LANDMINE MONITOR 2026



INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

1997 Nobel Peace Prize Co-Laureate

LANDMINE MONITOR

2026

28TH ANNUAL EDITION

Monitoring and Research Committee, ICBL-CMC Governance Board
Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines • DanChurchAid
Human Rights Watch • Humanity & Inclusion • Mines Action Canada
Monitor Editorial Team leaders • ICBL-CMC staff

Please cite this report as:

International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor 2026* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, December 2026).

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ISBN: 978-2-9701476-8-8

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Back cover photograph © T. Mayer/HI, October 2025

Cover, text design, and layout by Michael Sherwin.

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

For more information visit www.the-monitor.org or email monitor@icblcmc.org.

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INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or "Ottawa Convention") as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.

The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all, including:

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
- Efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW); and
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.

PREFACE

LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR

Peace agreements may be signed, and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Landmines are inherently indiscriminate weapons, meaning that, by design, it is not possible for the mine to be deployed to target a specific person. Hence, casualities can occur among whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, as well as anyone nearby. Landmines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

Antipersonnel landmines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. This includes improvised antipersonnel landmines, which constitute improvised explosive devices (IEDs) with those same human-activated characteristics. Antivehicle landmines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.

ERW refers to ordnance that either failed to explode or was abandoned, remaining a danger to anyone who may encounter it. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to function as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive items are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) refers to explosive weapons that have not been used during armed conflict but have been left behind and are no longer effectively controlled. Under the international legal definition, ERW consists of UXO and AXO, but not mines. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and also applies to cluster munition remnants. Cluster munitions are defined by the Convention on Cluster Munitions and are subject to a specific set of legal obligations under that convention.

Landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads and footpaths, in farmers' fields, in forests and deserts, along territorial borders, in and around critical infrastructure, in houses and schools, as well as other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. Landmines and ERW impede access to food, water, and other basic needs, and restrict freedom of movement. They endanger transit and prevent the safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities. In many cases, residents are unaware of the contamination and its hazards. However, even when aware of potentially mined areas, residents are often forced to take risks just to go on with their lives, having no alternative land to farm for their livelihood or safer routes to access schools. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to mine/ERW casualties, and

when countries must spend money clearing landmines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, but that they are also a lethal barrier to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global mine problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel landmines.[1] Governments that join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, as well as support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent future incidents.

This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations; and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of landmines and cluster munitions—a world where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine; where children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy; where communities are no longer burdened with the long-term socio-economic impacts of living on or near contaminated land; and where the rights of mine/ERW survivors and persons with similar needs are protected.

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The ICBL is a global network of organizations active in more than 100 countries, working for the full universalization and implementation of the treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams, in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty. The campaign includes national and international organizations, as well as multisectoral expertise from the human rights, development, refugee, medical, and humanitarian relief fields. The ICBL works in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance. The campaign calls additionally on non-state armed groups (NSAGs) to abide by the norm against mine use.

The ICBL was founded in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International (now Humanity & Inclusion, HI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), Medico International, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These organizations witnessed the horrendous impact of landmines on the communities in which they were working—across Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East—and how mines hampered and prevented development efforts. The solution, they realized, was a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines. More than 30 years on from its founding, the ICBL continues to serve as a decisive and effective model of a civil society-led campaign for disarmament and peace. Its effort to ban landmines led to a whole new approach known as humanitarian disarmament.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign a multisectoral perspective and practical experience on the impact of landmines. In a short time, these

1 This report uses "Mine Ban Treaty" to refer to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (1997). The term has been consistently used by civil society in reference to this convention since it was adopted. The treaty is also often referred to as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), including by its Implementation Support Unit (ISU), which serves as the convention's secretariat. The Monitor makes reference to the APMBC in footnotes that refer to documents and statements held and published by the ISU.

core members mobilized a global network of NGOs engaged on this issue. Conferences and outreach events were initially organized worldwide to raise awareness on the global landmine problem and the need for a ban, as well as to provide training to partners for effective advocacy efforts. The call for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines quickly spread throughout the world, and among diverse partners.

Through sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL and effective partnerships with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments, the Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada.

Once the goal of developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel mines was achieved, the attention of the ICBL shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations.

The ICBL's success over three decades speaks to the campaign's ability to evolve with changing circumstances. In January 2011, the ICBL merged with the CMC to become the ICBL-CMC.

LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL-CMC on the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has become the de facto monitoring regime for both treaties, reporting on States Parties' implementation and compliance, and more generally assessing the international community's response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other ERW.

The ICBL created Landmine Monitor in June 1998, for the first time bringing NGOs together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law and disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and challenges. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as "the Monitor") to reflect its new reporting on cluster munitions and the merger of the ICBL with the CMC. The Monitor successfully puts into practice the concept of civil society-based verification that is now employed in many similar contexts.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information, covering all aspects of mine action. Although in some cases it does entail field missions, the Monitor does not send researchers into harm's way and does not include war-zone reporting. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about the issues it is monitoring to benefit the international community as a whole. It aims to promote and advance discussion in support of the goal of a world free of landmines and cluster munitions.

The Monitor is supported by a global reporting network. Key outputs include country profiles and annual reports.[2] A Monitoring and Research Committee provides oversight of the plans and outputs of the ICBL-CMC's research and monitoring, including all Monitor publication content, and acts as a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The Monitor Project Manager, under the ICBL-CMC, is responsible for the coordination and management of research, editing, and production of all Monitor research products.

The Monitor complements transparency reporting required of States Parties under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

2 Reports, briefing papers, factsheets, maps, detailed country profiles, and other resources produced by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor are available online at www.the-monitor.org.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

This is the 28th annual *Landmine Monitor*. It is the sister publication to the annual *Cluster Munition Monitor*, first published in 2010.

Landmine Monitor 2026 covers mine ban policy, use, production, transfers, and stockpiling globally. It assesses the impact of mine contamination and casualties, and outlines progress made and challenges faced in efforts to clear and release contaminated land, provide risk education to affected communities, and assist mine/ERW victims. It also reviews international financial assistance and national resources allocated towards mine action efforts. The report focuses on calendar year 2025, with information included up to 1 November 2026 where possible. Unless otherwise specified, all translations in this report were carried out by the Monitor.

As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations from around the world contributed to this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of researchers and editors, with the support of a significant number of donors.

The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed to the research for this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for their crucial assistance in the production, release, distribution, and promotion of Monitor reports.

Content produced by the Monitor was reviewed by members of the Monitoring and Research Committee comprised of five NGOs, as well as Monitor Editorial Team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. At the time of publication, the committee's members were:

- Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Camilo Serna), DanChurchAid (Lene Rasmussen), Human Rights Watch (Mark Hiznay and Verity Coyle), Humanity & Inclusion (Eva Maria Fischer and Alma Taslidžan), and Mines Action Canada (Erin Hunt);
- Monitor Editorial Team leaders (Ban Policy: Jillian Rafferty; Impact: Katrin Atkins and Loren Persi Vicentic; and Mine Action Funding: Ruth Bottomley);
- Relevant senior ICBL-CMC staff (Éléa Boureux and Kasia Derlicka-Rosenbauer), and *ex officio* member Tamar Gabelnick (ICBL-CMC Director).

From January to October 2026, the Monitor's Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and drafted thematic overviews for *Landmine Monitor 2026*. The Editorial Team included:

- **Ban Policy:** Jillian Rafferty, Mark Hiznay, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, Nicolò Scarpat, and Alexandra Zak;
- **Impact:** Katrin Atkins and Loren Persi Vicentic; and
- **Mine Action Funding:** Ruth Bottomley.

Mine Action Review, an independent project of Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), provided the Monitor with the contamination and land release data used in this report under a Memorandum of Understanding. NPA is a member of the ICBL-CMC.

Anna Lim (Editorial Consultant) provided final editing in October and November 2026 with support from Éléa Boureux (Monitor Project Manager), Michael Hart (Production Consultant), and Lea Kohli and Tommaso Savelli (interns).

Report formatting and cover design were undertaken by Michael Sherwin. Maps were produced by Loreta Marcellino. Héliographie Girard printed the report in Switzerland.

The front cover photograph was provided by T. Nicholson/HI. The back cover photograph was provided by T. Mayer/HI. Additional photographs found within *Landmine Monitor 2026* were provided by multiple photographers, cited with each photograph.

We extend our gratitude to Monitor contributors. In 2026, this work was made possible with funding from (list accurate as of 1 November 2026):

- Government of Australia
- Government of Austria
- Government of Canada
- Government of France
- Government of Germany
- Government of Italy
- Government of Luxembourg
- Government of New Zealand
- Government of Norway
- Government of Slovenia
- Government of Switzerland
- Holy See
- MINE-EX Foundation
- République et canton de Genève

The Monitor is also grateful for the support received from private donors.

The Monitor's supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the content within this report.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AXO	abandoned explosive ordnance
BAC	battle area clearance
CCW	1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CHA	confirmed hazardous area
CMC	Cluster Munition Coalition
CPP	conflict preparedness and protection
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
DCA	DanChurchAid
DPO	disabled persons' organization
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EORE	explosive ordnance risk education
ERW	explosive remnants of war
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI	Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced person
IED	improvised explosive device
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
ISU	Implementation Support Unit
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
NGO	non-governmental organization
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NSAG	non-state armed group
SHA	suspected hazardous area
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UXO	unexploded ordnance

1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

Table Key
States Parties: Ratified, acceded, or succeded as of 1 November 2026
States not party: Not yet acceded (or withdrawn) as of 1 November 2026

The Americas

Antigua & Barbuda	Guyana
Argentina	Haiti
Bahamas	Honduras
Barbados	Jamaica
Belize	Mexico
Bolivia	Nicaragua
Brazil	Panama
Canada	Paraguay
Chile	Peru
Colombia	Saint Kitts & Nevis
Costa Rica	Saint Lucia
Dominica	Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
Dominican Rep.	Suriname
Ecuador	Trinidad & Tobago
El Salvador	Uruguay
Grenada	Venezuela
Guatemala	
Cuba	United States

East & South Asia & the Pacific

Afghanistan	Nauru
Australia	New Zealand
Bangladesh	Niue
Bhutan	Palau
Brunei Darussalam	Papua New Guinea
Cambodia	Philippines
Cook Islands	Samoa
Fiji	Solomon Islands
Indonesia	Sri Lanka
Japan	Thailand
Kiribati	Timor-Leste
Malaysia	Tonga
Maldives	Tuvalu
Marshall Islands	Vanuatu
China	Mongolia
India	Myanmar
Korea, North	Nepal
Korea, South	Pakistan
Lao PDR	Singapore
Micronesia	Vietnam

Europe, the Caucasus & Central Asia

Albania	Holy See	Romania
Andorra	Hungary	San Marino
Austria	Iceland	Serbia
Belarus	Ireland	Slovakia
Belgium	Italy	Slovenia
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Liechtenstein	Spain
Bulgaria	Luxembourg	Sweden
Croatia	Malta	Switzerland
Cyprus	Moldova	Tajikistan
Czech Republic	Monaco	Turkmenistan
Denmark	Montenegro	Türkiye
France	Netherlands	Ukraine
Germany	North Macedonia	United Kingdom
Greece	Norway	
	Portugal	
Armenia	Georgia	Lithuania*
Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Poland*
Estonia*	Kyrgyzstan	Russia
Finland*	Latvia*	Uzbekistan

*Withdrew from the Mine Ban Treaty.

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria	Lebanon	Tunisia
Iraq	Oman	Yemen
Jordan	Palestine	
Kuwait	Qatar	
Bahrain	Libya	United Arab Emirates
Egypt	Morocco	
Iran	Saudi Arabia	
Israel	Syria	

Sub-Saharan Africa

Angola	Eswatini	Niger
Benin	Ethiopia	Nigeria
Botswana	Gabon	Rwanda
Burkina Faso	Gambia	Sao Tome & Principe
Burundi	Ghana	Senegal
Cabo Verde	Guinea	Seychelles
Cameroon	Guinea-Bissau	Sierra Leone
Central African Rep.	Kenya	Somalia
Chad	Lesotho	South Africa
Comoros	Liberia	South Sudan
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Madagascar	Sudan
Congo, Rep.	Malawi	Tanzania
Côte d'Ivoire	Mali	Togo
Djibouti	Mauritania	Uganda
Equatorial Guinea	Mauritius	Zambia
Eritrea	Mozambique	Zimbabwe
	Namibia	

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A mine detection dog and his handler during a detection practice drill at a clearance site near the village of Vavylove in Mykolaiv oblast, Ukraine.

© C. Wright/ICBL-CMC, July 2025

MAJOR FINDINGS

BAN POLICY

STATUS OF THE 1997 MINE BAN TREATY

- Three countries joined the Mine Ban Treaty during the reporting period: Lebanon in 2026, and the Marshall Islands and Tonga in 2025. A total of 162 countries are now bound by the treaty.
- Lebanon's accession is an especially significant reaffirmation of the norm against antipersonnel mines, as the country joined the treaty amid renewed armed hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah.
- Five countries withdrew from the treaty in 2025 through early 2026—Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—marking the first ever withdrawals from the treaty.
- State Party Ukraine notified the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General of its decision to "suspend the operation" of the Mine Ban Treaty while engaged in armed conflict with Russia. Suspension is unlawful under the treaty, and Ukraine remains fully bound by all the treaty's provisions.

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE USE

- Antipersonnel landmines were used in the current reporting period by State Party Ukraine, in violation of its Mine Ban Treaty obligations.
- Antipersonnel mines were also used by:
  - states not party Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Russia, and possibly the United States (US);
  - as yet unconfirmed actors in the border region between Thailand and Cambodia; in Bangladesh and Myanmar along their shared border; in Sudan; and in Thailand (near Myanmar and Malaysia); and
  - non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Colombia, India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and in several states in Western and Central Africa.

PRODUCTION

- State Party Ukraine produced antipersonnel mines in the current reporting period, in violation of its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty.
- A total of 15 states not party either currently produce antipersonnel mines or have the potential to do so in the future. Five of these states—India, Myanmar, Poland, Russia, and South Korea—appear to be actively producing or developing antipersonnel mines or have publicly made plans to do so in the near future.
- Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania—all of which withdrew from the treaty during the reporting period—have indicated their intent to develop the capacity to produce antipersonnel mines.
- NSAGs have produced improvised mines that are victim-activated in Colombia, India, the Sahel region of Africa, and sporadically in Thailand.

