNMAS has continued providing explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and risk education throughout 2023.<sup>114</sup>

In **Zimbabwe**, contamination totaled 16.16km<sup>2</sup> as of the end of December 2023, a reduction of 2.14km<sup>2</sup> compared with the extent of contamination reported in 2022.<sup>115</sup> This contamination is all classified as CHA and mostly located along Zimbabwe's border with Mozambique in four provinces, with one inland minefield in Matabeleland North province.<sup>116</sup> At the treaty's June 2024 intersessional meetings, Zimbabwe reported that the contamination had been reduced to 15.43km<sup>2</sup>, with the largest CHA (8.9km<sup>2</sup>) remaining in Mashonaland East province between the Mazowe and Rwenya rivers.<sup>117</sup>

### Contamination from improvised mines

As noted previously in this report, victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IED) that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person are considered to be improvised mines that fall under the prohibition and clearance obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty.<sup>118</sup>


- 
- <sup>108</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 25 April 2024; and South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 6–9.
- <sup>109</sup> New contamination has been identified in Upper Nile (0.01km<sup>2</sup>), Central Equatoria (0.14km<sup>2</sup>), and Eastern Equatoria (0.028km<sup>2</sup>). Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 25 April 2024; presentation of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2023, p. 3, [bit.ly/SouthSudanPresentation21June2023](https://bit.ly/SouthSudanPresentation21June2023); response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), 17 April 2023; and South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 9.
- <sup>110</sup> South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 5–6.
- <sup>111</sup> Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Forms C and F, pp. 8 and 13; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abd El Majeed, Chief of Operations, Sudan National Mine Action Center (SNMAC), 20 April 2022.
- <sup>112</sup> "Together for Sudan free of Mine," *Brown Land News*, 6 April 2023, [bit.ly/BrownLandNews6April2023](https://bit.ly/BrownLandNews6April2023).
- <sup>113</sup> UNMAS, "Where We Work: Sudan," updated June 2023, [bit.ly/UNMASSudanJune2023](https://bit.ly/UNMASSudanJune2023).
- <sup>114</sup> UNMAS, "Annual Report 2023," 26 April 2024, p. 91, [bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2023](https://bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2023).
- <sup>115</sup> Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 2–4; response to Monitor questionnaire by Patson Mandaba, Operations Officer, Zimbabwe Mine Action Center (ZIMAC), 13 March 2024; and Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), p. 7.
- <sup>116</sup> The five provinces are Matabeleland North, Masvingo, Manicaland, Mashonaland East, and Mashonaland Central. Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 6.
- <sup>117</sup> Presentation of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, p. 4, [bit.ly/ZimbabwePresentation18June2024](https://bit.ly/ZimbabwePresentation18June2024).
- <sup>118</sup> Improvised mines are sometimes also referred to as artisanal mines, or by the type of construction or initiation system, such as pressure-plate or crush-wire IEDs.



While 30 States Parties have declared completion of clearance of antipersonnel mines, a growing number of States Parties and other states are confronted with contamination resulting from the use of improvised mines.<sup>119</sup>

As of October 2024, at least 32 states—including 25 States Parties—are believed or known to currently have improvised mine contamination. Among them are Mozambique and Venezuela, which had both previously fulfilled their clearance obligations in 2015 and 2013, respectively. This amounts to 15 more States Parties than in 2019, with the highest increase of affected countries in Africa.

### States recorded as affected by improvised mines in 2019 and through 2024<sup>120</sup>



Casualties are one of the first indications of new contamination from improvised mines. However, such contamination remains difficult to identify and record in any systematic way. Clearance operators must also increasingly deal with mixed, overlaying contamination in complex contexts and environments, including in urban areas. The traditional minefield, defined within clearly marked boundaries, has become increasingly rare.

Action 21 of the 2019 Oslo Action Plan specifies that “States Parties affected by anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature will ensure that they apply all provisions and obligations under the Convention to such contamination as they do for all other types of anti-personnel mines, including during survey and clearance in fulfilment of Article 5 and disaggregate by types of mines when reporting in fulfilment of Article 7 obligations.”<sup>121</sup>

However, adhering to Action 21 is challenging. Identifying the precise perimeter of areas affected with improvised mines and establishing accurate baselines of contamination is difficult. Also, if discovered before detonating, they are dealt with on the spot, predominantly

<sup>119</sup> In order of completion, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Honduras, Guatemala, Suriname, North Macedonia, Eswatini, France, Malawi, Albania, Greece, Rwanda, Tunisia, Zambia, Nicaragua, Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Gambia, Jordan, Uganda, Bhutan, Germany, Hungary, Venezuela, Burundi, Mozambique, Algeria, Chile, and the UK declared completion of clearance of antipersonnel mines between 1999 and 2020.

<sup>120</sup> In 2019, States Parties Afghanistan, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, and Yemen, and states not party India, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria were affected by improvised mines. Since 2019, States Parties Afghanistan, Benin, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Somalia, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Türkiye, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yemen are known or suspected to be contaminated with antipersonnel mines of an improvised nature. In addition, states not party Egypt, India, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria are also known or suspected to be affected by improvised mines since 2019.

<sup>121</sup> Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, p. 36, [bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019](https://bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019).

by local security forces. This comes with another difficulty: hesitation to share information concerning incidents and types of devices involved, as these may be a matter of national security.

These, among other challenges, were discussed during the treaty's Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties in November 2023 and at a regional conference on improvised antipersonnel mines held in Accra in February 2024, as well as in a recent report by the United Nations Secretary-General.<sup>122</sup>

While Burkina Faso and Mali have officially acknowledged the presence of mines of an improvised nature on their territory for the first time in their Article 7 reports for 2023, only affected States Parties Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, and Yemen have reported land release activities and the destruction of improvised mines in 2023. The reporting remains limited in terms of both the number of States Parties acknowledging the presence of improvised mines at all, and the quality of the reports providing an accurate disaggregation of explosive devices.

### *Suspected improvised (antipersonnel) mine contamination in States Parties without current clearance obligations*

As of October 2024, at least 32 countries including 25 States Parties are believed or known to currently have improvised mine contamination.<sup>123</sup>

**Burkina Faso** has reported the presence of “anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature” in its Article 7 transparency report for 2023.<sup>124</sup> Pressure-plate improvised antivehicle mines have been used since 2018 due to the introduction of measures that block signals to command-detonated IEDs. Casualties from IEDs have been recorded by Burkina Faso since 2017, without, however, specifying how many are believed to be caused by improvised mines. These incidents have predominantly occurred in the Sahel, East, North Central, North, Boucle du Mouhoun, Waterfall, and Central East regions, but more recently are affecting other regions and are increasingly impacting civilians.<sup>125</sup> Most incidents involved vehicles such as cars, carts, motorcycles, and bicycles, though some incidents involved pedestrians.<sup>126</sup> Although Burkina Faso has acknowledged the use of improvised mines on territory under its jurisdiction or control, it explained that it is challenging to identify the extent of contamination in square meters as the threat is from individual devices or a small number of devices in multiple places along routes or around living areas.<sup>127</sup> Burkina Faso has instead reported the threat by number of incidents and casualties.<sup>128</sup>

<sup>122</sup> “Anti-Personnel Mines of an improvised nature and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention,” Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 15 November 2023, pp. 1–2, [bit.ly/MBTImprovisedMines15Nov2023](https://bit.ly/MBTImprovisedMines15Nov2023); Regional Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Impact of Improvised Anti-Personnel Mines within the Framework of the Convention, 13–15 February 2024, [bit.ly/MBTAccra13-15Feb2024](https://bit.ly/MBTAccra13-15Feb2024); and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices: Report of the Secretary-General (A/79/211),” 22 July 2024, pp. 18–19, [www.undocs.org/en/A/79/211](https://www.undocs.org/en/A/79/211).

<sup>123</sup> The 25 States Parties are: Afghanistan, Benin, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Somalia, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Türkiye, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yemen.

<sup>124</sup> Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 3; and Small Arms Survey, “Out of Control – The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa,” November 2023, pp. 35–36, [bit.ly/SmallArmsSurveyNov2023](https://bit.ly/SmallArmsSurveyNov2023).

<sup>125</sup> Presentation of Burkina Faso, Regional Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Impact of Improvised Anti-Personnel Mines within the Framework of the Convention, 13 February 2024, pp. 2, 4–5, [bit.ly/BurkinaFasoPresentation13Feb2024](https://bit.ly/BurkinaFasoPresentation13Feb2024); and Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 3–5.

<sup>126</sup> Based on incident notes documented within ACLED data for conflict incidents in Burkina Faso.

<sup>127</sup> Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 4; and presentation of Burkina Faso, Regional Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Impact of Improvised Anti-Personnel Mines within the Framework of the Convention, 13 February 2024, [bit.ly/BurkinaFasoPresentation13Feb2024](https://bit.ly/BurkinaFasoPresentation13Feb2024).

<sup>128</sup> Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 3–5; and presentation of Burkina Faso, Regional Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Impact of Improvised Anti-Personnel Mines within the Framework of the Convention, 13 February 2024, pp. 4–5. [bit.ly/BurkinaFasoPresentation13Feb2024](https://bit.ly/BurkinaFasoPresentation13Feb2024).

**Mali** has seen a significant rise in incidents caused by IEDs in the center of the country since 2017.<sup>129</sup> Since 2021, the explosive threat has also spread towards the south and west of the country.<sup>130</sup> The Monitor recorded improvised mines and unspecified mine types in Mali in 2022, including in incidents resulting in casualties that were recorded by the National Secretariat to Counter the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.<sup>131</sup> Civilians accounted for more than 40% of all IED/mine casualties across Mali in 2022, and for 39% in the first half of 2023, with the largest share of casualties in the Mopti and Segou regions.<sup>132</sup> In 2024, Mali reported that it is “not easy to provide the exact dimensions of the contaminated area, or to state with accuracy the number or type of mines,” particularly in the Menaka, Bankass, Mopti, Bandiagara, Koro, Nara, and Sikasso regions.<sup>133</sup>

Nine States Parties have yet to clarify if they are contaminated by improvised mines.

**Benin** is regarded as a state with emerging IED threats.<sup>134</sup> The number of casualties from improvised mines increased from two to 23 between 2022 and 2023. Civilians have been injured or killed by improvised mines while fishing and riding tricycles or motorcycles, as well as due to bodies being booby-trapped.<sup>135</sup> In October 2024, Benin submitted its first Article 7 report since 2008 (covering the years 2008 to 2023). It did not report any contamination with improvised mines but announced the organization of a regional workshop in November 2024 to discuss the application of the Mine Ban Treaty by West African states confronted with the threat of IED and improvised mines.<sup>136</sup>

**Cameroon** originally declared that there were no mined areas under its jurisdiction or control.<sup>137</sup> However since 2014, improvised mines used by Boko Haram have caused casualties, particularly in the north on the border with Nigeria.<sup>138</sup> This reportedly includes victim-activated improvised explosive devices.<sup>139</sup> An increase in IED use was reported in regions bordering Nigeria since 2021, targeting state security forces but also causing

129 Small Arms Survey, “Out of Control – The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa,” November 2023, pp. 39–41, [bit.ly/SmallArmsSurveyNov2023](https://bit.ly/SmallArmsSurveyNov2023).

130 UNMAS, “Where We Work: Mali,” updated 31 July 2023, [bit.ly/UNMASMaliJuly2023](https://bit.ly/UNMASMaliJuly2023).

131 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, National Secretariat to Counter the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 26 April 2023.

132 UNMAS, “Where We Work: Mali,” updated 31 July 2023, [bit.ly/UNMASMaliJuly2023](https://bit.ly/UNMASMaliJuly2023); and presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Impact of Improvised Anti-Personnel Mines within the Framework of the Convention, 13 February 2024, [bit.ly/MaliPresentation13Feb2024](https://bit.ly/MaliPresentation13Feb2024).

133 Presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Impact of Improvised Anti-Personnel Mines within the Framework of the Convention, 13 February 2024, [bit.ly/MaliPresentation13Feb2024](https://bit.ly/MaliPresentation13Feb2024); and Mali Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for May 2023 to May 2024), Form C, p. 7.

134 Small Arms Survey, “Out of Control – The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa,” November 2023, pp. 47–48, [bit.ly/SmallArmsSurveyNov2023](https://bit.ly/SmallArmsSurveyNov2023).

135 Based on Monitor analysis of ACLED data for the period 2022–2023.

136 Benin Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar years 2008–2023). Form I, p. 3.

137 Cameroon Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2009), p. 4.

138 Small Arms Survey, “Out of Control – The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa,” November 2023, pp. 36–39, [bit.ly/SmallArmsSurveyNov2023](https://bit.ly/SmallArmsSurveyNov2023); Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Land Mines Hamper Cameroon, Chad in Fight Against Boko Haram,” *Voice of America*, 3 March 2015, [bit.ly/CameroonVOA3March2015](https://bit.ly/CameroonVOA3March2015); Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Boko Haram Surrounds Havens with Land Mines,” *Voice of America*, 24 May 2015, [bit.ly/CameroonVOA24May2015](https://bit.ly/CameroonVOA24May2015); and UNOCHA, “Cameroon: Far North: Situation Report No. 16,” 29 December 2021, [bit.ly/UNOCHACameroon29Dec2021](https://bit.ly/UNOCHACameroon29Dec2021).

139 UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Needs Overview: Cameroon,” March 2021, p. 18, [bit.ly/UNOCHACameroonMarch2021](https://bit.ly/UNOCHACameroonMarch2021); Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Cameroon Military Says Rebels Turning to IEDs as Numbers Fall,” *Voice of America*, 11 May 2021, [bit.ly/VOACameroon11May2021](https://bit.ly/VOACameroon11May2021); “Cameroon: Improvised explosive kills seven-year-old in Anglophone region,” *Journal du Cameroun*, 26 March 2021; “4 soldiers and a civilian killed in makeshift bomb blast in Cameroon,” *News 24*, 7 January 2021, [bit.ly/News24Cameroon7Jan2021](https://bit.ly/News24Cameroon7Jan2021); and “Cameroonian forces dismantle explosive devices in restive Anglophone region,” *Xinhua*, 14 December 2020, [bit.ly/XinhuaCameroon14Dec2020](https://bit.ly/XinhuaCameroon14Dec2020).

civilian casualties as IEDs are being placed along public roads.<sup>140</sup> Cameroon last submitted an Article 7 report in 2009 and it has not officially reported the presence of improvised mine contamination on territories under its jurisdiction or control.

In the **Central African Republic**, conflict between government forces and armed groups has escalated since 2020, with a corresponding increase in the use of improvised mines and IEDs, particularly in the west.<sup>141</sup> The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that antipersonnel mines were discovered for the first time in the country in April 2022. It was not reported if they were improvised.<sup>142</sup> In February 2023, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) expressed concern that incidents involving landmines and other explosive devices had increased.<sup>143</sup> UNMAS reported 25 incidents in 2023, including those involving mines, booby-traps, and IEDs.<sup>144</sup> In June 2024, UNOCHA reported that 75% of the victims of explosive devices in 2023 were civilians, and that in the first half of 2024, seven civilians were killed.<sup>145</sup> The regions most affected over the past three years have been the western part of the country, notably the prefectures of Ouham, Ouham-Pendé, Nana-Mambéré, and Mambéré-Kadei.<sup>146</sup> The Central African Republic last submitted an Article 7 report in 2004.

**Mexico** used its 2022 Article 7 report to detail the use of IEDs and “artisanal mines” by cartels in the state of Michoacán de Ocampo during 2022, but the exact nature of these devices was not known.<sup>147</sup> Such devices appear to include primarily command-detonated roadside bombs and improvised antivehicle mines.<sup>148</sup> In February 2022, the Secretariat of National Defense deployed troops to the area to conduct clearance operations.<sup>149</sup> Mexican soldiers reportedly cleared more than 500 improvised mines between February and April 2022.<sup>150</sup> In March 2024, a media report described the “widespread use of improvised landmines” by cartels. It was reported that some devices used by the cartels have “tripwires sensitive enough to be set off by pedestrians.”<sup>151</sup> In its Article 7 report for 2023, Mexico noted that the “artifacts” reported by the media—by their nature—do not fall under the remit of the Mine Ban Treaty obligations.<sup>152</sup>

<sup>140</sup> Celestin Delanga, “Explosive Ordnance Threaten Cameroon’s Far North,” *Institut d’Etudes de Sécurité*, 16 June 2023, [bit.ly/ISSCameroon16June2023](https://bit.ly/ISSCameroon16June2023); UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Needs Overview: Cameroon,” 14 April 2022, p. 14, [bit.ly/UNOCHACameroon14April2022](https://bit.ly/UNOCHACameroon14April2022); and UNOCHA, “Cameroon: Situation Report,” 29 December 2021, pp. 1–2, [bit.ly/UNOCHACameroonDec2021](https://bit.ly/UNOCHACameroonDec2021).

<sup>141</sup> United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2536,” S/2021/569, 25 June 2021, [bit.ly/SecurityCouncilCARReportJune2021](https://bit.ly/SecurityCouncilCARReportJune2021); Jack Losh, “Central African Republic War: No-go zones and Russian meddling,” *BBC News*, 23 September 2021, [bbc.in/3RZnXWj](https://bbc.in/3RZnXWj); and “CAR violence grows with addition of Russian landmines,” *Africa Defense Forum*, 13 October 2021, [bit.ly/AfriceDefenseForum13Oct2021](https://bit.ly/AfriceDefenseForum13Oct2021).

<sup>142</sup> UNOCHA, “Central African Republic: The ever-growing threat of explosive devices,” updated 20 September 2023, [bit.ly/UNOCHACentralAfricanRep20Sept2023](https://bit.ly/UNOCHACentralAfricanRep20Sept2023).

<sup>143</sup> UNICEF, “Central African Republic Humanitarian Situation Report: January–February 2023,” 25 March 2023, [bit.ly/UNICEFCentralAfricanRep25March2023](https://bit.ly/UNICEFCentralAfricanRep25March2023).

<sup>144</sup> UNMAS, “Annual Report 2023,” 26 April 2024, p. 38, [bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2023](https://bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2023).

<sup>145</sup> UNOCHA, “Central African Republic: The ever-growing threat of explosive devices,” updated 12 June 2024, [bit.ly/UNOCHA12June2024](https://bit.ly/UNOCHA12June2024).

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>147</sup> Mexico Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), p. 1.

<sup>148</sup> There were at least two incidents in Mexico in 2021 and two in 2022 that resulted in casualties. See, John P. Sullivan, Robert J. Bunker, and David A. Kuhn, “Improvised Anti-Vehicle Land Mines (IAVMs) in Mexico: Cartel Emergent Weaponry Use,” *Homeland Security Today*, 8 November 2022, [bit.ly/MexicoAVM8Nov2022](https://bit.ly/MexicoAVM8Nov2022).

<sup>149</sup> “Mexican army sends anti-mine squads to cartel turf war zone,” *Associated Press*, 19 February 2022, [bit.ly/AssociatedPressMexico19Feb2022](https://bit.ly/AssociatedPressMexico19Feb2022).

<sup>150</sup> John P. Sullivan, Robert J. Bunker, and David A. Kuhn, “Improvised Anti-Vehicle Land Mines in Mexico: Cartel Emergent Weaponry Use,” *Homeland Security Today*, 8 November 2022, [bit.ly/MexicoAVM8Nov2022](https://bit.ly/MexicoAVM8Nov2022).

<sup>151</sup> Keegan Hamilton and Kate Linthicum, “Soldiers and civilians are dying as Mexican cartels embrace a terrifying new weapon: Land mines,” *Los Angeles Times*, 9 March 2024, [bit.ly/LosAngelesTimes9Mar2024](https://bit.ly/LosAngelesTimes9Mar2024).

<sup>152</sup> Mexico Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 1.

**Mozambique** was declared mine-free in 2015. However, it may face the threat of contamination from improvised mines due to ongoing conflicts between NSAGs in the northern province of Cabo Delgado.<sup>153</sup> The World Health Organization (WHO), UNOCHA and other sources indicate an increase of incidents with IEDs involving civilians in 2023 and 2024.<sup>154</sup> In its Article 7 report for 2023, Mozambique reported the situation to be unchanged from previous years without referring to any incidents with IEDs and improvised mines.<sup>155</sup>

The **Philippines** reported in 2020 that it has no remaining mined areas, yet risk education is still carried out due to accidents caused by ERW, or where “government forces have exchanged fires [*sic*] with the non-state armed groups (NSAGs).”<sup>156</sup> In November 2022, the Philippines reported that “landmines” are used in “sporadic attacks” by NSAGs including the New People’s Army.<sup>157</sup> This indicates that the devices are command-detonated mines. However, the use of improvised mines by other NSAGs has been documented on the southern island of Mindanao.<sup>158</sup>

**Togo** last submitted an Article 7 report in 2003. It has not reported any mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. Yet improvised mine use by NSAGs has been reported since 2022 and incidents have caused military and civilian casualties, including among children traveling by cart.<sup>159</sup>

**Tunisia** declared completion of mine clearance in 2009 but acknowledged in 2023 that there is residual contamination.<sup>160</sup> There have also been reports of military and civilian casualties from new use of improvised antipersonnel mines since 2013, including in 2023.<sup>161</sup>

**Venezuela** reported the completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations in 2013.<sup>162</sup> In August 2018, local media reports said that Venezuelan military personnel were wounded by an antipersonnel mine in Catatumbo municipality, Zulia state, along the border with Colombia.<sup>163</sup> Colombian NSAGs were reported to be using improvised mines in the area

153 Omardine Omar, “Terrorists say they used explosive devices to destroy a military vehicle in Cabo Delgado,” *Integrity Magazine*, 16 January 2023, [bit.ly/IntegrityMagazine16Jan2023](https://bit.ly/IntegrityMagazine16Jan2023).

154 World Health Organization (WHO), “Mozambique: Cabo Delgado Humanitarian Response – Health Cluster Bulletin No. 03,” 31 March 2023, [bit.ly/WHOCaboDelgado31March2023](https://bit.ly/WHOCaboDelgado31March2023); UNOCHA, “Mozambique Access Snapshot – Cabo Delgado Province – April 2024,” 31 May 2024, [bit.ly/UNOCHAMozambique31May2024](https://bit.ly/UNOCHAMozambique31May2024); UNOCHA, “Mozambique Access Snapshot – Cabo Delgado Province – as of 31 July 2024,” 13 September 2024, [bit.ly/UNOCHAMozambique13Sept2024](https://bit.ly/UNOCHAMozambique13Sept2024); and ACLED, Zitamar News, and Mediacoop, “Cabo Ligado Updates,” [www.caboligado.com/reports](https://www.caboligado.com/reports).

155 Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 1.

156 Philippines Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form I, p. 14; and Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD), “Philippines,” undated, [bit.ly/FSDPhilippines](https://bit.ly/FSDPhilippines).

157 Statement of the Philippines, Mine Ban Treaty Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 25 November 2022, [bit.ly/PhilippinesStatement25Nov2022](https://bit.ly/PhilippinesStatement25Nov2022).

158 Henrique Garbino, “Rebels against Mines? Legitimacy and Restraint on Landmine Use in the Philippines,” *Security Studies*, Volume 32, Issue 3, 23 June 2023, [bit.ly/Garbino23June2023](https://bit.ly/Garbino23June2023); Michael Hart, “Mindanao’s Insurgencies Take an Explosive Turn,” *The Diplomat*, 1 June 2018, [bit.ly/TheDiplomatMindanao1June2018](https://bit.ly/TheDiplomatMindanao1June2018); Barnaby Papadopoulos, “Abu Sayyaf and suicide bombings in the Philippines: an analysis,” Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), 9 March 2021, [bit.ly/AOAV9March2021](https://bit.ly/AOAV9March2021); and response to Monitor questionnaire by Paul Davies, Country Director, FSD France, 20 April 2020.

159 Kars de Bruijne, “Conflict in the Penta-Border Area: Benin’s Northern Jihad from the Perspective of its Neighbours,” Clingendael, December 2022, p. 9, [bit.ly/BeninBorderConflictDec2022](https://bit.ly/BeninBorderConflictDec2022); “Terror Attacks Increase in Togo as Sahel Extremists Encroach,” *Africa Defense Forum*, 25 July 2024, [bit.ly/AfricaDefenseForum25July2024](https://bit.ly/AfricaDefenseForum25July2024); “Togo: Over 30 dead in ‘terrorist attacks’ in 2023,” *Africanews*, undated, [bit.ly/AfricanewsTogo2023](https://bit.ly/AfricanewsTogo2023); and incident notes documented within ACLED data for conflict incidents in Togo between January 2022 and December 2023.

160 Tunisia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Forms C and F, pp. 6 and 10.

161 Monitor analysis of ACLED data for Tunisia for 2013–2023; and “IED explodes in Tunisia’s restive Kasserine governorate wounding teenager,” *The North Africa Post*, 18 December 2023, [bit.ly/NorthAfricaPost18Dec2023](https://bit.ly/NorthAfricaPost18Dec2023).

162 ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Venezuela: Mine Action,” updated 9 October 2014, [bit.ly/VenezuelaMineAction2014](https://bit.ly/VenezuelaMineAction2014).

163 “Venezuelan military killed by antipersonnel mine at the border with Colombia,” *France 24*, 6 August 2018, [bit.ly/France24-6Aug2018](https://bit.ly/France24-6Aug2018).



in 2020 and 2021.<sup>164</sup> After a confrontation in March 2021 between Venezuelan troops and dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) in Victoria, Apure state, a Venezuelan non-governmental organization (NGO) stated that mines “similar to those used in Colombia” were found in the area.<sup>165</sup> Mine contamination was later alleged by a member of parliament and the Venezuelan Ministry of Defense.<sup>166</sup> The Monitor reported eight casualties caused by improvised mines in this area in 2022.<sup>167</sup> Venezuela reported that the military would clear the area, but also requested UN support to clear mines from the border.<sup>168</sup> As of October 2024, no update was available on the progress of clearance in this area.

### States Parties with residual contamination

Within the Mine Ban Treaty, ‘residual contamination’ is understood as unknown antipersonnel mine contamination under a State Party’s jurisdiction or control after all known or suspected mined areas have been processed and considered fit for normal human use.<sup>169</sup> Five States Parties were known or suspected to have residual mine contamination as of the end of 2023.

**Algeria** declared the completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations in December 2016.<sup>170</sup> However, it has continued to find and destroy a significant number of antipersonnel mines each year since 2016.<sup>171</sup> This includes mines that moved (due to wind and other natural factors) from areas where they were originally laid along the Challe and Morice Lines in the 1950s, and mines along the southern Algerian–Moroccan border. In 2023, Algeria reported the destruction of 1,168 of these “scattered and isolated” antipersonnel mines.<sup>172</sup>

**Kuwait** last provided an Article 7 transparency report in 2010, stating that there are “no mined areas left in Kuwait recently and formally.”<sup>173</sup> Kuwait has however had mine/ERW casualties with injuries consistent with antipersonnel mines every year since 2000, including one casualty in 2022 and in 2023.<sup>174</sup> Landmines are believed to be present mainly on Kuwait’s borders with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, in areas where shepherds graze animals. In June 2023, Kuwait reported that the government has declared the clearance of over 90% of the land that was contaminated with landmines following the Gulf War.<sup>175</sup> Kuwait has never made a formal declaration of contamination in line with its Article 5 obligations. It last provided an Article 7 transparency report in 2010.