TRANSFERS

- The current reporting period has seen no new evidence of completed transfers of antipersonnel mines.
- Some evidence indicates the possibility of future transfers from Finland, Lithuania, and Poland, all of which recently withdrew from the Mine Ban Treaty. Both Lithuania and Poland mentioned the possibility of both import and export.
- Iran's Ministry of Defence Export Center (MINDEX) continued to advertise antipersonnel landmines available for purchase, indicating a willingness to transfer mines.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION AND MINES RETAINED

- Of the 162 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 157 reported that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines. Of these, 94 states have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction, collectively destroying more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines.
- States Parties Greece and Ukraine continue to possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty. While Greece has made substantial progress in the past two years to destroy its remaining stockpiles, Ukraine is producing mines and adding to its stockpile in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.
- A total of 59 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines for permitted training and research purposes.
    - Bangladesh retains the largest quantity of mines for these purposes, totaling just under 12,000.
    - Another 21 States Parties retain more than 1,000 mines for permitted purposes.
- Five of the 22 States Parties retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines consumed mines for permitted purposes in the current reporting period: Croatia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, and Uganda.

THE IMPACT

CASUALTIES

- At least 6,929 casualties of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) were recorded in 2025 (1,955 killed, 4,930 injured, and survival status unknown for 44), making it the highest annual casualty figure since 2020.
- In 2025, mine/ERW casualties were identified in 54 countries and areas. Of these, 39 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.
- Civilians made up 84% (5,078) of all recorded casualties, where the civilian, deminer, or military status was known. Children accounted for 50% (1,690) of civilian casualties, where the age group was known.

- State not party Myanmar recorded the highest number of annual casualties (1,891) for the third consecutive year.
- In state not party Syria, recorded casualties rose by more than 50% in 2025, amid large-scale returns of displaced people after the fall of the Assad government in December 2024. Syria recorded 1,602 mine/ERW casualties in 2025.
- In 2025, as in previous years, victim-activated improvised landmines continued to cause the most casualties (1,530) of any device type.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

- At least 41 States Parties held responsibilities under the Mine Ban Treaty to provide assistance to mine/ERW victims in 2025. Victim assistance services were curtailed in many of these countries due to limited national capacity, declining international funding, coordination challenges, insecurity, and conflict.
- Barriers such as distance, transport costs, inaccessible infrastructure, and shortages of trained personnel often prevented survivors from reaching services, particularly in remote and rural areas.
- Major setbacks, restrictions, and disruptions to the healthcare system and emergency care were observed in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen.
    - In many of these States Parties, health facilities, ambulances, and health workers came under direct attack in the context of ongoing conflicts.
- Despite advancements among some States Parties in integrating rehabilitation services into national health and protection systems and in developing innovative 3D-printed prosthetics, persistent gaps in financing, coordination, and accessibility limited survivors' access to sustained care.
- The availability of socio-economic opportunities for survivors remained uneven, particularly in rural and remote areas, with support heavily dependent on international organizations. Peer support initiatives expanded in some countries but lacked sustained funding, training, and institutional support.

CONTAMINATION

- At least 65 states and other areas were suspected or confirmed to be contaminated by antipersonnel mines, or faced a threat from improvised mines, as of November 2026; with Bangladesh newly included among those assessed to be affected by antipersonnel mines.
- This total included 32 contaminated States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations. Lebanon was the most recent contaminated country to join the Mine Ban Treaty; its treaty-mandated clearance deadline is 1 November 2036.
- At least 17 States Parties with current Article 5 clearance obligations were known or suspected to be affected by improvised mine contamination. Improvised mine contamination continued to pose challenges for treaty implementation, particularly in identifying and surveying affected areas and determining the extent of contamination.
- Four States Parties (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, and Ukraine) and four states not party (Azerbaijan, Morocco, North Korea, and South Korea) were assessed to have massive antipersonnel mine contamination (more than 100km^2), although reliable estimates of the extent of contamination remained unavailable, particularly for Ukraine and the four states not party.

CLEARANCE AND LAND RELEASE

- Twenty-two States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations reported releasing a combined 388.3km^2 of mine contaminated land in 2025, an 18% decrease from 2024. Cambodia reported the largest area of land released in 2025.

- Croatia completed its Article 5 clearance obligations in 2026, following Oman's completion in 2025. Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999, 32 States Parties have completed clearance.
- Nine States Parties submitted Article 5 clearance deadline extension requests in 2026: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand.
    - Mali was the only one of these nine seeking an extension to address newly identified improvised antipersonnel mine contamination, after previously declaring no mined areas.
    - For the remaining eight, the justification for the extension requests included insufficient funding, insecurity, restricted access, limited operational capacity, or incomplete knowledge of remaining contamination.
- Burkina Faso received a new Article 5 clearance deadline in December 2025 following the identification of improvised mine contamination.

RISK EDUCATION

- Risk education was conducted in 27 of the 32 contaminated States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations in 2025. However, only 19 provided cumulative national sex- and age-disaggregated beneficiary data, and just four reported disability-disaggregated data.
- Of the nine States Parties requesting clearance deadline extensions in 2026, only four provided multiyear risk education plans with annual or phased implementation projections.
- Children accounted for 48% of risk education beneficiaries for whom age-disaggregated data was available in 2025, while women and girls accounted for 55% of beneficiaries for whom sex-disaggregated data was available, despite men and boys being reported as facing greater risk due to livelihood activities in contaminated areas.
- Risk education continued to adapt to evolving threats and changing patterns of civilian exposure, including drone-delivered explosive devices in Ukraine, large-scale returns of displaced people in Afghanistan, Sudan, and Syria, and overlapping risks from explosive ordnance, ongoing hostilities, and natural disasters in Gaza, Lebanon, and Myanmar.

FUNDING FOR MINE ACTION

INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

- Global mine action funding reached US$1.1 billion in 2025, about 5% higher than in 2024. International funding rose by 11%, while reported national funding was down by 10% from 2024.
- Twenty-two affected states, along with other area Kosovo, reported contributing a combined $276.9 million to their national mine action programs. Azerbaijan, BiH, Colombia, Croatia, and Türkiye reported particularly substantial contributions, reflecting increased national capacity to fund mine action.
- In 2025, $850 million in international funding was provided by 43 donors to mine action programs in affected states. The US, the European Union (EU), Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Germany together provided 62% of all international mine action funding. This reliance on a small group of donors increased the sector's vulnerability to budget cuts and policy changes.
    - Land release and integrated land release programs received 76% of international contributions in 2025 ($643.8 million). Ukraine received the largest share for land release (29% of the total), while Croatia received the second highest amount (10% of the total), helping it complete its Article 5 clearance obligations by its March 2026 deadline.

    - Victim assistance received only 5% of international mine action funding ($38.3 million), despite growing needs and rising casualty numbers. Ukraine and Yemen together received 43% of this funding, leaving many countries responsible for supporting survivors without adequate resources.
- The 90-day US foreign assistance freeze in 2025 and subsequent grant terminations significantly disrupted mine action programs worldwide. Although funding resumed in some countries, terminated grants affected programs in many states, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of the Middle East.

RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL FUNDING

- In 2025, 48 states and two other areas received $804.3 million, with the remainder of international funding supporting regional or global programs.
- International assistance was increasingly concentrated among a small number of recipients. In 2025, the top 10 recipient countries—Ukraine, Yemen, Croatia, Lao PDR, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Colombia—received 75% ($638.2 million) of all international assistance. Ukraine remained the largest recipient, receiving at least $237.2 million (28% of international funding).
- Emergency needs drove substantial support for Ukraine and increased assistance to Palestine, Sudan, and Yemen in 2025. By contrast, funding declined elsewhere, including in other affected Mine Ban Treaty States Parties.
    - Funding fell by more than 20% in 2025 in six Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations: Afghanistan, BiH, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, and Senegal.
    - Five affected African States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty—Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Niger—received no funding in 2025.
    - Sub-Saharan African countries continued to struggle to secure international support, limiting their ability to fulfill Article 5 clearance obligations "as soon as possible."



Mohammed was herding his sheep in southern Aleppo, Syria, when he stepped on a landmine in 2014. He later adopted three of his brothers' children. One of the children was killed and one was injured in an explosive remnant of war (ERW) incident.

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BAN POLICY

BANNING ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

For nearly 30 years, the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty has served as a cornerstone of the humanitarian disarmament movement. Together with other humanitarian disarmament conventions, the Mine Ban Treaty aims to address the humanitarian costs of weapons of war—in this case, the casualties and human suffering that result from the use of antipersonnel landmines.

During the reporting period, the treaty faced unprecedented challenges. For the first time since its adoption, the Mine Ban Treaty lost five members when Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland withdrew from the treaty in 2025–2026. Meanwhile, State Party Ukraine attempted to "suspend" the operation of the Mine Ban Treaty in the context of its ongoing war with Russia. Landmines continue to be used in conflicts around the world, while production continues in a handful of countries, and large-scale new production is on the horizon in Europe. Two States Parties, Greece and Ukraine, remain in non-compliance with their stockpile destruction deadlines, though Greece made progress towards completing its Article 4 obligations in 2025–2026.

At the same time, the reporting period also affirmed the Mine Ban Treaty and its core norms.

During the reporting period, the treaty gained three new States Parties. Lebanon, a country in active conflict, joined the treaty, providing a sharp counterexample to the security arguments put forward by the states that withdrew. The Marshall Islands and Tonga also joined the treaty, showing the universal appeal of the ban even among non-affected states.

The continued vigor of the treaty is also clear from the reactions of states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other advocates in the face of challenges to the treaty and its norms. A significant number of States Parties sought to discourage the withdrawals and expressed regret at meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty after the decisions were made. The Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in 2025 concluded clearly that Ukraine's attempt to "suspend" the treaty was not permitted, and the country remains fully bound by its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Together, these successes demonstrate that the Mine Ban Treaty remains strong. But the pressures the treaty faces are a reminder that complacency is not an option.

The continued use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and states not party calls for a renewed push to universalize the treaty and bring all actors in line with

its obligations. The use of antipersonnel mines by State Party Ukraine is a reminder that compliance must be prioritized, both to prevent humanitarian harm and to avoid undermining the Mine Ban Treaty and its core norms.

This chapter provides updates on the universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty through 1 November 2026, as well as on documented use, production, stockpiling, and transfers of antipersonnel mines in the current reporting period (1 January 2025 until 1 October 2026).

UNIVERSALIZING THE LANDMINE BAN

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) continues its work to ensure the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, working in close partnership with its dedicated community of states, United Nations (UN) agencies, and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

UNIVERSALIZATION OVERVIEW

As of 1 November 2026, there are 162 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. There are 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Forty percent (67 countries) of Mine Ban Treaty States Parties signed and ratified the treaty prior to its 1 March 1999 entry into force.[1] A further 74 countries joined the treaty by the end of 2003, when the pace of ratifications slowed.[2] Three or four countries joined during each of the next four years.[3] Eleven countries have joined the Mine Ban Treaty since 2007, including three during the current reporting period.[4]

PROGRESS TOWARD UNIVERSALIZATION

Three countries joined the Mine Ban Treaty in the reporting period: Lebanon and Tonga via accession, and the Marshall Islands via ratification. They were the first states to join the treaty since December 2017, when Palestine and Sri Lanka joined.

Lebanon acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 May 2026. The treaty entered into force for the country on 1 November 2026.[5] Lebanon's accession carries particular weight: it represents a major advance in the treaty's universalization and a particularly significant reaffirmation of the norm against antipersonnel mines. By joining amid ongoing armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, Lebanon demonstrated that states facing active hostilities can reject these weapons and undertake binding commitments to protect civilians from their enduring harm. Its decision stands in stark contrast to the withdrawals of Estonia, Finland, Latvia,

1 Canada, Ireland, and Mauritius ratified the treaty in 1997. Turkmenistan, Holy See, San Marino, Switzerland, Hungary, Niue, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago, Djibouti, Croatia, Mali, Denmark, Bolivia, Mexico, Fiji, Peru, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Andorra, Austria, Norway, Jamaica, France, Germany, Samoa, the Bahamas, the United Kingdom (UK), Malawi, Grenada, Mozambique, Yemen, Belgium, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), North Macedonia, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, Honduras, Senegal, Benin, Japan, Panama, Guinea, Qatar, Slovenia, Jordan, Paraguay, Monaco, Thailand, Nicaragua, Sweden, Lesotho, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Eswatini ratified in 1998. Australia, Spain, Barbados, the Solomon Islands, El Salvador, New Zealand, Portugal, Slovakia, and Uganda ratified in 1999 prior to the treaty's entry into force. Note that all countries in this footnote are listed in the order in which they joined the treaty.

2 This group includes Lithuania, which has since withdrawn from the treaty.

3 This includes both Estonia and Latvia, which have since withdrawn from the treaty, as well as Ukraine, which attempted to "suspend" the treaty during the current reporting period.

4 This includes both Finland and Poland, which have since withdrawn from the treaty.

5 United Nations (UN), "Lebanon: Accession. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," depositary notification C.N.155.2026. TREATIES-XXVI.5, 1 May 2026, bit.ly/LebanonAccession1May2026.



Government representatives of new States Parties the Marshall Islands and Tonga meet with the Mine Ban Treaty's Special Envoys, HRH Prince Mired bin Raad bin Zeid Al Hussein of Jordan and Princess Astrid of Belgium.

© Mine Ban Treaty ISU, December 2025

Lithuania, and Poland, which cited security concerns related to Russia.[6]

Lebanon's accession followed years of increasingly explicit support for the treaty, despite longstanding concerns about security along its border with Israel. The decision also builds on Lebanon's longstanding humanitarian mine action efforts and its direct experience of the consequences of mine contamination for civilian safety, livelihoods, and the return of displaced communities. Writing shortly after accession, Brigadier General Ziad Rizkallah, head of the Lebanese Army's International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Directorate, explained: "This situation [of ongoing hostilities and mine-related insecurity] … became a reason to act."[7] Lebanon's accession provides a powerful affirmation of the treaty's humanitarian purpose at a time of serious challenges to its membership and norms.

Tonga acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 25 June 2025, and the treaty entered into force on 1 December 2025.[8] Unlike signatory states that required ratification, Tonga never formally signed the Mine Ban Treaty despite endorsing its humanitarian goals. Historical records indicate that Tonga had not joined the treaty sooner due to resource constraints and domestic procedural hurdles, though Tonga has consistently voted in favor of every annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the Mine Ban Treaty since the year 2000. In November 2024, Tonga told States Parties that it was "committed to promoting the treaty's universalization across the Pacific, where some countries have yet to join."[9]

The Marshall Islands signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 12 March 2025. The treaty entered into force on 1 September 2025.[10] The ratification comes nearly three decades after the Marshall Islands initially embraced the humanitarian principles of the convention by signing the treaty in December 1997. The Marshall Islands has long aligned itself with the treaty's principles, as it has never produced or stockpiled landmines and has regularly affirmed its commitment to the treaty's goals. Its ratification is especially notable as it marks a departure from its prior hesitations in light of its defense arrangements with the United States (US). During the treaty's intersessional meetings in June

6 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Estonia, of the Republic of Latvia, of the Republic of Lithuania, and of the Republic of Poland, "Statement by the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish Ministers of Defence on the Withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention," 18 March 2025, bit.ly/StatementWithdrawal18March2025; Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Estonia press release, "Baltic and Polish defence ministers recommend withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention," 18 March 2025, bit.ly/MBTWithdrawal18Mar2025; and "Finland prepares to leave Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel landmines," *Yle*, 1 April 2025, bit.ly/Yle1Apr2025. See also, Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Lebanon Joins Mine Ban Treaty," 27 May 2026, bit.ly/HRW27May2026.

7 Ziad Rizkallah, "Lebanon's wartime decision to ban anti-personnel mines," *Humanitarian Law & Policy* (blog), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 7 May 2026, bit.ly/Rizkallah7May2026.

8 UN, "Tonga: Accession. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," depositary notification C.N.352.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5, 25 June 2025, bit.ly/TongaAccession25June2025.

9 Statement of Tonga, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 27 November 2024, bit.ly/TongaStatement27Nov2024.

10 UN, "Marshall Islands: Ratification. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," depositary notification C.N.125.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5, 12 March 2025, bit.ly/MIRatification12March2025.

2025, the Marshall Islands called on all Pacific states to create "a region free of landmines."[11] The Marshall Islands was the last remaining signatory to the treaty that had not yet ratified it.

UNIVERSALIZATION BY REGIONAL AND SECURITY BODIES

Eighty-two percent of countries have joined the Mine Ban Treaty. This includes the vast majority of members of the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).

Until Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland withdrew from the treaty in 2025–2026, all EU member states were Mine Ban Treaty States Parties. Indeed, implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty is integral to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The five withdrawals mark a major break from the rest of the EU, which has not clarified to date how the withdrawals will affect EU relations or the CFSP, nor what they mean for interoperability within the EU.

Mine Ban Treaty membership by regional or security body[12]

Regional/security body	States Parties (%)	States Parties	States not party to the convention
African Union (AU)	94%	51 of 55	Egypt, Libya, Morocco, *Western Sahara*
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	64%	7 of 11	Lao PDR, Myanmar, Singapore, Vietnam
European Union (EU)	81%	22 of 27	Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	81%	26 of 32	Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, US
Organization of American States (OAS)	94%	32 of 34	Cuba, US
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)	94%	17 of 18	Micronesia

Note: Other areas are indicated in *italics*.

IMPEDIMENTS TO UNIVERSALIZATION

There are 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: 30 states that have not yet agreed to be bound by the treaty, as well as five states that withdrew from the treaty.[13]

Several states not party—including many that have articulated their support for the treaty's objectives and regularly vote in favor of the annual UNGA resolution promoting the treaty's universalization and implementation—have clearly indicated their reasons for not joining the treaty.

11 Statement of Marshall Islands, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2025, bit.ly/MIStatement20June2025.

12 While the African Union (AU) has 55 member states, the 94% support rate is calculated out of 54 eligible states. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member of the AU, but Western Sahara's lack of official representation at the UN prevents it from joining the Mine Ban Treaty. See, International Campaign to Ban Landmines–Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), "Country Profile: Western Sahara: Mine Ban Policy," last updated 18 December 2019, bit.ly/WesternSaharaCountryProfile. Note that the numbers for the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are lower this year than in prior years due to the withdrawal of five States Parties from the Mine Ban Treaty during the reporting period.

13 States not party are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Cuba, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Syria, United Arab Emirates (UAE), United States (US), Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

Some cite territorial disputes or their security environment as the impediment to joining the treaty. These countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Morocco, Pakistan, and South Korea.[14]



Lebanon delivers a statement during the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2026, following the deposit of its instrument of accession in May 2026.

© Mine Ban Treaty ISU, June 2026

Others—both mine-affected countries and those unaffected—cite resource constraints that would inhibit their fulfillment of treaty obligations were they to join. Lao PDR, for example, noted in 2022 that it is a "strong supporter of the humanitarian spirit" of the Mine Ban Treaty, but that as a "least developed country with limited resources and capacity," it is "challenging … to fully fulfill international obligations" under international treaties. Lao PDR added that "with consistent support and assistance from the international community," the country "would be able to accede" to the Mine Ban Treaty "in the near future."[15] It does not appear that Lao PDR has taken further steps to join the treaty since 2022. Similarly, Vietnam has said that it "profoundly understands and supports the humanitarian aspects" of the Mine Ban Treaty and "strongly opposes the indiscriminate use of mines against civilians," but has not joined the treaty; it refers to the country's "right … to self-defense" and to the enormous task ahead in Vietnam regarding clearance of existing landmines, even with international assistance.[16]

Some have, at various points, noted that they are taking steps to join, or plan to do so imminently, but have yet to make further progress. Mongolia, for example, has long expressed support for the Mine Ban Treaty's purpose and implementation, including by voting in favor of the annual UNGA resolution on the subject, and between 2004 and 2011 adopted several initiatives aimed at acceding to the treaty, but has not provided substantive updates since.

Egypt and Iran have repeatedly noted their concern that the treaty was negotiated outside the framework of the UN.[17]

STATES PARTIES WITHDRAWING FROM THE MINE BAN TREATY

On 18 March 2025, the defense ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland issued a joint statement informing that they "unanimously recommend withdrawing" from the Mine Ban Treaty. According to the statement, "the security situation in our region has fundamentally deteriorated" and "[m]ilitary threats to NATO Member States bordering Russia and Belarus

14 Statements of Cuba, India, Iran, Pakistan, and South Korea on Resolution A/C.1/80/L.30, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, video record and transcript, 4 November 2025, bit.ly/FirstCommittee4Nov2025; statement of Armenia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, held virtually, 21 June 2021, bit.ly/IM2021Universalization; statement of Azerbaijan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, held virtually, 22 June 2021, bit.ly/AzerbaijanStatement21June2021; statement of Morocco, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2023, bit.ly/MoroccoStatement21June2023; and statement of China, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 19 November 2020.

15 Statement of Lao PDR, Mine Ban Treaty Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 November 2022, bit.ly/LaosStatement21Nov2022.

16 Statement of Vietnam, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25 November 2024, bit.ly/VietnamStatement25Nov2024.

17 Explanations of Vote by Egypt and Iran on Resolution A/C.1/80/L.30, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, video record and transcript, 4 November 2025, bit.ly/FirstCommittee4Nov2025.

have significantly increased." The four ministers added, "We believe that in the current security environment it is of paramount importance to provide our defence forces with flexibility and freedom of choice of potential use of new weapon systems and solutions to bolster the defence of the Alliance's vulnerable Eastern Flank."[18] Two weeks later, on 1 April 2025, Finland announced that it was also preparing to withdraw from the Mine Ban Treaty.

Following these announcements, each state began a parliamentary process to withdraw from the treaty. The withdrawals took effect six months after the depositary was notified in each case.

Withdrawals from the Mine Ban Treaty

State Party	Notification of withdrawal	Effective date
Estonia	27 June 2025	27 December 2025
Latvia	27 June 2025	27 December 2025
Lithuania	27 June 2025	27 December 2025
Finland	10 July 2025	10 January 2026
Poland	20 August 2025	20 February 2026

Prior to withdrawing from the treaty, all five States Parties engaged regularly in Mine Ban Treaty meetings, voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution promoting the treaty, and condemned Russia's use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine.[19]

As these withdrawals have now taken effect, these states are no longer bound by the Mine Ban Treaty. Poland is now considered a producer of antipersonnel mines following its withdrawal from the Mine Ban Treaty. Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania have all taken steps to indicate their interest in developing the capacity to produce landmines in the future.[20] (See *Production of Antipersonnel Mines* section for a discussion of efforts to start producing antipersonnel mines.)

LEAD-UP TO WITHDRAWALS

As reported in *Landmine Monitor 2025*, the armed forces of both Estonia and Latvia had previously concluded—shortly before the decisions to withdraw—that they actually did not need or desire to leave the Mine Ban Treaty to effectively defend their country.[21] For example, in January 2024, Latvia's National Armed Forces carried out an assessment of Latvia's continued adhesion to the Mine Ban Treaty and concluded that a withdrawal should not be supported. The Commander of the Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Leonīds Kalniņš, told *Latvian Public Service Media (LSM)* that Latvia was not using antipersonnel mines as they "are not effective against mechanized infantry and heavily armed units," adding that "[t]here are far more efficient and modern weapon systems than landmines - with direct or indirect

18 Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Estonia, of the Republic of Latvia, of the Republic of Lithuania, and of the Republic of Poland, "Statement by the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish Ministers of Defence on the Withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention," 18 March 2025, bit.ly/StatementWithdrawal18March2025.

19 See, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), "Working Paper. Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Geneva, 13–15 November 2024," 15 November 2024, docs.un.org/en/CCW/MSP/2024/WP.11. The document was submitted by a large group of states—including all five states that recently withdrew from the Mine Ban Treaty—expressing their grave concern regarding Russia's failure to comply with the CCW and its Protocols, which prohibits or restricts the use of landmines; they also condemned Russia for its violations of international law.

20 Andrius Sytas and Anne Kauranen, "Finland and Lithuania set to produce anti-personnel mines, officials say," *Reuters*, 9 July 2025, bit.ly/Reuters9July2025; Evelyn Ann-Marie Dom, "Baltics and Poland announce planned withdrawal from landmine treaty," *EuroNews*, 18 March 2025, bit.ly/EuroNews18Mar2025; and Jaroslaw Adamowski, "Poland eyes 1 million landmines for borders with Belarus, Russia," *Defense One*, 20 March 2025, bit.ly/DefenseOne20March2025.

21 "Defense Minister: Latvia should not withdraw from anti-mine convention," *Latvian Public Service Media (LSM)*, 22 January 2024, bit.ly/LSM22Jan2024; "Latvian army opposes possible withdrawal from Ottawa Convention," *LSM*, 22 January 2024, bit.ly/LSMLatvianArmy22Jan2024; and Madis Hindre, "EDF commander: Estonia does not need to leave the Ottawa Convention right now," *ERR News*, 16 December 2024, bit.ly/ERRNews16Dec2024.

firepower that allows the same or even more powerful effect to be achieved. We have been working purposefully in this direction in recent years."[22] Similarly, in December 2024, Estonian Defence Forces commander Major General Andrus Merilo told a parliamentary committee that an assessment undertaken in collaboration with experts "concluded that in order to achieve our military objectives and successfully defend the country, there is currently no need for us to withdraw" from the Mine Ban Treaty.[23]

On 1 April 2025, Finland's prime minister announced that his government was preparing to withdraw from the Mine Ban Treaty, stating, "Finland is not currently facing an immediate military threat. Withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention will give us the possibility to prepare for the changes in the security environment in a more versatile way."[24] The announcement came after a group of Finnish lawmakers and former defense and foreign affairs officials launched an initiative urging Finland to leave the treaty.[25] A governmental review to assess whether Finland should leave the treaty was concluded in March 2025 but not made public.[26] Yet in 2022, the Finnish Defence Forces noted, "In the Finnish Defence Forces, anti-personnel mines are not seen as a critical and necessary capability. The Finnish Defence Forces have been able to adapt their operations to existing agreements and restrictions. In addition, the Finnish Defence Forces actively researches and monitors solutions related to capability development."[27]

INTERNATIONAL REACTION

Since these withdrawals were announced, UN Secretary-General António Guterres, at least 27 States Parties, plus the African Group, the ICRC, the ICBL, and many of its member organizations expressed concern and/or regret about these five countries' decision to withdraw from the Mine Ban Treaty.[28]

Ahead of the treaty's intersessional meetings in June 2025, the UN Secretary-General said he was "gravely concerned" by the group of withdrawals, which he considered "particularly troubling, as it risks weakening civilian protection and undermining two decades of a normative framework that has saved countless lives."[29] Similarly, Mirjana Spoljaric, president of the ICRC, issued a statement on the withdrawals stressing that the "global consensus that once made anti-personnel mines a symbol of inhumanity is starting to fracture. After decades of progress, we are witnessing a dangerous shift."[30]

At the treaty's 2025 intersessional meetings, the African Group stated that they "believe that the strength of the Convention lies in its collective ability to address emerging threats within the framework of cooperation and solidarity. Withdrawal from the Convention risks eroding hard-won gains and undermines the confidence of the international community in

22 "Latvian army opposes possible withdrawal from Ottawa Convention," *LSM*, 22 January 2024, bit.ly/LSMLatvianArmy22Jan2024.

23 Madis Hindre, "EDF commander: Estonia does not need to leave the Ottawa Convention right now," *ERR News*, 16 December 2024, bit.ly/ERRNews16Dec2024.

24 Government of Finland press release, "Government to begin preparations to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention and to increase national defence expenditure," 1 April 2025, bit.ly/FinlandPR1April2025.

25 Aleksi Teivainen, "Finland urged to opt out of anti-personnel landmine ban in citizens' initiative," *Helsinki Times*, 29 November 2024, bit.ly/HelsinkiTimes29Nov2024.

26 Government of Finland press release, "Government to begin preparations to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention and to increase national defence expenditure," 1 April 2025, bit.ly/FinlandPR1April2025; and Government of Finland, "Finland and the Ottawa Convention," undated, bit.ly/FinlandOttawaConvention.

27 Finnish Defence Forces, "Withdrawal from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban and Allowing the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines," 8 June 2022, bit.ly/FinlandMoD8June2022.