<sup>164</sup> Jan Philip Klever, “Antipersonnel mines in Colombia, silent weapons preventing development,” *El Espectador*, 4 April 2021, [bit.ly/ElEspectador4April2021](https://bit.ly/ElEspectador4April2021); and Owen Boed, “Colombia’s Doubtful Progress Against Landmines,” *Insight Crime*, 20 October 2020, [bit.ly/InsightCrime20Oct2020](https://bit.ly/InsightCrime20Oct2020).

<sup>165</sup> “Clash between Venezuelan Armed Forces and FARC dissidents in Apure: they denounced that antipersonnel mines were found in the conflict area,” *NTN24*, 21 March 2021, [bit.ly/NTN24-21March2021](https://bit.ly/NTN24-21March2021).

<sup>166</sup> “Chavist member of Parliament confirmed FARC dissidents found antipersonnel mines in Apure,” *El Nacional*, 24 March 2021, [bit.ly/ElNacional24March2021](https://bit.ly/ElNacional24March2021).

<sup>167</sup> Monitor media monitoring of improvised mine incidents in Venezuela during 2022; and “Venezuela reports 8 deaths from landmines placed by armed groups,” *Agencia EFE*, 11 February 2022, [bit.ly/EFE11Feb2022](https://bit.ly/EFE11Feb2022).

<sup>168</sup> “Venezuela to request UN aid to clear mines from Colombia border,” *France 24*, 5 April 2021, [bit.ly/France24-5April2021](https://bit.ly/France24-5April2021); and “Venezuelan Army to Begin Clearing Mines in Apure State near Colombian Border,” *Orinoco Tribune*, 16 April 2021, [bit.ly/OrinocoTribune16Apr2021](https://bit.ly/OrinocoTribune16Apr2021).

<sup>169</sup> Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Article 5 Implementation, “Reflections and understandings on the implementation and completion of Article 5 mine clearance obligations,” 22 October 2018, p. 6, [bit.ly/MBTArt5Committee22Oct2018](https://bit.ly/MBTArt5Committee22Oct2018).

<sup>170</sup> See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Algeria: Mine Action,” last updated 16 November 2017, [bit.ly/AlgeriaMineAction2017](https://bit.ly/AlgeriaMineAction2017).

<sup>171</sup> See, for example, Algeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), Form I, pp. 39–40.

<sup>172</sup> Algeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, pp. 4–5.

<sup>173</sup> Kuwait Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for April 2009 to March 2010), p. 5.

<sup>174</sup> Sebastian Castelier and Aladdin Elbarbary, “Killer mines in Kuwait keep Gulf War alive and deadly,” *Al Jazeera*, 28 November 2023, [bit.ly/KuwaitAlJazeera28Nov2023](https://bit.ly/KuwaitAlJazeera28Nov2023); and Monitor media monitoring from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2023.

<sup>175</sup> Statement of Kuwait, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2023, [bit.ly/KuwaitStatement19June2023](https://bit.ly/KuwaitStatement19June2023).

**Mozambique** was declared mine-free in 2015 but has since reported residual and isolated mine contamination throughout the country.<sup>176</sup> Four small suspected mined areas, totaling 1,881m<sup>2</sup>, were reported in 2018 to be located underwater in Inhambane province. Mozambique stated at the time that it would address this contamination once the water level had receded, allowing access.<sup>177</sup> Mozambique provided an Article 7 report in 2024, but it has not provided updates on progress in these areas since 2019.<sup>178</sup>

**Nicaragua** declared the completion of clearance under Article 5 in April 2010. However, it has since found residual contamination.<sup>179</sup> Twenty-nine reports from the public during 2022 resulted in the clearance of 1,337m<sup>2</sup> and the destruction of 17 antipersonnel mines and 412 ERW.<sup>180</sup> Nicaragua did not report any clearance and destruction in 2023.<sup>181</sup>

**Tunisia** reported in 2009 the clearance of all minefields laid in 1976 and 1980 along its borders with Algeria and Libya. Yet, since then, it has reported a residual mine/ERW threat dating from World War II in El Hamma, Mareth, and Matmata in the south; Faieth and Kasserine in the center of the country; Cap-Bon in the north; and other areas in the northwest.<sup>182</sup> As of October 2024, Tunisia has not submitted an Article 7 report for calendar year 2023 and has not provided updates on efforts to clear this residual contamination.



In Tula Sanji, Angola, a deminer carefully places a specially designed fork to pull an uncovered PPM-2 antipersonnel landmine, to ensure that there are no booby-traps. The PPM-2 mine had been placed on top of two rocket-propelled grenades to create a bigger blast and increase the extent of the damage.

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## ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION IN STATES NOT PARTY AND OTHER AREAS

Twenty-two states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and three other areas are, or are believed to be, contaminated by antipersonnel mines.

<sup>176</sup> Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), p. 1.

<sup>177</sup> Statement of Mozambique, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018, [bit.ly/StatementMozambiqueJune2018](https://bit.ly/StatementMozambiqueJune2018); and Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period of 20 April 2017–1 April 2018), Form F. Mozambique erroneously reported that the total of the areas was “18.888 square meters” in its statement at the intersessional meetings in 2019, and “1.118m<sup>2</sup>” across four tasks in its 2019 Article 7 transparency report. See, Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period of 1 April 2018–31 March 2019), Form C, p. 4.

<sup>178</sup> Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023); statement of Mozambique, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023, [bit.ly/MozambiqueStatementJune2023](https://bit.ly/MozambiqueStatementJune2023).

<sup>179</sup> See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Nicaragua: Mine Action,” last updated 17 September 2012, [bit.ly/NicaraguaMineAction2012](https://bit.ly/NicaraguaMineAction2012).

<sup>180</sup> Nicaragua Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), p. 4.

<sup>181</sup> Nicaragua Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 5–6.

<sup>182</sup> Tunisia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form C, p. 6. See also, Article 7 Report (for the period April 2011–April 2012), Form C.

## States not party and other areas with confirmed or suspected antipersonnel mine contamination<sup>183</sup>

Armenia	Kyrgyzstan	South Korea
Azerbaijan	Lao PDR	Syria
China	Lebanon	Uzbekistan
Cuba	Libya	Vietnam
Egypt	Morocco	<i>Kosovo</i>
Georgia	Myanmar	<i>Somaliland</i>
India	North Korea	<i>Western Sahara</i>
Iran	Pakistan	
Israel	Russia	

Note: Other areas are indicated in *italics*.

### States not party

The extent of contamination is unknown in most states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

**Armenia** reported 11 CHAs and 25 SHAs contaminated with mines and explosive ordnance totaling 42.17km<sup>2</sup>, as of the end of December 2023, with Gegharkunik and Syunik identified as the most affected regions.<sup>184</sup> In 2023, Armenia also launched its Humanitarian Mine Action Strategy 2023–2027 and a National Mine Action Coordination Platform to enable better coordination among international and national stakeholders involved in mine action.<sup>185</sup>

**Azerbaijan** gained control of areas along the former line of contact after the conflict with Armenia ended in September 2020. These areas are deemed to be heavily contaminated with mines/ERW.<sup>186</sup> In 2023, the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) reported that it planned to survey suspected mined areas to gain a better understanding of the extent of contamination.<sup>187</sup> In its quarterly update for October–December 2023, ANAMA reported that it prioritizes the demining of access roads, essential infrastructure, and residential zones to facilitate the return of IDPs. In Nagorno-Karabakh, the reported contamination, before the renewed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in September 2020, included 5.62km<sup>2</sup> of land containing antipersonnel mines, 0.23km<sup>2</sup> containing antivehicle mines, and 0.9km<sup>2</sup> containing mixed contamination.<sup>188</sup> After Nagorno-Karabakh ceased to exist as of January 2024, ANAMA reported that it received eight new maps on mines in Karabakh.<sup>189</sup> In September 2024, Azerbaijan reported that the contamination in “liberated territories” is approximately 11,667km<sup>2</sup> and accounts for more than 13% of the country’s total territory.<sup>190</sup> Yet the exact extent of mine contamination in Azerbaijan remains unknown.

<sup>183</sup> Nagorno-Karabakh—formerly listed as an ‘other area’—is now considered part of the territory of Azerbaijan, as it ceased to exist as of January 2024. See, Piotr Sauer, “Nagorno-Karabakh’s breakaway government says it will dissolve itself,” *The Guardian*, 28 September 2023, [bit.ly/TheGuardian28Sept2023](https://bit.ly/TheGuardian28Sept2023); and Laurens Broers, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic: The life and death of an unrecognized state,” *Eurasianet*, 2 January 2024, [bit.ly/Eurasianet2Jan2024](https://bit.ly/Eurasianet2Jan2024).

<sup>184</sup> Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE), “National Mine Action Authority the Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise sums up the activities carried out in 2023,” 29 December 2023, [bit.ly/CHDE29Dec2023](https://bit.ly/CHDE29Dec2023).

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>186</sup> After the end of the conflict in 2020, the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) reported that there were “obvious minefields” and that the entire region “will be surveyed to register the mine and ERW affected regions.” Due to changes in the affected territories, strategic and operational plans were under review in 2021. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Elnur Gasimov, Operations Manager, ANAMA, 7 March 2021.

<sup>187</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ramil Azizov, Head of International Relations, Risk Education and Media Department, ANAMA, 17 May 2023.

<sup>188</sup> Email from Programme Officer, The HALO Trust, 20 July 2021.

<sup>189</sup> Burç Eruygür, “Azerbaijan says Armenia presented 8 new maps on minefields in Karabakh,” *Anadolu Agency*, 12 February 2024, [bit.ly/AnadoluAgency12Feb2024](https://bit.ly/AnadoluAgency12Feb2024).

<sup>190</sup> Anar Huseynov, “Landmine contamination, a problem in Azerbaijan,” *Albanian Daily News*, 18 September 2024, [bit.ly/AlbanianDailyNews18Sept2024](https://bit.ly/AlbanianDailyNews18Sept2024).

In **Georgia**, there are five landmine contaminated areas in Tbilisi-administered territory, totaling 2.25km<sup>2</sup> (0.02km<sup>2</sup> contaminated by antipersonnel mines and 2.23km<sup>2</sup> of mixed contamination, including antivehicle mines). The largest minefield (2.2km<sup>2</sup>) is known as the “Red Bridge”—a seven-kilometer-long mine belt along Georgia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The full extent of contamination in these areas has yet to be confirmed as survey is ongoing.<sup>191</sup> As of October 2024, no update on progress has been reported.

**Israel** reported some 90km<sup>2</sup> of contamination in 2017 (41.58km<sup>2</sup> CHA and 48.51km<sup>2</sup> SHA), including in areas in the West Bank.<sup>192</sup> This did not include mined areas “deemed essential to Israel’s security.” No updates on contamination have been provided since 2017, although Israel has reported re-surveying and clearing mine-affected areas, and destroying 56,513 mines and ERW since 2017.<sup>193</sup> Areas with demining operations included the West Bank, the Negev desert, a religious site near Jericho, and the Golan Heights.<sup>194</sup>

**Lebanon** reported a total of 16.17km<sup>2</sup> of land contaminated with antipersonnel, antivehicle, and improvised mines as of the end of 2023, without further disaggregating the figure by contamination type.<sup>195</sup> After land release activities, this is a reduction from the 16.91km<sup>2</sup> reported as of the end of 2022.<sup>196</sup>

In **Libya**, the full extent of antipersonnel mine contamination is not known. In May 2024, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) reported that 36% of hazardous land in Libya had been cleared but 436km<sup>2</sup> remain contaminated. At the same time, the Libyan Mine Action Center (LibMAC) announced its plans to establish a mine action strategy to address the remaining contamination.<sup>197</sup>

In **Myanmar**, the extent of landmine contamination is not known, but is likely to be extensive given the ongoing use and production by both Myanmar Armed Forces and NSAGs, with reports of increased use and production since the military coup in February 2021.<sup>198</sup> As of September 2023, suspected landmine/ERW contamination was reported in 168 of Myanmar’s townships—51% of all townships.<sup>199</sup>

**North Korea** has laid more than one million mines in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates the country from South Korea, but the full extent of contamination is not known.<sup>200</sup> In 2024, the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines shared information about North Korea laying new mines in the DMZ and along North Korea’s border with China to prevent

191 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Rachael Rosenberg, Partnerships and Programme Support Manager, The HALO Trust, 15 May 2023.

192 Email from Michael Heiman, Director of Technology and Knowledge Management, Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA), 26 May 2018.

193 Israel CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Reports (for calendar years 2017 to 2023), Form B. See, CCW Amended Protocol II Database, [bit.ly/CCWAmendedProtocolIIDatabase](http://bit.ly/CCWAmendedProtocolIIDatabase).

194 Ibid.; “Israel Defense Ministry completes demining operation near Egypt border,” *Jewish News Syndicate*, 16 December 2021, [bit.ly/JewishNewsSyndicate16Dec2021](http://bit.ly/JewishNewsSyndicate16Dec2021); “So Israeli forces demining a camp in the Golan Heights,” *Agenzia Nova*, 17 January 2023, [bit.ly/AgenziaNova17Jan2023](http://bit.ly/AgenziaNova17Jan2023); and Emanuel Fabian, “Man lightly hurt in blast during landmine clearing operation on Jordan border,” *The Times of Israel*, 21 August 2023, [bit.ly/TimesOfIsrael21Aug2023](http://bit.ly/TimesOfIsrael21Aug2023).

195 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Charbel Njeim, Operations Section Head, Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) 8 April 2024.

196 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 8 May 2023.

197 United Nations Support Mission in Libya’s Mine Action Section (UNSMIL), “Libyan Mine Action Center to develop country-wide Mine Action Strategy with UNSMIL support,” 14 May 2024, [bit.ly/UNSMIL14May2024](http://bit.ly/UNSMIL14May2024).

198 The Monitor has documented extensive use of antipersonnel landmines by the Myanmar Armed Forces and by various NSAGs operating in Myanmar, since the first annual Landmine Monitor report was published in 1999. See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Myanmar/Burma: Mine Ban Policy,” [bit.ly/MyanmarCountryProfile](http://bit.ly/MyanmarCountryProfile).

199 Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), “Townships with Suspected Landmine/ERW Contamination (1999–2023) and Landmine/ERW Casualties in Myanmar (2022),” September 2023, [bit.ly/MIMUMineAction](http://bit.ly/MIMUMineAction). The MIMU infographic uses data collected by the Monitor.

200 Joe He-rim, “Tall order to transform DMZ minefield into peace zone,” *The Korea Herald*, 28 October 2019, [bit.ly/KoreaHerald28Oct2019](http://bit.ly/KoreaHerald28Oct2019); and Guy Rhodes, “Confidence-Building through Mine Action on the Korean Peninsula,” *The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction*, Vol. 24, Issue 1, July 2020, p. 11, [bit.ly/GuyRhodesJul2020](http://bit.ly/GuyRhodesJul2020).



defections and smuggling.<sup>201</sup> Mines are reported to be laid not only along the main traffic axes but also in mountainous areas and fields, including on Arrowhead Hill where, previously, joint demining operations took place.<sup>202</sup>

**South Korea** has also laid mines in the DMZ but reported not to have done so in recent years.<sup>203</sup> In July 2024, South Korea warned that there is a possibility of antipersonnel mines being displaced from the DMZ after heavy rains.<sup>204</sup> Such displacements are known to have taken place previously.<sup>205</sup>

In **Syria**, contamination from landmines and/or ERW has been recorded across the country.<sup>206</sup> While several operators are conducting survey and clearance of hazardous areas, the extent of the contamination with antipersonnel mines, including improvised mines, in Syria remains unknown.<sup>207</sup>

Landmines are also known or suspected to be located along the borders of several other states not party, including China, Cuba, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Morocco, North Korea, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Ongoing armed conflict, insecurity, and improvised mine contamination also affects states not party Egypt, India, and Pakistan.

### Other areas

Three other areas, unable to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty due to their political status, are known to be contaminated.

As of the end of 2023, mine-affected areas in **Kosovo** totaled 0.58km<sup>2</sup> (0.21km<sup>2</sup> CHA and 0.37km<sup>2</sup> SHA). Kosovo reported an additional 0.42km<sup>2</sup> of mixed contamination from antipersonnel mines and cluster munition remnants.<sup>208</sup>

**Somaliland's** contaminated areas totaled 3.4km<sup>2</sup> as of the end of 2021 (1.1km<sup>2</sup> of antipersonnel mine contamination and 2.3km<sup>2</sup> of mixed contamination).<sup>209</sup> Most of the mined areas in Somaliland are barrier or perimeter minefields around military bases.<sup>210</sup> In

<sup>201</sup> Emails from Soohong Eum, Peace Sharing Association (PSA), 29 April, 18 May, 27 May, 18 June, and 17 July 2024.

<sup>202</sup> Emails from Soohong Eum, PSA, 29 April and 18 May 2024.

<sup>203</sup> Response from Jung Ji-yoon, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Policy Division, Policy Planning Bureau, Office of National Defense Policy, Ministry of National Defense, to an Official Information Disclosure Request by World Without War, 19 June 2023. Previously, Ministry of National Defense officials stated that no new non-self-destructing mines had been laid in 2020. Response from Lee Yoo-jung, Deputy Director, Arms Control Division, North Korea Policy Bureau, Office of National Defense Policy, Ministry of National Defense, to an Official Information Disclosure Request by World Without War, 22 April 2021.

<sup>204</sup> "Military Calls for Caution after N. Korea's Land Mines Swept Away in Monsoon Rain," *KBS World*, 17 July 2024, [bit.ly/KBSWorld17July2024](https://bit.ly/KBSWorld17July2024); Hyung-Jin Kim, "North Korean land mines could float into South Korea, South warns," *Associated Press*, 17 July 2024, [bit.ly/AP17July2024](https://bit.ly/AP17July2024); and email from Soohong Eum, PSA, 17 July 2024.

<sup>205</sup> "Parts of North Korean land mines washing up in South," *Associated Press*, 29 July 2011, [bit.ly/AP29July2011](https://bit.ly/AP29July2011); and "North Korea Wooden Land Mine Swept into South Korea," *Sputnik International*, 28 July 2017, [bit.ly/SputnikInternational28July2017](https://bit.ly/SputnikInternational28July2017).

<sup>206</sup> Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), "On the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action, We Are Still Discovering New Areas Contaminated With Landmines in Syria, With More Deaths and Injuries Recorded Across the Country," 4 April 2024, [bit.ly/SNHR4April2024](https://bit.ly/SNHR4April2024).

<sup>207</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Francesca Chiaudani, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 8 May 2023; and by Cassiopee Bruschini-Chaumet, Programme Officer, The HALO Trust, 25 April 2023; iMMAP, "Northeast Syria: Humanitarian Mine Action Response, Bi-annual Update (October 2022–March 2023)," 20 June 2023, p. 4, [bit.ly/iMMAP20June2023](https://bit.ly/iMMAP20June2023); Mines Advisory Group (MAG), "Syria," undated, [bit.ly/MAGSyria](https://bit.ly/MAGSyria); and ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2023," 18 March 2024, p. 93, [bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2023](https://bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2023).

<sup>208</sup> Republic of Kosovo, "Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030," 18 June 2024, p. 3, [bit.ly/KosovoStrategy2025-2030](https://bit.ly/KosovoStrategy2025-2030); and response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmet Sallova, Director, Kosovo Mine Action Center (KMAC), 24 April 2023.

<sup>209</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Pantigoso Vargas, Somaliland Programme Officer, The HALO Trust, 26 March 2022.

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Aislinn Redbond, Somaliland Programme Officer, The HALO Trust, 31 July 2023.



September 2023, The HALO Trust reported that it was conducting a baseline assessment to obtain a more accurate estimate of contamination.<sup>211</sup>

**Western Sahara's** minefields lie east of the Berm, a 2,700km-long wall built during the 1975–1991 conflict, dividing control of the territory between Morocco in the west and the Polisario Front in the east. These minefields are contaminated with antivehicle mines but occasionally antipersonnel mines are also found.<sup>212</sup> As of the end of 2023, the contaminated area in Western Sahara covered 213.11km<sup>2</sup> (10 CHAs totaling 58.54km<sup>2</sup> and 14 SHAs totaling 154.57km<sup>2</sup>).<sup>213</sup> This represents an overall increase from the contaminated area reported in 2022, due to newly identified SHA. However, due to land release activities that resumed as of May 2023, there was in fact a reduction of the number and extent of CHA.<sup>214</sup>

## ADDRESSING THE IMPACT


### ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CLEARANCE

Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty obliges each State Party to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel landmines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after entry into force of the treaty for that State Party.

### MINE CLEARANCE SINCE 2019

Between 2019 and 2023, the overall amount of land cleared from antipersonnel mines increased from 156km<sup>2</sup> in 2019 to 281.50km<sup>2</sup> in 2023—with a notable decline during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021. The number of antipersonnel mines destroyed is subject to a less obvious trend and, comparing the last five years, saw its peak in 2022 with 169,276 antipersonnel mines destroyed by States Parties.

### Total clearance (in km<sup>2</sup>) and destruction of antipersonnel mines: 2019–2023<sup>215</sup>



Between 2019 and 2023, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, Yemen, and Zimbabwe were consistently among the 10 States Parties that cleared the most landmine contaminated

<sup>211</sup> Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Aislinn Redbond, Programme Officer, The HALO Trust, 31 July and 20 September 2023.

<sup>212</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kebe Elhadji, Chief of Mine Action Program, UNMAS, 22 April 2024.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid.

<sup>214</sup> UNMAS reported in April 2023 that, following a request from the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), its implementing partner SafeLane Global was preparing to resume humanitarian demining operations in Western Sahara in May 2023. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kebe Elhadji, Chief of Mine Action Program, UNMAS, 22 April 2024; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Edwin Faigmane, Acting Chief of Mine Action Program, UNMAS, 12 April 2022.

<sup>215</sup> Figures for 2019 to 2022 are taken from previous Landmine Monitor reporting. Figures for 2023 derive from sources cited in this year's edition of the Landmine Monitor. See, *Landmine Monitor 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023), [bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports](http://bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports).

land. Angola, Chad, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Türkiye, and Ukraine were on the list more than one time. The UK—as it reported the completion of clearance of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas in 2020—and Thailand were among the top 10 States Parties once in the last five years. The largest amount of land cleared in the last five years by any State Party was reported by Cambodia in 2023 (167.53km<sup>2</sup>).

### Top ten countries conducting clearance (in km<sup>2</sup>) of landmines: 2019–2023<sup>216</sup>

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
1	<b>Iraq</b> (46.56km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Croatia</b> (49.66km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Cambodia</b> (43.73km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Cambodia</b> (88.47km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Cambodia</b> (167.53km <sup>2</sup> )
2	<b>Croatia</b> (39.16km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Cambodia</b> (46.42km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Croatia</b> (34.49km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Croatia</b> (40.2km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Croatia</b> (41.5km <sup>2</sup> )
3	<b>Afghanistan</b> (28.01km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Afghanistan</b> (24.24km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Afghanistan</b> (17.69km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Yemen</b> (31.91km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Afghanistan</b> (21.68km <sup>2</sup> )
4	<b>Cambodia</b> (20.93km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Iraq</b> (7.66km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Iraq</b> (11.07km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Sri Lanka</b> (11.8km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Iraq</b> (18.29km <sup>2</sup> )
5	<b>UK</b> (3.61km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Sri Lanka</b> (4.59km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Angola</b> (5.91km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Iraq</b> (11.23km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Yemen</b> (11.09km <sup>2</sup> )
6	<b>Yemen</b> (3.1km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Yemen</b> (2.8km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Yemen</b> (4.49km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Afghanistan</b> (11.12km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Angola</b> (5.95km <sup>2</sup> )
7	<b>Zimbabwe</b> (2.75km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Zimbabwe</b> (2.41km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Ukraine</b> (2.9km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Chad</b> (6.21km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Sri Lanka</b> (4.83km <sup>2</sup> )
8	<b>Ethiopia</b> (1.75km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Angola</b> (1.77km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Zimbabwe</b> (2.44km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Angola</b> (5.87km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Zimbabwe</b> (1.91km <sup>2</sup> )
9	<b>Ukraine</b> (1.7km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Colombia</b> (1.08km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Colombia</b> (1.94km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Zimbabwe</b> (2.13km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Chad</b> (1.69km <sup>2</sup> )
10	<b>Colombia</b> (1.39km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Thailand</b> (0.92km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Chad</b> (1.94km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Türkiye</b> (1.29km <sup>2</sup> )	<b>Türkiye</b> (0.92km <sup>2</sup> )

## MINE CLEARANCE IN 2023

States Parties with clearance obligations reported clearance totaling 281.50km<sup>2</sup> in 2023.<sup>217</sup> This represents an increase from the reported 219.31km<sup>2</sup> of land cleared in 2022. At least 160,566 antipersonnel landmines were cleared and destroyed in 2023—a decrease from the 169,276 reported in 2022.


Non-technical and technical survey also contribute to the overall amount of land that is released and returned to productive use. In 2023, a total of 693.91km<sup>2</sup> of land was released by States Parties with Article 5 obligations, of which 281.50km<sup>2</sup> was released through clearance operations, 183.82km<sup>2</sup> was reduced through technical survey, and 228.59km<sup>2</sup> was cancelled through non-technical survey. This is a similar disaggregation of land release activities as

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> Monitor data on clearance in States Parties is based on analysis of multiple sources, including reporting by national mine action programs, Article 7 reports, and Article 5 extension requests. In cases where varying annual clearance data is reported by States Parties, details are provided in footnotes and more information can be found in country profiles on the Monitor website.

in 2022 with a slight reduction of cleared land in favor of reduced and cancelled land (the proportion of cleared land decreased from 44% in 2022 to 41% in 2023).<sup>218</sup> Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, the DRC, Ecuador, Iraq, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe all reported the release of land through non-technical and technical survey in 2023. Afghanistan, BiH, Iraq, Tajikistan, Türkiye, and Thailand reduced and cancelled more land than they cleared.

### Land release by States Parties with clearance obligations in 2023<sup>219</sup>



**Cambodia** cleared the most land in 2023 and almost doubled its clearance output compared to 2022. It is followed by **Croatia, Afghanistan,** and **Iraq**. Both Afghanistan and Iraq also significantly increased the amount of land cleared compared with 2022. **Zimbabwe** cleared and destroyed the most landmines in 2023, for a total of 37,330. **Türkiye** and **Sri Lanka** also cleared a large number of antipersonnel mines from relatively small areas, indicating the density of mines laid in their contaminated areas.

Eleven States Parties cleared more than 1km<sup>2</sup> in 2023: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

Eleven States Parties cleared under 1km<sup>2</sup> in 2023: BiH, the DRC, Ecuador, Mauritania, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Türkiye.

Three States Parties with Article 5 obligations did not report clearance of areas contaminated with antipersonnel mines in 2023: Argentina, Cyprus, and Niger.

**Argentina** was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty and exercises control over the territory. Whereas the UK reported having completed mine clearance in 2020, a media article published in November 2023 reported that the government of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas had announced new mines found on the beach of Hell's Kitchen on the Murrell Peninsula. Following this, through clearance activities, three antipersonnel mines were discovered and destroyed in an area bordering previously cleared land.<sup>220</sup>

<sup>218</sup> Figures for 2022 are taken from previous Landmine Monitor reporting. ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2023*, (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2023), [bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports](https://bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports).