28 The 27 States Parties include: Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Germany, the Holy See, Ireland, Japan, Mauritania, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye, the UK, Venezuela, and Zambia.

29 UN, "Statement by the Secretary-General - on the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention," 16 June 2025, bit.ly/UNSGStatement16June2025.

30 ICRC press release, "ICRC president: Civilians will pay the price if global commitment to ban landmines allowed to fracture," 16 June 2025, bit.ly/ICRC16June2025.

the effectiveness and endurance of this vital instrument."[31] Similarly, Austria stated that it "regrets that five European States have initiated and advanced their procedures for withdrawal from the Convention" and was "concerned about the implications of such decisions on our joint goal of achieving a mine-free world and beyond this Convention on IHL [international humanitarian law], the protection of civilians and the humanitarian principles in general."[32]

The president of the treaty's Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Ambassador Ichikawa Tomiko, also expressed "deep regret" at these states' decision to withdraw, noting, "While I am fully aware of the security concerns of those States, prompted by Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the wide-spread use of mines by Russia in the conflict, their withdrawal would represent a marked setback in our efforts to universalize the Convention prohibiting anti-personnel mines." She further noted that "we need to redouble our efforts to uphold the Convention and to extend the reach of its norms."[33]

At the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in June 2025, the ICBL expressed that it was "profoundly saddened and deeply disturbed by the planned withdrawals of Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland."[34] It also presented to the treaty's president and the five withdrawing states a petition signed by over 80,000 individuals from across Europe urging these states not to withdraw.[35] In October 2025, the ICBL condemned these decisions and urged the withdrawing states to reverse course, and not to engage in production or use of antipersonnel mines.[36]



ICBL-CMC member Dhesarme conducts a public advocacy action in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in response to the withdrawal of five former States Parties from the treaty and Ukraine's attempt to suspend its operation.

© Dhesarme, December 2025

Many of these same actors reiterated these sentiments during the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025.[37]

During the treaty's intersessional meetings in June 2025, ICBL ambassador and Cambodian landmine survivor Tun Channareth also presented the treaty's president with a joint statement from 21 eminent people, including former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who led the "Ottawa Process" that created the treaty. The joint appeal urged the withdrawing states to reconsider, asserting that "[u]pholding [the Mine Ban Treaty] is not only a legal and moral obligation—it is a strategic imperative for all who seek to limit suffering in war."[38]

31 Statement of the African Group, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2025, bit.ly/AfricanGroupStatement20June2025.

32 Statement of Austria, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2025, bit.ly/AustriaStatement20June2025.

33 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) press release, "Statement by the 22MSP President," 28 June 2025, bit.ly/JapanStatement28June2025.

34 Statement of ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2025, bit.ly/ICBLUniversalizationStatement20June2025.

35 WeMove Europe and ICBL, "Don't Let Europe Bring Back Landmines," undated [2025], bit.ly/WeMoveICBLPetition2025.

36 Statement of ICBL, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 17 October 2025, bit.ly/ICBLStatement17Oct2025.

37 Statement of ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2025, bit.ly/ICBLStatement2Dec2025; statement of ICRC and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2025, bit.ly/ICRCStatement2Dec2025; statement of Austria, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2025, bit.ly/AustriaStatement2Dec2025; statement of the African Group, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2025, bit.ly/AfricanGroupStatement2Dec2025; and statement by Izumi Nakamitsu, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2025, bit.ly/NakamitsuStatement1Dec2025.

38 ICBL-CMC, "Joint Appeal to Uphold the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel Landmines and the Convention on Cluster Munitions," 16 June 2025, bit.ly/ICBL16June2025.

Additionally, on 30 May 2025, 101 Nobel laureates issued a joint statement expressing that they "are deeply concerned by disturbing developments that are again putting civilians at greater risk of harm from antipersonnel landmines and explosive remnants of war, notably cluster munitions."[39]

UKRAINE'S ATTEMPT TO "SUSPEND" THE MINE BAN TREATY

Ukraine attempted to "suspend" its Mine Ban Treaty obligations during the reporting period. Ultimately, the final report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties affirmed: the Mine Ban Treaty "does not allow the suspension of its operation and consequently its obligations."[40] As a result, Ukraine's attempted "suspension" is invalid and carries no legal weight, and Ukraine remains fully bound by its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty.

This attempted "suspension" began in June 2025, when Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the country had decided to "stop the implementation of irrelevant obligations under the Ottawa Convention" in the context of Russia's invasion and conduct of hostilities, which Ukraine argued created an "asymmetric advantage" for Russia.[41] As was later suggested by Ukrainian officials, this "suspension" was largely viewed as an attempt to circumvent the treaty's prohibition on withdrawal during active armed conflict under Article 20.[42]

On 18 July 2025, Ukraine notified the UN, as depositary of the Mine Ban Treaty, that it had decided to "suspend the operation" of the treaty "[i]n accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties."[43] This was followed by the publication of a July 2025 national implementation law, which elaborated on the intent and reasoning behind Ukraine's action.[44]

That law explained Ukraine's plan to suspend its Mine Ban Treaty obligations until the end of its war with Russia, providing a list of criteria to determine when that condition is met. Ukraine also asserted that, while the Mine Ban Treaty does not permit withdrawals, suspension is permitted under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention generally allows suspension or withdrawal if a state faces a "fundamental change of circumstances."[45] According to Ukraine, it joined the Mine Ban Treaty in reliance on the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, which laid out a set of security assurances in which Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US committed not to use force against Ukraine.[46]

39 "Statement from Nobel Laureates on Landmines," 30 May 2025, bit.ly/NobelLaureates30May2025.

40 Mine Ban Treaty, "Final Report. Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025," 18 May 2026, p. 8, bit.ly/MBT22MSPFinalReport.

41 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, "Statement of the MFA of Ukraine on the Decision to Suspension from the Ottawa Convention," 29 June 2025, bit.ly/UkraineMFA29June2025.

42 See, for instance, Camille Pagella, "Ukraine official on landmine treaty pause: 'It does not function in the current context'," *Geneva Solutions*, 22 April 2026, bit.ly/GenevaSolutions22Apr2026. Ihor Bezkaravainyi, Ukraine's Deputy Minister of the Economy, explained that Ukraine "want[s] a common solution. I hope this will be possible, especially as some of our neighbours – the Baltic states and Poland – have simply chosen to withdraw from the treaty. On our side, we are trying to adopt a more nuanced, more legally 'elegant' approach, given that we cannot leave the treaty in the middle of a war. That is why we are relying, among other things, on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to explore different legal mechanisms."

43 UN, "Ukraine: Communication. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," depositary notification C.N.385.2025. TREATIES-XXVI.5, 21 July 2025, bit.ly/UkraineSuspension21July2025.

44 *Draft Law on the Suspension of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction for Ukraine*, No. 0329, Explanatory note, 11 July 2025, bit.ly/UkraineSuspensionLawDraft11July2025. Law No. 4519-IX was adopted 15 July 2025. See also, HRW, "Challenging Ukraine's Mine Ban Treaty 'Suspension': A Humanitarian and Legal Imperative," 22 September 2025, bit.ly/HRW22Sept2025.

45 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, p. 29, bit.ly/ViennaConventionMay1969.

46 Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum), 5 December 1994, bit.ly/BudapestMemorandum5Dec1994.

Ukraine claims that it thus could not have foreseen a conflict with Russia, and so Russia's invasion amounts to a "fundamental change of circumstances" that altered an "essential basis of [Ukraine's] consent" to be bound by the Mine Ban Treaty. It is the totality of these circumstances that, Ukraine argued, entitled the country to suspend the operation of the Mine Ban Treaty.[47]

The ICBL, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and others condemned this decision and debunked the argument behind it.[48] In particular, HRW and the ICBL averred:

1. The Mine Ban Treaty does not permit suspensions.[49]

   While the Mine Ban Treaty's text does not explicitly address suspensions, its provisions, as well as its object and purpose, make it clear that a State Party cannot suspend its obligations during armed conflict. Article 1 explicitly bans use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines under any circumstances, including in armed conflict. Withdrawals are explicitly prohibited while a State Party is engaged in armed conflict. The preamble bases the treaty "on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited."

2. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a country cannot argue that armed conflict amounts to a "fundamental change of circumstances."[50]

   As noted previously, Ukraine claims that Russia's invasion changed the conditions under which it joined the treaty. But the Vienna Convention disallows invoking the "fundamental change of circumstances" argument if there is "an outbreak of hostilities." The change of circumstances must also be one that "was not foreseen" by the negotiating parties. While Ukraine may not have foreseen a conflict of the scale it is engaged in now, the risk of future armed conflict was unquestionably anticipated by negotiators because ending the use of antipersonnel mines in future conflicts was at the core of the treaty. Seeking to temporarily avoid the treaty's obligations at a time when they are most critical is contrary to both its operative provisions and its humanitarian object and purpose.

Prior to the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, several States Parties formally registered their objections to Ukraine's attempted suspension under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention. Switzerland issued a press release announcing that it was registering its objection to Ukraine's suspension with the treaty depositary (the UN Secretary-General) and noting that such a suspension is "incompatible with international law."[51] Several other States Parties subsequently raised parallel objections: Austria, Belgium, and Norway registered their objections with the depositary, and Ireland communicated its objection to the UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, as well as directly to Ukraine.[52]

47 See, HRW, "Challenging Ukraine's Mine Ban Treaty 'Suspension': A Humanitarian and Legal Imperative," 22 September 2025, bit.ly/HRW22Sept2025.

48 Ibid.; and ICBL, "Why Ukraine's proposed 'suspension' of its Mine Ban Treaty obligations is deeply problematic," 9 October 2025, bit.ly/ICBL9Oct2025.

49 HRW, "Challenging Ukraine's Mine Ban Treaty 'Suspension': A Humanitarian and Legal Imperative," 22 September 2025, bit.ly/HRW22Sept2025; and ICBL, "Why Ukraine's proposed 'suspension' of its Mine Ban Treaty obligations is deeply problematic," 9 October 2025, bit.ly/ICBL9Oct2025.

50 Ibid.

51 Swiss Federal Council press release, "Switzerland submits objection to Ukraine's suspension of the Ottawa Convention," 17 October 2025, bit.ly/SwitzerlandObjection17Oct2025. Switzerland registered its objection with the UN Secretary-General on 17 October 2025.

52 Austria (on 17 October 2025), Belgium (on 17 October 2025), and Norway (on 20 October 2025) to the UN Secretary-General; and Ireland to the UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs (on 11 November 2025), as well as a communication directly to Ukraine. Colombia also sent a formal objection to the UN Secretary-General on 4 December 2025, during the Meeting of States Parties. Mine Ban Treaty, "Final Report. Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025," 18 May 2026, p. 8, bit.ly/MBT22MSPFinalReport.

Other States Parties sent communications or statements about Ukraine's "suspension" prior to the Meeting of States Parties as well, though the text of many of these documents is not publicly available. New Zealand sent a communication to the UN Secretary-General, and France sent a communication to the UN Secretariat.[53] The UK and Australia issued a joint statement on Ukraine's "purported suspension," a phrase that could be understood to signal agreement that suspension was not valid.[54]

New Zealand also addressed Ukraine's "suspension" during UNGA First Committee meetings in October 2025. Its statement noted that it was "deeply concerned by Ukraine's purported suspension of its operation of the Mine Ban Convention," noting that "[a]ny assertion that the Convention can be 'suspended' during armed conflict is inconsistent with, and risks undermining, its humanitarian rationale."[55]

This issue was also raised repeatedly at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025. The ICBL urged States Parties and the meeting as a whole "to state unambiguously that *suspension of the convention is not permitted*."[56] The UN Under-Secretary-General, in her opening remarks, also stated that "the Convention does not allow for suspension."[57] Numerous other entities, including the ICRC, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action, and Mine Action Review, all delivered statements raising concerns or expressing regret regarding Ukraine's "suspension," including by specifically highlighting the unlawful and dangerous nature of this decision and calling on States Parties to communicate to Ukraine that suspension is not permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty.[58]

In their statements at the meeting, States Parties from around the world also raised the issue, calling the legitimacy of the suspension into question. Many specifically noted that the Mine Ban Treaty does not permit suspension of treaty obligations.[59] Some noted that indeed suspension is "explicitly and unequivocally foreclosed by Articles 1 and 20."[60] Others noted

53 New Zealand to the UN Secretary-General (on 25 November 2025), and France to the UN Secretariat (on 20 October 2025). Mine Ban Treaty, "Final Report. Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025," 18 May 2026, p. 8, bit.ly/MBT22MSPFinalReport.

54 Australia and the UK in a public statement (on 23 October 2025). Mine Ban Treaty, "Final Report. Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025," 18 May 2026, p. 8, bit.ly/MBT22MSPFinalReport.

55 Statement of New Zealand, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 80th Session, New York, 23 October 2025, bit.ly/NewZealandStatement23Oct2025.

56 Statement of ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2025, bit.ly/ICBLStatement1Dec2025. See also, statement of ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2025, bit.ly/ICBLStatement2Dec2025.

57 Statement by Izumi Nakamitsu, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2025, bit.ly/NakamitsuStatement1Dec2025.

58 For instance, in a joint statement, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), the ICBL, Mines Action Canada, and Mine Action Review stated that "Ukraine's attempted suspension of its APMBC obligations is an illegal and unprecedented step." Statement of Mine Action Review (and other organizations), Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2025, bit.ly/NGOsStatement2Dec2025. The ICRC stated that it is "a step backward that risks eroding life-saving protections and threatens decades of global efforts to eradicate these inhumane weapons." Statement of ICRC and IFRC, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2025, bit.ly/ICRCStatement2Dec2025. See also, statement of NPA, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2025, bit.ly/NPAStatement2Dec2025; and statement of UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2025, bit.ly/UNStatement2Dec2025.

59 For instance, Canada stated that "the Ottawa Convention does not envision the suspension of a State Party's obligations as a response to an armed conflict." Statement of Canada, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2025, bit.ly/CanadaStatement1Dec2025. See also the statements of Austria, Belgium, Chile, Mexico, Mexico (on behalf of some Latin American states), Mexico (on behalf of a group of states), Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, and the UK. Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025, bit.ly/MBT22MSPStatements.

60 Statement of Brazil, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2025, bit.ly/BrazilStatement5Dec2025.

that the treaty does not "provide for," "envision," "allow for," or contain provisions enabling suspension.[61] Many expressed their concern over any attempted suspension of the treaty.[62]

Ultimately, in its final report, the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties confirmed that "the Convention does not allow the suspension of its operation and consequently its obligations," and that Ukraine thus remains fully bound by its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty.[63] Ukraine maintains its position that its membership is suspended, creating an unprecedented compliance challenge.

ANNUAL UNGA RESOLUTION

Since 1997, the annual UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty has provided states outside the treaty with a way to demonstrate their support for its humanitarian rationale and the objective of its universalization. In the past, more than a dozen countries have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.[64]

On 1 December 2025, a total of 159 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 80/35, which urged full universalization and the effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.[65] The resolution also "not[ed] with regret that five States have decided to withdraw from the Convention, representing a setback and challenges in the universalization efforts."[66] As in past years, Russia was the only country to vote against. Nineteen countries abstained.[67]

UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty[68]

Year	Resolution	In favor	Against	Abstained
1997	52/38	142	0	18
1998	53/77	147	0	21
1999	54/54 B	139	0	20
2000	55/33 V	143	0	22
2001	56/24 M	138	0	19

61 See the statements of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, South Africa (on behalf of the African Group), Thailand, and the UK. Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025, bit.ly/MBT22MSPStatements.

62 See the statements of Palestine, the Philippines, and South Africa (on behalf of the African Group). Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025, bit.ly/MBT22MSPStatements.

63 Mine Ban Treaty, "Final Report. Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025," 18 May 2026, p. 8, bit.ly/MBT22MSPFinalReport.

64 This includes Belarus, Bhutan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Türkiye.

65 "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," UNGA Resolution 80/35, 1 December 2025, docs.un.org/A/RES/80/35; and voting data for "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," UNGA Resolution 80/35, 1 December 2025, bit.ly/UNGAVotingData1Dec2025. Eleven States Parties were not in the room or didn't vote. UNGA Voting Record, 1 December 2025, bit.ly/UNGAVotingData1Dec2025.

66 "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," UNGA Resolution 80/35, 1 December 2025, p. 2, docs.un.org/A/RES/80/35.

67 The 19 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, India, Iran, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Ukraine, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. This compares to 14 abstaining states in the previous year. There were six new abstentions in 2025 (the five states that recently withdrew from the Mine Ban Treaty plus Ukraine); however, Syria, which had previously abstained in 2024, was non-voting in 2025.

68 See, voting data on annual resolution titled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," bit.ly/UNGAResolutionVotingDataMBT.

Year	Resolution	In favor	Against	Abstained
2002	57/74	143	0	23
2003	58/53	153	0	23
2004	59/84	157	0	22
2005	60/80	158	0	17
2006	61/84	161	0	17
2007	62/41	164	0	18
2008	63/42	163	0	18
2009	64/56	160	0	18
2010	65/48	165	0	17
2011	66/29	162	0	18
2012	67/32	165	0	19
2013	68/30	165	0	19
2014	69/34	164	0	17
2015	70/55	168	0	17
2016	71/34	164	0	20
2017	72/53	168	0	16
2018	73/61	169	0	16
2019	74/61	169	0	18
2020	75/52	169	0	17
2021	76/26	169	0	19
2022	77/63	167	0	17
2023	78/45	170	1	16
2024	79/34	173	1	14
2025	80/35	159	1	19

During the debate, 22 delegations, including Austria, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Moldova, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, San Marino, South Africa, and Thailand stressed their commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty; the EU did so as well, as did the Nordic states in a joint statement.[69]

Ten delegations expressed concern or regret at withdrawals from the convention, including Australia, Austria, Canada, Ireland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, San Marino, and Switzerland. In particular, Austria and Mexico were disturbed at the resurfacing of old arguments seeking to justify alleged military utility of mines; which is contested and, in any case, vastly outweighed by the prolonged suffering they inflict on civilian populations.[70] New Zealand used the opportunity to express concern about Ukraine's attempt to suspend the Mine Ban Treaty.[71]

69 Notes by the Monitor during the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security meetings, New York, October 2025. See also, Reaching Critical Will, "Statements from First Committee 2025," bit.ly/RCWFirstCommittee2025. Not all delegations provided the text of their statements to the UN secretariat, so this listing may not be complete.

70 Statement of Austria, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 80th Session, New York, 9 October 2025, bit.ly/AustriaStatement9Oct2025; and statement of Mexico, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 80th Session, New York, 23 October 2025, bit.ly/MexicoStatement23Oct2025.

71 Statement of New Zealand, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 80th Session, New York, 23 October 2025, bit.ly/NewZealandStatement23Oct2025.

Six delegations condemned any use of antipersonnel landmines, with four delegations specifically condemning use of antipersonnel landmines by Russia in Ukraine.[72] Seven delegations called for universalization of the convention and other states to join.[73]



A deminer checks the surrounding area after responding to an emergency explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-out on farmland used to grow cashew nuts and other crops in Ratanakiri province, Cambodia.

© MAG/Maryam Ashrāfi, February 2026

A core of 13 states not party have consistently abstained from voting on consecutive UNGA resolutions on the Mine Ban Treaty since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.[74] Of those, 11 abstained in 2025 as well, while Russia voted against and Syria did not vote at all. In 2025, as in 2024, Nepal and Saudi Arabia also abstained from the vote. In a significant change, Ukraine and all five countries with then-pending withdrawals from the convention—Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—also abstained for the first time; all had previously voted in favor of the resolution every year.

Ten states not party provided explanations of their vote: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US.[75] The five states that had then-pending withdrawals from the convention all noted that their vote resulted from their withdrawal from the convention due to changed security circumstances. Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania stated that they remain financial supporters of humanitarian mine action.[76] Cuba, India, Iran, Pakistan, and South Korea repeated previous explanations for their vote, stating that they supported the humanitarian aims of the treaty but could not join due to

72 Austria, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia (condemning use by Ukraine), and Zambia made statements condemning the use of antipersonnel landmines. Bulgaria, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the EU condemned use by Russia in Ukraine.

73 Australia, Austria, Canada, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, and Thailand called for universalization of the convention or for other states to join. Notes by the Monitor during the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security meetings, New York, October 2025. Full text of statements can be found at Reaching Critical Will, "Statements from First Committee 2025," bit.ly/RCWFirstCommittee2025.

74 Of these states not party that typically abstain, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, and the US are party to the CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines; Cuba and Uzbekistan are party to CCW Protocol II; and Egypt and Vietnam have signed the CCW but are not party to any of its protocols. Iran, North Korea, and Syria remain outside of any treaty-based prohibition or regulation on antipersonnel mines.

75 The US condemned the resolution for containing "language calling out states that have decided to withdraw from these conventions," while Israel stated that "the decision to accede to an international instrument, or to withdraw from one is the sovereign prerogative of any state." Russia criticized the Mine Ban Treaty as "weak and unreliable," stating that it "does not have the requisite levers for exerting pressure on countries shirking their responsibilities" and gave Ukraine as an example. Explanations of Vote by Israel, Russia, and the US on Resolution A/C.1/80/L.30, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, video record and transcript, 4 November 2025, bit.ly/FirstCommittee4Nov2025.

76 Estonia, Latvia, and Poland attributed their withdrawals to a drastically altered security and strategic environment. Finland and Lithuania emphasized defense capabilities, with Finland noting it would reintroduce antipersonnel mines for defense but not deploy them in peacetime, and Lithuania stating it could no longer accept unilateral constraints on its self-defense. Both Lithuania and Poland reaffirmed their ongoing commitment to international law and humanitarian objectives. Explanations of Vote by Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland on Resolution A/C.1/80/L.30, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, video record and transcript, 4 November 2025, bit.ly/FirstCommittee4Nov2025.

their unique security needs.[77] Egypt and Iran reiterated their concern that the treaty was negotiated outside the framework of the UN.[78]

Though not a State Party, China has voted in favor of the annual resolution every year since 2005. Similarly, state not party Singapore explained its vote in favor of the resolution as it "supports all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of antipersonnel landmines."[79]

USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

The Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines in the reporting period by State Party Ukraine and ongoing use by states not party Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia, and possible new use by the US.

Antipersonnel mines were also used by NSAGs in State Party Colombia and in states not party India, Myanmar, and Pakistan. There are also reports of NSAGs using mines, including victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo.

There is also evidence of new use of antipersonnel mines by unconfirmed actors in the border region between Thailand and Cambodia. Finally, this reporting period saw sporadic use of antipersonnel mines by unconfirmed actors in States Parties Bangladesh, Sudan, and Thailand (near both Malaysia and Myanmar), and in state not party Myanmar.

USE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES

This section discusses new use or allegations of use of antipersonnel mines during the current reporting period. This includes use by State Party Ukraine, in clear violation of its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, as well as use by states not party Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Russia, and possibly the US.

USE BY STATE PARTY UKRAINE

Since 2022, there have been increasing indications that Ukraine has used antipersonnel mines in the context of its ongoing conflict with Russia, though the scale of this use is unclear. Ukraine remains a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Its purported "suspension" of the treaty has no legal effect and does not alter its legal obligations, including the prohibition on using antipersonnel landmines under any circumstances. Ukraine's use of mines in the context of the conflict with Russia therefore amounts to a serious violation of its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Ukraine inherited a substantial stockpile of antipersonnel mines after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Although Ukraine destroyed more than 3.4 million antipersonnel mines between 1999 and 2020, including PFM mines, it last reported a stockpile of close to 3.4 million PFM antipersonnel mines, which are thus available for use.[80] Notably, retaining this large stockpile of antipersonnel mines is a violation of Ukraine's stockpile destruction obligations, which it should have completed by 1 June 2010. It is also known that Ukraine

77 Statements of Cuba, India, Iran, Pakistan, and South Korea on Resolution A/C.1/80/L.30, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, video record and transcript, 4 November 2025, bit.ly/FirstCommittee4Nov2025.

78 Explanations of Vote by Egypt and Iran on Resolution A/C.1/80/L.30, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, video record and transcript, 4 November 2025, bit.ly/FirstCommittee4Nov2025.

79 It further explained that it has not joined the treaty as it believes that "the legitimate security concerns and the right to self-defense of any state cannot be disregarded. In that regard, a blanket ban on all types of cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines may be counterproductive." Explanation of Vote by Singapore on Resolution A/C.1/80/L.30, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, video record and transcript, 4 November 2025, bit.ly/FirstCommittee4Nov2025.

80 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form B. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7MBT.

acquired artillery-delivered antipersonnel mines from the US in November and December 2024.[81]

In addition to well-documented reports that Ukrainian forces used rocket-delivered PFM antipersonnel mines in 2022, there is now public information from several sources, including combatants from both sides, that points to the use of drone-delivered and artillery-delivered antipersonnel mines by Ukrainian forces in 2024–2026.[82] Some of these drone-delivered antipersonnel mines are produced by Ukraine. (See also *Production of Antipersonnel Mines* section.) In the examples listed below, it was not possible to verify the exact locations at which the mines were dropped.

- In May 2026, it was reported that Ukraine was remotely mining Russian supply routes in Russian-occupied Ukraine by dropping landmines from drones, including Ukrainian-made DP-02 antipersonnel mines.[83] The DP-02 antipersonnel mines are an evolution of Ukrainian IBM-series antipersonnel mines (IBM-0.2, IBM-0.5, IBM-1), whose use was reported by Russians in January 2026.[84]
- Ukrainian and Russian social media posts from February–August 2025 show a 3D-printed Ukrainian improvised blast antipersonnel landmine that has several nicknames. Due to its elongated shape with a small wing that allows it to be scattered when dropped from drones, it is called "Wing" (крило) by Ukrainians, while the Russians have used "Soap Dish" (мыльницу), "Vape" (вейп), "Glasses Case" (футляр для очков), or "Eclair" (эклер).[85] The same mine appears to be designated MPP-3.[86] Further, larger variants developed from the "Wing" are called "Aikos40"

81 HRW, "Q&A: US Antipersonnel Landmine Transfers," 13 December 2024, bit.ly/HRW13Dec2024; and ICBL, "ICBL Strongly Condemns Second US AP Mine Transfer to Ukraine," 4 December 2024, bit.ly/ICBL4Dec2024.

82 See, ICBL-CMC, "Country Profile: Ukraine: Mine Ban Policy," last updated 14 September 2026, bit.ly/UkraineMonitorCountryProfile.

83 "Ukrainian drones are remotely planting mines along the occupiers' supply routes," *UA News*, 1 June 2026, bit.ly/UANews1June2026; Oleksii Levkov, "Russia's Own Tactics Turn Against It as Ukraine Expands Drone-Based Remote Mining of Logistics Routes," *Defense Express*, 2 June 2026, bit.ly/DefenseExpress2June2026; Neil Gibson (blueboy1969), "There seems to be quite a lot of posts today about the Ukrainian use of small aerially-deployed mines. Of what's visible in imagery, most would seem to be the DP-02 (ДП-02) electronically-fuzed anti-personnel fragmentation (APF) mine. An example below." 29 May 2026, 20:03 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostNeilGibson29May2026; Collective Awareness to UXO, "DP-02 Landmine," undated, bit.ly/DP02Landmine; and Fenix Insight, "DP-02," undated, bit.ly/FenixInsightDP02.

84 Ibid.; and Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "A Ukrainian anti-personnel blast landmine called 'Houston' that was dropped from a drone has a "Jonik" magnetic-influence fuze. The motion-sensitive anti-handling gyroscope becomes the primary sensor here, as stepping on or disturbing the device should initiate the detonator." 28 January 2026, 19:58 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostRoy28Jan2026. See also, Fenix Insight, "IBM-0.2," undated, bit.ly/FenixInsightIBM-02; Fenix Insight, "IBM-0.5," undated, bit.ly/FenixInsightIBM-05; and Fenix Insight, "IBM-1," undated, bit.ly/FenixInsightIBM-1.