<sup>219</sup> The chart does not include data from the following States Parties with clearance obligations as they did not report on land release activities, or did not conduct land release activities in 2023: Argentina, Cyprus, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, and Sudan. Ukraine reported that since the invasion by Russian troops up until the end of December 2023, 1,135.06km<sup>2</sup> has been surveyed and cleared, but did not provide data for 2023 only. Sources used for land release figures 2023: see table "Mine clearance in States Parties with clearance obligations in 2023 compared with 2022."

<sup>220</sup> "Falklands: mines discovered on a beach in Murrell Peninsula, north of Stanley," *MercoPress, South Atlantic News Agency*, 29 November 2023, [bit.ly/MercoPress29Nov2023](https://bit.ly/MercoPress29Nov2023); Evelina Mezennaja, "Clearance of Unexpected Mines at Hell's Kitchen Underway," *Falkland Islands Television*, 25 March 2024, [bit.ly/FITV25Mar2024](https://bit.ly/FITV25Mar2024); and Evelina Mezennaja, "Hell's Kitchen on the Murrell Peninsula is mine free," *Falkland Islands Television*, 13 April 2024, [bit.ly/FITV13Apr2024](https://bit.ly/FITV13Apr2024).

## Mine clearance in States Parties with clearance obligations in 2023 compared with 2022<sup>221</sup>

State Party	2023		2022	
	Clearance (km <sup>2</sup> )	APM destroyed	Clearance (km <sup>2</sup> )	APM destroyed
<b>Afghanistan</b>	21.68	4,168	11.12	5,464
<b>Angola</b>	5.95	4,586	5.87	3,342
<b>Argentina*</b>	0	0	0	0
<b>BiH</b>	0.36	786	0.91	3,180
<b>Cambodia</b>	167.53	23,946	88.47	13,708
<b>Chad</b>	1.69	5	6.21	0
<b>Colombia</b>	1.73	339	0.96	247
<b>Croatia</b>	41.5	797	40.2	1,107

<sup>221</sup> Total figures reported for antipersonnel mines destroyed include improvised mines, where applicable and available. Clearance figures for 2023 are from Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports for calendar year 2023, unless otherwise stated. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, [bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT](http://bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT). Clearance figures for 2022 are from 2023 Monitor reporting. It is acknowledged that States Parties sometimes update their land release figures for previous years. For its reporting, the Monitor relies on figures provided during the relevant reporting period. **Afghanistan:** the figure reported in the table includes the clearance of 14.53km<sup>2</sup> of antipersonnel mine contamination, 5.68km<sup>2</sup> of improvised mine contamination and 1.47km<sup>2</sup> of mixed contamination. The 4,168 antipersonnel mines destroyed include 1,950 improvised mines. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Hamid Wardak, Operations/EOD Manager, DMAC, April 2024; and email from Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 30 October 2024. **Angola:** the 4,586 antipersonnel mines include 14 destroyed during battle area clearance and 122 destroyed during land clearance activities in support of development projects in areas not registered in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. **BiH:** response to Monitor questionnaire by Enis Horozović, Acting Director, Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMIC), 19 April 2024. **Cambodia:** response to Monitor questionnaire by Kimsin Hean, Director of SEPD, CMAA, May 2024. **Colombia:** in its Article 7 report, Colombia reported the clearance of 0.87km<sup>2</sup> and the removal of 129 mines. The figures shown in the table are extracted from the response to the Monitor questionnaire by Maicol Velásquez, Information Management Coordinator, Mine Action Group, 20 April 2024. **Croatia:** in its Article 7 report, Croatia reported the removal of 790 mines. The figures shown in the table are extracted from the response to the Monitor questionnaire by Ph.D. Damir Trut, Director, Civil Protection Directorate (CPD), 11 June 2024. **DRC:** response to Monitor questionnaire by Christophe Wembelombe Lomani, Head of Quality Management Department, CCLAM, 14 June 2024. **Guinea-Bissau:** Guinea-Bissau conducted 0.053km<sup>2</sup> of battle area clearance during which 518 ERW and one antipersonnel mine were found. The 0.053km<sup>2</sup> have not been added to the table of mined areas cleared. Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 April 2024, p. 9, [bit.ly/Guinea-BissauArt5ExtRequestApr2024](http://bit.ly/Guinea-BissauArt5ExtRequestApr2024). **Iraq:** the reported clearance figure includes 3.36km<sup>2</sup> of antipersonnel mine contaminated land and 14.93km<sup>2</sup> of IED contaminated land. Antipersonnel mines destroyed include 140 V-50 mines, of which 62 were categorized as IED and 78 were categorized as ERW. The total figure presented in the table includes 8,432 destroyed IEDs, including improvised mines. **Mauritania:** in addition to the clearance figure reported in the table, a further 0.11km<sup>2</sup> of land was declared as “verified” without giving further explanation. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mamadou Sarr, Chief of Operations, PNDHD, 20 May 2024; and email from Julien Kempeneers, Project Manager, HAMAP-Humanitaire, 4 October 2024. **Senegal:** the land cleared contained mixed contamination, consisting of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and ERW. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mamadou Diallo, Chief of Operations Office, CNAMS, 12 July 2024. **Serbia:** on p. 11 of its Article 7 report, Serbia indicates that it cleared 0.12km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated land. However, in its Article 5 deadline extension request, Serbia reports that this area was released through technical survey in February 2024. The Monitor therefore did not count the 0.12km<sup>2</sup> as land cleared in 2023. Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2024, pp. 5–6, [bit.ly/SerbiaArt5ExtRequestMar2024](http://bit.ly/SerbiaArt5ExtRequestMar2024). **South Sudan:** response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, NMAA, 25 April 2024. **Tajikistan:** response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 3 April 2024. **Ukraine:** it was reported that, since the invasion by Russian troops up until the end of December 2023, 1,135.06km<sup>2</sup> have been surveyed and demined. The figures are not included in the table, as neither the type of contamination nor the items destroyed were specified. Furthermore, the data was not disaggregated by year. **Yemen:** Yemen reported the removal of 40 “APM/IED” (which are assumed to be improvised mines) and 253 ERW in 0.18km<sup>2</sup>, in addition to the clearance of 10.91km<sup>2</sup> as “emergency response” during which 521 antipersonnel mines, 7,202 antivehicle mines, 291 IED, and 50,732 ERW were destroyed.

State Party	2023		2022	
	Clearance (km <sup>2</sup> )	APM destroyed	Clearance (km <sup>2</sup> )	APM destroyed
<b>Cyprus**</b>	0	0	0	0
<b>DRC</b>	0.005	4	0.03	4
<b>Ecuador</b>	0.01	8	0.002	17
<b>Eritrea</b>	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R
<b>Ethiopia</b>	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	0	1	0	0
<b>Iraq</b>	18.29	16,756	11.23	5,702
<b>Mauritania</b>	0.13	133	0.13	0
<b>Niger</b>	0	0	0	0
<b>Nigeria</b>	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R
<b>Oman</b>	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R
<b>Palestine</b>	0.01	33	0.03	37
<b>Peru</b>	0.05	2,136	0.02	529
<b>Senegal</b>	0.05	13	0.08	N/R
<b>Serbia</b>	0	0	0.17	0
<b>Somalia***</b>	2.22	11	5.56	360
<b>South Sudan</b>	0.58	86	0.28	284
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	4.83	19,212	11.80	29,599
<b>Sudan</b>	N/R	N/R	N/R	32
<b>Tajikistan</b>	0.41	1,127	0.58	1,197
<b>Thailand</b>	0.55	15,085	0.33	11,421
<b>Türkiye</b>	0.92	33,443	1.29	58,078
<b>Ukraine</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Yemen***</b>	11.09	561	31.91	3,864
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	1.91	37,330	2.13	31,104
<b>Total</b>	<b>281.50</b>	<b>160,566</b>	<b>219.31</b>	<b>169,276</b>

Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; N/R=not reported; N/A=not available.

\*Argentina was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty and exercises control over the territory, and reported completion of mine clearance in 2020. Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.

\*\*Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.

\*\*\*Clearance of mixed/undifferentiated contamination that included antipersonnel mines.

**Cyprus** reported that it did not undertake any clearance in 2023 as no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines are under its control.<sup>222</sup>

**Niger** reported that it did not conduct any clearance operations in 2023 due to a lack of funding, insecurity, a continuing priority to fight the proliferation of illicit weapons, and a lack of support from partners.<sup>223</sup>

As of October 2024, five States Parties with Article 5 obligations—Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Oman, and Sudan—had not submitted updated Article 7 transparency reports to outline their progress on clearance.

<sup>222</sup> Cyprus Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C, pp. 4–5.

<sup>223</sup> Niger Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), pp. 8–9.



**Eritrea** has not reported any clearance activities since it last submitted an Article 7 transparency report in 2014.<sup>224</sup>

**Ethiopia** reported 1.76km<sup>2</sup> of land cleared and 128 antipersonnel mines destroyed in 2019–2020.<sup>225</sup> In March 2021, Ethiopia reported that it had cleared 0.05km<sup>2</sup> in Fiq district in the Somali region, clearing and destroying 46 antivehicle mines.<sup>226</sup>

**Nigeria** reported in 2023 that the Nigerian Armed Forces had conducted mine clearance activities for military purposes in 2022, but did not provide any further information.<sup>227</sup> It has not provided an updated report for 2023, as of October 2024.

**Oman** reported the “re-clearance” of 0.08km<sup>2</sup> of land in 2018, but did not provide any further details.<sup>228</sup> In 2019, Oman reported “re-clearance” of 11 mined areas in Al-Mughsail, in Dhofar governorate, totaling 0.13km<sup>2</sup>, but no mines were found.<sup>229</sup> In 2020, Oman reported that no mine/ERW incidents had taken place in the country in 20 years, and that formerly mined areas had been cleared, released, and were subsequently reinhabited.<sup>230</sup> As of October 2024, Oman had not provided an updated report on its clearance activities.

**Sudan** reported clearing 0.03km<sup>2</sup> of contaminated land, destroying 17 antipersonnel mines and 57 antivehicle mines in 2021.<sup>231</sup> In 2022, Sudan reported that access to Blue Nile, Darfur, and South Kordofan had improved following the Juba Agreement for Peace, enabling the assessment of roads for humanitarian assistance and population movement.<sup>232</sup> Yet Sudan also cited ongoing insecurity, a lack of funding, difficult terrain, and weather conditions as key challenges that have negatively impacted progress.<sup>233</sup> UNITAMS reported that 32 antipersonnel landmines, 14 antivehicle mines, and 2,347 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) were destroyed in 2022.<sup>234</sup> No further update was received from UNITAMS for 2023, and the mission closed on 29 February 2024 due to the conflict.<sup>235</sup> As of October 2024, no Article 7 report has been submitted for 2023.

Four States Parties with clearance obligations reported clearing improvised mines in 2023: Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, and Yemen.

In 2023, **Afghanistan** released 5.68km<sup>2</sup> of land contaminated with improvised mines, clearing 1,950 improvised mines.<sup>236</sup> **Colombia** cleared a total of 339 mines, all of which were improvised mines.<sup>237</sup> **Iraq** cleared 14.93km<sup>2</sup> of land contaminated with IEDs, and destroyed

<sup>224</sup> Eritrea Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2013).

<sup>225</sup> Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form D, p. 6.

<sup>226</sup> Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form C, pp. 5–6.

<sup>227</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Edwin Faigmane, Chief of Mine Action Program, UNMAS Nigeria, 30 May 2023.

<sup>228</sup> Oman Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017); Oman Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018); and Oman Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020). In its report for 2020, Oman reported different clearance figures for 2018 and 2019: 0.44km<sup>2</sup> and 0.17km<sup>2</sup> respectively.

<sup>229</sup> Oman Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019).

<sup>230</sup> Ibid.

<sup>231</sup> Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 13.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid., pp. 23–24; and Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 August 2022, [bit.ly/SudanRevisedMBTArt5ExtRequest2022](https://bit.ly/SudanRevisedMBTArt5ExtRequest2022).

<sup>233</sup> Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 August 2022, p. 10, [bit.ly/SudanRevisedMBTArt5ExtRequest2022](https://bit.ly/SudanRevisedMBTArt5ExtRequest2022).

<sup>234</sup> “Together for Sudan free of Mine,” *Brown Land News*, 6 April 2023, [bit.ly/BrownLandNews6April2023](https://bit.ly/BrownLandNews6April2023).


<sup>235</sup> United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission (UNITAMS), “Security Council Terminates Mandate of UNITAMS, Adopting Resolution 2715 (2023),” 1 December 2023, [bit.ly/UNITAMS1Dec2023](https://bit.ly/UNITAMS1Dec2023).

<sup>236</sup> The total land cleared by Afghanistan included 14.53km<sup>2</sup> of antipersonnel mine contamination, 5.68km<sup>2</sup> of improvised mine contamination and 1.47km<sup>2</sup> of mixed contamination. In addition to the 1,950 improvised mines, Afghanistan reported the destruction of 2,218 antipersonnel mines. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Hamid Wardak, Operations/EOD Manager, DMAC, April 2024.

<sup>237</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Maicol Velásquez, Information Management Coordinator, Mine Action Group, 20 April 2024.

8,432 IEDs, including improvised mines.<sup>238</sup> Yemen acknowledged the presence of mines of an improvised nature but did not sufficiently disaggregate land release figures for improvised mines. For areas released with mixed or undifferentiated contamination, 40 antipersonnel/improvised mines were recorded being destroyed along with 291 IEDs, but without further specification.<sup>239</sup>

### Explosive ordnance including mines cleared and destroyed by States Parties with clearance obligations in 2023<sup>240</sup>



Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; AVM=antivehicle mines; CMR=cluster munition remnants; ERW=explosive remnants of war.

## ARTICLE 5 DEADLINES AND EXTENSION REQUESTS

If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy all antipersonnel landmines contaminating its territory within 10 years after entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty for the country, it must request a deadline extension under Article 5, and can do so for a period of up to 10 years.

### Clearance progress to 2025

At the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2014, States Parties agreed to intensify efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency that the completion work requires. They collectively committed to clear all mined areas as soon as possible, but not later than 2025.<sup>241</sup> This commitment was reinforced during the Fourth Review Conference with the adoption of the Oslo Action Plan 2020–2024.

<sup>238</sup> Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C, pp. 24–29.

<sup>239</sup> Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, pp. 8–9.

<sup>240</sup> In addition to antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, improvised mines, cluster munition remnants, and ERW, Iraq reported clearing and destroying 11,620 'other explosive items.' As these items were not further specified, they were not included in the chart. The chart also does not include data from the following States Parties with clearance obligations as they did not report on destroyed ordnance, or did not destroy any ordnance in 2023: Argentina, Cyprus, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Serbia, and Sudan. Ukraine reported that since the invasion by Russian troops up until the end of December 2023, 465,445 explosive devices have been found, but did not further specify the types of explosive devices destroyed and did not provide data for 2023 only.

<sup>241</sup> "MAPUTO +15: Declaration of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 2, [bit.ly/MaputoDeclaration27June2014](https://bit.ly/MaputoDeclaration27June2014); Maputo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 16 June 2014, [bit.ly/MaputoActionPlan16June2014](https://bit.ly/MaputoActionPlan16June2014); and Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, p. 2, [bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019](https://bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019).

Between 2019 and October 2024, 27 States Parties requested extensions to their clearance deadlines. Of those, Afghanistan, Argentina, Chad, Cyprus, the DRC, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Niger, Serbia, and Yemen have each requested more than one extension within the past five years.

As of October 2024, a total of 19 States Parties have current deadlines to meet their Article 5 obligations before or no later than 2025: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Cyprus, the DRC, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Serbia, Tajikistan, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe. Another 14 States Parties have Article 5 deadlines later than 2025.

### States Parties with clearance deadlines beyond 2025

Clearance deadline	States Parties
2026	Argentina, Croatia, Mauritania, Senegal, South Sudan, Thailand
2027	BiH, Somalia, Sudan
2028	Iraq, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Yemen
2033	Ukraine

In 2022, four States Parties—Afghanistan, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, and Serbia—requested extensions to their clearance deadlines up to 2025. Another four States Parties—Argentina, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen—requested extensions beyond 2025. All requests were granted during the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties in November 2022.<sup>242</sup>

In 2023, two States Parties—Ukraine and Eritrea—submitted an extension request.<sup>243</sup> Both requests were granted at the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties in November 2023.

In 2024, seven States Parties—Afghanistan, Chad, Cyprus, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Peru, and Serbia—requested extensions to their current clearance deadline of 2025 or earlier.<sup>244</sup> The requests will be approved or rejected by States Parties at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024.

Of the States Parties with current Article 5 clearance deadlines in 2024 or 2025 that have not requested an extension, only Oman is on track to meet its deadline. Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, the DRC, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Nigeria, Tajikistan, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe do not appear to be able to complete clearance within their deadlines.

**Angola's** annual land release since 2019 has consistently failed to meet the projected annual amount of 17km<sup>2</sup> detailed in its 2019–2025 workplan.<sup>245</sup> In June 2024, Angola presented its land release projections with 46.01km<sup>2</sup> left to be cleared beyond its current deadline of 31 December 2025.<sup>246</sup> It is expected that Angola will submit another extension request.

<sup>242</sup> Mine Ban Treaty, “Article 5 Extensions,” undated, [bit.ly/MBTArticle5Extensions](https://bit.ly/MBTArticle5Extensions).

<sup>243</sup> Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2023, [bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2023](https://bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2023); and Eritrea Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 November 2023, [bit.ly/EritreaArt5ExtRequest2023](https://bit.ly/EritreaArt5ExtRequest2023).

<sup>244</sup> Mine Ban Treaty, “Article 5 Extensions,” undated, [bit.ly/MBTArticle5Extensions](https://bit.ly/MBTArticle5Extensions); and Chad Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 June 2024, [bit.ly/ChadArt5ExtRequest2024](https://bit.ly/ChadArt5ExtRequest2024).

<sup>245</sup> National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH), “Detailed Work Plan for the Implementation of Article 5 of the Convention (2019–2025),” November 2018, Annex 1, p. 13, [bit.ly/CNIDAH2019-2025Workplan](https://bit.ly/CNIDAH2019-2025Workplan).

<sup>246</sup> Presentation of Angola, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, p. 9, [bit.ly/AngolaPresentation18June2024](https://bit.ly/AngolaPresentation18June2024).

**Cambodia** has reported its commitment to meet its Article 5 deadline of 2025 and has started to raise additional funds to facilitate an increase in demining capacity.<sup>247</sup> In May 2023, Cambodia submitted a revised workplan with a projected release of 345.3km<sup>2</sup> of mined areas in 2023, and 168km<sup>2</sup> annually in both 2024 and 2025.<sup>248</sup> In June 2024, Cambodia announced that it will submit its third extension request in March 2025, referring to current challenges in meeting its deadline. The challenges include: the likelihood of finding new minefields, difficult terrain along the border with Thailand, a need to strengthen cooperation with Thailand for the clearance of border areas, and a shortfall in the required financial resources.<sup>249</sup>

The **DRC** reported in June 2024 that it is not on track to meet its clearance deadline and plans to submit an extension request. Among the cited reasons for not being able to comply with its current Article 5 clearance deadline is the ongoing conflict in the eastern part of the country that has been adding to contamination and restricting access and progress due to insecurity.<sup>250</sup>

**Ecuador's** progress toward meeting its Article 5 deadline in December 2025 is uncertain. The rate of clearance has been slow over the past five years, despite the small extent of remaining contamination. Although Ecuador reported to have met its annual clearance target of 0.01km<sup>2</sup> for 2023, as projected in its fourth extension request, it did not meet the target in 2022 and did not conduct any clearance in 2021.<sup>251</sup>

In November 2023, **Eritrea** was granted a new deadline of 31 December 2024. In granting the request, it was noted that Eritrea had not acted in accordance with the agreed process for the preparation, submission and consideration of requests for extensions to Article 5 deadlines. Eritrea was expected to submit another extension request following the correct process by 31 March 2024.<sup>252</sup> As of October 2024, Eritrea had not submitted the request.



A deminer performs a daily check of his metal detector in a safe, testing area before starting clearance operations in Tal Afar, in Iraq's Ninewa governorate.

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<sup>247</sup> Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties, The Hague, 15–19 November 2021, [bit.ly/CambodiaStatementNov2021](https://bit.ly/CambodiaStatementNov2021); APMB, “Revised Workplan Cambodia,” 10 May 2023, p. 5, [bit.ly/CambodiaRevisedWorkplan10May2023](https://bit.ly/CambodiaRevisedWorkplan10May2023); and Lay Samean, “Mine-Free Kingdom 2025 goal gets big funding boost via new sub-decree,” *The Phnom Penh Post*, 5 December 2022, [bit.ly/PhnomPenhPost5Dec2022](https://bit.ly/PhnomPenhPost5Dec2022).

<sup>248</sup> APMB, “Revised Workplan Cambodia,” 10 May 2023, p. 4, [bit.ly/CambodiaRevisedWorkplan10May2023](https://bit.ly/CambodiaRevisedWorkplan10May2023).

<sup>249</sup> Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, pp. 1–2, [bit.ly/CambodiaStatement18June2024](https://bit.ly/CambodiaStatement18June2024).

<sup>250</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Clément Lokandja Tokenge, Head of Legal and Audit Department, CCLAM, 14 June 2024.

<sup>251</sup> Ecuador Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form C, p. 6; Ecuador Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar years 2022 and 2023), Form C, pp. 10 and 36, [bit.ly/EcuadorMBTArt7Report2022-2023](https://bit.ly/EcuadorMBTArt7Report2022-2023); and Ecuador Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 17 August 2022, pp. 31–32, [bit.ly/EcuadorRevisedArt5ExtRequestAug2022](https://bit.ly/EcuadorRevisedArt5ExtRequestAug2022).

<sup>252</sup> Eritrea Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 November 2023, [bit.ly/EritreaArt5ExtRequest2023](https://bit.ly/EritreaArt5ExtRequest2023); and Final Report, Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 November 2023, pp. 7–8, [undocs.org/APLC/MSP.21/2023/18](https://undocs.org/APLC/MSP.21/2023/18).

In **Ethiopia**, there has been little progress on clearance and survey over the past two years, including the period since a November 2022 peace agreement.<sup>253</sup> Ethiopia has not submitted its Article 7 report for 2022 and did not provide an update on clearance progress in its Article 7 report for 2023.<sup>254</sup> Ethiopia is unlikely to meet its December 2025 deadline.

**Oman** was believed to be on track to complete clearance, with a plan to re-clear seven areas from February 2021 to April 2024.<sup>255</sup> As of October 2024, Oman had not submitted an Article 7 report for 2022 and 2023 to update States Parties on its progress. However, in June 2024, Oman indicated that it would be in a position to declare completion by its 1 February 2025 deadline.<sup>256</sup>

**Tajikistan** reported that it was on track to meet its deadline but also highlighted that, without additional funding, clearance will only be completed by 2030.<sup>257</sup>

**Türkiye** cleared three times more mine-contaminated land in 2022 than in 2021 but achieved only around 70% of the 2022 clearance rate in 2023. Considering the massive extent of the remaining contamination, Türkiye is not on track to meet its 2025 deadline.<sup>258</sup>

**Zimbabwe** stated in early 2023 that it would meet its deadline of December 2025, but acknowledged in June 2024 that the 2025 deadline seemed “unattainable.”<sup>259</sup>

Ongoing conflict and insecurity are impacting the ability of three States Parties to meet their Article 5 clearance deadlines. **Colombia** reported that it will not meet its deadline due to ongoing instability and the use of improvised mines by NSAGs. Colombia has announced its plans to submit its third extension request in 2025.<sup>260</sup> In **Nigeria**, conflict in the northeast has hindered the mapping of contamination, and has restricted survey and clearance activities. In June 2024, Nigeria affirmed its commitment to conduct survey, security and accessibility conditions permitting. In June 2024, Nigeria stated that it plans to resubmit an Article 5 extension request to enable the newly established National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) to respond to the challenges ahead.<sup>261</sup> **Ukraine** reported that prior to the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, it did not have control over parts of the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, which prevented it from clearing contaminated areas in these territories.<sup>262</sup> Ongoing hostilities since 2022 have added to the extent of contamination and prevented access for survey and clearance operations. As a result, in March 2023, Ukraine submitted a 10-year extension request under Article 5.<sup>263</sup>

<sup>253</sup> African Union, “Agreement for lasting peace through a permanent cessation of hostilities between the government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF),” 2 November 2022, [bit.ly/EthiopiaTPLF2Nov2022](https://bit.ly/EthiopiaTPLF2Nov2022).

<sup>254</sup> Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), [bit.ly/EthiopiaMBTArt7Report2023](https://bit.ly/EthiopiaMBTArt7Report2023).

<sup>255</sup> Oman Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), pp. 8 and 14.

<sup>256</sup> Statement of Oman, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, [bit.ly/OmanStatement18June2024](https://bit.ly/OmanStatement18June2024).

<sup>257</sup> Statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, pp. 5–6, [bit.ly/TajikistanStatement18June2024](https://bit.ly/TajikistanStatement18June2024).

<sup>258</sup> Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, p. 3; and Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form D, p. 5.

<sup>259</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Capt. Patson Mandaba, Operations Officer, Zimbabwe Mine Action Center (ZIMAC), 24 April 2023; statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2023, p. 1, [bit.ly/ZimbabweStatement21June2023](https://bit.ly/ZimbabweStatement21June2023); and presentation of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, p. 2, [bit.ly/ZimbabwePresentation18June2024](https://bit.ly/ZimbabwePresentation18June2024).

<sup>260</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Angela Patricia Cortés Sánchez, Advisor, AICMA, 24 May 2023; and statement of Colombia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, pp. 1–2, [bit.ly/ColombiaStatement18June2024](https://bit.ly/ColombiaStatement18June2024).

<sup>261</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Edwin Faigmane, Chief of Mine Action Program, UNMAS Nigeria, 30 May 2023; and statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, p. 2, [bit.ly/NigeriaStatement18June2024](https://bit.ly/NigeriaStatement18June2024).

<sup>262</sup> Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 8 June 2020, [bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2020](https://bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2020).

<sup>263</sup> Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2023, [bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2023](https://bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2023).