85 Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "A printed Ukrainian improvised anti-personnel landmine for dropping by drones. The spring-loaded striker is restrained by a printed piece held in a very thin casing. When stepped on, the casing shatters and displaces the restraint, releasing the striker into the detonator." 5 February 2025, 15:00 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostRoy5Feb2025; Russian-style Survival (vizhivanie_po_russki), "Another homemade 'soap dish' / 'éclair' landmine (3D-printed) – Overview," *Dzen* (blog), 23 February 2025, bit.ly/Dzen23Feb2025; One foot here, one there! (combat_engineer), "Several people sent a new antipersonnel mine dropped by the enemy from drones. In the combat position, the striker is held by the brown element, but when pressed on the case, it moves and the striker ignites the MD-5 (MD-2, in the photo homemade MD), an explosion occurs. Thanks to my chat friends for the photo." 14 May 2025, 17:11 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/CombatEngineerTelegram14May2025; Engineering Support Brigade (VIUKSIDV), "It caught my eye: VUSushniks call their homemade antipersonnel mines: 'Donut' – 'gingerbread', and 'Vape' – 'soap dish'. Want to share a photo or video? Here you go: @BrigadaIP_bot." 15 May 2025, 01:32 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/EngineeringSupportBrigadeTelegram15May2025; Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "Further testing of Ukrainian improvised landmines, in this case 'Wing' (Russian: 'Soapbox', 'Pencil Case'). With 30 grams of C-4 the effect is similar to the 'Gingerbread' device in the quote." 29 July 2025, 14:19 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostRoy29July2025; and Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "The back of a Ukrainian "Wing" improvised landmine clarifies its name. Similar to the design of the PFM-1 'Petal/Butterfly', the devices will spin when released to facilitate distribution into a statistical minefield." 1 August 2025, 15:37 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostRoy1Aug2025.

86 Collective Awareness to UXO, "MPP-3 Landmine," undated, bit.ly/MPP-3Landmine; and Fenix Insight, "MPP-3," undated, bit.ly/FenixInsightMPP-3.

and "Aikos100."[87] A social media post from 5 April 2025 shows a Ukrainian military unit apparently using drones to drop "Wing" antipersonnel landmines to counter infiltration of their positions by Russian forces.[88] A video from 17 February 2026 allegedly shows a Russian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operator stepping on a "Wing" antipersonnel mine and being injured.[89]

- A video from 13 May 2025 features a Russian combatant who explains the operation of a drone-delivered OZM-72 antipersonnel mine "with a 'Drop-2' (Крапля-2) Doppler microwave motion detector fuze" allegedly dropped by Ukrainian forces.[90]
- A video from 11 May 2025 shows a Ukrainian soldier describing the "K2" improvised antipersonnel landmine derived from the POM-2 landmine. The device is dropped by drones and deploys four tripwires.[91]
- In an in-depth 18 April 2025 print media feature of a Ukrainian unit on the Zaporizhzhia front that produces landmines for use by drones, a Ukrainian commander talks about using homemade 3D-printed antipersonnel mines nicknamed "ginger cookies." The deputy director of Ukraine's Humanitarian Demining Center also stated in the feature that he sees no reason to stop mining even though the country ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, and emphasized that "[m]oral considerations have no place when defending oneself."[92]
- A video posted on 25 February 2025 to an account associated with the Ukrainian 413th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion appears to show antipersonnel mines being dropped from drones on Russian trenches.[93]
- On 25 January 2025, social media posts from another Ukrainian military unit show the handling of 155mm M692 artillery shells that carry 36 M74/M67 Artillery Delivered Antipersonnel Mines (ADAM) supplied by the US in late 2024.[94] Social media posts from Russian-language channels later show the same type of mines on the ground

87 Fenix Insight, "Aikos40," undated, bit.ly/FenixInsightAikos40; Fenix Insight, "Aikos100," undated, bit.ly/FenixInsightAikos100; and Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "The 3D printed Ukrainian 'Wing' (Крило) improvised anti-personnel landmine for dropping from drones has fathered new variants. 'Aikos40' (Айкос40) and 'Aikos100' have 40 and 100 grams of high explosive respectively, compared to 30g for the original 'Wing.'" 8 July 2025, 18:52 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostRoy8July2025.

88 MPB "Edelweiss" (MPBEdelweiss), "Remote mining that sends the orcs to hell when they make a sneaky attempt to approach our position. Everything will be Ukraine!" 5 April 2025, 13:38 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/MPBEdelweissTelegram5April2025.

89 Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "Warning: very graphic video! A Russian UAV unit infiltrating to a forward position steps into a minefield dropped by a Ukrainian heavy bomber drone. The blast from 30–40 g of explosive in a 'Wing' printed anti-personnel landmine shatters feet of two of the drone operators." 17 February 2026, 04:39 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostRoy17Feb2026.

90 Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "Another Ukrainian use of an OZM-72 anti-personnel landmine with a 'Drop-2' (Крапля-2) Doppler microwave motion detector fuze. The fuze has a range of about 15m, and connects to a firing device in the fuze well of an OZM-72 bounding anti-personnel landmine." 13 May 2025, 10:45 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostRoy13May2025.

91 Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "A Ukrainian soldier describes the 'K2' improvised anti-personnel landmine derived from the POM-2 landmine. The printed device is dropped by drones and deploys 4 tripwires, with a notched coil of steel wire wound around a pipe filled with explosive to yield fragmentation pieces." 12 May 2025, 16:10 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostRoy12May2025; and One foot here, one there! (combat_engineer), "The enemy's 152 Orr workshop for the production and equipment of Ukrainian ersatz POM-2 mines (in my opinion, the old version is K-2). And the interviewed TTX KPOM-2 does not know, and floats in theory, but they hope that he does not need to collect mines like hell…" 11 May 2025, 09:53 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/CombatEngineerTelegram11May2025.

92 Jacques Follorou, "Ukraine intensifies use of land mines against Russia," *Le Monde*, 18 April 2025, bit.ly/LeMonde18April2025. These "ginger cookies" appear to be the same as "Gingerbread" antipersonnel mines.

93 In Factum (in_factum), "An interesting video of remote mining of enemy trenches by dropping antipersonnel mines from the 'Nachtigall' unit of the 413th SBS 'Raid' battalion." 25 February 2025, 22:19 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/InFactumTelegram25Feb25; and Nachtigall (ptah_ngl), "It moves to tears…They couldn't calmly watch these Russians freeze. That's why they designed a trench candle for their brother, made in Baton's workshop. Do good – warm your fellow countrymen." 25 February 2025, 15:42 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/NachtigallTelegram25Feb2025.

94 "Ukraine Uses US-Supplied ADAM Anti-Personnel Landmines," *Kyiv Post*, 28 January 2025, bit.ly/KyivPost28Jan2025.

in Kursk oblast, Russia, and Kharkiv oblast, Ukraine, though it was not possible to independently verify the precise location of these mines.[95]

- A video by the Ukrainian 414th Separate Brigade from 3 January 2025 shows interviews with combatants discussing using drones to drop different munitions including landmines. In the video they state, "We will do anti-personnel."[96]
- In October 2024, Russian soldiers started reporting the use of a new Ukrainian 3D-printed drone-dropped antipersonnel mine nicknamed "Gingerbread."[97] The first models were simple disc shapes, while versions that emerged in 2025 added small wings, letting the mines scatter unpredictably as they fell.[98]

USE BY STATE NOT PARTY IRAN

Since 2023, there have been reports and allegations of new use of antipersonnel landmines in the east of Iran by the Iranian government's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Reports continued to emerge in 2025 and early 2026, but it is difficult to know precisely when the mines were laid.

Most reported casualties involve civilians engaged in agriculture near the Iran-Pakistan border, refugees crossing the borders with Pakistan or Afghanistan, and people engaged in the portering or transport of fuel across the border. Communities on both sides of the border have reported regular activity by the IRGC, after which mine incidents occurred. A locally focused human rights organization has alleged that mines are emplaced and moved sporadically in Sistan-Balochistan province by the IRGC. This new use occurs primarily along the borders of the province with neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also in internal areas of the province. Mined areas are unmarked.[99]

According to the human rights group Haalvsh, there has also allegedly been a dramatic increase in mines laid along Iran's border with Pakistan since the US and Israel launched

95 North Wind (warriorofnorth), "!!American antipersonnel mines in the Kharkiv region. The footage shows an American antipersonnel mine 'M-67' ('M-72', visually identical, differing in self-destruction time). A few days ago, we reported that this type of ammunition was actively used by the enemy in the Sudzhansky border area. However, our servicemen clarified that the mines, nicknamed 'cheese' or 'curd', are also actively used by the enemy in the Kharkiv region and other parts of the front […]." 20 June 2025, 18:25 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/NorthWindTelegram20June2025; and North Wind (warriorofnorth), "!!American antipersonnel mines in the Sudzhansky border area. Servicemen of the 1427th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment 'North', participating in the demining of the liberated territories of the Kursk region, shared photos of the combat mission. The footage shows an American antipersonnel mine 'M-67' ('M-72', visually identical, differing in self-destruction time). The system was developed by 1975. It was intended for combined use with M70 (M73) antitank mines, which are also delivered by 155 mm shells. Submunitions (mines) from one shell scatter within a radius of up to 600 m from the aiming point. Discovering one mine of this type means you can be sure that within a radius of one kilometer there are several dozen similar explosive devices." 18 June 2025, 11:55 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/NorthWindTelegram18June2025.

96 "Night Horror of the occupiers - the work of the Night Doctor crew 414 Birds of the Magyar," *414 Birds of the Magyar*, YouTube.com, 3 January 2025, bit.ly/YouTube3Jan2025.

97 Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "The Russians claim they have recovered a new Ukrainian improvised anti-personnel landmine called 'Gingerbread'. When stepped on, the printed plastic casing flattens. This drives a screw into a detonator capsule, initiating 55g of an explosive resembling C4." 30 November 2024, 20:47 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostRoy30Nov2024; The Armourers Bench, "3D Printed Anti-Personnel Mines," 1 December 2024, bit.ly/ArmourersBench1Dec2024; and Russian-style Survival (vizhivanie_po_russki), "'Gingerbread' Mine Review," *Dzen* (blog), 18 December 2024, bit.ly/Dzen18Dec2024.

98 Collective Awareness to UXO, "Gingerbread Landmine," undated, bit.ly/GingerbreadLandmine; Fenix Insight, "Gingerbread," undated, bit.ly/FenixInsightGingerbread; and Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "These Ukrainian 'Gingerbread' anti-personnel improvised landmine variants have a new printed wing extension. By spinning the device some dispersion should occur when dropped from a heavy drone. The higher the release altitude, the better the dispersion." 12 August 2025, 11:06 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostRoy12Aug2025.

99 Correspondence with Shirahmad Shirani, Editor-in-Chief of the Haalvsh Human Rights Organization, 18 August 2025.

attacks on Iran on 28 February 2026, due to fear of attacks across the border.[100] In May 2026, the Hengaw Organization for Human Rights reported a death due to an antipersonnel landmine "planted earlier by the IRGC near the Mile 69 Sofreh border area in Mirjaveh" on the Iran-Pakistan border of Sistan-Balochistan province.[101] They noted that no mine warning signs were in that area, which is frequently used by local residents, *sukhtbars* (fuel carriers), and livestock herders.

An investigation by Mines Action Canada in early 2026 into 648 casualties attributed to antipersonnel landmines found that incidents had been reported on every border of Iran, suggesting a policy of mine use on its borders.[102] In several incidents, the casualty was attributed to mines that had recently been laid, although most were attributed to legacy contamination.

In addition, in September 2026, communities in Saravan county of Sistan-Balochistan province reported that the IRGC had laid mines in the preceding days. The mined zone extends across the border areas connecting Bacheh-Rahi, Kolgan, Kuh-e Siahan, Petkuki, and surrounding regions toward Mort, all in Saravan. Informants in the region told Haalvsh that many of the planted mines are interconnected by tripwires. They stated that none are marked with warning signs. A video sent with the report appears to show nomads locating mines with a metal detector.[103]

USE BY STATE NOT PARTY MYANMAR

Myanmar continues to use antipersonnel landmines, despite voting in favor of an annual UNGA resolution promoting the treaty since 2022.[104] Myanmar's Armed Forces have regularly used antipersonnel mines since 1999, with use increasing notably following the coup in February 2021. Since then, antipersonnel mines have regularly been used around military bases and outposts, but also around infrastructure such as mobile phone towers, extractive enterprises, and energy pipelines.[105] A Myanmar government official acknowledged to the Monitor in 2019 that the Myanmar Armed Forces uses antipersonnel mines in areas where it is under attack.[106]

In a March 2025 conversation with the Monitor, a Myanmar Armed Forces combat engineer confirmed that, in the past few years, he was ordered to place mines around military bases, sentry posts, and bunkers and along the sides of movement routes in Kachin and Rakhine

100 Interview with Shirahmad Shirani, Editor-in-Chief of the Haalvsh Human Rights Organization, 8 May 2026. He stated that in addition to civilian casualties, several Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members also became victims to recently laid landmines due to a lack of marking, and that a second layer of mines was laid some kilometers from the border in Sistan-Balochistan province.

101 Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, "IRGC-planted landmine kills Baloch man as victim toll reaches nine this year," 10 May 2026, bit.ly/Hengaw10May2026.

102 The investigation covered 648 casualties due to antipersonnel mines from the beginning of 2013 to the end of 2025. Gillian Flude, "New Infographic Reveals Impact of Antipersonnel Landmines on the People of Iran," Mines Action Canada, 2 October 2026, bit.ly/MACIranOct2026; and Mines Action Canada, "The Human Impact of Antipersonnel Mines in Iran," undated [October 2026], bit.ly/MACIranOct2026.

103 Haalvsh (haalvsh), "IRGC Lays Mines in Nomadic Transit Areas Along the Saravan Border; Civilian Routes Mined Without Warning Signs." 17 September 2026, 10:12 UTC. Telegram, t.me/haalvsh/36556.

104 See, UN Voting Data on annual resolution titled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," bit.ly/UNGAResolutionVotingDataMBT.

105 In February 2025, in Ann township of Rakhine state, one youth was killed and another injured by a landmine near the base of a cellular phone tower. It is unknown when this tower may have been mined. Saw Shin May, "Young Man Killed, Another Wounded After Treading on Landmine Near Tat Taung Town in Ann," *Narinjara News*, 17 February 2025, bit.ly/NarinjaraNews17Feb2025. In May 2025, a man was injured after stepping on a mine near a cellular phone tower in Dawei township, Tanintharyi region; it is not known when the tower was mined. Monitor data on casualties from Myanmar Police Force records.

106 "In border areas, if the number of Tatmadaw [Myanmar Armed Forces] is small, they will lay mines around where they reside, but only if their numbers are small. Mines are also laid around infrastructure, such as microwave towers. If these are near villages, we warn them. If there is a Tatmadaw camp in an area controlled by an ethnic armed group where they are sniped at and harassed, they will lay mines around the camp." Monitor meeting with U Min Htike Hein, Assistant Secretary, Union Minister Office for Defence, Myanmar Ministry of Defence, Naypyitaw, 5 July 2019.

states. He stated that all engineers were trained to lay mines in the same pattern. Mined areas were mapped, and he had to turn the map over to the next engineer when rotated out of an area. He added that mines were not always laid within a fenced area, and that there were no warning signs if it was a remote outpost. He also noted that, if mines were laid at a location near a settled area, signs saying "Danger Do Not Enter" were posted, but the signs did not mention mines.[107]

Photographs reviewed by the Monitor indicate that antipersonnel mines manufactured by Myanmar were captured from the Myanmar Armed Forces by NSAGs nearly every month between January 2022 and September 2026 in most townships and regions of the country, indicating extensive landmine use.[108] The Myanmar Armed Forces were reported to have sometimes increased the destructive power of antipersonnel landmines by placing a mortar projectile underneath them.[109] However, discerning the specific time period of new use of antipersonnel mines in Myanmar is made difficult by the complex conflict situation in the country, the sensitivity of the topic, and the partisan nature of media sources.[110]

While many areas were already heavily contaminated by landmines, most of the casualties reported during 2025 and 2026 appear to be from recently emplaced antipersonnel mines due to an increase in use since the military coup.[111] Numerous reports state that people are impacted by antipersonnel landmines while undertaking ordinary activities such as foraging

107 Monitor interview with Myanmar Armed Forces combat engineer, 11 March 2025.

108 Consistent with recent years and as reported in prior *Landmine Monitor* reports, multiple non-state armed groups (NSAGs) seized or captured antipersonnel mines from the Myanmar Armed Forces in Chin, Kayin, Kayah, Rakhine, and Shan states, and in the Bago, Magway, Sagaing, and Tanintharyi regions during the current reporting period. Between January 2022 and September 2026, through a non-exhaustive survey of media reports and photographs, Mine Free Myanmar found more than 80 instances of mines being captured from the Myanmar Armed Forces, amounting to many hundreds of antipersonnel mines of types MM1 (stake mounted fragmentation, POMZ2 variant), MM2 (blast, PMN variant), MM5 (directional, claymore variant) and MM6 (non-detectable blast, M-14 variant), as well as Myanmar Defence Products Industries (KaPaSa) made antivehicle mines (plastic, VS1.6 variant). See, Mine Free Myanmar, "Military made antipersonnel landmines continue to be captured by anti-military groups," 1 September 2026, bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar1Sept2026; Mine Free Myanmar, "More antipersonnel landmines captured by anti-military groups," 21 August 2025, bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar21Aug2025; Mine Free Myanmar, "More antipersonnel landmines seized by armed groups during first 3 months of 2024," 1 June 2024, bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar1June2024; and Mine Free Myanmar, "Myanmar Armed Forces consistently using antipersonnel landmines over the past 18 months," 9 June 2023, bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar9June2023.

109 As the Myanmar Armed Forces withdrew from Thaung Salone village, Shan state, an MM6 mine—placed on top of the fuze and body of a mortar projectile—was reportedly emplaced by departing troops on a path behind the village medical clinic. It was later found by returnees. Free Burma Rangers, "Doctors as Targets: Many Killed In Burma Army's Attacks On Medical Facilities," 21 June 2023, bit.ly/FreeBurmaRangers21Jun2023; and email from David Eubanks, Free Burma Rangers, 5 September 2023.

110 Media and data sources tied to the military tend to publish incidents ascribed to anti-military groups. Media and data sources tied to ethnic armed groups or the National Unity Government (NUG) publish incidents ascribed to the Myanmar Armed Forces. Very few publish the same incidents.

111 This new use has mostly been reported by villagers injured in areas where it was previously safe to conduct their livelihoods. For example, in May 2025, in Toungup town, Rakhine state, an elderly couple was injured by a landmine while walking to their farm. In April 2025, in Man Kan village, Shan state, a father was killed and his son was injured by a landmine while looking for their cow near the village. In March 2025, near Nan San Khan village, Kayah state, a 40-year-old woman was severely injured by a landmine while collecting garlic in her field. Online database of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) citing *Narinjara News*, *Kantarawaddy Times*, and *Shwe Phee Myay News Agency*. See, ACLED website, www.acleddata.com.

or travel near current or abandoned military bases.[112] Prior years have seen reports of people being injured by landmines while near checkpoints constructed by the military.[113] Some military outposts are alleged not to mark areas near them that they have mined.[114] Villagers have complained about denial of access to resources due to landmines laid by the military to counter armed opponents.[115]

USE BY STATE NOT PARTY NORTH KOREA

In June 2026, the United Nations Command (UNC) reported on recent mine laying by North Korean forces in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).[116] In addition, an investigation carried out jointly by the UNC and South Korea's military verified reports that, on 21 September 2026, a North Korean landmine detonated on the South Korean side of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), injuring three South Korean soldiers, a violation of the Armistice Agreement.[117]

This is consistent with prior Monitor reporting from 2023 through mid-2025 regarding North Korea's use of antipersonnel mines in its own territory and at locations along its border with South Korea.

112 In August 2026, as armed conflict spread from Rakhine state to the Lay Myat Nar township of Ayeyarwady region, locals claimed that the Myanmar Armed Forces laid landmines near eight villages in the township. "Two More Rakhine Refugees Killed by Landmines in Ayeyarwady Division, Raising Death Toll to Three," *Narinjara News*, 21 August 2026, bit.ly/NarinjaraNews21Aug2026. See also, Khaing Lu Hla, "Local Man Loses Leg After Stepping on Landmine in Myebon," *Narinjara News*, 18 May 2026, bit.ly/NarinjaraNews18May2026. The following incidents were reported by Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG). In July 2025, a woman was killed and her daughter injured while foraging in the forest 1,200 meters from a camp of the Myanmar Army in Kyainseikgyi township in Kayin state. In October 2025, a child was seriously injured in Ler Muh Plaw village tract, Hpapun township of Kayin state. Locals claim the mine was laid by Myanmar Army soldiers from the Htaw Muh Pleh Meh military camp. In January 2026, a man was killed by a landmine planted near a Myanmar Army camp in Zayat Gyi Taung Chan village tract of Htatabin township in Bago region. KHRG, "KHRG Submission to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), August 2025 – July 2026," 11 August 2026. On different dates in June 2025, two people received serious injuries near a former military base of the Myanmar Armed Forces Operation Command No. 5 in Taungup township, and another near the former military installation of the 543rd Infantry Battalion in Kyauk Phyu township, both in Rakhine state. Maung Sar Ga, "Landmine victim dies, another civilian wounded in Taungup explosion," *Narinjara News*, 1 July 2025, bit.ly/NarinjaraNews1July2025.

113 See, for example, Human Rights Foundation of Monland, "Man steps on a landmine and loses his leg in Tha Yet Chaung," 14 March 2024, bit.ly/HURFOM14March2024.

114 In May 2026, villagers near Sittwe claimed that the Myanmar military was laying mines near the villages and around their camps without warnings. "Young Muslim Girl Loses Leg to Landmine in Sittwe," *Narinjara News*, 2 May 2026, bit.ly/NarinjaraNews2May2026. See also, "Locals in junta-held Sittwe fear landmines planted by military," *Development Media Group (DMG)*, 18 May 2024, bit.ly/DMG18May2024; and Human Rights Foundation of Monland, "Battalions Plant Landmines alongside Thanbyuzayat-Ye Highway: Danger created for plantation workers," 8 January 2024, bit.ly/HURFOM8Jan2024.

115 For example, in December 2025, the Myanmar Army was accused of laying mines in Kyi Kone village in Chaung-U township in Sagaing region, resulting in casualties among civilians who returned once the army left later the same month. Facebook post by Myaelatt Athan "Local man returning to village where military convoy was stationed loses leg after stepping on mine," 30 December 2025, bit.ly/MyaelattAthan30Dec2025. Between December 2025 and February 2026, villagers in Hpapun township of Kayin state said that they could not travel to their plantations due to landmines laid along the roads near Myanmar Army camps. KHRG, "KHRG Submission to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), August 2025 – July 2026," 11 August 2026.

116 United Nations Command (UNC), "UNC Fact Sheet: DMZ Armistice Enforcement & Recent DPRK Activity," 23 June 2026, bit.ly/UNCommandDMZ23June2026. Report states that recently laid mines south of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) were identified and removed as a violation of the 1953 Armistice Agreement and that other areas were being investigated.

117 "South Korean military, UN command launch investigation into DMZ explosion," *Reuters*, 27 September 2026, bit.ly/Reuters27September2026; Republic of Korea press release, "Announcement of the final investigation results of the Joint Field Investigation Task Force concerning the 25th Division DMZ landmine explosion," 5 October 2026, bit.ly/SouthKoreaInvestigation5Oct2026; and "U.N. Command says Armistice Agreement violation occurred over DMZ mine blast," *Yonhap News Agency*, 30 September 2026, bit.ly/YonHapNewsAgency30Sep2026.

In addition to the two incidents above, the following reports surfaced during the current reporting period:

- In June 2025, it was reported that North Korea continued to deploy troops near the MDL within the DMZ to emplace mines, as well as install barriers and fencing. This activity had halted in the winter of 2024 but resumed in the spring of 2025.[118]
- In March 2025, the South Korean military reported multiple North Korean casualties as a result of a landmine explosion that occurred while North Korean troops were enhancing frontline fortifications.[119]

Previously, North Korea has been reported to use antipersonnel mines along its borders with both South Korea and China.[120] The governments of South Korea and China have each previously commented on the danger to their own citizens of North Korean mining activities along these borders.[121]

USE BY STATE NOT PARTY RUSSIA

Russia has used antipersonnel landmines extensively in Ukraine since its full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. Presently, it is not possible to systematically document, survey, and attribute the continuing use of antipersonnel mines in this conflict given available evidence and lack of access to areas where there are active hostilities. However, available data indicates that the use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine by Russia is extensive, with at least 15 types of antipersonnel mines being deployed.

The scale of landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in Ukraine represents the most widespread use of landmines in decades. Russian forces have used at least 15 types of antipersonnel mines since 24 February 2022 (see table). Factory markings on some of the landmines used by Russia show that they were manufactured in the Soviet era and subsequently in Russia, as recently as 2021.[122] More recently, new types of PMD-6 and 3D-printed antipersonnel mines, reportedly used by Russia in 2025–2026, appear to have been produced since 2025.[123]

118 Chae Yun-hwan, "S. Korea says N. Korea notified UN Command of fortification plans inside DMZ," *Yonhap News Agency*, 30 June 2025, bit.ly/YonhapNewsAgency30June2025.

119 Jooheon Kim and Joon Ha Park, "North Korean troops suffer multiple casualties in border landmine explosion: ROK," *NK News*, 27 March 2025, bit.ly/NKNews27March2025.

120 See, ICBL-CMC, "Country Profile: North Korea: Mine Ban Policy," last updated 18 December 2025, bit.ly/NorthKoreaCountryProfile; ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2025* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, December 2025), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports. See also, Kim Arin, "Landmines kill, hurt North Korean soldiers deployed for 'barren border' project," *The Korea Herald*, 18 June 2024, bit.ly/KoreaHerald18June2024; "Official: N. Korea Has Been Laying Landmines North of MDL since April," *KBS World*, 17 May 2024, bit.ly/KBSWorld17May2024; "North Korea redeploys landmine near Gyeongui Line," *The Dong-A Ilbo*, 5 January 2024, bit.ly/Dong-A5Jan2024; and emails from Soohong Eum, Peace Sharing Association (PSA), 29 April, 18 May, 27 May, 18 June, and 17 July 2024.

121 Lee Minji, "Military warns against N. Korean land mines washing into South amid heavy downpours," *Yonhap News Agency*, 17 July 2024, bit.ly/YonhapNewsAgency17July2024; and "Chinese authorities warn of possible North Korean landmine displacement due to floods, notify residents 'Do not go to the riverbank'," *Asia Press*, 13 August 2024, bit.ly/AsiaPress13Aug2024. Of specific concern is a North Korean-made plastic antipersonnel landmine that is camouflaged into the shape of a leaf and roughly the size of a mobile phone. "Military Calls for Caution after N. Korea's Land Mines Swept Away in Monsoon Rain," *KBS World*, 17 July 2024, bit.ly/KBSWorld17July2024.

122 HRW, "Briefing Paper: Landmine Use in Ukraine," 13 June 2023, bit.ly/HRW13June2023.

123 Vladislav V., "Russians Return to the Concept of World War II-Era PMD-6 Mines," *Militarnyi*, 9 June 2026, bit.ly/Militarnyi9June2026; and Vladislav V., "Russians Drop 3D-Printed Anti-Personnel Mines on Kherson," *Militarnyi*, 8 March 2026, bit.ly/Militarnyi8Mar2026.

Antipersonnel landmines used in Ukraine by Russia since February 2022[124]

Name	Origin	Type	Initiation	Notes
MOB	Russia	Fragmentation	Multiple options	Hand-emplaced directional multipurpose mine that can be used in either a command-detonated or victim-activated mode. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.
MON-50	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/ command	MON-series hand-emplaced directional multipurpose mines can be used either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.
MON-90	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/ command	
MON-100	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/ command	
MON-200	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/ command	
OZM-72	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/ command	A multipurpose bounding munition emplaced either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

124 The numbers associated with each model of the MON family indicate the range, from 50 to 200 meters. According to Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance (2008), each model contains a specific number of pre-formed fragments that are projected horizontally. The MON-50 contains 540 ball bearings or 485 pieces of 5mm chopped steel rod, and the MON-100 contains 400 pieces of 10mm chopped steel rod. Colin King, *Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance 2008-2009* (Croydon: Jane's Information Group, 2008); Trevor Kirton (TJK_EOD), "Today the @OfficialSOLI EOD team was able to remote pull a live OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mine from a marsh located close to a farming community. This will be destroyed so it no longer presents a danger." 21 April 2023, 13:08 UTC. Tweet (no longer available online); Maksim (kms_d4k), "In this footage, you can see why it is important not to touch any mines. These mines are set with a trap underneath. It is very dangerous to demine them, so the only way is to destroy them right away." 6 February 2023, 13:32 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/MaksimTweet6Feb2023; Mark Hiznay (MarkHiznay), "More PMN-4 antipersonnel mines being cleared. Since Ukraine never stockpiled this type, it doesn't take much to figure out who did it. Now where? @minefreeworld." 20 April 2023, 16:42 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/MarkHiznayTweet20April2023; Stu M (SM_EOD), "More anti-personnel mines out of a field today. We have also come across more evidence of POM-2 use which adds another level of complexity to our work. #onemineatatime #minefreeukraine #eod #demining #StandWithUkraine." 21 April 2023, 08:58 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/StuMEODTweet21April2023. Armament Research Services has produced a detailed technical reference for POM-3 antipersonnel mines. See, Mick F. and N. R. Jenzen-Jones, "Russian POM-3 anti-personnel landmines documented in Ukraine (2022)," Armament Research Services, 15 April 2022, bit.ly/ARES15Apr2022. For information on the PMD-6 and the Pryanik/Plushka ("Gingerbread"), see, Vladislav V., "Russians Return to the Concept of World War II-Era PMD-6 Mines," *Militarnyi*, 9 June 2026, bit.ly/Militarnyi9June2026; and Vladislav V., "Russians Drop 3D-Printed Anti-Personnel Mines on Kherson," *Militarnyi*, 8 March 2026, bit.ly/Militarnyi8Mar2026.