## Summary of Article 5 deadline extension requests

State Party	Original deadline	Extension period (Number of requests)	Current deadline	Status
<b>Afghanistan*</b>	1 March 2013	10 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 2 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	1 March 2025	Extension request submitted but pending acceptance
<b>Angola</b>	1 January 2013	5 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 8 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	31 December 2025	Expected to request another extension
<b>Argentina</b>	1 March 2010	10 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 3 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 3 years (3 <sup>rd</sup> )	1 March 2026	Has not acknowledged completion
<b>BiH</b>	1 March 2009	10 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 2 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 6 years (3 <sup>rd</sup> )	1 March 2027	Behind target
<b>Cambodia</b>	1 January 2010	10 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 6 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	31 December 2025	Expected to request another extension
<b>Chad</b>	1 November 2009	1 year and 2 months (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 3 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 6 years (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 5 years (4 <sup>th</sup> )	1 January 2025	Requested extension until 31 December 2029 (5 years)
<b>Colombia</b>	1 March 2011	10 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 4 years and 10 months (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	31 December 2025	Expected to request another extension
<b>Croatia</b>	1 March 2009	10 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 7 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	1 March 2026	On target
<b>Cyprus</b>	1 July 2013	3 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 3 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 3 years (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 3 years (4 <sup>th</sup> )	1 July 2025	Requested extension until 1 July 2028 (3 years)
<b>DRC</b>	1 November 2012	2 years and 2 months (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 6 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 1 year and 6 months (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 3 years and 6 months (4 <sup>th</sup> )	31 December 2025	Expected to request another extension
<b>Ecuador</b>	1 October 2009	8 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 3 months (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 5 years (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 3 years (4 <sup>th</sup> )	31 December 2025	Progress uncertain
<b>Eritrea</b>	1 February 2012	3 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 5 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 11 months (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 2 years (4 <sup>th</sup> )	31 December 2024	Behind target

State Party	Original deadline	Extension period (Number of requests)	Current deadline	Status
<b>Ethiopia</b>	1 June 2015	5 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 5 years and 7 months (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	31 December 2025	Behind target
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	1 November 2011	2 months (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 1 year (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 2 years (3 <sup>rd</sup> )	31 December 2024	Requested extension until 31 December 2027 (3 years)
<b>Iraq</b>	1 February 2018	10 years (1 <sup>st</sup> )	1 February 2028	Behind target
<b>Mauritania</b>	1 January 2011	5 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 5 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 1 year (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 5 years (4 <sup>th</sup> )	31 December 2026	Behind target
<b>Niger**</b>	1 September 2009	2 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 1 year (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 4 years (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 4 years (4 <sup>th</sup> )	31 December 2024	Requested extension until 31 December 2029 (5 years)
<b>Nigeria***</b>	1 March 2012	1 year (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 4 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	31 December 2025	Behind target
<b>Oman</b>	1 February 2025	N/A	1 February 2025	On target
<b>Palestine</b>	1 June 2028	N/A	1 June 2028	On target
<b>Peru</b>	1 March 2009	8 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 7 years and 10 months (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	31 December 2024	Requested extension until 31 December 2029 (5 years)
<b>Senegal</b>	1 March 2009	7 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 5 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 5 years (3 <sup>rd</sup> )	1 March 2026	Behind target
<b>Serbia</b>	1 March 2014	5 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 4 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 1 year and 10 months (3 <sup>rd</sup> )	31 December 2024	Requested extension until 31 December 2026 (2 years)
<b>Somalia</b>	1 October 2022	5 years (1 <sup>st</sup> )	1 October 2027	Progress to target uncertain
<b>South Sudan</b>	9 July 2021	5 years (1 <sup>st</sup> )	9 July 2026	Behind target
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	1 June 2028	N/A	1 June 2028	On target
<b>Sudan</b>	1 April 2014	5 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 4 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 4 years (3 <sup>rd</sup> )	1 April 2027	Progress to target uncertain
<b>Tajikistan</b>	1 April 2010	10 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 5 years and 9 months (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	31 December 2025	Behind target

State Party	Original deadline	Extension period (Number of requests)	Current deadline	Status
<b>Thailand</b>	1 May 2009	9 years and 6 months (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 5 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 3 years and 2 months (3 <sup>rd</sup> )	31 December 2026	Progress to target uncertain
<b>Türkiye</b>	1 March 2014	8 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 3 years and 10 months (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	31 December 2025	Behind target
<b>Ukraine</b>	1 June 2016	5 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 2 years and 6 months (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 10 years (3 <sup>rd</sup> )	1 December 2033	Progress to target uncertain
<b>Yemen</b>	1 March 2009	6 years (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 5 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 3 years (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 5 years (4 <sup>th</sup> )	1 March 2028	Progress to target uncertain
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	1 March 2009	1 year and 10 months (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 2 years (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 2 years (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 3 years (4 <sup>th</sup> ) 8 years (5 <sup>th</sup> )	31 December 2025	Behind target

Note: N/A=not applicable.

\*The Taliban government (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan), as well as the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations Office in Geneva, submitted an extension request. As of October 2024, the extension request was not publicly available, as States Parties had not yet found a way to accept and consider the request given the current political situation in Afghanistan.

\*\*In 2008, Niger declared that there were no remaining areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines. In May 2012, Niger informed States Parties of suspected and confirmed mined areas. Not until July 2013 did Niger request its first extension to the deadline that had already expired in 2009.

\*\*\*In 2019, seven years after its initial deadline, Nigeria declared newly mined areas and, in 2020, submitted a first extension request to its initial, already-expired deadline.

### Extension requests submitted in 2023–2024

In March 2023, **Ukraine** submitted its third extension request, for 10 years, proposing a new deadline of 1 December 2033, and stating that this extension was required due to the ongoing conflict that continues to augment the extent of contamination and hinders land release activities.<sup>264</sup> Ukraine's extension request was approved by the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties in November 2023. In April 2024, Ukraine submitted an updated workplan for the implementation of Article 5.<sup>265</sup> Later, in June 2024, Ukraine presented an updated workplan but still did not yet have a clear picture of the total extent of contamination to be cleared in order to meet its new clearance deadline in 2033.<sup>266</sup>

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

<sup>265</sup> Ukraine, "The Work Plan for Humanitarian Demining of De-occupied Territories of Ukraine for 2024," 30 April 2024, [bit.ly/UkraineWorkPlan30Apr2024](https://bit.ly/UkraineWorkPlan30Apr2024).

<sup>266</sup> Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 21–26; presentation of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, pp. 3 and 5–8, [bit.ly/UkraineArt5-18June2024](https://bit.ly/UkraineArt5-18June2024); and Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2023, [bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2023](https://bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2023).

In November 2023, **Eritrea** submitted an extension request to its missed Article 5 deadline of 2020.<sup>267</sup> The request was granted by the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties, and a new deadline was set for 31 December 2024. As of October 2024, Eritrea has yet to submit a new extension request.

The main purpose of the extension request submitted by **Afghanistan** in July 2022 was for additional time to understand how the demining sector in the country will develop. Based on this, Afghanistan planned to submit a further detailed extension request for its current deadline of 1 March 2025 by 31 March 2024.<sup>268</sup> In the first half of 2024, the Taliban government (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan), as well as the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations Office in Geneva, submitted an extension request. As of October 2024, States Parties had not yet found a way to accept and consider the request given the current political situation in Afghanistan.

In June 2024, **Chad** submitted its fifth extension request for a five-year period until 31 December 2029 in order to conduct survey and mine clearance in Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti regions.<sup>269</sup> Chad reported several reasons why it will not be able to meet its current clearance obligations: insufficient financial resources, unfavorable weather conditions causing long stand-down periods, challenging road conditions hindering access, and a lack of information concerning the contaminated areas in Tibesti.<sup>270</sup>

**Cyprus** submitted its fifth extension request, asking for a three-year extension until 1 July 2028. It reported that the mined areas left to be cleared remain outside of the effective control of the Government of Cyprus.<sup>271</sup> During the 2024 Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2024, in its right of reply to Cyprus's statement, Türkiye stated that the reported minefields are on territory under Cyprus's control.<sup>272</sup>

In 2022, **Guinea-Bissau** was granted its third extension until 31 December 2024 to conduct survey, as well as subsequent marking, risk education, and clearance as required.<sup>273</sup> In April 2024, Guinea-Bissau submitted another three-year extension until 31 December 2027.<sup>274</sup> Guinea-Bissau has made progress in setting up the pre-conditions—e.g., the accreditation of operators and the training of non-technical survey personnel—to conduct the planned survey.<sup>275</sup> Yet implementation of the survey has been delayed due to insufficient financial resources, and because the workplan presented with the third extension request may have been too ambitious.<sup>276</sup>

In March 2024, **Niger** submitted its fifth request, for a five-year extension until 31 December 2029, for the clearance of the remaining 0.18km<sup>2</sup> of CHA adjacent to a military post in Madama, in the Agadez region.<sup>277</sup> Niger referred to a lack of financial resources to

<sup>267</sup> Eritrea Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 November 2023, [bit.ly/EritreaArt5ExtRequest2023](https://bit.ly/EritreaArt5ExtRequest2023).

<sup>268</sup> Mine Ban Treaty, "Consideration of request submitted under Article 5: Request for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention: Executive Summary: Afghanistan," 25 August 2022, [bit.ly/MBTAfghanistanA5Request25Aug2022](https://bit.ly/MBTAfghanistanA5Request25Aug2022).

<sup>269</sup> Chad Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 June 2024, pp. 1 and 4, [bit.ly/ChadArt5ExtRequest2024](https://bit.ly/ChadArt5ExtRequest2024).

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>271</sup> Cyprus Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 8 March 2024, [bit.ly/CyprusArt5ExtRequest8Mar2024](https://bit.ly/CyprusArt5ExtRequest8Mar2024).

<sup>272</sup> Statement of Türkiye, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, [bit.ly/TurkiyeRightOfReply18June2024](https://bit.ly/TurkiyeRightOfReply18June2024).

<sup>273</sup> Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 May 2021, [bit.ly/Guinea-BissauMBTArt5ExtRequestMay2021](https://bit.ly/Guinea-BissauMBTArt5ExtRequestMay2021).

<sup>274</sup> Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 April 2024, [bit.ly/Guinea-BissauArt5ExtRequestApr2024](https://bit.ly/Guinea-BissauArt5ExtRequestApr2024).

<sup>275</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>276</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9–11.

<sup>277</sup> Niger Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 8–9; and Niger Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 March 2024, pp. 7–8, [bit.ly/NigerArt5ExtRequestMar2024](https://bit.ly/NigerArt5ExtRequestMar2024).

justify why it will not be able to fulfill its current clearance obligations by 31 December 2024.<sup>278</sup>

**Peru** submitted its third extension request in March 2024, for a five-year extension until 31 December 2029.<sup>279</sup> Peru reported that clearance operations were brought to a halt by the El Niño phenomenon that occurred in 2017, which brought intense rains, followed by the COVID-19 pandemic. This caused significant delays in the projected progress. Peru noted other hindrances to completion of clearance by 31 December 2024: one contaminated area (“PV Gutiérrez”) had not been included in Peru’s previous extension request, and funds reserved for demining operations have since been reallocated.<sup>280</sup>

**Serbia** was granted a third extension during 2022 and committed to provide an updated workplan by the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties in November 2023.<sup>281</sup> In November 2023, Serbia said it will not be able to meet the 31 December 2024 deadline, explaining that security issues in the contaminated municipality of Bujanovac have prevented the survey from starting.<sup>282</sup> In March 2024, Serbia submitted its third extension request for a two-year period until 31 December 2026 to clear the remaining contamination.<sup>283</sup>

The seven Article 5 deadline extension requests submitted in 2024 will be considered at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024.

## RISK EDUCATION

Risk education has been a core pillar of humanitarian mine action since before the Mine Ban Treaty came into force in 1999. In its first edition, the Monitor reported that, due to the often lengthy timeframe for demining, local populations find that they must learn how to live their daily lives in mine and ERW contaminated areas until the threat is removed.<sup>284</sup>

Since then, the need for risk education has not changed. Informing and educating affected populations about the mine threat is a key legal obligation under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. It requires States Parties to “provide an immediate and effective warning to the population” in all areas under their jurisdiction or control in which antipersonnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.

The delivery of risk education to affected populations is a primary and often cost-effective means of preventing injuries and saving lives. While most affected States Parties acknowledge this, and risk education is delivered, the systematic and detailed reporting of these activities in Article 7 transparency reports has been largely insufficient during the first 20 years of the implementation of the Convention.



Children participate in an explosive ordnance risk education session in Al-Uzairi village, in Iraq’s Kirkuk governorate.

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<sup>278</sup> Niger Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 March 2024, pp. 7 and 14, [bit.ly/NigerArt5ExtRequestMar2024](https://bit.ly/NigerArt5ExtRequestMar2024).

<sup>279</sup> Peru Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2024, [bit.ly/PeruArt5ExtRequestMarch2024](https://bit.ly/PeruArt5ExtRequestMarch2024).

<sup>280</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

<sup>281</sup> Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 August 2022, [bit.ly/SerbiaMBTRevisedArt5ExtRequest2022](https://bit.ly/SerbiaMBTRevisedArt5ExtRequest2022).

<sup>282</sup> Statement of Serbia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, p. 2, [bit.ly/SerbiaStatement18June2024](https://bit.ly/SerbiaStatement18June2024).

<sup>283</sup> Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2024, [bit.ly/SerbiaArt5ExtRequestMar2024](https://bit.ly/SerbiaArt5ExtRequestMar2024).

<sup>284</sup> ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World* (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 1999), p. 17, [bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports](https://bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports).



The 2019 Oslo Action Plan recognizes the importance of risk education and identified five action points, contributing to renewed attention for this pillar in recent years. These actions include commitments on:

1. Integrating risk education within wider humanitarian, development, protection, and education efforts, and with other mine action activities;
2. Providing context-specific risk education to all affected populations and at-risk groups;
3. Prioritizing people most at risk through analysis of casualty and contamination data, and through an understanding of people's behavior and movements;
4. Building national capacity to deliver risk education, which can adapt to changing needs and contexts; and
5. Reporting on risk education in annual Article 7 transparency reports.<sup>285</sup>

In addition, the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to provide detailed, costed, and multi-year plans for context-specific mine risk education and reduction in affected communities.<sup>286</sup>

## PROVISION OF RISK EDUCATION IN 2023

Of the 33 States Parties with clearance obligations, 28 reported providing, or are known to have provided, risk education to populations at risk from antipersonnel mine contamination in 2023. Argentina, Cyprus, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, and Oman did not report any risk education activities.

### States Parties with clearance obligations that provided risk education in 2023

Afghanistan	Ethiopia	South Sudan
Angola	Iraq	Sri Lanka
BiH	Mauritania	Sudan
Cambodia	Nigeria	Tajikistan
Chad	Palestine	Thailand
Colombia	Peru	Türkiye
Croatia	Senegal	Ukraine
DRC	Serbia	Yemen
Ecuador	Somalia	Zimbabwe
Eritrea		

In addition, risk education was also delivered in 2023 in States Parties Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Mali, and the Philippines—all states known or believed to have improvised mine contamination.<sup>287</sup>

Algeria and Nicaragua, which have residual contamination, also implemented risk education activities.<sup>288</sup> Algeria reported risk education activities, partly organized and delivered by mine/ERW victim associations.<sup>289</sup>

<sup>285</sup> Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, pp. 8–9, [bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019](https://bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019).

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>287</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ag Ingatt Ibrahim, Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding (HDP) Coordinator, Danish Refugee Council, 4 June 2024; email from Hugues Laurence, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF, 21 June 2024; response to Monitor questionnaire by David Wasolu Djuma, Technical Consultant Humanitarian Mine Action, DanChurchAid (DCA) and Support Association for Rural Populations of Mali (Association d'Appui aux Populations Rurales du Mali, AAPPOR), 10 May 2024; DCA, "Supplying protection, education, assistance and action on conflict related risk in the center of Mali," undated, [bit.ly/DCAMaliRE2023-2024](https://bit.ly/DCAMaliRE2023-2024); and UNMAS, "Annual Report 2023," 26 April 2024, pp. 34–35, 38–39 and 70–71, [bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2023](https://bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2023).

<sup>288</sup> Algeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 12; and Nicaragua Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 9.

<sup>289</sup> Algeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 12.

Since the adoption of the Oslo Action Plan, the percentage of affected States Parties reporting on risk education activities in their Article 7 report has increased from 70% (23 of 33 States Parties) in 2019 to 85% (28 of 33 States Parties) in 2022 and 2023. The exception is the year 2021, when fewer risk education activities were implemented due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Only 22 States Parties provided an update on these activities during the period 2020–2022.<sup>290</sup>

## RISK EDUCATION REPORTING AND PLANNING

In 2023, 14 States Parties with clearance obligations submitted Article 7 reports that provided updates on risk education, including beneficiary data disaggregated by gender and age: Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, Iraq, Senegal, South Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Türkiye provided gender-disaggregated beneficiary data for adults but not for children. This is a positive trend since 2019, when only eight affected States Parties submitted sufficiently disaggregated data in their Article 7 report.<sup>291</sup>

Of the Article 5 extension requests submitted in 2023 and 2024, only Guinea-Bissau and Serbia provided a detailed, costed, and multi-year plan for context-specific risk education.<sup>292</sup> Chad mentioned risk education and included it in the multi-year budget for victim assistance but did not provide any further information.<sup>293</sup>

## RISK EDUCATION BENEFICIARIES BY AGE, GENDER, AND DISABILITY

National authorities and risk education operators across 29 States Parties—four more than in 2022—provided disaggregated risk education beneficiary figures for 2023.<sup>294</sup>

While there have been efforts to better reach persons with disabilities for risk education, such data is not systematically collected. Sixteen national authorities and risk education operators reported data on beneficiaries with disabilities, while only two—Afghanistan and one operator in Somalia—also disaggregated the data by age and gender.<sup>295</sup> A total of 365,329 persons with disabilities were reported to have received risk education in affected States Parties during 2023.<sup>296</sup>



A billboard in Sinjar district, Iraq, informs passers-by of the risks posed by explosive ordnance and promotes safe behavior.

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<sup>290</sup> ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023), [bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports](http://bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports).

<sup>291</sup> ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2020* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2020), [bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports](http://bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports).

<sup>292</sup> Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 April 2024, pp. 22–23 and 26, [bit.ly/Guinea-BissauArt5ExtRequestApr2024](http://bit.ly/Guinea-BissauArt5ExtRequestApr2024); and Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2024, pp. 46–47, [bit.ly/SerbiaArt5ExtRequestMar2024](http://bit.ly/SerbiaArt5ExtRequestMar2024). As of October 2024, the extension request submitted by Afghanistan was not yet publicly available.

<sup>293</sup> Chad Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 June 2024, p. 38, [bit.ly/ChadArt5ExtRequest2024](http://bit.ly/ChadArt5ExtRequest2024).


<sup>294</sup> Disaggregated beneficiary data was provided by Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

<sup>295</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Hamid Wardak, Operations/EOD Manager, DMAC, April 2024; response to Monitor questionnaire by Kimsin Hean, Director of SEPD, CMAA, 22 August 2024; and email from Hugues Laurence, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF, 21 June 2024.

<sup>296</sup> In 2022, 8,970 beneficiaries with disabilities were reported to the Monitor. The massive increase in 2023 is predominantly due to the reported high figures by the national mine action authorities of Afghanistan (279,097 beneficiaries) and Cambodia (62,126 beneficiaries), and by UNICEF Afghanistan (10,661).

Children living in contaminated areas often lack knowledge of the risks, and have been a key target group for the last few years. The number of child beneficiaries increased significantly from 47% of all beneficiaries in 2022 to 67% in 2023, with the percentage of boys increasing by 13% over the same period.<sup>297</sup>

### Risk education beneficiaries by age and gender in States Parties in 2023<sup>298</sup>



Working-age adult men were cited by most States Parties and operators as a high-risk group, primarily due to their economic responsibilities. Men were at risk due to livelihood activities in rural areas, including agricultural cultivation, the collection of forest products, hunting, fishing, foraging, and tending livestock. Men, as well as boys, were also reported to be more likely than other groups to take intentional risks due to economic necessity. However, in 2023, adult male beneficiaries decreased by almost 9% compared with 2022.

Operators noted that, in general, women and girls were less likely to engage in unsafe behaviors or to travel as far from home as men and boys. Nevertheless, they remained an important target group due to their engagement in livelihood activities, and as they can help promote safer behavior among men and boys. While risk education delivered to girls in 2023 increased by 7.3% compared to 2022, female adult beneficiaries saw a decline of 11.4%.

## INTEGRATING RISK EDUCATION IN OTHER ACTIVITIES AND INITIATIVES

In 2023, as in previous years, risk education was integrated into survey and clearance activities. This included providing emergency risk education and stand-alone sessions. However, increasingly, risk education is also being integrated into victim assistance and, for

<sup>297</sup> A comprehensive global dataset submitted by UNICEF for 2023 has been included in the Monitor analysis for States Parties presented in this report, since it was clear that the information in the UNICEF dataset was not already included in other provided datasets. However, this only increased the reported percentage of children who received risk education in 2023 by 2.4%. Email from Hugues Laurence, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF, 21 June 2024.

<sup>298</sup> The data used for the Monitor analysis is drawn from risk education beneficiary figures collected by States Parties and international and national agencies and operators, where their data is not included in the official State Party's Article 7 reporting or response to the Monitor questionnaire. International operators collected data according to the Standard Beneficiary Definition guidelines. See, DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Refugee Council, Danish Demining Group (DDG), Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD), The HALO Trust, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), "Standardising Beneficiary Definitions in Humanitarian Mine Action: Second Edition," p. 9, October 2020, [bit.ly/StandardisingBeneficiaryDef](https://bit.ly/StandardisingBeneficiaryDef). Data in the chart reflects only "direct" beneficiaries of risk education, defined as those who receive safety messages through interpersonal risk education sessions, mass and digital media, and training of trainers programs. Beneficiary data for digital media was often not disaggregated and in these cases was not included in the overall Monitor figures. The Monitor analysis included the disaggregated data provided by 29 States Parties. In these countries, at least 2,168,059 men, 1,546,425 women, 4,200,728 boys, and 3,440,336 girls (a total of 11,355,548 persons) benefited from risk education activities.

instance, delivered by operators when visiting communities and victims to gather casualty data and conduct needs assessments.<sup>299</sup>

International and national humanitarian actors have a tradition of integrating risk education in wider humanitarian, development, protection, health, and education efforts. But over the last five years, such efforts have also increased within the mine action community. This is partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which made it necessary for mine action operators and national authorities to find new ways to transport risk education messages to at-risk groups in the face of restricted access. Many of these initiatives were successful and have lasted beyond the pandemic.<sup>300</sup>

## CONTEXT-SPECIFIC RISK EDUCATION TO ALL AFFECTED POPULATIONS AND AT-RISK GROUPS

To be effective, risk education must be sensitive to gender, age, and disability, and take the diverse needs and experiences of people living in affected communities into account. The consideration of target areas, high-risk groups, and the activities and behaviors that place people at risk, is crucial to the design and implementation of effective risk education programs.

As in 2022, risk education activities in 2023 were targeted predominantly at rural communities in areas known to be affected by contamination. Populations identified as the most vulnerable included groups that move regularly between different locations, such as nomadic communities, hunters, herders, shepherds, agricultural workers, and people collecting natural resources. This includes men, as they are more likely to participate in livelihood activities that take them to contaminated areas. Children, as well, are considered an at-risk group. Their lack of knowledge of the risks, and their curiosity, can lead them to venture into and/or play in or near contaminated areas, and even touch or pick up unexploded ordnance. Other specific at-risk groups included internally displaced persons, scrap metal collectors and other people deliberately engaging with mines and ERW.

In 2023, more States Parties, agencies, and operators than ever before reported delivering risk education specifically addressing the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, including improvised mines.<sup>301</sup>

A variety of methods were used to reach target groups in 2023: printed materials such as leaflets, posters, or notebooks; mass media (predominantly radio broadcasting); and interactive risk education approaches, including theater performances, puppet shows, games, and sports. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, the delivery of digital risk education has increased through the use of interactive websites and social media. This method has proven successful, even in challenging contexts, at reaching large audiences while also being cost-efficient.<sup>302</sup>

## BUILDING NATIONAL CAPACITY TO DELIVER RISK EDUCATION

Initiatives to integrate risk education into wider humanitarian, development, protection, health, and education efforts over the past few years have helped to further localize risk education projects and work towards sustainable national capacities.

<sup>299</sup> See, for example, Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 23–24.

<sup>300</sup> See, for example, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “Explosive Ordnance Risk Education in Residual Contamination Management,” 12 December 2023, p. 9, [bit.ly/GICHD12Dec2023](https://bit.ly/GICHD12Dec2023).

<sup>301</sup> See, for example, UNGA, “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices - Report of the Secretary-General (A/79/211),” 22 July 2024, p. 10, [undocs.org/A/79/211](https://undocs.org/A/79/211); UNOCHA, “Mozambique Access Snapshot – Cabo Delgado Province – June 2024,” 30 July 2024, [bit.ly/OCHAMozambique30July2024](https://bit.ly/OCHAMozambique30July2024); and Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 10–11.

<sup>302</sup> For example: Mines Advisory Group (MAG), “Evaluation of MAG’s Mine Action Responses in Sinjar and Tel Afar district, Ninewa Governorate, Republic of Iraq,” August 2024, p. 17, [bit.ly/MAGIraqAug2024](https://bit.ly/MAGIraqAug2024); GICHD, “Review of new technologies and methodologies for explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) in challenging contexts,” August 2020, [bit.ly/GICHD-EOREAug2020](https://bit.ly/GICHD-EOREAug2020); and ICRC, “Digital communication in WEC programmes,” August 2020, [bit.ly/ICRCDigitalCommunicationRE2020](https://bit.ly/ICRCDigitalCommunicationRE2020).

The integration into school curricula, as well as into disaster risk reduction and human security frameworks, and local political, health, and religious activities and agendas, requires training of trainer (TOT) programs. Such programs have been provided by most agencies and operators involved in risk education for a number of years, including in 2023.<sup>303</sup>

National humanitarian and development organizations, emergency service personnel, security forces, civil society members, community focal points and volunteers, political parties, religious leaders, teachers, tourist guides, students, and other persons in a position of authority have benefitted from such programs and are delivering risk education today.

The risk education pillar has managed to build up local capacities already. These efforts should continue and should include commitments by national authorities to establish the necessary legal and normative frameworks—where not yet in place—to ensure that the engagement of trained national and local personnel continues in order to become truly sustainable.

## VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Victim assistance aims to reduce death rates, advance recovery and rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors, improve psychological wellbeing, and ensure full inclusion and equal participation of victims in society. Victim assistance is an enduring obligation that requires sustained efforts, including by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that have been declared mine-free as well as those that remain contaminated.

Key components, or pillars, of victim assistance include: data collection and needs assessment with referral to emergency and ongoing medical care; physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics and assistive devices; psychological and psychosocial support; social and economic inclusion, along with education; and the development or adjustment of relevant laws and policies.

These services work best if they can be delivered to survivors in a comprehensive, integrated manner. In some cases, though less well documented, victim assistance efforts also support family members and other indirect victims. It also works to provide people with similar needs access to the same services and support.

As of 2024, at least 38 States Parties are recognized as having responsibility for significant numbers of mine victims.<sup>304</sup> At the Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference in Nairobi in 2004 an initial group of 24 States Parties had, themselves, “indicated there likely are hundreds, thousands or tens-of-thousands of landmine survivors” on their territory and, as such, further acknowledged that they have the greatest responsibility to act, and also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance.<sup>305</sup>

## THE MINE BAN TREATY, ACTION PLANS, AND VICTIM ASSISTANCE

The Mine Ban Treaty is the first disarmament or humanitarian law treaty through which States Parties committed to provide assistance for people harmed by a specific type of weapon. The

<sup>303</sup> See, for example, Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 22–24.

<sup>304</sup> It has been recorded that at the close of the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 38 States Parties “had reported mine victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control”: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Victim Assistance, “General Observations: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance Committee on Victim Assistance,” Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024, p. 4, [bit.ly/GeneralObservationsVAJune2024](https://bit.ly/GeneralObservationsVAJune2024).

<sup>305</sup> Final Report, Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference, Nairobi, 9 February 2005, pp. 33 and 99, [bit.ly/MBT1RevConFinalReport](https://bit.ly/MBT1RevConFinalReport). Of these countries, 23 reported responsibility at the First Review Conference in Nairobi from 29 November to 3 December 2004, and with Ethiopia’s ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty on 17 December 2004, the number increased to 24.



preamble recognizes the desire of States Parties “to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims.” The ICBL has played a crucial role in ensuring the inclusion of language related to assistance to mine victims in the treaty’s text. Article 6 of the treaty requires that each State Party “in a position to do so” provide such assistance. Article 6 also establishes the right of each State Party to seek and receive support for victim assistance. These provisions have been interpreted as both the responsibility of states with victims to ensure national ownership for addressing their rights, and the responsibility of the international community to support victim assistance in mine-affected countries.

A definition of “landmine victim” was agreed by States Parties in the Final Report formally adopted at the First Review Conference in Nairobi in 2005 as “those who either individually or collectively have suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to mine utilization.”<sup>306</sup> This definition also includes family members of casualties.

The Monitor tracks advancements in services, programs, and activities that support mine/ERW victims as outlined in the Mine Ban Treaty and its successive five-year action plans, most recently the Oslo Action Plan.

Under Action 5 of the Oslo Action Plan, States Parties committed to update and adapt their national mine action standards (NMAS) in accordance with best practices and the latest version of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Adopted in 2021, IMAS 13.10 on Victim Assistance reminds all actors that victim assistance should be implemented as an equal pillar of mine action, and that the mine action sector is responsible for providing assistance and facilitating access to services.<sup>307</sup>

According to IMAS 13.10 on Victim Assistance, national mine action authorities and centers can, and should, play a role in monitoring and facilitating the ongoing, multi-sector efforts to address the needs of survivors, and help ensure the inclusion of survivors and indirect victims, and their views, in the development of relevant national legislation and policy decisions. The standard notes that national mine action authorities are well placed to gather data on victims and their needs, provide information on services, and refer victims for support.

In January 2023, Iraq was the first to adopt IMAS 13.10 as a national standard, and worked with Humanity & Inclusion (HI) to elaborate a plan for the operationalization of its NMAS on Victim Assistance.<sup>308</sup> Other States Parties have integrated the standards as their own, including Türkiye, which reported that its NMAS 13.10 Victim Assistance in Mine Action was published in 2023; and Angola, which has developed an NMAS in alignment with IMAS 13.10 that is pending approval and formal adoption.<sup>309</sup>

Monitor research demonstrates that there has been improvement over time in understanding needs in affected States Parties. However, significant challenges remain in creating access to suitable and enduring services, and in covering all pillars of holistic and integrated assistance.

It is also well recognized that many victims do not have access to emergency medical services, comprehensive rehabilitation, or the opportunity to participate in society on an equal basis with others. Some have never had access to facilities and services. Many

<sup>306</sup> Final Report, Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference, Nairobi, 9 February 2005, para. 64, p. 27, [bit.ly/MBT1RevConFinalReport](https://bit.ly/MBT1RevConFinalReport); and Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009, Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference, Nairobi, 9 February 2005, [bit.ly/NairobiActionPlan2004](https://bit.ly/NairobiActionPlan2004).

<sup>307</sup> Following a review of an initial draft that was made available in 2020, the new standard was fully adopted in October 2021. The February 2020 edition of IMAS 13.10, as reported in *Landmine Monitor 2020*, was taken offline in a review process to address concerns raised by international stakeholders. The updated version included input by mine survivors, as originally submitted by ICBL-CMC. See, UNMAS, “IMAS 13.10: Victim assistance in mine action, Amendment 1,” 17 January 2023, [bit.ly/IMAS1310VJan2023](https://bit.ly/IMAS1310VJan2023).

<sup>308</sup> HI, “Towards an effective implementation of the Lausanne Action Plan: operationalizing International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 13.10 on Victim Assistance in Mine Action: the case of Iraq,” side event, Convention on Cluster Munitions Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 12 September 2023.

<sup>309</sup> Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), p. 7; and Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), p. 15.

local and international NGOs have reported decreased funding and resources for most countries and programs in recent years, especially those not in emergency settings. The decline in finances and supplies has limited existing operations and threatened the sustainability of essential programs. Existing services are far from meeting the needs of victims, and the disparities are yet to be covered by other frameworks.

The Mine Ban Treaty's action plans support victim assistance by building on States Parties' commitments to:

- Save lives;
- Enhance health services;
- Increase physical rehabilitation;
- Develop psychosocial support capacities;
- Actively support socio-economic inclusion;
- Develop and implement relevant policy frameworks;
- Give consideration to cross-cutting factors, including gender, age, and disability;
- Enhance data collection;
- Involve mine victims in the work of the treaty; and
- Ensure the meaningful participation of victims and other relevant experts at international meetings.

Since the emergence of victim assistance through the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, other weapons-related conventions have adopted this rapidly emerging norm. The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions codified the expanded principles and commitments of victim assistance into binding international law. In 2008, a Plan of Action on Victim Assistance was adopted by States Parties to the 2003 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V on ERW. A victim assistance standard was also adopted in the text of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In November 2022, 83 countries adopted the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas.<sup>310</sup> Endorsed by 87 states, the declaration affirms the signatories' commitments to address the impacts of IEDs and ERW, among other weapons, and also includes provisions for victim assistance.<sup>311</sup>

## VICTIM ASSISTANCE AND THE OSLO ACTION PLAN

The Oslo Action Plan asserts States Parties' continuing commitment to "ensuring the full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society, based on respect for human rights, gender equality, inclusion and non-discrimination."<sup>312</sup> It also reaffirms States Parties' understanding that "victim assistance should be integrated into broader national policies, plans and legal frameworks relating to the rights of persons with disabilities, and to health, education, employment, development and poverty reduction in support of the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals."<sup>313</sup>

Since the Mine Ban Treaty's First Meeting of States Parties in Maputo in 1999, the international mine action community has taken the view that victim assistance is to be a part of broader contexts, including human rights approaches.<sup>314</sup> Thus, in the Mine Ban Treaty's first Action Plan adopted in Nairobi in 2004, States Parties committed to ensuring that they

<sup>310</sup> Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs press release, "Conference adopts Declaration on protecting civilians from Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas," 18 November 2022, [bit.ly/IrelandPR18Nov2022](https://bit.ly/IrelandPR18Nov2022); and International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW), "Dublin Conference to Adopt the Political Declaration on Explosive Weapons," 19 November 2022, [bit.ly/INEW19Nov2022](https://bit.ly/INEW19Nov2022).

<sup>311</sup> "Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas," 18 November 2022, [bit.ly/EWIPAPoliticalDeclaration18Nov2022](https://bit.ly/EWIPAPoliticalDeclaration18Nov2022).

<sup>312</sup> Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, p. 9, [bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019](https://bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019).

<sup>313</sup> Ibid.

<sup>314</sup> "MAPUTO +15: Declaration of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 27 June 2014, [bit.ly/MaputoDeclaration27June2014](https://bit.ly/MaputoDeclaration27June2014).

effectively address the fundamental human rights of mine victims through national legal and policy frameworks.<sup>315</sup>

The 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is synergistically compatible with victim assistance, and is legally binding. The rights of many landmine and ERW survivors who have been injured, resulting in impairments, come under the protection of the CRPD.<sup>316</sup> Through the Oslo Action Plan, States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have committed to enhancing the protection of mine victims and persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including in situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters. States that are party to the CRPD also have an obligation, under Article 11, to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies.<sup>317</sup>

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were designed to address the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development, with an emphasis on poverty reduction, equality, rule of law, and inclusion. They complement the aims of the Mine Ban Treaty and offer opportunities for bridging victim assistance and other relevant frameworks. In many cases, victim assistance efforts can both benefit from and contribute to the achievement of the SDGs.<sup>318</sup>

During the five-year period covered by the Oslo Action Plan, the COVID-19 pandemic—and responses to it—created challenges for the implementation of victim assistance. COVID-19 restricted victim assistance services in several countries, with Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, and Yemen reported as heavily impacted. Yemen's healthcare system, already on the verge of collapse in 2019, effectively buckled under the strain of the pandemic. While the maintenance of coordination of services was possible in some countries such as Afghanistan and Cambodia, in others, including Chad and Senegal, coordination of victim assistance efforts was weakened or became non-existent.

Over the past five years, a lack of funding and resources has continued to be a significant barrier to progress in addressing victims' needs. In several countries, this has been compounded by health systems facing economic crises, armed conflict, and natural disasters. These problems have impeded the efforts of States Parties and their implementing partners to fulfill the commitments of the Oslo Action Plan, including the provision of emergency medical response, ongoing healthcare and rehabilitation, psychosocial support, and socio-economic inclusion, all of which are crucial aspects of victim assistance.

Through the Oslo Action Plan, States Parties committed to increasing the quality, availability, and accessibility of victim assistance measures, including in the following areas of implementation:

- Effective and efficient emergency medical response, including timely first aid and pre-hospital care;
- A national referral mechanism and directory of services;
- Comprehensive healthcare, rehabilitation support services;
- Comprehensive psychological and psychosocial support services;
- Social and economic inclusion; and
- Protection in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters.

<sup>315</sup> Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009, Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference, Nairobi, 9 February 2005, Action #33, p. 6, [bit.ly/NairobiActionPlan2004](http://bit.ly/NairobiActionPlan2004).

<sup>316</sup> While not all injuries due to landmines and ERW lead to long-term impairment, the impact of these weapons often results in lasting disabilities.

<sup>317</sup> See, UNGA, "Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities," New York, 13 December 2006, Article 11, [bit.ly/CRPDArt11Dec2006](http://bit.ly/CRPDArt11Dec2006).

<sup>318</sup> With regard to mine survivors, persons with disabilities are referred to directly in several of the SDGs that are highly relevant to the implementation of the CRPD and the humanitarian disarmament conventions' action plans: education (SDG 4), employment (SDG 8), reducing inequality (SDG 10), and accessibility of human settlements (SDG 11), in addition to including persons with disabilities in data collection and monitoring (SDG 17). See, UN, "Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development," September 2015, [bit.ly/SDGsSept2015](http://bit.ly/SDGsSept2015).

As with the Oslo Action Plan's key objective of ensuring the inclusion and participation of victims, the ICBL emphasizes that landmine and ERW survivors be actively consulted and meaningfully involved in all decision-making processes that affect them. This includes their input in the planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of projects and programs. The ICBL continues to insist that, for responses to be effective, it is essential that victims be consulted and their perspectives taken into account at all levels of decision-making.<sup>319</sup>

### Timely emergency medical response

Time-sensitive emergency care includes interventions such as first aid and field trauma response, emergency evacuation, available transport, and immediate medical care that involves assessment and prehospital communication of critical information for patient handover. The provision of appropriate emergency medical services can considerably affect the chance of survival and the speed of recovery of mine victims, as well as the outcome of injuries and the severity of impairments.

In some states, healthcare systems have been completely jeopardized, making access to any type of medical services challenging.

In South Sudan, medical care is practically non-existent for people living in remote areas. The ongoing influx of refugees and returnees to South Sudan from Sudan has exacerbated shortages of essential goods, further complicating access to medical care.<sup>320</sup> In Sudan, healthcare services for the population, and all persons with disabilities, also decreased due to renewed conflict since 2023 and the devastating security situation.<sup>321</sup>

In Ukraine, the war has severely damaged Ukraine's healthcare infrastructure and workforce, leading to a significant reduction in the availability of essential services.<sup>322</sup>

In Yemen, ongoing conflict has further undermined an already struggling health system. Many medical facilities have been damaged, and healthcare has severely deteriorated.<sup>323</sup>

In 2023, international organizations continued to provide much needed medical assistance, including emergency services in conflict-affected areas, where the situation is often dire, as noted below.

In Afghanistan, there is now no dedicated funding for providing emergency medical care to mine/ERW casualties. Requests for financial resources to provide first aid and trauma care training to community health workers have not been successful. However, clearance and EOD teams are equipped with ambulances and have provided evacuation support in case of accidents, when possible.<sup>324</sup> In addition, HI collaborated closely with the Health Cluster to reduce the impact of the suspension of several health support projects by directing people in need of primary healthcare to the remaining operational health centers.<sup>325</sup>

In Zimbabwe, demining organizations have provided first response medical assistance.<sup>326</sup> In response to the large numbers of people injured during the intense fighting in Nigeria, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reached more hospitals than planned and increased its support for the provision of life-saving interventions in 2023.<sup>327</sup>

<sup>319</sup> ICBL-CMC, "Guiding Principles for Victim Assistance," January 2021, [bit.ly/VAGuidingPrinciplesICBL-CMC2021](https://bit.ly/VAGuidingPrinciplesICBL-CMC2021).

<sup>320</sup> Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF), "South Sudan: War in neighbouring Sudan is exacerbating needs," 2 July 2024, [bit.ly/MSFSudan2July2024](https://bit.ly/MSFSudan2July2024).

<sup>321</sup> ICRC, "Sudan faces health crisis as conflict devastates medical infrastructure," 8 August 2024, [bit.ly/ICRCSudan8Aug2024](https://bit.ly/ICRCSudan8Aug2024).

<sup>322</sup> United States Agency for International Development (USAID), "Ukraine: Health," updated 4 July 2024, [bit.ly/USAIDUkraineHealth](https://bit.ly/USAIDUkraineHealth).

<sup>323</sup> WHO, "Yemen Health Emergency," 11 April 2024, [bit.ly/WHOYemen11Apr2024](https://bit.ly/WHOYemen11Apr2024).

<sup>324</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 27 April 2024.

<sup>325</sup> ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2023," 18 March 2024, pp. 70–71, [bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2023](https://bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2023).

<sup>326</sup> Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), Annex B, p. 9.

<sup>327</sup> ICRC, "Annual Report 2023, Volume I," Geneva, June 2024, p. 163, [bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport](https://bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport).



A capacity-building workshop on peer support was organized for the members of a newly setup survivors' network in the West Nile region of Uganda.

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## Referral mechanisms

States Parties can improve accessibility of services by ensuring that existing service providers have the capacity to make referrals to appropriate health and rehabilitation facilities. Similarly, by taking a holistic approach to assistance, health and rehabilitation service providers can provide referrals to others who can support the inclusion of victims. Referral mechanisms can involve national-level mechanisms, as well as local community referral networks, including through community-based rehabilitation systems.

In 2023, national governmental bodies providing referrals included a range of both mine action centers and government ministries, such as: Algeria's Ministry of National Solidarity, Family and the Status of Women; Angola's Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration; the Cambodian Mine/ERW Victim Information System (CMVIS), which operates as the data department of the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority; Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal (AICMA) and the Colombian government-run reparations program at the Victim's Unit; Iraq's Directorate for Mine Action; the Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC); and the Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC).

In States Parties with victims, referrals at a national or local level were also provided by many non-governmental groups and organizations, including a range of survivor networks, national disabled people's organizations (DPOs), and national and international NGOs, notably HI, as well as the ICRC and national Red Cross and Red Crescent movements. For example, in 2023, the Danish Refugee Council introduced an emergency victim assistance program in Afghanistan to assess each reported case of an incident, cover the medical expenses for the survivor and their accompanying family member at a specialized hospital, and refer them for rehabilitation.<sup>328</sup>

## Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation—including physiotherapy and the provision of assistive devices such as prostheses, orthoses, mobility aids, and wheelchairs—aims to restore or improve mobility for victims and to support their engagement in everyday activities. Psychosocial support can also be an integral aspect of rehabilitation services.

A number of interconnected and overlapping global initiatives seek to improve the availability of rehabilitation and assistive devices. Integrating rehabilitation into national healthcare systems—including through the universalization of health coverage—is deemed crucial for ensuring sustainable services.

The Global Rehabilitation Alliance, launched in Geneva in 2018, worked in strategic partnership with the WHO to advocate for coordinated and affordable rehabilitation and a

<sup>328</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 27 April 2024.



World Health Assembly resolution on rehabilitation.<sup>329</sup> Following an initial rollout in 2022, the World Rehabilitation Alliance (WRA), a WHO-hosted global network of stakeholders, was fully launched in Geneva in July 2023 after the World Health Assembly passed a resolution in May to improve access to rehabilitative care.<sup>330</sup> The WRA aims to advocate for the implementation of the WHO's Rehabilitation 2030 Initiative.<sup>331</sup>

The World Health Assembly resolution on strengthening rehabilitation within health systems, adopted in May 2023, urges the expansion and integration of rehabilitation services into health systems as part of Universal Health Coverage (UHC). It is relevant to victim assistance because it highlights the importance of making rehabilitation available at the primary care level, as well as its inclusion in emergency response efforts.<sup>332</sup>

However, healthcare systems in many States Parties responsible for survivors are underfunded, with limited accessibility, infrastructure, human resource capacity, and expertise. Monitor findings show that rehabilitation has not yet been a priority for sustainable resource allocation in many mine-affected States Parties.

Facing a significant decline in budgets, the ICRC has turned to focusing its efforts on programs with the greatest impact in conflict zones. As part of this shift, the ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP) ended several projects in 2023 and reduced the number of countries it works in by some 20%. This resulted in the conclusion of its support to rehabilitation efforts in States Parties Algeria, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, the Philippines, and Rwanda. Due to these budget constraints, the ICRC also curtailed or suspended survivors' social inclusion activities and continuous staff development.<sup>333</sup> The ICRC also handed over some of the rehabilitation activities it had supported in Iraq and Jordan.<sup>334</sup>

In Afghanistan, rehabilitation centers in Kabul, Farah, Paktya, and Paktika provinces provided physiotherapy, orthotics, and prosthetics services; and supported vocational rehabilitation and development training for landmine survivors and their immediate family members living with disabilities.<sup>335</sup> HI deployed emergency mobile teams to provide urgent physical rehabilitation and psychosocial support to persons with disabilities in rural areas, who would otherwise have no access to such services.<sup>336</sup> Despite facing financial and staffing constraints, the ICRC carried out a number of activities.<sup>337</sup> The ICRC made repairs and renovations to its supported physical rehabilitation centers, and provided material support to several centers run by other actors. The ICRC also completed construction of a new physical rehabilitation center with increased capacity in Lashkar Gah.<sup>338</sup>

<sup>329</sup> Christian Blind Mission (CBM), "Global Rehabilitation Alliance," (undated), [bit.ly/CBMGlobalRehabilitationAlliance](https://bit.ly/CBMGlobalRehabilitationAlliance); and World Physiotherapy, "Global Rehabilitation Alliance launched in Geneva," 23 May 2018, [bit.ly/WorldPhysiotherapy23May2018](https://bit.ly/WorldPhysiotherapy23May2018).

<sup>330</sup> WHO, "Pre-launch of the World Rehabilitation Alliance," 13 September 2022, [bit.ly/WHO13Sept2022](https://bit.ly/WHO13Sept2022); and Cochrane Rehabilitation, "Rehabilitation Alliance is finally launched!," 20 July 2023, [bit.ly/CochraneRehabilitation20July2023](https://bit.ly/CochraneRehabilitation20July2023).

<sup>331</sup> WHO, "3rd Global Rehabilitation 2030 meeting and launch of the World Rehabilitation Alliance 10–11 July 2023," [bit.ly/WHO10July2023](https://bit.ly/WHO10July2023).

<sup>332</sup> WHO, "Landmark resolution on strengthening rehabilitation in health systems," 27 May 2023, [bit.ly/WHO27May2023](https://bit.ly/WHO27May2023).

<sup>333</sup> The ICRC was seeking alternative funding strategies to support those initiatives. ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2023 Annual Report," July 2024, p. 5, [bit.ly/ICRCPRPAnnualReport2023](https://bit.ly/ICRCPRPAnnualReport2023).

<sup>334</sup> ICRC, "Annual Report 2023, Volume II," Geneva, June 2024, pp. 399 and 414, [bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport](https://bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport).

<sup>335</sup> US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), "To Walk the Earth in Safety (2024)," 4 April 2024, p. 55, [bit.ly/TWEIS2024](https://bit.ly/TWEIS2024).

<sup>336</sup> ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2023," 18 March 2024, pp. 70–71, [bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2023](https://bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2023).

<sup>337</sup> ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2023 Annual Report," July 2024, p. 28, [bit.ly/ICRCPRPAnnualReport2023](https://bit.ly/ICRCPRPAnnualReport2023).

<sup>338</sup> ICRC, "Annual Report 2023, Volume II," Geneva, June 2024, p. 255, [bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport](https://bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport).

In Angola, during the first half of 2024, the ‘Princesa Diana’ Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Center in Huambo significantly increased its monthly production of prostheses, tripling its previous output.<sup>339</sup>

In Cambodia, the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVAY) continued to manage existing rehabilitation. The ICRC supported two state-run physical rehabilitation centers that provided over 47% of all rehabilitation services in Cambodia.<sup>340</sup> The physical rehabilitation centers in Siem Reap and in Kratie were operating with support from HI through the ATscale project.<sup>341</sup> However, while workshop equipment is sufficient, the centers lack imported materials and human resources, including prosthetics technicians and social services staff. Food and travel allowances for people with disabilities remained insufficient.<sup>342</sup>

Colombia has a functional rehabilitation system linked to the mixed public-private health insurance structure that includes the national public health insurance plan Entidades Promotoras de Salud (EPS). HI provided accompaniment for access to rehabilitation and psychosocial services, capacity-building on community-based rehabilitation, as well as legal assistance.<sup>343</sup>

In Ethiopia, HI offered awareness sessions, highlighting the importance of early physical rehabilitation and quality physiotherapy in improving independence and access to humanitarian assistance. Stationary and mobile rehabilitation sessions were also offered, together with staff training on the use of donated equipment and assistive devices tailored for emergency rehabilitation.<sup>344</sup> For ICRC, the focus has shifted in recent years to responding to the needs created by successive conflicts rather than its previous system-strengthening approach, however, it has continued to provide assistance to the 13 physical rehabilitation centers with which it partners.<sup>345</sup>

In Iraq, the ICRC ended its support for two state-run physical rehabilitation centers, in Mosul and Fallujah in accordance with its operational changes globally.<sup>346</sup> The Mosul center in Ninewa governorate was built by the ICRC in 2018, and subsequently handed over to the state Ministry of Health. In 2023, HI provided physical and functional rehabilitation, as well as mental health and psychosocial support services to the most vulnerable through direct delivery, outreach and mobile capacity support, and a cash-for-health system.<sup>347</sup>

In Jordan, the ICRC concluded its support for its physical rehabilitation program, handing it over to the Jordan National Red Crescent Society and other partners.<sup>348</sup> In 2023, the US Department of State provided rehabilitation and prosthetic support for Jordanians and Syrian refugees who are mine/ERW survivors.<sup>349</sup>

<sup>339</sup> “Princess Diana rehabilitation center triples prosthesis production,” *Agência Angola Press*, 10 August 2024, [bit.ly/Angop10Aug2024](https://bit.ly/Angop10Aug2024).

<sup>340</sup> ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2023 Annual Report,” July 2024, p. 32, [bit.ly/ICRCPRPAnnualReport2023](https://bit.ly/ICRCPRPAnnualReport2023).

<sup>341</sup> The Geneva-based ATscale, Global Partnership for Assistive Technology, is supporting the Government of Cambodia with US\$3.2 million over three years through a program managed by the Clinton Health Access Initiative, HI, and the Cambodia Disabled People’s Organization (CDPO), under the guidance of a committee co-chaired by the Ministry of Health and MoSVAY. ATScale, “Catalytic funding set to increase access to assistive technology for 275,000 Cambodians by 2025,” 8 November 2023, [bit.ly/ATscale8Nov2023](https://bit.ly/ATscale8Nov2023).

<sup>342</sup> Email from So Not, Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Munitions, 9 September 2024.

<sup>343</sup> HI, “Country Sheet: Colombia,” September 2023, p. 7, [bit.ly/HIColombiaSept2023](https://bit.ly/HIColombiaSept2023).

<sup>344</sup> HI, “Country Sheet: Ethiopia,” 2023, p. 5, [bit.ly/HICountrySheetEthiopia2023](https://bit.ly/HICountrySheetEthiopia2023).

<sup>345</sup> ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2023 Annual Report,” July 2024, p. 12, [bit.ly/ICRCPRPAnnualReport2023](https://bit.ly/ICRCPRPAnnualReport2023).

<sup>346</sup> ICRC, “Annual Report 2023, Volume II,” Geneva, June 2024, p. 399, [bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport](https://bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport).

<sup>347</sup> HI, “Country Card: Iraq 2023,” September 2023, p. 6, [bit.ly/HICountryCardIraq2023](https://bit.ly/HICountryCardIraq2023).

<sup>348</sup> ICRC, “Annual Report 2023, Volume II,” Geneva, June 2024, p. 414, [bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport](https://bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport).

<sup>349</sup> US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, PM/WRA, “To Walk the Earth in Safety (2024),” 4 April 2024, p. 48, [bit.ly/TWEIS2024](https://bit.ly/TWEIS2024).

In Nigeria, fewer people than anticipated received rehabilitation services at the National Orthopaedic Hospital in Kano and at the physical rehabilitation center at the University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital due to financial and other constraints.<sup>350</sup>

In Palestine, rehabilitation and prosthetics services have been unavailable in Gaza due to damage to facilities, displacement, and the loss of rehabilitation capacity as a result of renewed hostilities. The Sheikh Hamad Hospital, established in 2016, suffered significant damage early in the conflict. The Artificial Limbs and Polio Centre (ALPC), which provided the majority of services to thousands of persons with disabilities, remained undamaged, but was inaccessible to staff and patients after October 2023.<sup>351</sup> Prior to October 2023, access to physiotherapy and other services at ALPC was supported by the ICRC, which provided guidance on the provision of assistive devices and its long-term fundraising strategy. After operations at the center were suspended in early October, the ICRC transferred its physical rehabilitation services to the European Gaza Hospital.<sup>352</sup> However, activities at the European Gaza Hospital ceased when patients and staff had to evacuate in early July 2024.<sup>353</sup>

In Rwanda, the ICRC concluded its physical rehabilitation program at three ICRC-supported physical rehabilitation centers, where thousands of people with disabilities had previously obtained physical rehabilitation, including physiotherapy and prosthetics. The program, however, left material supplies to last until the end of 2024.<sup>354</sup>



Orthopedic technicians from Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Liberia are trained by SwissABILITY at the opening of the new orthopedic center in Ziguinchor, Senegal.

© ISAD-ASVM, April 2024

In Senegal, the Senegalese Association of Mine Victims (Association Sénégalaise des Victimes de Mines, ASVM) established a prosthetic center in 2023, enabling local services in Casamance that were previously only available by traveling to Guinea-Bissau.<sup>355</sup> The new center includes a complete orthopedic workshop, a physiotherapy unit, and a mobile clinic unit. In addition to landmine victims, the physical rehabilitation center covers other amputees and persons with disabilities, and people injured during political demonstrations.<sup>356</sup> Until 2023, physical rehabilitation services were largely unavailable in Casamance. From 2015 to 2022, mine/ERW victims from Senegal received prosthetic devices in Guinea-Bissau through an agreement involving the ICRC and the Senegalese survivor network, ASVM. The nearest specialized facility was in Guinea-

Bissau, which began operating independently after the ICRC ended its support to the center in 2022.<sup>357</sup>

<sup>350</sup> ICRC, “Annual Report 2023, Volume I,” Geneva, June 2024, p. 163, [bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport](https://bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport).

<sup>351</sup> Global Health Cluster, “Rehabilitation Task Force Technical Note: Amputations and Prosthetics in Gaza,” 6 May 2024, [bit.ly/HealthClusterGazaMay2024](https://bit.ly/HealthClusterGazaMay2024).

<sup>352</sup> ICRC, “Annual Report 2023,” Geneva, June 2024, p. 407, [bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport](https://bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport).

<sup>353</sup> ICRC, “Israel and the occupied territories: Key Facts and Figures from 7 October 2023 to 31 July 2024,” 8 August 2024, [bit.ly/ICRCGaza8Aug2024](https://bit.ly/ICRCGaza8Aug2024).

<sup>354</sup> ICRC, “Annual Report 2023, Volume I,” Geneva, June 2024, pp. 116 and 119, [bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport](https://bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport).

<sup>355</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Papa Magueye Diop, Director, CNAMS, Senegal, 12 July 2024.

<sup>356</sup> “Ziguinchor gets a physical rehabilitation center in Boutoute,” *Jumelages & Partenariats*, 1 May 2024, [bit.ly/JumelagesPartenariats1May2024](https://bit.ly/JumelagesPartenariats1May2024).

<sup>357</sup> ICRC, “Annual Report 2023, Volume I,” Geneva, 22 June 2024, p. 93, [bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport](https://bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport); ICRC, “Annual Report 2020,” 1 July 2021, p. 168, [bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2020](https://bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2020); emails from Sarani Diatta, Coordinator, ISAD, 15 and 18 June 2021; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Israel Santos, Country Manager, HI, 15 April 2021.

In Sudan, conflict since April 2023 forced the suspension of many rehabilitation activities.<sup>358</sup>

In Tajikistan, services were provided at four state-run rehabilitation centers. The ICRC supported the centers with training and materials, focusing in particular on one renovated center near the Afghan border.<sup>359</sup> The WHO expanded its one-stop-shop assistive products services from the pilot site to four additional districts in Tajikistan.<sup>360</sup>

Uganda's Rehabilitation Strategic Plan 2024/25–2029/30 includes the provision of assistive technology. Implementing the strategy, however, requires national-level planning and decision-making informed by quality rehabilitation data and information. The Ugandan Ministry of Health has engaged in integrating rehabilitation into the WHO's Routine Health Information System (RHIS), which gathers health service data directly from healthcare and community health workers at health facilities.<sup>361</sup> However, there are concerns about the integration of rehabilitation into the wider Ugandan health information system, particularly given that rehabilitation remains an unfunded 'priority,' lacks a budget or financing, and has insufficient human resources.<sup>362</sup>

The ICRC PRP continued providing support to make physical rehabilitation services available in Benin, Mali, Niger, and Togo.

### Psychosocial support

Psychological and psychosocial support activities encompass professional counseling, individual peer-to-peer counseling, community-based peer support groups, networks of survivors, associations of persons with disabilities, and various sports and recreational activities.

In Algeria, psychological support was made available nationwide to survivors and their families through national health sector establishments, as well as through doctors, social workers, and psychologists working in community agencies.<sup>363</sup>

In BiH, psychological and psychosocial support was available for survivors, but no updates have been provided regarding the provision of peer-to-peer support.<sup>364</sup>

In Cambodia, efforts to improve the quality and availability of psychological support services have continued by offering direct interventions, like peer-to-peer counseling and consultations, and by providing psychological support training in order to build a cadre of trained professionals.<sup>365</sup>

Psychosocial assistance workshops were conducted for survivors in Croatia, with additional support available through specialized centers for war victims.<sup>366</sup>

Ethiopia developed a psychosocial and social rehabilitation manual for use in rehabilitation centers. It also noted the importance of the work of Survivors Recovery

<sup>358</sup> ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2023 Annual Report," July 2024, p. 12, [bit.ly/ICRCPRPAnnualReport2023](https://bit.ly/ICRCPRPAnnualReport2023).

<sup>359</sup> ICRC, "Annual Report 2023, Volume II," Geneva, June 2024, p. 371, [bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport](https://bit.ly/ICRC2023AnnualReport); ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2023 Annual Report," July 2024, p. 36, [bit.ly/ICRCPRPAnnualReport2023](https://bit.ly/ICRCPRPAnnualReport2023); and response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 3 April 2024.

<sup>360</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 3 April 2024.

<sup>361</sup> WHO, "Improving rehabilitation data in Uganda," 17 July 2024, [bit.ly/WHOUGanda17July2024](https://bit.ly/WHOUGanda17July2024).

<sup>362</sup> Rachel Neill, Elizeus Rutebemberwa, Raymond Tweheyo, Sam Tukey Ojulo, Gerald Okello, Abdulgafoor M. Bachani, and Yusra Ribhi Shawar, "Generating Political Priority for the Health Needs of the 21st Century: A Qualitative Policy Analysis on the Prioritization of Rehabilitation Services in Uganda," *International Journal of Health Policy and Management*, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2024, pp. 1–14, [bit.ly/IJHPMRehabilitationUganda2024](https://bit.ly/IJHPMRehabilitationUganda2024).

<sup>363</sup> Algeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 18.

<sup>364</sup> Committee on Victim Assistance, "Preliminary Observation, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024, [bit.ly/MBTObservationVABiHJun2024](https://bit.ly/MBTObservationVABiHJun2024).

<sup>365</sup> Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 13–14.

<sup>366</sup> Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form J.

and Rehabilitation Organization (SRaRO) as the only survivor network in the country that provides peer support.<sup>367</sup>

In South Sudan, some psychological assistance was provided in health facilities, however, with limited availability, and no peer support component.<sup>368</sup>

Psychological support was also provided by NGOs to address acute and ongoing needs. For example, in Iraq, HI continued to provide mental health and psychosocial support services in Anbar and Ninewa governorates, which are heavily impacted by the use of improvised mines.<sup>369</sup>

Significant gaps still remain regarding the provision of psychological and psychosocial support.

In Afghanistan, amidst decreased funding and shrinking civil society reach, there is a clear need to provide psychosocial and psychological support, including peer support, especially to new victims, as well as those who have been traumatized and live in isolation. In the DRC, the availability of psychosocial services requires improvement, especially outside the capital, while in Mozambique, prioritization of assistance based on psychological and socioeconomic needs could help bring about fuller inclusion. In Senegal, the sustainability of psychosocial support in the Casamance region needs to be ensured to complement the rehabilitation services now being provided locally.

While survivor organizations provided peer support in many countries, this was rarely included in health budgets or government funded initiatives. For instance, while Colombia increased support to survivor networks and enhanced opportunities for national organizations, it has yet to include peer support services under the national health insurance system that would allow these services to be funded.

### Social and economic inclusion

Implementation of socio-economic inclusion projects for victims through education, sports, leisure and cultural activities, vocational training, micro-credit, income generation, and employment was most frequently undertaken by NGOs and charity institutions. Many initiatives remained localized, small scale and time-limited, but provided much needed opportunities.

In BiH, a beekeeping project offered opportunities to balance household incomes and improve quality of life.<sup>370</sup> In Croatia, a small-scale investment initiative was launched in 2023 to enhance the economic welfare and employment capacities of victims, and support the creation of new businesses and the expansion of existing ones for mine survivors and immediate family members.<sup>371</sup> In Tajikistan, a summer rehabilitation camp for survivors from remote mine-affected districts provided rehabilitation, enhanced communication, and social-integration skills.<sup>372</sup>

<sup>367</sup> Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 7 and 9.

<sup>368</sup> South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 19.

<sup>369</sup> HI, "Country card: Iraq 2023," September 2023, p. 6, [bit.ly/HICountryCardIraq2023](https://bit.ly/HICountryCardIraq2023).


<sup>370</sup> ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2023," 18 March 2024, p. 34, [bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2023](https://bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2023).

<sup>371</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Damir Trut, Director, Civil Protection Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, Croatia, 11 June 2024.


<sup>372</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 3 April 2024.



# ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINE CONTAMINATION: 2023



# LANDMINE/EXPLOSIVE REMNANT OF WAR CASUALTIES: 2023







An all-women Ukrainian team undergoes training with technical survey dogs in Cambodia. The dogs and their handlers will strengthen the clearance teams already operating in Ukraine.

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# SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

## INTRODUCTION

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in order to fulfill its treaty obligations. Article 6 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions similarly recognizes this right. This provision on international cooperation and assistance within both the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions has been crucial in supporting their implementation.

This chapter examines the financial contribution provided in 2023 by affected countries and international donors to support mine action efforts globally.<sup>1</sup> It covers the contributions of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and contributions of states not party to either treaty.

The chapter also considers the progress in the last five years towards meeting the Mine Ban Treaty's objectives on cooperation and assistance as outlined in the five-year Oslo Action Plan and agreed by States Parties at the Fourth Review Conference in Oslo in November 2019.

In 2023, global support for mine action increased by 12% (US\$112.1 million) from 2022, with 34 donors and 20 affected states having reported providing a total of \$1.03 billion in international and national support for mine action.<sup>2</sup> This is the first time that annual funding

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<sup>1</sup> While this chapter focuses on financial support for mine action, cooperation and assistance is not only limited to financial assistance. Other forms of assistance include the provision of equipment, expertise, and personnel, as well as the exchange of experience and skills.

<sup>2</sup> Mine action support includes funding specifically related to landmines, cluster munitions, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), but is rarely disaggregated as such. State reporting on contributions varies in the level of detail, and some states utilize the fiscal year rather than the calendar year. The figures in this report are presented in US\$, rounded to the nearest thousand, million, or billion. However, calculation of totals and percentages are made prior to rounding figures; as such, the rounded numbers presented in this document may not add up precisely to the totals listed, and percentages may not add up to 100%. In 2023, 16 of the 25 States Parties documented in this chapter reported disaggregated data on international funding for mine action in their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports. Two reported fiscal year funding and two reported multi-year funding. Five donor States Parties—Andorra, Austria, Ireland, Italy, and Norway—had not submitted their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports by 1 October 2024. Andorra, Austria, and Norway had also not submitted their Cluster Munition Convention Article 7 reports.

for mine action has reached one billion. While international support to mine action remained on a similar level as 2022, totaling \$798.3 million, the Monitor identified 20 affected states that provided a total of \$227.3 million to their own mine action programs, a 97% increase on the \$115.1 million reported in 2022.<sup>3</sup> This included a significant contribution of \$64.8 million by state not party Azerbaijan for mine action in the territories regained after the 2020 conflict with Armenia.

As in previous years, a small number of donors provided the majority of international mine action support in 2023, with the United States (US) remaining the largest donor, followed by Germany and the European Union (EU).<sup>4</sup> Several European donors increased their funding contributions in 2023, mainly providing additional support to Ukraine.<sup>5</sup>

Funding for Ukraine increased significantly in 2023 as the conflict continued for a second year following Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. Of the top 10 recipient countries, which received a total of \$603.8 million (76% of all international funding), Ukraine received \$308.1 million, representing 39% of all international donor funds. This is almost double (90%) the \$162.3 million that went to Ukraine in 2022. The only other country in the top 10 group that saw an increase in funding was Vietnam. The other eight countries all saw a decrease in mine action funding. The decrease was particularly significant in Afghanistan and Yemen, with Afghanistan receiving 60% less funding than in 2022, and Yemen 76% less.

As in previous years, most funding provided in 2023 by donors was spent on mine clearance activities and integrated clearance programs (\$401.8 million, or 50% of total contributions).<sup>6</sup> A large proportion of clearance funding (\$245.3 million, or 61%) was spent in six States Parties with massive contamination (more than 100km<sup>2</sup>), with Ukraine receiving 55% (\$134.6 million) of that support. The combined clearance support to States Parties with large, medium, and small contamination decreased compared to 2022. Eight Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with clearance obligations did not receive any international funding for clearance in 2023, despite funding requests by four of them: Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Peru, and Türkiye.<sup>7</sup>

In the five years since the Oslo Action Plan was adopted by States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty at the Fourth Review Conference in November 2019, States Parties have been



A demining team heads to a hazardous area where it will carry out clearance operations in the region of Antioquia, Colombia.

© Sebastian Caro/CCCM, April 2024

<sup>3</sup> Data on national support for mine action is based on responses to Monitor questionnaires, reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, and media reporting.

<sup>4</sup> Data on international support for mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports, the ITF Enhancing Human Security and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) annual reports, media reporting, and responses from donors to Monitor questionnaires. Data was also checked against relevant databases, including the International Aid Transparency Initiative Database (IATI), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) Financial Tracking Service, and the EU Aid Explorer. See, IATI, "Country Development Finance Data," [bit.ly/IATIData2023](https://bit.ly/IATIData2023); UNOCHA, "Humanitarian aid contributions 2023," [bit.ly/UNOCHADonors2023](https://bit.ly/UNOCHADonors2023); and European Commission, "EU Aid Explorer," [bit.ly/EUAidExplorer](https://bit.ly/EUAidExplorer). See also the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, [www.the-monitor.org](https://www.the-monitor.org).

<sup>5</sup> Austria, the Czech Republic, Liechtenstein, and Slovakia all provided increased funding to Ukraine.

<sup>6</sup> Integrated clearance programs included activities such as risk education, victim assistance, and capacity-building, although clearance accounted for the largest component of spending.

<sup>7</sup> States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with Article 5 obligations that did not receive international funding in 2023 were: Cyprus, Ecuador, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Oman, Peru, and Türkiye.



consistent in their provision of financial assistance. From 2019–2023, 27 States Parties reported contributing \$1.6 billion to mine action support to affected countries. This represents almost half (49%) of all international assistance to mine action during this period. Of the \$1.6 billion contributed by States Parties, \$1.1 billion was provided to other affected States Parties. As the case of Ukraine demonstrates, States Parties have been able to respond to crises and conflict, ensuring that funds are directed to States Parties where the need is great. However, while some affected States Parties have seen a lot of support, others have struggled to obtain international funds, which has impacted their ability to meet their Article 5 clearance obligations “as soon as possible.” The challenge in the next five years will be for States Parties to ensure better geographical and equitable distribution of resources so that all affected States Parties receive the support they need. This need has already been noted by States Parties, and Action 41 of the draft Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029 refers to the possibility of establishing a voluntary trust fund for this purpose.


## FIVE-YEAR SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION: 2019–2023

Over the past five years (2019–2023), total support to mine action amounted to \$3.9 billion, an average of \$776 million per year. This is almost \$700 million more than the total support provided in the previous five-year period from 2014–2018, constituting a 22% increase.<sup>8</sup>

Although data on national support for mine action remains incomplete, such support accounted for at least 16% of mine action funding from 2019–2023, totaling approximately \$611.3 million.<sup>9</sup> International support over the period totaled \$3.3 billion, averaging some \$653 million per year and representing 84% of all support.

From 2019–2023, the US contributed \$1.2 billion, representing 37% of all international support during the five-year period. Together with the EU (\$396.3 million) and Germany (\$316.8 million), these three donors contributed \$1.9 billion, or more than half of total international support (58%). Two other donors—Japan and Norway—contributed more than \$200 million each; while Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK) ranked among the top 10 mine action donors during the five-year period.

### Summary of contributions: 2019–2023



<sup>8</sup> According to Monitor data, from 2014–2018, total support for mine action totaled \$3.2 billion (\$2.6 billion from international donors and \$560 million provided by affected states to their own mine action activities).

<sup>9</sup> Funding by affected States Parties amounts to at least \$467.6 million (77% of the total).

Support from Mine Ban Treaty States Parties accounted for almost half (49%) of all international funding provided in 2019–2023, with a combined contribution of \$1.6 billion.<sup>10</sup> This is an increase from the support provided by States Parties in 2014–2018, when \$1.3 billion was provided, representing 41% of all international funding during the period.


## INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2023

International donors provided \$798.3 million to mine action in 2023, a similar amount to the \$798.4 million provided in 2022, which was the highest level of annual funding recorded by the Monitor since it began reporting in 1999. International funding previously peaked at \$696.3 million in 2017.

There were few changes to the donor base in 2023, and a small number of donors continued to provide the majority of international mine action support. The US remained the largest mine action donor, followed by Germany and the EU.

The 15 largest donors provided almost all international mine action funding in 2023 with a combined total of \$762.4 million (96% of all international support).<sup>11</sup> This represents a decrease of 2% from the \$774.9 million provided by the 15 largest donors in 2022.

### International support for mine action: 2014–2023



Note: Totals not adjusted for inflation.

## DONORS

In 2023, 25 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, three states not party, one other area, the EU, and four other institutions contributed a total of \$798.3 million to mine action.

Five donors—the US, Germany, the EU, Japan, and Norway—accounted for 72% of all international support in 2023, providing a combined total of \$576.9 million.

In 2023, the US remained the largest mine action donor with a total contribution of \$309.8 million, representing 39% of all international support. Germany ranked second, with \$80.3 million, accounting for 10% of contributions. The EU provided the third-largest contribution of \$68.5 million (9% of all support), which represented a 45% decrease from the

<sup>10</sup> Twenty-seven States Parties reported mine action contributions during the period 2019–2023: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the UK.

<sup>11</sup> The 15 largest donors in 2023 were: the US, Germany, the EU, Japan, Norway, Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, the UK, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, New Zealand, and Austria.

EU contribution in 2022. Japan provided \$67.5 million (8% of all support) and Norway \$50.8 million (6% of all support).

Despite variations in the level of support provided, the proportion of total assistance from the top five donors each year has remained constant over time. From 2019–2023, the combined annual contributions from the five major donors accounted for 70–77% of all international support. Only five countries—Germany, Japan, Norway, the UK, and the US—plus the EU appeared in the group of five largest donors of international support from 2019–2023.

### Contributions by donors: 2019–2023<sup>12</sup>

Donor	Contribution (US\$ million)					Total
	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	
US	309.8	310.2	194.5	204.8	177.4	<b>1,196.7</b>
<b>Germany</b>	80.3	78.8	64.8	54.3	38.6	<b>316.8</b>
EU	68.5	124.2	37.8	89.8	76.0	<b>396.3</b>
<b>Japan</b>	67.5	45.3	42.3	39.8	36.9	<b>231.8</b>
<b>Norway</b>	50.8	44.7	35.5	37.4	43.0	<b>211.4</b>
<b>Canada</b>	40.7	22.6	16.3	8.4	8.7	<b>96.7</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>	35.8	19.7	15.2	15.4	14.8	<b>100.9</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	24.6	25.0	21.5	12.7	14.9	<b>98.7</b>
<b>France</b>	22.0	10.9	9.6	8.5	5.3	<b>56.3</b>
<b>UK</b>	15.2	24.7	38.2	32.3	71.7	<b>182.1</b>
<b>Italy</b>	11.7	8.1	5.4	4.8	5.1	<b>35.1</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	11.7	12.5	14.3	9.1	8.8	<b>56.4</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	8.3	10.3	14.8	13.8	17.6	<b>64.8</b>
<b>New Zealand</b>	7.9	4.7	9.9	8.1	9.1	<b>39.7</b>
<b>Austria</b>	7.6	3.3	3.5	2.3	2.0	<b>18.7</b>
Saudi Arabia	6.6	33.3	0	0	0	<b>39.9</b>
<b>Australia</b>	5.4	3.1	4.4	6.5	10.8	<b>30.2</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	4.7	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.7	<b>19.5</b>
South Korea	3.5	1.6	0.3	0.5	1.7	<b>7.6</b>
<b>Luxembourg</b>	3.4	2.3	1.5	1.3	1.3	<b>9.8</b>
<b>Finland</b>	3.3	3.2	3.7	3.3	3.4	<b>16.9</b>
<b>Belgium</b>	3.0	3.0	3.5	4.5	4.3	<b>18.3</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	2.6	1.6	0.3	0.5	1.7	<b>6.7</b>
Other donors*	3.4	1.7	2	3.1	5.2	<b>15.4</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>798.3</b>	<b>798.4</b>	<b>543.5</b>	<b>565.2</b>	<b>561.3</b>	<b>3,266.7</b>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**.

\*Other donors providing less than \$1 million each are: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties **Andorra**, the **Czech Republic**, **Estonia**, **Liechtenstein**, **Poland**, and **Slovakia**; other area Jersey; and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS).

<sup>12</sup> The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. The totals are not adjusted to inflation. This data is drawn from information provided by donors in their Article 7 transparency reports, as well as responses to Monitor questionnaires and other sources. In 2022, the total contributions of New Zealand and South Korea may have been slightly higher. For more information see, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2023* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2023), [bit.ly/LM2023Report](https://bit.ly/LM2023Report). In 2020, the total contributions of Denmark and the UK might have been slightly higher. For more information see, International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), *Landmine Monitor 2021* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2021), [bit.ly/LM2021report](https://bit.ly/LM2021report).

Mine Ban Treaty States Parties provided just over half (51%) of all international support in 2023 with 25 countries providing \$407.8 million, excluding EU funding. This represents a 24% increase from the \$328 million provided in 2022. With EU funding, the States Parties contribution in 2023 increased to \$476.3 million, or 60% of all international support.<sup>13</sup>

States not party the US, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea accounted for \$319.8 million, or 40% of all donor funding.

In 2023, 20 donors contributed more than they did in 2022, including a \$22.2 million (49%) increase from Japan, an \$18.1 million (80%) increase from Canada, a \$16.1 million (82%) increase from Switzerland, and an \$11.1 million (102%) increase from France. Several of the smaller European donors—Austria, the Czech Republic, Liechtenstein, Slovakia, and Slovenia—increased their funding in 2023, with the increase largely due to support for mine action activities in Ukraine. For Austria, \$7.6 million, or 99% of its contribution, went to clearance, risk education, and victim assistance activities in Ukraine, while \$1.8 million, or 72% of the Slovenian budget, went to clearance in Ukraine. All of the funds provided by Jersey, \$0.3 million, were allocated to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training and victim assistance in Ukraine through Jersey Overseas Aid.<sup>14</sup>

South Korea was reported to have contributed \$3.5 million to mine action in 2023 through the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) and ITF Enhancing Human Security. South Korea also provided multi-year funding to Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam, although the amounts disbursed annually were not reported.<sup>15</sup>

Two donors provided new funding in 2023: the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), both of whom provided funds through the United Nations VTF.

In 2023, 11 donors decreased their funding, including a \$55.8 million (45%) decrease from the EU, a \$9.5 million (39%) decrease from the UK, and a \$26.7 million (80%) decrease from Saudi Arabia.<sup>16</sup> The UK, previously among the top five donors in 2021, dropped to 10<sup>th</sup> on the list, providing \$15.2 million in 2023. In addition to the 39% decrease from the \$24.7 million provided in 2022, this represents a 79% decrease in contributions since 2019.<sup>17</sup> Saudi Arabia continued to support mine action activities in Yemen, although the financial contribution decreased in 2023, as a large proportion of the support switched from funds to

<sup>13</sup> All EU member states are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.

<sup>14</sup> Jersey Overseas Aid, “Our work: Humanitarian Response: Ukraine Response,” undated, [bit.ly/JerseyOverseasAidUkraine](https://bit.ly/JerseyOverseasAidUkraine).

<sup>15</sup> In 2022, South Korea committed \$11 million for a 2022–2026 project to support the unexploded ordnance (UXO) sector in Lao PDR, and \$25 million for a five-year mine action and rural development project in Vietnam. In addition, in 2021, South Korea committed \$10 million towards mine clearance and victim assistance in Cambodia for the period 2021–2025. See, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Cambodia press release, “Korea Commits \$10M to Increase Cambodia’s Mine Clearance and Victim Assistance Efforts in 2021 and Beyond,” 15 March 2021, [bit.ly/UNDPSouthKorea15March2021](https://bit.ly/UNDPSouthKorea15March2021); “Laos, UNDP and KOICA sign USD11 million partnership to support UXO sector in Lao PDR,” *Lao News Agency*, 10 May 2022, [bit.ly/LaoNewsAgency10May2022](https://bit.ly/LaoNewsAgency10May2022); and UNDP Vietnam press release, “KOICA and central provinces renewed cooperation in mine action and rural development,” 17 March 2022, [bit.ly/UNDPVietnam17March2022](https://bit.ly/UNDPVietnam17March2022).

<sup>16</sup> EU funding data for 2023 was compiled from the EU Aid Explorer, the IATI database, and the UNOCHA financial tracker. It is possible that not all EU funding data for 2023 was available on these websites. The EU had not responded to the Monitor questionnaire as of 1 October 2024.

<sup>17</sup> In July 2021, the UK parliament endorsed the decision to cut the UK’s foreign aid budget from 0.7% to 0.5% of its national income due to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. In October 2021, media reports estimated that UK funding for mine clearance in 2022–2024 could be reduced by at least 75%. Larisa Brown, “Foreign Office cuts cash for mine clearing by 75%,” *The Times*, 7 October 2021, [bit.ly/TheTimes7Oct2021](https://bit.ly/TheTimes7Oct2021); and Andrew Mitchell, “Cutting aid for landmine clearance is crazy,” *The Telegraph*, 10 October 2021, [bit.ly/TheTelegraph10Oct2021](https://bit.ly/TheTelegraph10Oct2021).

in-kind support for clearance.<sup>18</sup> Other donors that decreased their funding in 2023 included Andorra, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).<sup>19</sup> Funding from the US slightly decreased compared to its 2022 contribution.

Three donors from 2022—Spain, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and the United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UNMPTF)—did not report any funding contributions to mine action in 2023.

### Summary of changes in 2023

Change	Donors	Combined total (US\$)
Increase of more than 20%	Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Switzerland, UNICEF	\$87.5 million increase
Increase of less than 20%	Finland, Germany, Norway	\$7.7 million increase
Decrease of more than 20%	Andorra, Estonia, EU, Saudi Arabia, UNDP, UK	\$92.5 million decrease
Decrease of less than 20%	Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, US	\$3.7 million decrease
New donors in 2023	UNOCHA, UNTFHS	\$1.2 million provided in 2023
Donors from 2022 that did not report new funding in 2023	Spain, UNOPS, UNMPTF	\$0.4 million provided in 2022

Note: UNDP=United Nations Development Programme; UNICEF=United Nations Children's Fund; UNMPTF=United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund; UNOCHA=United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; UNOPS=United Nations Office for Project Services; UNTFHS=United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security.

## INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS: 2019–2023

International donors contributed a total of \$3.3 billion in 2019–2023. This is a 24% increase from the \$2.6 billion contributed during the previous five-year period (2014–2018).<sup>20</sup> In 2019–2021, international support remained within a range of \$543 million to \$565 million but increased to just below \$800 million in 2022 and 2023. The \$798.4 million reported in 2022 was the highest level of annual funding recorded by the Monitor since it began reporting in 1999. Ukraine received a large proportion of the international funding in 2022 and 2023 (20% and 39% respectively), following the full-scale invasion by Russia.

<sup>18</sup> In 2023, Saudi Arabia provided in-kind support to the value of \$33.3 million for clearance activities by Dynasafe International Group in Yemen. In 2022, the contribution to mine clearance was financial. A \$6.6 million financial contribution was provided for victim assistance support in Yemen in 2023, via the Al Ameen Organization for Humanitarian Support. See, UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service, "Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of), Government of 2023," undated, [bit.ly/UNOCHAFTS2023SaudiArabia](https://bit.ly/UNOCHAFTS2023SaudiArabia).

<sup>19</sup> Denmark may have contributed more in 2023, with a commitment of over \$6 million to UNMAS, including \$3.2 million to Iraq, \$1 million to Ethiopia, and \$2.2 million as core support. The actual spending in 2023 had not been confirmed. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Uffe Troensegaard, Head of Section, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 July 2024; and Denmark Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form I. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, [bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM](https://bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM).


<sup>20</sup> See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2019* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2019), [bit.ly/LM2019Report](https://bit.ly/LM2019Report).



## CONTRIBUTIONS BY AND TO STATES PARTIES OF THE MINE BAN TREATY: 2019–2023

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties to fulfill its treaty obligations. This provision on international cooperation and assistance has been critical in supporting the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty and the successes achieved to date. In the last five years, a total of 27 States Parties reported contributing a combined total of some \$1.6 billion to mine action support to affected countries.<sup>21</sup> This does not include EU contributions. Of this \$1.6 billion, \$1.1 billion was provided to affected States Parties.

### Support by and to States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty: 2019–2023



Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate contributions from States Parties to affected States Parties in US\$ million, with the percentage in brackets as a proportion of total international support.

In 2023, a total of 23 States Parties provided \$293.3 million in mine action support to 34 States Parties. This represents a 35% increase from the \$216.8 million provided by and to States Parties in 2022.<sup>22</sup> It also represents an increase in the proportion of overall mine action funding, representing 37% of the total international contributions for 2023 (up from 27% in 2022). With the inclusion of EU funding, the total amount contributed by States Parties to States Parties in 2023 was \$350.6 million (44% of total mine action funding).

## FUNDING PATHS

Donors contributed to mine action through several trust fund mechanisms, notably the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), administered by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and ITF Enhancing Human Security. ITF was established by the government of Slovenia and was formerly known as the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance.

In 2023, UNMAS received approximately \$19.9 million from 19 donors, a marked reduction from the \$50.6 million from 23 donors received in 2022.<sup>23</sup> Several donors providing financial

- <sup>21</sup> Twenty-seven Mine Ban Treaty States Parties reported mine action contributions during the period 2019–2023: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, and the UK. Twenty-five States Parties (excluding Spain and Türkiye) provided contributions each year in the five-year period.
- <sup>22</sup> In 2021, a total of 21 States Parties provided \$196.3 million to 26 States Parties. In 2022, 22 States Parties provided \$216.8 million to 31 States Parties. See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2023* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2023), [bit.ly/LM2023Report](https://bit.ly/LM2023Report).
- <sup>23</sup> See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2023* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2023), [bit.ly/LM2023Report](https://bit.ly/LM2023Report).

assistance under \$1 million used the VTF to contribute to mine action, including Andorra, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Slovakia, and Poland, as well as the UNDP, UNICEF, UNOCHA, and UNTFHS. Recipient countries of the VTF were Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria.

Seven donor states reported allocating a combined total of \$8.6 million for mine action programs in 2023 through ITF Enhancing Human Security.<sup>24</sup> Recipient countries were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Ukraine.

Financial support to Ukraine was provided through several funding mechanisms including the Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine (PFRU), the Ukraine Comprehensive Assistance Package (U-CAP) for non-lethal assistance launched by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the UNOCHA Ukraine Humanitarian Fund (UHF), which responds to the critical needs defined in the Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Response Plan.<sup>25</sup>

Implementation of mine action activities is often carried out by government institutions, non-profit organizations (NPOs), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and UN agencies. International funding to UN agencies accounted for 7% of total funding in 2023, with at least \$56.1 million received. This was a decrease of 26% from the \$76.1 million received in 2022. However, international assistance to international NPOs increased by 23% in 2023 with at least \$363.5 million received (compared to \$295 million in 2022). Support provided through international NPOs accounted for 46% of total funding in 2023.

International NPOs that received a significant proportion of contributions in 2023 included The HALO Trust (\$64.6 million), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) (\$46.3 million), Mines Advisory Group (MAG) (\$28.2 million), Humanity & Inclusion (HI) (\$26.7 million), the Danish Refugee Council (\$24.1 million), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) (\$22.8 million), and DanChurchAid (DCA) (\$10.1 million). The ICRC and National Societies received \$23.5 million.

International assistance provided directly to national NPOs accounted for less than 1% (\$4 million). This was a slight increase on the \$3.4 million received by national organizations in 2022. Six donors supported local organizations in BiH, Colombia, Lao PDR, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Vietnam.<sup>26</sup> Other funding went to national NPOs in Afghanistan, BiH, Colombia, and Sri Lanka, but these figures were not disaggregated so the specific amounts could not be recorded.<sup>27</sup>

Financial support provided to government partners increased by \$43 million in 2023 (up 114% from 2022), with national agencies working in mine action in Angola, Colombia, Croatia, Lao PDR, the Solomon Islands, Thailand, and Ukraine benefitting from this support. However, 83% of those funds (\$66.8 million) went to support national demining agencies in Ukraine.


<sup>24</sup> The seven donors were: Austria, the Czech Republic, the EU, France, Slovenia, South Korea, and the US. The US did not always disaggregate funding by recipient.

<sup>25</sup> The PFRU is a multi-donor program that enables Canada, Estonia, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US to provide funding to Ukraine, including for mine action. See, Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine (PFRU) website, <https://pfru.org.ua/>. Slovakia reported providing a financial contribution to U-CAP for demining equipment. See NATO, "NATO Allies continue Ukraine support through Comprehensive Assistance Package at Washington Summit," 17 July 2024, [bit.ly/NATOUkraine17Jul2024](https://bit.ly/NATOUkraine17Jul2024). Australia reported providing funding to the UNOCHA Ukraine Humanitarian Fund, which also allocates funding to mine action in Ukraine. Australia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), Form J, p. 17. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, [bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT](https://bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT).

<sup>26</sup> National non-profit organizations (NPOs) received at least \$3.4 million (less than 1%) in 2022. Donors supporting national NPOs in 2023 were Canada, the EU, Germany, Ireland, Japan, and Norway.

<sup>27</sup> The US supported national NPOs in these states, but did not disaggregate figures for the amounts provided to national NPOs, international NPOs, commercial companies, and the UN. Switzerland also supported two NPOs in Colombia but did not disaggregate the figures for the amounts provided to the national and international NPOs.

## Allocation of mine action support across implementing partners in 2023 (in US\$ million)<sup>28</sup>



Note: Percentages in brackets reflect funding as a proportion of total international support. NPO=non-profit organization.

## RECIPIENTS

A total of 48 states and one other area received \$715.5 million from 31 donors in 2023. Another \$13.4 million went to mine action activities in specific regions, including West Africa, East Africa, the Sahel, the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, and Europe.<sup>29</sup> This represented a 139% increase from the \$5.6 million provided in 2022 for regional activities. Another \$69.4 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, NPOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area. Andorra only reported contributions to “global” activities, and Liechtenstein reported contributions to “global” activities and to Ukraine.<sup>30</sup>

As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding.<sup>31</sup> The top 10 recipients of international support—Ukraine, Iraq, Lao PDR, Cambodia, Colombia, Syria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Sri Lanka—received \$603.8 million, which accounted for 76% of all international assistance in 2023. Since 2019, only 14 countries have appeared in this group of 10 largest recipients, with six of them present every year over the five-year period: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Syria.<sup>32</sup>

In 2023, Ukraine remained at the top of the list of countries receiving the most mine action assistance, as in 2022. Ukraine received \$308.1 million for mine action activities from 22 donors, representing 39% of all international donor funds. This was a significant increase (90%) from the \$162.3 million (20% of the total) that went to Ukraine in 2022.

Vietnam also saw a 23% increase in funding compared to 2022. Other recipients in the top 10—Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Yemen—

<sup>28</sup> Some donors did not disaggregate the type of implementing partner. This has been represented within the “various” category, and mainly includes multilateral organizations, international and national NPOs, and UN agencies.

<sup>29</sup> This includes regional programs and support to countries in the same region but where funds were not disaggregated by country.

<sup>30</sup> Italy and the Netherlands did not disaggregate contributions to individual states and so their contributions were also categorized as global.

<sup>31</sup> Of the 10 countries that received the most mine action funding in 2023, nine were also in the top 10 in 2022: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Syria, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen. Libya was included among the top 10 recipient countries in 2022, and Sri Lanka in 2023.

<sup>32</sup> The 14 countries appearing in the list of the 10 largest recipients of international support in 2019–2023 were: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Sri Lanka, Syria, Türkiye, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen.

all experienced a decrease in mine action funding in 2023. Iraq, which was the largest recipient of mine action assistance from 2016 until 2021, received \$68.1 million (9% of all international support, and a 24% decrease from the \$89.6 million received in 2022). The decrease in funding to Afghanistan and Yemen was particularly significant, with Afghanistan receiving 60% less funding than in 2022, and Yemen 76% less. Libya also experienced a 59% decrease in funding compared to 2022, moving it out of the top 10 recipient countries. While Sri Lanka saw an 11% decrease in funding compared to contributions in 2022, it moved into the list of top 10 recipients in 2023.

Several Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations that have received little funding in the past saw a welcome increase in funding in 2023. Ethiopia received \$2.7 million, an increase of 170% from the \$1 million received in 2022, and Senegal received \$1.6 million, a 100% increase from the \$0.8 million received in 2022. Chad also saw an increase in funding from \$30,433 in 2022 to \$540,850 in 2023. However, funding for Chad remains low, and Chad has cited insufficient financial resources as one of the reasons it has been unable to meet its clearance deadline under Article 5 of the treaty.<sup>33</sup> Niger and Nigeria both saw a decrease in funding compared to 2022, of 90% and 72% respectively. Funding for Mauritania remained the same as in 2022, with France providing \$1.7 million over the two-year period 2022–2023.<sup>34</sup> France was the only donor for both Chad and Mauritania.<sup>35</sup>

Chad, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal received a combined total of \$19.1 million in the five-year period from 2019–2023. This represents less than 1% of all international funding for the five-year period (totaling \$3.3 billion). Guinea-Bissau received no funding in the five-year period, despite reporting the discovery of previously unknown mined areas in 2021 and submitting extension requests in 2021 and 2022; it also has submitted a new extension request to be considered at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024.<sup>36</sup> States Parties have recognized the need to consider how all affected States Parties can be supported to meet their clearance obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Action 41 of the draft Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan refers to the possibility of establishing a voluntary trust fund for this purpose.<sup>37</sup>

In 2023, a total of 31 recipient states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared to 2022, of which 12 received more support and 19 received less support. Five recipients from 2022 received no international support in 2023: Moldova, Pakistan, Türkiye, and other areas Abkhazia and Western Sahara.<sup>38</sup> Six recipients that did not receive support in 2022 received support in 2023: Central African Republic, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Mozambique, Peru, and Togo.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Chad Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 June 2024, p. 3, [bit.ly/ChadArt5ExtRequest2024](https://bit.ly/ChadArt5ExtRequest2024).

<sup>34</sup> France provided \$1.6 million to HAMAP-Humanitaire in Mauritania for the period 2022–2023. The funds were reported by the Monitor in 2023 and have not been included in the 2024 report to avoid double-counting. See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2023* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2023), [bit.ly/LM2023Report](https://bit.ly/LM2023Report).

<sup>35</sup> Twelve states had only one donor. Recipients with one donor (listed in brackets) included: Benin (Japan), Cameroon (Japan), Chad (France), Georgia (Switzerland), Jordan (US), Kiribati (Australia), Marshall Islands (US), Mauritania (France), Mozambique (Luxembourg), Peru (Germany), Rwanda (US), and Serbia (US).

<sup>36</sup> See, Guinea Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 11 August 2021, [bit.ly/Guinea-BissauSecondArt5ExtRequest2021](https://bit.ly/Guinea-BissauSecondArt5ExtRequest2021); Guinea Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 April 2022, [bit.ly/Guinea-BissauMBTArt5ExRequest2022](https://bit.ly/Guinea-BissauMBTArt5ExRequest2022); and Guinea Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 April 2024, [bit.ly/GuineaBissauArt5ExtRequest2024](https://bit.ly/GuineaBissauArt5ExtRequest2024).

<sup>37</sup> Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), “Draft Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029,” 16 August 2024, p. 13, [bit.ly/SRAAPdraft16Aug2024](https://bit.ly/SRAAPdraft16Aug2024).

<sup>38</sup> Other area Nagorno-Karabakh was reported as a recipient in 2022, but Azerbaijan gained territorial control in 2023. Funding to the former territory of Nagorno-Karabakh was reported as funding to Armenia or Azerbaijan by donors in 2023.

<sup>39</sup> Peru received funding from Germany for the destruction of cluster munition stockpiles. Peru completed the destruction of its stockpiles in December 2023. See, Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), *Cluster Munition Monitor 2024* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2024), [bit.ly/CMM2024Report](https://bit.ly/CMM2024Report).

## International support recipients in 2023

Recipient	Amount (US\$ million)	Recipient	Amount (US\$ million)
<b>Ukraine</b>	308.1	Marshall Islands*	1.7
<b>Iraq</b>	68.1	<b>Senegal</b>	1.6
Lao PDR*	49.3	Azerbaijan	1.4
<b>Cambodia</b>	31.4	<b>Serbia</b>	1.2
<b>Colombia</b>	30.8	<b>Rwanda</b>	1.1
Syria	30.7	<b>Palau</b>	0.8
Vietnam	27.3	<b>Chad</b>	0.5
<b>Afghanistan</b>	26.6	<b>Peru</b>	0.4
<b>Yemen</b>	15.7	<b>Jordan</b>	0.4
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	15.7	<b>Togo</b>	0.4
<b>BiH</b>	12.9	<b>Benin</b>	0.4
<b>Somalia</b>	12.9	<b>Nigeria</b>	0.4
<b>Angola</b>	11.2	<b>Philippines</b>	0.3
Lebanon*	11.1	<b>Mali</b>	0.2
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	8.9	<b>Mozambique</b>	0.2
Libya	7.2	<b>Burkina Faso</b>	0.1
<b>South Sudan</b>	6.2	<b>Niger</b>	0.1
<b>DRC</b>	4.5	<b>Kiribati</b>	<0.1
<b>Solomon Islands</b>	4.3	Georgia	<0.1
<b>Tajikistan</b>	3.9	<b>Central African Republic</b>	<0.1
<b>Myanmar</b>	3.3	<b>Cameroon</b>	<0.1
<b>Ethiopia</b>	2.7	Armenia	<0.1
<i>Kosovo</i>	2.6		
<b>Sudan</b>	2.4	<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>715.5</b>
<b>Croatia</b>	2.4	Regional	<b>13.4</b>
<b>Thailand</b>	2.2	Global	<b>69.4</b>
<b>Palestine</b>	1.8	<b>Total</b>	<b>798.3</b>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated in *italics*.  
\*Lao PDR and Lebanon are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The Marshall Islands is a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Ukraine received the largest increase in funding in 2023, receiving \$145.8 million more than in 2022. This represents 87% of the combined total increase in contributions for those countries that received more than a 20% increase in funding. Other affected countries that received a significant increase in international assistance in 2023 were BiH and Vietnam (both received \$5.2 million more), the Solomon Islands (\$3.6 million more), Ethiopia (\$1.7 million more), and the DRC (\$1.6 million more).

The Pacific region saw an increase in funding in 2023, with increased international funding provided to the Solomon Islands and Palau, and new funding provided to Kiribati and the



Marshall Islands. Funding was provided by Australia, Japan, and the US for the clearance of unexploded ordnance on these Pacific islands.

Three Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with massive contamination and Article 5 clearance obligations saw more than a 20% drop in funding in 2023. Of particular concern, Afghanistan saw a decrease of \$40 million in funding from 2022. Despite having a strong national mine action coordination structure and national mine action organizations, Afghanistan has struggled to attract funding since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021. This was the first year since 2018 that Afghanistan has not been among the top three recipients of international mine action funding. Iraq also saw its funding decrease for the third year in a row, reduced by \$21.5 million (24%) in 2023, although Iraq remains the second highest recipient of mine action support. No funding was recorded for Türkiye in 2023. Türkiye contributes nationally to its mine action program but reported that it had prepared a project document for the fourth phase of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project (EBMCP) which is yet to be financed.<sup>40</sup>

In addition to Iraq, other countries in the Middle East saw a reduction in funding in 2023. Libya and Palestine both saw a decrease from funds received in 2022, with Libya down \$10.3 million (59%) and Palestine \$2.1 million (54%). Yemen saw a \$48.7 million decrease (76%) from funding in 2022. The decrease was partly due to Saudi Arabia providing in-kind rather than financial assistance to mine clearance efforts in 2023.<sup>41</sup> Syria saw a decrease of \$3 million (9%).

### Summary of changes in 2023

Change	Recipients	Combined total (US\$)
Increase of more than 20%	BiH, Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Ukraine, Vietnam	\$167.5 million increase
Increase of less than 20%	Lebanon, Palau, Somalia, Tajikistan	\$2.3 million increase
Decrease of more than 20%	Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Croatia, Georgia, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Philippines, South Sudan, Thailand, Yemen	\$149.8 million decrease
Decrease of less than 20%	Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Jordan, Lao PDR, Sri Lanka, Syria, Zimbabwe	\$19.3 million decrease
Recipients from 2022 that did not receive new support in 2023	Abkhazia, Moldova, Pakistan, Türkiye, Western Sahara	\$11.3 million received in 2022
New recipients in 2023	Central African Republic, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Mozambique, Peru, Togo	\$2.9 million received in 2023

Regional funding to Africa increased in 2023, up \$7.7 million from 2022, with around \$2.4 million allocated to programs. However, several countries in West Africa also saw a decrease

<sup>40</sup> The project was previously funded by the EU. See, Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, p. 5. Türkiye hosted an Individualized Approach meeting at the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties on 22 November 2023 in Geneva to request new donor funding. See, statement of Türkiye, Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 22 November 2023, [bit.ly/TurkiyeStatement22Nov2023](https://bit.ly/TurkiyeStatement22Nov2023).

<sup>41</sup> Saudi Arabia provided \$33.3 million in mine action funding to Dynasafe International Group in Yemen in 2022. A similar amount was provided in 2023 but recorded as in-kind support. See, UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service, "Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of), Government of 2023," undated, [bit.ly/UNOCHAFTS2023SaudiArabia](https://bit.ly/UNOCHAFTS2023SaudiArabia).

in funding in 2023, including Burkina Faso (down \$2.3 million), Mali (down \$2.1 million), and Niger (down \$1 million). Funding to Armenia and Azerbaijan decreased (by \$0.7 million and \$9 million respectively), although these countries also received funding as part of regional allocations amounting to \$3.4 million.

## RECIPIENTS: 2019–2023

In 2019–2023, the 10 largest recipients of mine action support received the majority of available funding, totaling almost \$2.3 billion. Of these 10 recipient states, one is in Europe, three are in the Middle East and North Africa region, five in the Asia-Pacific region, and one in the Americas.

No country from Sub-Saharan Africa was among the top 10 recipients during this five-year period. Two affected states from Sub-Saharan Africa were among the 15 largest recipients of mine action support in 2019–2023: Somalia ranked 14<sup>th</sup> (\$60.7 million) and Angola ranked 15<sup>th</sup> (\$59 million).

From 2019 to 2023, the composition of the top 10 group of recipients remained relatively similar from one year to another, with the exception of Ukraine, which ranked first in the top 10 group, despite ranking eighth or lower in the list of recipients from 2019–2021. There were some variations in the contributions received by each recipient from one year to the next, illustrating changes in circumstances globally and/or nationally, as well as shifts in funding approaches, priorities, and focus. Afghanistan has seen a noticeable decline in funding over the five-year period, and a 50% reduction from funding in the previous five-year period (2014–2018). Iraq, Lao PDR, and Syria also saw a decrease in funding compared to the previous five-year period. The remaining six recipients saw an increase in funding in 2019–2023 compared to the previous five-year period.

### Summary of changes: top 10 recipients of mine action support

Recipient	2019–2023 contributions (US\$ million)	2019–2023 ranking	2014–2018 contributions (US\$ million)	2014–2018 ranking	% change from the previous five-year period
<b>Ukraine</b>	528.5	1	47.2	13	+1,020%
<b>Iraq</b>	453.4	2	469.7	2	-3%
<b>Afghanistan</b>	244.3	3	490.6	1	-50%
Lao PDR*	243.3	4	398.4	3	-39%
<b>Colombia</b>	166.3	5	150.9	5	+10%
Syria	157.2	6	191.5	4	-18%
<b>Cambodia</b>	155.8	7	121.8	6	+28%
<b>Yemen</b>	124.4	8	29.7	19	+319%
Vietnam	112.6	9	62.5	9	+80%
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	82.4	10	34.4	17	+140%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,268.2</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>1,996.7</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>+14%</b>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; N/A=not applicable.

\*Lao PDR is a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The 10 smallest recipients of mine action changed each year from 2019–2023. Out of the 27 countries which were included in the bottom 10 recipients during the five-year period, six appeared in the list for three or more consecutive years. Three (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and other area Western Sahara) were from Sub-Saharan Africa; two (Armenia and Georgia) from Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia; and one (Jordan) from the Middle East. States Parties

with Article 5 clearance obligations appearing once or twice in the group of 10 smallest recipients of mine action in 2019–2023 were: Chad, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Serbia, Thailand, and Türkiye.

## FUNDING BY THEMATIC SECTOR

In 2023, half of international mine action funding went to support clearance and integrated clearance programs. Capacity-building programs represented 12% of all international mine action support, while victim assistance represented 6% and risk education represented a little over 1%. Less than 1% of funding was spent on advocacy, and less than 0.1% was spent on stockpile destruction, with Germany supporting the destruction of cluster munition stockpiles in Peru.<sup>42</sup> “Various” funding represented 30% of all international mine action support. This included contributions not disaggregated by donors, funding for activities such as coordination and core costs, as well as funding not earmarked for any particular sector.

### Contributions by thematic sector in 2023<sup>43</sup>

Sector	Total contribution (US\$ million)	% of total contribution	Number of donors
Clearance and integrated clearance programs	401.8	50%	25
Various	236.7	30%	23
Capacity-building	96.5	12%	18
Victim assistance	47	6%	18
Risk education	11.7	1%	11
Advocacy	4.2	<1%	11
Stockpile destruction (CM)	0.4	<0.1%	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>798.3</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>N/A</b>

Note: N/A=not applicable; CM=cluster munitions.

## CLEARANCE AND INTEGRATED CLEARANCE PROGRAMS

In 2023, \$401.8 million, or half (50%) of all support went to clearance and integrated clearance programs, which include clearance combined with risk education, victim assistance, capacity-building, and other activities such as information management and gender mainstreaming. This represented a decrease of \$98 million (or 20%) from 2022. However, several donors did not disaggregate funding by sector so the amount spent on clearance was likely higher.

A total of 25 donors reported contributions to clearance and integrated clearance programs in 2023. Five donors—Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the US—provided the majority (\$288 million, or 72%), with the US contributing 36% of this amount (\$103.9 million).

Many donors reported clearance programs integrated with other activities as a combined figure. Contributions for clearance and integrated clearance programs were provided across


<sup>42</sup> Germany Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form J, p. 22. Germany provided \$0.4 million to Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) to support the destruction of cluster munition stockpiles in Peru. See also, NPA, “Protecting civilians from explosive weapons in Peru – the importance of stockpile destruction,” 2023, [bit.ly/NPAPeruStockpileDestruction](https://bit.ly/NPAPeruStockpileDestruction).

<sup>43</sup> In 2022, international support was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education (\$499.5 million, or 63% of total international support), capacity-building (\$71.6 million, or 9%), victim assistance (\$37.6 million, or 5%), risk education (\$10.1 million, or 1%), advocacy (\$4.2 million, or <1%), and various activities (\$175.4 million, or 22%). See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2023* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2023), [bit.ly/LM2023Report](https://bit.ly/LM2023Report).

35 affected countries and one other area.<sup>44</sup> Eleven donors earmarked some contributions specifically for clearance activities, providing a total of \$28.7 million (7% of total clearance contributions).<sup>45</sup>

While few donors disaggregate clearance funding according to device type, available data indicates that, in 2023, \$142.7 million (35% of clearance funding) was spent on the removal of landmines including improvised mines, \$18.7 million (5%) on cluster munition clearance, and \$29.2 million (7%) on clearance of both landmines and cluster munitions. The remaining \$211 million (53%) was provided for the clearance of mixed contamination or where the device was not specified.

### Allocation of mine action clearance support by device type in 2023 (in US\$ million)<sup>46</sup>



Note: Percentages in brackets reflect funding as a proportion of total international clearance and integrated clearance support.

### Clearance support to Mine Ban Treaty States Parties

About \$245.3 million (61%) of international support for clearance and integrated clearance programs was spent in six Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with massive landmine contamination (more than 100km<sup>2</sup>).<sup>47</sup> Ukraine received \$134.6 million (55%) of that support. While the combined amount of international clearance support directed to States Parties with massive contamination increased in 2023, the combined amount of clearance support provided to States Parties with large (20–99km<sup>2</sup>), medium (5–19km<sup>2</sup>), and small (less than 5km<sup>2</sup>) contamination decreased compared to 2022 (by 51%, 56%, and 59% respectively). Of the 12 States Parties with less than 5km<sup>2</sup> of contamination, only six—Colombia, the DRC, Palestine, Senegal, Serbia, and Somalia—received funds for clearance in 2023, and three of these—Colombia, Niger, and Palestine—saw a drop in funding for clearance.

<sup>44</sup> States Parties that were recipients of international assistance for clearance in 2023 were: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kiribati, Palau, Palestine, Philippines, Senegal, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. One signatory, the Marshall Islands, also received international assistance for clearance. States not party that received international assistance for clearance in 2023 were: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, and Vietnam. The other area that received international assistance for clearance activities in 2023 was Kosovo.


<sup>45</sup> This included mine, ERW, and cluster munition remnant clearance. The 11 donors were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Slovenia, and the US.

<sup>46</sup> Information on device type was obtained from questionnaires sent to donors and information from Article 7 reports, as well as publicly available funding databases. This information was triangulated with operator websites and reports and the Landmine Monitor Impact Profiles.

<sup>47</sup> Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Ukraine. No funding for clearance was reported by donors for Türkiye, which also has massive landmine contamination. At the end of 2023, Croatia had reduced its mine contamination to 92.13km<sup>2</sup> and is now categorized by the Monitor as having large contamination.

Three States Parties that had received no funds for clearance in 2022—Chad, Ethiopia, and Serbia—all received funds for clearance in 2023. Eight mine-affected States Parties did not receive new external support to carry out clearance or integrated clearance projects in 2023: Cyprus, Ecuador, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Oman, Peru, and Türkiye.<sup>48</sup> Of these, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, and Türkiye sought funding for clearance. Ecuador and Peru fund their own clearance programs, although Peru has stated that international funding would help it to meet its Article 5 clearance obligations more quickly.<sup>49</sup>

### Clearance support by extent of mine contamination in Mine Ban Treaty States Parties: 2021–2023<sup>50</sup>



Note: Figures above each bar indicate the combined total of clearance and integrated clearance program support.

### Clearance support: 2019–2023

Between 2019 and 2023, approximately two-thirds of international support went to clearance and integrated clearance projects (59%, or \$1.9 billion). This is similar to the previous five-year period from 2014–2018 when clearance represented 64% of international support.

The proportion of international funds spent on clearance annually decreased slightly in 2019–2023 (a range of 50–69%) compared to the previous five years (a range of 59–72%). This could be due to funds allocated to capacity-building and risk education being better disaggregated from funds allocated to clearance since 2019.


<sup>48</sup> Ecuador last received international support for clearance in 2012, Eritrea in 2010, Guinea-Bissau in 2010, Niger in 2011, and Peru in 2016.

<sup>49</sup> Presentation of Peru, Individualized Approach Meeting, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2024.

<sup>50</sup> Recipients of international support for clearance with massive contamination (more than 100km<sup>2</sup>) included: Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Türkiye, and Ukraine. Recipients with large contamination (20–99km<sup>2</sup>) included: Angola, Croatia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Recipients with medium contamination (5–19km<sup>2</sup>) included: South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Recipients with small contamination (less than 5km<sup>2</sup>) included: Colombia, the DRC, Palestine, Senegal, Serbia, and Somalia.



## Clearance dedicated international support: 2019–2023



Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate clearance and integrated clearance funding in US\$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international support.

## RISK EDUCATION

In 2023, 11 donors reported contributions totaling \$11.7 million for risk education projects across 10 states and for activities at a global level.<sup>51</sup> Some of the projects were combined with risk education, capacity-building, or gender mainstreaming.<sup>52</sup> Denmark, France, Japan, and Norway provided the largest contributions to risk education dedicated support with a combined contribution of \$9.2 million (78% of the total).

### Recipients of risk education dedicated support in 2023<sup>53</sup>

Recipient	Amount (US\$ million)	Recipient	Amount (US\$ million)
Syria	3.3	<b>Afghanistan</b>	0.6
<b>Ukraine</b>	3.1	<b>Iraq</b>	0.5
Myanmar	1.6	<b>Nigeria</b>	0.1
<b>Senegal</b>	0.9	<b>Central African Republic</b>	<0.1
<b>Ethiopia</b>	0.7	Global	0.2
<b>Palestine</b>	0.7	<b>Total</b>	<b>11.7</b>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**.

<sup>51</sup> Donors of international assistance for risk education in 2023 were: Denmark, the EU, France, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, and the UK. In comparison, 13 donors reported contributing a total of \$10.1 million for risk education projects in 2022. See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2023* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2023), [bit.ly/LM2023Report](https://bit.ly/LM2023Report).

<sup>52</sup> In cases where it was not clear if funding for capacity-building was related to the risk education activities, these contributions were not included within the risk education dedicated support.


<sup>53</sup> This table only includes recipients of funding specifically earmarked for risk education. In addition to the recipients listed in the table, 23 states received support in 2023 for risk education combined with other mine action activities, such as clearance or victim assistance (the specific amount going to each sector could not be disaggregated): Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Palau, Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

### Risk education support: 2019–2023

Between 2019 and 2023, risk education-specific funding represented just 1.6% of all support, totaling \$51.1 million. However, this is a significant increase on the \$36.6 million for risk education recorded in the previous five-year period from 2014–2018. The increase may be due to better disaggregation of funding data and the renewed focus on risk education since 2019. It also reflects the increased need for risk education for populations in conflict-affected areas.

However, annual contributions for dedicated risk education have remained within a 1–2% range of overall funding. It continues to be the case that the majority of risk education funding is not clearly disaggregated from funding for clearance.

### Risk education dedicated international support: 2019–2023



Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated risk education funding in US\$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international support.

## VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Direct international support for victim assistance activities in 2023 totaled \$47 million, an increase of 25% from the 2022 figure of \$37.6 million. Eighteen donors reported contributing to victim assistance projects in 16 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, in seven states not party, and at a global level.<sup>54</sup>

Germany was the largest contributor to victim assistance in 2023, providing \$14.2 million, or 30% of the total. Saudi Arabia, Canada, and the EU also provided significant contributions to victim assistance with a combined total of \$16.8 million, or 36% of the total. Saudi Arabia was not recorded as a donor to victim assistance previously although has provided support to rehabilitation infrastructure and services in Yemen since 2018. In 2023, it provided support to the Al Ameen organization for Humanitarian Support for prosthetics and rehabilitation services.<sup>55</sup> It is likely that state not party South Korea contributed to victim assistance programs in Southeast Asia although the annual funding figures for 2023 were

<sup>54</sup> Victim assistance donors in 2023 were: Austria, Canada, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. States Parties who received international funding for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, BiH, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. The states not party were: Armenia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, and Vietnam.

<sup>55</sup> UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service, “Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of), Government of 2023,” undated, [bit.ly/UNOCHAFTS2023SaudiArabia](https://bit.ly/UNOCHAFTS2023SaudiArabia).

not recorded.<sup>56</sup> Italy also provided victim assistance support to Afghanistan, Sudan, Mali, and Somalia, and at a global level, but was not able to provide disaggregated funding data.<sup>57</sup>

Most mine-affected countries did not receive any direct international support for victim assistance. In 2023, 59% of all victim assistance support went to just five countries—Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen—for a combined total of \$27.8 million. Ukraine received \$7.9 million (or 17%) of all victim assistance support. The remaining \$19.2 million went to victim assistance activities in 18 other countries (including 12 States Parties) and to activities at a global level.<sup>58</sup>

As in previous years, many States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims received little or no victim assistance support despite needs remaining great and available resources limited. Of the 38 States Parties identified at the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties in 2023 to have landmine victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control, only 12 received dedicated victim assistance support.<sup>59</sup> Two others were reported to have received victim assistance contributions as part of integrated programs.<sup>60</sup> It is likely that other States Parties with victims received victim assistance support but the data was not disaggregated as such.

International funding for victim assistance remains difficult to track. Many donors claim to support victim assistance more broadly through contributions to programs for development and for disability rights that do not specify the portion of funding that might contribute to victim assistance. There is, however, little evidence that such funding consistently reaches victims, or meets the specific needs of survivors, especially those people in rural and remote areas. Allocating earmarked victim assistance funding would help ensure that victims receive the necessary support and that it could be effectively tracked. This aligns with sector standards, donor obligations and commitments, and Article 6.3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

### Victim assistance support: 2019–2023

Between 2019 and 2023, victim assistance dedicated support, totaling \$186.6 million, represented 6% of the overall five-year contributions from international donors. This remains the same as the previous five-year period from 2014–2018 when victim assistance also represented 6% of the overall five-year contributions from international donors (\$145.3 million out of a total contribution of \$2.6 billion).

In the last five years, annual victim assistance contributions have remained within a range of 5–8% of overall funding.

<sup>56</sup> In 2021–2022, South Korea announced funding for clearance and victim assistance activities in Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam. See, UNDP Cambodia press release, “Korea Commits \$10 Million to Increase Cambodia’s Mine Clearance and Victim Assistance Efforts in 2021 and Beyond,” 15 March 2021, [bit.ly/UNDPSouthKorea15March2021](https://bit.ly/UNDPSouthKorea15March2021); “Laos, UNDP and KOICA sign USD11 million partnership to support UXO sector in Lao PDR,” *Lao News Agency*, 10 May 2022, [bit.ly/LaoNewsAgency10May2022](https://bit.ly/LaoNewsAgency10May2022); and UNDP Vietnam press release, “KOICA and central provinces renewed cooperation in mine action and rural development,” 17 March 2022, [bit.ly/UNDPVietnam17March2022](https://bit.ly/UNDPVietnam17March2022).


<sup>57</sup> Italy Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form I. Emails from Elena Gai, Attaché for Disarmament Affairs, Permanent Mission of Italy to International Organizations in Geneva, 13 August 2024 and 23 September 2024.

<sup>58</sup> Twelve States Parties received international support for victim assistance in 2023: BiH, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, and South Sudan. Six states not party received international support for victim assistance in 2023: Armenia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, and Vietnam.

<sup>59</sup> States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty reporting mine victims in areas under their jurisdiction and control at the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties were: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. See, Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Victim Assistance, “General Observations, Status of Implementation: Victim Assistance,” 18–20 June 2024, p. 4, [bit.ly/VACCommitteeMBTJune2024](https://bit.ly/VACCommitteeMBTJune2024). The States Parties with significant numbers of survivors receiving victim assistance contributions in 2023 were: Afghanistan, BiH, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen.

<sup>60</sup> States Parties Colombia and Tajikistan received victim assistance contributions as part of integrated programs.

## Victim assistance dedicated international support: 2019–2023



Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated victim assistance funding in US\$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international support.

## ADVOCACY AND CAPACITY-BUILDING

In 2023, less than 1% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities (\$4.2 million).<sup>61</sup> Eleven donors reported supporting advocacy activities.<sup>62</sup>

Eighteen donors collectively provided \$96.5 million—representing 12% of international support in 2023—for capacity-building activities in 14 countries and at a regional and global level.<sup>63</sup> This is a 35% increase from the level of funding for capacity-building reported in 2022 (\$71.6 million). Capacity-building was also included as an element in many of the integrated clearance programs. While the financial support allocated to capacity-building has increased since 2019,<sup>64</sup> much of the support in 2022 and 2023 has been provided to Ukraine to enhance the mine action capabilities of the Ukrainian authorities. In 2023, \$59.9 million (62% of the total) was provided to capacity-building activities in Ukraine.<sup>65</sup> Global capacity-building activities received \$18.7 million (19% of the total).

The EU was the largest donor of capacity-building in 2023, providing \$39.3 million (41% of the total), all of which went to activities in Ukraine. Canada, Germany, and Switzerland also provided significant contributions to capacity-building with a combined total of \$37 million (38% of the total).

<sup>61</sup> Advocacy activities generally include, but are not limited to, funding for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Mine Ban Treaty implementation support units, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Geneva Call, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC) and its Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Mine Action Review, and other operators and NPOs.

<sup>62</sup> Advocacy donors in 2023 included: Australia, Austria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland.

<sup>63</sup> Capacity-building donors in 2023 included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Jersey, South Korea, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. Recipients of international assistance for capacity-building were: Afghanistan, Benin, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Solomon Islands, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Ukraine, and Yemen.

<sup>64</sup> Capacity-building was one of the three priorities of the Dutch presidency of the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. See, statement of the Netherlands, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 16–20 November 2020, [bit.ly/NLStatement18MSP](https://bit.ly/NLStatement18MSP).

<sup>65</sup> In 2022, Ukraine received \$28 million (39% of the total contribution). See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2023* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2023), [bit.ly/LM2023Report](https://bit.ly/LM2023Report).


### Advocacy and capacity-building support: 2019–2023

Between 2019 and 2023, funding for mine action advocacy has remained consistently low, at around 1% or less of total annual international funding. When considered as a proportion of the overall five-year contribution, advocacy represents less than 1%, totaling \$25.7 million. Funding for advocacy has decreased over the five-year period, from a high of \$6.5 million in 2019 to a low of \$4.2 million in 2023.

In contrast, funding for capacity-building support has fluctuated as a proportion of total international funding, representing less than 1% of overall funding in 2019, 9% in 2022, and 12% in 2023. Funding for capacity-building has increased over the five-year period, from a low of \$7.4 million in 2019 to a high of \$96.5 million in 2023. Much of the increase in 2022 and 2023 was due to contributions to strengthen Ukraine's national mine action capacities.

Capacity-building represented 7% of total contributions for 2019–2023, which is an increase from the previous five-year period, 2014–2018, when it represented 2% of overall contributions.

### Advocacy and capacity-building dedicated international support: 2019–2023



Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated advocacy and capacity-building funding in US\$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international support.

## NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2023

National contributions to mine action continue to be under-reported. Few States Parties report national funding in their annual Article 7 transparency reports. Several affected states indicated contributing to their own national mine action programs, but details on their annual level of contribution were either unavailable or only partially available. In many states, national contributions cover the running costs of their respective mine action authorities, but these are not reported.

In 2023, the Monitor identified at least 20 affected states that provided a combined total of \$227.3 million in contributions to mine action from their national budgets.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>66</sup> Data on national support to mine action is based on responses to Monitor questionnaires from Mine Action Authorities, reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, and media reporting. See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, <http://www.the-monitor.org/cp>.



## National support in 2023

State	Contribution (US\$ million)
Azerbaijan	64.8
<b>Croatia</b>	42.3
<b>Colombia</b>	34.4
<b>Germany*</b>	32.0
<b>Cambodia</b>	30.4
<b>BiH</b>	10.3
Lebanon*	6.0
<b>Thailand</b>	1.9
<b>Chad*</b>	1.9
<b>Serbia</b>	0.9
<b>Peru</b>	0.8
<b>Senegal</b>	0.5
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	0.5
<b>Jordan</b>	0.3
<b>Türkiye</b>	0.1
<b>Mauritania*</b>	0.1
<b>Tajikistan</b>	0.06
<b>Afghanistan*</b>	0.04
<b>Chile*</b>	0.04
Lao PDR*	<0.01
<b>Total</b>	<b>227.3</b>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**.

\*Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, Germany, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Mauritania have Article 4 obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

A total of 33 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties currently have Article 5 clearance obligations, however, only 14 reported on their financial contributions in 2023: Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe.<sup>67</sup> Of the 10 States Parties with Article 4 clearance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, seven reported on their financial contributions in 2023: Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, Germany, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Mauritania.

Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that provided funding towards their mine action operations in 2023 included Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Peru, and Serbia, and state not party Azerbaijan. Cambodia stated that it would contribute \$30 million towards its mine clearance efforts in 2023, and similar amounts annually in 2024 and 2025.<sup>68</sup> A national contribution of \$30.4 million was provided in 2023, which included a contribution to the UNDP Clearing for Results program.<sup>69</sup> Colombia reported a national contribution of around \$34.4 million. This included \$1.5 million for risk education and victim assistance and \$32.9 million for demining activities.<sup>70</sup> Croatia's national contribution in 2023 was about \$42.3 million, which was reported to be 70% of the total mine action budget for the country.<sup>71</sup> Peru funds its own mine action activities and, in 2023, reported \$0.8 million was spent on operations. Due to the remote and inaccessible locations of the remaining minefields, Peru estimated that 60% of the budget was allocated to the travel time required to fly deminers to the work sites.<sup>72</sup> Serbia reported \$0.6 million to support the running of the Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) and \$0.3 million to survey and demining operations.<sup>73</sup>

The government of state not party Azerbaijan funded the majority of its mine action program, with international donor funding amounting to around 4% of total spending in the period from November 2020 to December 2023.<sup>74</sup> In 2023, a reported \$64.8 million was allocated from the state budget for mine action

<sup>67</sup> Three of these States Parties also have Article 4 obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Afghanistan, Chad, and Mauritania.

<sup>68</sup> Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), "Revised Workplan Cambodia," 10 May 2023, p. 5, bit.ly/MBTCambodiaWorkplan10May2023; and statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023, p. 2, bit.ly/CambodiaStatementJune2023.

<sup>69</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Chim Chansideth, Director of Regulations and Monitoring Department, Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), May 2024.

<sup>70</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nathalie Ochoa Niño, Coordinator, Comprehensive Action Group Against Antipersonnel Mines (Grupo de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, Grupo AICMA) 20 April 2024.

<sup>71</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Damir Trut, Director, Civil Protection Directorate, Ministry of Interior, 11 June 2024; and "Croatia Mine Action Revised Workplan 2024–2026," April 2024, p. 6, bit.ly/CroatiaWorkplan2024-2026.

<sup>72</sup> "Peru Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request," 28 March 2024, p. 23, bit.ly/PeruArt5ExtRequest2024.

<sup>73</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Slađana Kosutić, Senior Advisor, Serbian Mine Action Centre, 8 April 2024. Note that figures in the Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report differ from those provided via the Monitor questionnaire. See, Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, p. 2.

<sup>74</sup> Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ramil Azizov, Chief of Risk Education and International and Public Relations Department, Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), 25 June 2024.

activities in the territories regained after the 2020 conflict with Armenia, including parts of Nagorno-Karabakh.<sup>75</sup>

Several Mine Ban Treaty States Parties—Afghanistan, Jordan, Senegal, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe—reported contributions covering the salaries and operational costs of their mine action authorities.<sup>76</sup>

Several States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions—Chile, Germany, Lao PDR, and Lebanon—contributed national funds towards their efforts to clear cluster munition remnants. After completing clearance of its mined areas in 2020, Chile began clearance of cluster munition remnants in 2023, spending around \$38,804 to clear 1.44km<sup>2</sup>.<sup>77</sup>

Germany has been funding clearance of cluster munition remnants from a former military training area in Wittstock, spending a total of \$128.4 million since 2017.<sup>78</sup> Lao PDR provides an annual national contribution of \$5,000 for the offices of the National Regulatory Authority for UXO/Mine Action (NRA) and for EOD tasks in provinces with no operator presence.<sup>79</sup> Lebanon has been unable to allocate national resources to conduct clearance since 2020 due to political instability and the national economic crisis. The government contribution of \$6 million in 2023 supported the operations of the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC), emergency hospitalization of victims, and rapid response EOD teams.<sup>80</sup>

Some states remained reliant on international funding for mine action due to a lack of government budget. South Sudan reported that the government had been unable to pay the salaries of civil servants for several months during 2023.<sup>81</sup> Yemen continued to report a decrease in the annual state contribution to mine action due to the ongoing armed conflict and intermittent pay for Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC) staff.<sup>82</sup>



In Mozambique, local landmine survivor-led association DONAKATI provides risk education sessions in rural areas of Zambézia province that were sites of clashes during the civil war.

© DONAKATI, September 2023

75 “Over 64M directed to demining of liberated territories in 2023,” *Report News Agency*, 23 May 2024, [bit.ly/ReportNewsAgency23May2024](https://bit.ly/ReportNewsAgency23May2024); and Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Strengthening International Support to Azerbaijan in Demining,” August 2024.

76 **Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan]:** Afghanistan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023) Form I, p. 45; response to Monitor questionnaire by Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, Directorate of Mine Action Coordination, 27 April 2024; **Jordan:** Jordan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 7; **Senegal:** email from Khady Badji, Chief of Division of Risk Education and Victim Assistance, Senegalese National Mine Action Center (Centre National d’Action Antimines au Sénégal, CNAMS), 24 July 2024; **Tajikistan:** response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre, 3 April 2024; Tajikistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, p. 9; **Zimbabwe:** Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 17.

77 Chile Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form I, p. 8.

78 Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form I, p. 26.

79 Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form I, p. 24.

80 Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form I, p. 28.

81 South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 23.

82 Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 17–18.

## NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS: 2019–2023

Affected states do not all provide the same level of information regarding national resources allocated to mine action activities, so drawing conclusions on trends in national support is difficult. Regular annual reporting of national contributions to mine action by affected States Parties would provide a clearer picture and demonstrate the commitment and ownership of affected states in dealing with their treaty obligations.

From 2019–2023, the combined amount contributed by national governments to their mine action programs on an annual basis has fluctuated from a low of \$76.8 million in 2021 to a high of \$227.3 million in 2023.<sup>83</sup> Most states reporting on their national contributions are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with Article 5 clearance obligations. Several of these States Parties—BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Peru, Serbia, Thailand, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe—have reported reasonably consistently, although figures are not always found in annual Article 7 transparency reports. States Parties Chile, Germany, Lao PDR, and Lebanon, which have clearance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions have reported regularly within their Article 7 reports. In the five-year period, only one state not party, Azerbaijan, has reported on its national contribution to its mine action program.

In the five years from 2019–2023, the proportion of national contributions as part of overall funding has ranged from 12% to 22%, with the rise in 2023 largely attributed to reporting of state funding by state not party Azerbaijan. It is likely that affected states contributed more to their mine action programs but this was not captured in reporting.

### National contributions: 2019–2023

Year	Total national contributions (US\$ million)	% of total contribution (national + international)
2019	\$100.9	15%
2020	\$91.2	14%
2021	\$76.8	12%
2022	\$115.1	13%
2023	\$227.3	22%
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$611.3</b>	<b>N/A</b>

<sup>83</sup> National contribution figures for 2019, 2020, and 2021 have been updated from previous Monitor reports to include Germany's contributions to its cluster munition clearance.

# INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION: 2023


**EU**  
European Union  
The EU contributed  
\$68.5 million.

**UNDP**  
United Nations  
Development Programme  
UNDP contributed  
\$0.06 million.

**UNICEF**  
United Nations Children's Fund  
UNICEF contributed  
\$0.6 million.

**UNOCHA**  
United Nations Office for  
the Coordination of  
Humanitarian Affairs  
UNOCHA contributed  
\$0.5 million.

**UNTFHS**  
United Nations Trust Fund  
for Human Security  
UNTFHS contributed  
\$0.7 million.



## MAP KEY

### International contributions (in US\$)

- More than \$100 million
- Between \$40–\$100 million
- Between \$10–\$39.9 million
- Between \$1–\$9.9 million
- Less than \$1 million

### National contributions (in US\$)

- More than \$10 million
- Between \$1–\$10 million
- Less than \$1 million

Note: **States Parties** to the Mine Ban Treaty are **bold**, non-signatories are plain text, other areas are *italics*.

## DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.







A deminer erects a landmine warning sign in Trostianets village, in Ukraine's Sumy oblast.

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# STATUS OF THE CONVENTION

## 1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION (MINE BAN TREATY)

Under Article 15, the Mine Ban Treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force on 1 March 1999. Since the treaty entered into force, states can no longer sign it but can join through a one-step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the Mine Ban Treaty is open for accession by any state that has not signed. In the following list of states, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Accession is indicated with (a) and succession is indicated with (s).

As of 1 November 2024, there were 164 States Parties and one signatory.

### STATES PARTIES

Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)	Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00	Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01	Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98	Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02	Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99	Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99	Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99	Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98	Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98	Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00	Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99	

Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98  
 Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03  
 Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99  
 Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02  
 Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97  
 Cabo Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01  
 Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a)  
 Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99  
 Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01  
 Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00  
 Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)  
 Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 May 02 (a)  
 Congo, Rep. 4 May 01 (a)  
 Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06  
 Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99  
 Côte d'Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00  
 Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98  
 Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03  
 Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99  
 Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98  
 Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98  
 Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99  
 Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97;  
 30 Jun 00  
 Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99  
 El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99  
 Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a)  
 Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a)  
 Estonia 12 May 04 (a)  
 Eswatini 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98  
 Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04  
 Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98  
 Finland 9 Jan 12 (a)  
 France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98  
 Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00  
 Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02  
 Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98  
 Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00  
 Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03  
 Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98  
 Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99  
 Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98  
 Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01  
 Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03  
 Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06  
 Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98  
 Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98  
 Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98  
 Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99  
 Indonesia 4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07  
 Iraq 15 Aug 07 (a)  
 Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97  
 Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99  
 Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98  
 Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98  
 Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98  
 Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01  
 Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a)  
 Kuwait 30 Jul 07 (a)  
 Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)  
 Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98  
 Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a)  
 Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99  
 Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03  
 Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99  
 Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99  
 Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98  
 Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99  
 Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00  
 Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98  
 Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01  
 Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00  
 Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97  
 Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98  
 Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00  
 Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98  
 Montenegro 23 Oct 06 (s)  
 Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98  
 Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98  
 Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a)  
 Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99  
 New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99  
 Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98  
 Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99  
 Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a)  
 Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98  
 North Macedonia 9 Sep 98 (a)  
 Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98  
 Oman 20 Aug 14 (a)  
 Palau 18 Nov 07 (a)



Palestine 29 Dec 2017 (a)	South Sudan 11 Nov 11 (s)
Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98	Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99
Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a)	Sri Lanka 13 Dec 2017 (a)
Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98	Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03
Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98	Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02
Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00	Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Poland 4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12	Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98
Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99	Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a)
Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98	Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00
Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00	Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98
Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00	Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a)
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98	Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00
Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99	Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01	Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98	Türkiye 25 Sep 03 (a)
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98	Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98
Sao Tome and Principe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03	Tuvalu 13 Sep 2011 (a)
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98	Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a)	Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00	United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01	Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01
Slovakia 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99	Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98	Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99	Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98
Somalia 16 Apr 12 (a)	Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98	Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98

## SIGNATORY

Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97

## NON-SIGNATORIES

Armenia	Korea, North	Pakistan
Azerbaijan	Korea, South	Russia
Bahrain	Kyrgyzstan	Saudi Arabia
China	Lao PDR	Singapore
Cuba	Lebanon	Syria
Egypt	Libya	Tonga
Georgia	Micronesia	United Arab Emirates
India	Mongolia	United States
Iran	Morocco	Uzbekistan
Israel	Myanmar	Vietnam
Kazakhstan	Nepal	

# MINE BAN TREATY

18 SEPTEMBER 1997

## CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

### PREAMBLE

#### The States Parties

*Determined* to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

*Believing* it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

*Wishing* to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

*Recognizing* that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

*Welcoming* the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

*Welcoming* also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

*Welcoming* furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

*Stressing* the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

*Recalling* the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

*Emphasizing* the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,



*Basing* themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

## ARTICLE 1

### General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
  - a) To use anti-personnel mines;
  - b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
  - c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

## ARTICLE 2

### Definitions

1. "Anti-personnel mine" means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
2. "Mine" means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.
3. "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.
4. "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.
5. "Mined area" means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

## ARTICLE 3

### Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

## ARTICLE 4

### Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

## ARTICLE 5

### Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:

- a) The duration of the proposed extension;
- b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
  - (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
  - (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
  - (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
- c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
- d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

## ARTICLE 6

### International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.
2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.
3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.
6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.
7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
  - a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
  - b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;
  - c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
  - d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
  - e) Assistance to mine victims;
  - f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.
8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

## ARTICLE 7

### Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:

- a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
- b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
- c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
- d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;
- e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;
- f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
- g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;
- h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and
- i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

## ARTICLE 8

### Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.
4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.
6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.
7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.
8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.



10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:

- a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
- b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
- c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

## ARTICLE 9

### National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

## ARTICLE 10

### Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

## ARTICLE 11

### Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
  - a) The operation and status of this Convention;
  - b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
  - c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
  - d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
  - e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
  - f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

## ARTICLE 12

### Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years.

All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:

- a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
- b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
- c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
- d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

## ARTICLE 13

### Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

## ARTICLE 14

### Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

## ARTICLE 15

### Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

## ARTICLE 16

### Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

## ARTICLE 17

### Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

## ARTICLE 18

### Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

## ARTICLE 19

### Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

## ARTICLE 20

### Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the

withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

## ARTICLE 21

### Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

## ARTICLE 22

### Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.



# LANDMINE MONITOR 2024



**Landmine Monitor 2024** provides a global overview of efforts to universalize and fully implement the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Focusing on calendar year 2023 with information included up to October 2024 where possible, the report documents recent landmine use and covers mine ban policy, production, trade, and stockpiling globally. The report also outlines developments and challenges in addressing the impact of mine contamination and casualties through clearance of mined areas, the delivery of risk education to affected communities, and the provision of assistance to victims of these weapons, before reviewing global trends in support for mine action.

This report was prepared by the **Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor**, the civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). The Monitor has reported on the international community's response to the global landmine problem and its solutions since 1999.

**Cover:** A 13-year-old mine/ERW survivor who was injured when she was 4 years old plays football with her siblings in Kampong Thom province, Cambodia. Landmines were widely used in this province of Cambodia. © S. Rae/Hi, February 2024

**Back cover:** At Mindol Metta Karuna Reflection Centre in Siem Reap, Cambodia, women with disabilities gather to share experiences, talk about their rights, encourage one another, and plan for the future, with the support of other Cambodian mine survivors. © So Not/IRS Cambodia, June 2024

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
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