Name	Origin	Type	Initiation	Notes
PFM-1/PFM-1S	USSR	Blast	Pressure/ self-destruct	Uniquely shaped and constructed, this plastic-cased mine can be scattered by mine-laying rockets and dispensers mounted on trucks or helicopters, or dropped from drones. It contains 37 grams of a liquid high explosive. Both Russia and Ukraine stockpile this type.
PMN-2	USSR/Russia	Blast	Pressure	A circular, plastic-cased mine. Ukraine destroyed its stockpile of this type in 2003.
PMN-4	Russia	Blast	Pressure	A modern circular, plastic-cased mine produced by Russia. First publicly displayed by Russia in 1993, it has never been stockpiled by Ukraine.
POM-2/POM-2R	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/ self-destruct	A metal-case bounding mine delivered by helicopter, ground-fired rockets, or other means. POM-2 and POM-2R mines are stockpiled by Russia; Ukraine destroyed its stocks of this mine in 2018.
POM-3	Russia	Fragmentation	Seismic	Used only by Russia, POM-3 mines were first publicly displayed during annual military exercises in 2021. The POM-3 is scattered by rockets or truck-mounted launchers. Ukraine does not possess the POM-3 mine or its delivery system. Markings on an expended delivery canister photographed with POM-3 mines that failed to deploy properly indicate that it was produced in 2021.
PMD-6	Russia	Blast	Pressure	Modern version of the Soviet, World War II-era PMD-6 antipersonnel pressure-activated mine, with a plastic casing. Russia reportedly restarted producing it in 2025, and in June 2026 a number of these mines were reportedly discovered in Ukraine's Sumy region.

Name	Origin	Type	Initiation	Notes
Pryanik/ Plushka ("Gingerbread")	Russia	Blast	Pressure	3D-printed plastic mines, resembling small, round gingerbread cakes—flat discs about five to six centimeters in diameter—reportedly dropped from drones by Russian forces, starting in 2026.

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Russian forces have also emplaced victim-activated booby-traps around positions they have taken, occupied, or fortified. Deminers told HRW in 2022 that they have cleared and destroyed multiple victim-activated booby-traps from areas that were formerly under Russian control. The booby-traps were constructed using various types of hand grenades equipped with tripwires, including F-1, RGD-5, and RGN-type grenades. Booby-traps can function as antipersonnel landmines when the fuze that is used is activated unintentionally by a person.

Russian forces posting on social media from late 2023 into 2026 confirm that they are using drones to emplace several different types of landmines including PFM-1, POM-2, and PMN-4 antipersonnel mines and PTM-3 and PTM-4 antivehicle mines.[125]

In May–June 2025, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine and HRW reported on Russia's use of armed quadcopter drones to drop antipersonnel mines and terrorize civilians in Kherson, Ukraine.[126] HRW verified drone footage from Russian military-affiliated Telegram channels showing drones dropping PFM-1 mines in residential areas, resulting in several injuries.[127] It also spoke to several civilians who had been injured by mines, including one resident of Antonivka who noted that some drones dropped PFM mines in plastic bags in a possible effort to disguise or camouflage the mines.[128] Russian use of antipersonnel mines dropped from drones in populated areas continued to be reported by Ukrainian media and authorities in 2026. For example, between February and July 2026, Ukrainian authorities warned residents that Russian forces had begun dispersing new

125 Rob Lee (RALee85), "Video about engineers from Russia's 1st Tank Army who are using UAVs to emplace POM, PMN-4, PTM-3, and PTM-4 mines." 12 December 2023, 20:33 UTC. X post, bit.ly/TweetRobLee12Dec2023; Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "Both sides drop mines by drones to interdict logistics. Near dusk, a Russian drone drops a cassette of 26 PFM-1 anti-personnel mines on a Ukrainian road. That night a truck loses tires when it hits the mines, and is abandoned. It is destroyed the next day by drone bombing." 27 September 2024, 16:31 UTC. X post, bit.ly/TweetRoy27Sept2024; Volunteer Corps, "Our work requires the precision of a jeweler; it can be compared to art," 21 January 2026, bit.ly/VolunteerCorps21Jan2026; Volunteer Corps, "The Karbyshev detachment is making it difficult for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to move around the rear areas using remote mining," 24 June 2026, bit.ly/VolunteerCorps24June2026; and Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "A Russian tethers the arming ripcords of PMN-4 anti-personnel landmines to the FPV that will dispense them. A 1–40 minute (temperature dependent) hydromechanical arming delay in which a spring-loaded plunger moves through a viscous fluid will be initiated when the cord is pulled." 15 July 2026, 16:07 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostRoy15July2026.

126 UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, "'They are hunting us': systematic drone attacks targeting civilians in Kherson," 28 May 2025, p. 12, bit.ly/HRCUkraine28May2025; and HRW, "Hunted from Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine," 3 June 2025, bit.ly/3UGcyhH. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) also collected reports from local authorities and medical personnel in Kharkiv and Kherson regions in early 2025 of use of antipersonnel mines scattered by drones. See, HRMMU, "Deadly Drones: Civilians at Risk from Short-Range Drones in Frontline Areas of Ukraine: 24 February 2022 – 30 April 2025," 26 June 2025, p. 10, bit.ly/HRMMU26June2025.

127 HRW, "Hunted from Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine," 3 June 2025, pp. 35–39, bit.ly/3UGcyhH.

128 Ibid., p. 37.

3D-printed Pryanik/Plushka ("Gingerbread") pressure-activated antipersonnel mines from drones in the Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Nikopol regions.[129]

Russian state media reported that Russian forces continued using Zemledeliye mine-laying vehicles to mine Ukrainian supply lines and approaches to Russian troop positions in 2025–2026, including near Dobropillia, Kharkiv, and Pokrovsk.[130] (For more on the Zemledeliye, see *Production by states not party: Russia* section.) Ukrainian media reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed several Zemledeliye mine-laying vehicles in 2025–2026.[131]

Some landmines used by Russia in Ukraine can be used in either a command-detonated or victim-activated mode, including the newly seen MOB, MON-series, and OZM-72 mines.[132] If activated by the victim through a mechanical pull, tension release, seismic fuze, or other means, then these mines are considered to be antipersonnel mines, prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[133]

POSSIBLE USE BY THE UNITED STATES

In December 2025—as in 2020, under the first Trump administration—the US reversed its longstanding policy that halted the use of antipersonnel landmines anywhere except the Korean Peninsula.[134] In addition to lifting geographic limitations, the new policy also gives combatant commanders (the heads of various commands with geographic and other functional areas of responsibility) the authority to approve the use of landmines.[135]

Prior to this reversal, the US announced a change in its landmine policy in 2022.[136] Notably, the 2022 US policy change did not exempt "non-persistent" antipersonnel mines equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation features from the prohibition on use

129 These 3D-printed plastic mines, wrapped in camouflage fabric, are difficult to spot on roads or in grass. They appear to be copy of Ukrainian "Gingerbread" improvised antipersonnel mines that Ukraine has used since 2024. See, Vladislav V., "Russians Drop 3D-Printed Anti-Personnel Mines on Kherson," *Militarnyi*, 8 March 2026, bit.ly/Militarnyi8Mar2026; Oleksandr Shumilin, "Russians begin scattering hard-to-spot Pryanik anti-personnel mines in Nikopol area," *Ukrainska Pravda*, 6 April 2026, bit.ly/UkrainskaPravda6Apr2026; Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "A Russian cassette drop system for FPVs holds 20 copies of the Ukrainian 'Gingerbread' improvised anti-personnel landmine. These 3D-printed blast devices contain about 30 grams of explosive, making them the equivalent of the infamous PTM-1 'Butterfly/Petal' landmine." 8 June 2026, 23:34 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostRoy8June2026; and Oleksandra Utkina, "The Russian army remotely scatters 'Pryanyk' mines in the Mykolaiv region," *Suspilne*, 11 July 2026, bit.ly/Suspilne11July2026.

130 "Sappers of the 'Zemledeliye' system disrupted the rotation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Dobropillya direction," *TASS*, 31 July 2026, bit.ly/TASS31July2026; "Center fighters blocked supply routes for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Krasnoarmeysk direction," *TASS*, 29 January 2026, bit.ly/TASS29Jan2026; "Engineers from the Center group mined approaches to Russian Armed Forces positions in the DPR," *TASS*, 23 May 2025, bit.ly/TASS23May2025; "The 'Zemledeliye' crew remotely mined the approaches to the Russian Armed Forces positions in the Northern Military District zone," *TASS*, 15 April 2025, bit.ly/TASS15Apr2025; "The 'Zemledeliye' system helped disrupt the rotation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces," *TASS*, 21 March 2025, bit.ly/TASS21Mar2025; and "Russian soldier: minefields laid with the Zemledeliye system are difficult to clear," *TASS*, 21 February 2025, bit.ly/TASS21Feb2025. These reports do not specify whether antipersonnel or antivehicle mines were used in each of these cases, but mention that the Zemledeliye can launch both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and that, depending on the mission, Zemledeliye crews deliver both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.

131 Vlad Litnarovych, "Russia's Rare Zemledeliye Can Mine a Battlefield From 9 Miles Away—Ukraine Just Destroyed One, Video," *UNITED24 Media*, 19 August 2026, bit.ly/United24Media19Aug2026; Sofiia Syngaivska, "Ukrainian FPV Drone Destroys Rare russian Zemledeliye Mine-Laying System in Zaporizhzhia (Video)," *Defense Express*, 16 July 2026, bit.ly/DefenseExpress16July2026; Roman Kohanets, "Ukraine Destroys Rare Russian Zemledeliye Remote Mining System in Donetsk Region," *UNITED24 Media*, 19 November 2025, bit.ly/United24Media19Nov2025; and Sania Kozatskyi, "Ukrainian Special Forces Destroy Rare Russian Mine-Laying System Zemledeliye," *Militarnyi*, 9 July 2025, bit.ly/Militarnyi9July2025.

132 Collective Awareness to UXO, "OZM-72 Landmine: Description," undated, bit.ly/OZM-72LandmineDescription.

133 HRW, "Backgrounder on Antivehicle Landmines," 8 April 2022, bit.ly/HRWAntivehicleMines8April2022.

134 Joyce Sohyun Lee, "Hegseth Reverses Landmine Policy to Allow Use of Controversial Weapon," *The Washington Post*, 19 December 2025, bit.ly/TheWashingtonPost19Dec2025.

135 Ibid.

136 US Department of State, "Briefing on the United States' Updated Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy," 21 June 2022, bit.ly/USDoS21June2022.

outside of the Korean Peninsula. The maintenance of those terms reflected how the US had come to accept that the Mine Ban Treaty comprehensively bans all types of victim-activated explosive devices, regardless of their predicted longevity, delivery method, or type of manufacture (improvised or factory-made).[137] Yet, current US landmine policy states that it will use "remotely delivered" antipersonnel mines if they have "compliant self-destruction mechanisms and self-deactivation features."[138]

In 2022, the US confirmed that the country's last use of antipersonnel mines was in Iraq and Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War, with the exception of the use of a single antipersonnel mine in Afghanistan in 2002.[139] However, open-source researchers reviewed and geolocated visual evidence that indicates US forces may have used antivehicle mines from the air-delivered GATOR Mine Scattering System in or near populated areas of Iran in March 2026. These reports include imagery of BLU-91/B antivehicle mines identified in locations around Kafari, a village near Shiraz in southern Iran.[140] The GATOR system is designed to scatter both BLU-91/B antivehicle and BLU-92/B antipersonnel landmines over a wide area from a single dispenser. None of the reporting or visual evidence seen to date includes the presence or remnants of BLU-92/B antipersonnel mines.[141] However, the Monitor is unaware of any GATOR system that scatters only antivehicle mines without antipersonnel mines, so evidence of use of the GATOR system is an indicator that antipersonnel mines may have been present. According to media reports, "the images were reportedly taken near the southern city of Shiraz, roughly 3 miles (4.8 kilometers) from several Iranian ballistic missile facilities … mobile missile launchers are often stationed in these areas, and the mines may have been deployed to hinder their movement or access."[142] As of September 2026, no further information on this allegation has emerged publicly.

USE BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

During the reporting period, the Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in at least four states—State Party Colombia and states not party India, Myanmar, and Pakistan—and sporadically by groups operating in Western and Central Africa, including in States Parties Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, the DRC, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo.

Since 1997, at least 70 NSAGs have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines.[143] The exact number is difficult to determine as NSAGs frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures.

137 Ibid.

138 Joyce Sohyun Lee, "Hegseth Reverses Landmine Policy to Allow Use of Controversial Weapon," *The Washington Post*, 19 December 2025, bit.ly/TheWashingtonPost19Dec2025.

139 US Department of State, "Briefing on the United States' Updated Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy," 21 June 2022, bit.ly/USDoS21June2022. The use of an antipersonnel mine in Afghanistan was previously disclosed as part of a June 2014 policy announcement. Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf stated: "And since the Ottawa Convention came into force in 1999, we are—or since 1991, excuse me—we are aware of only one confirmed operational employment by U.S. military forces, a single munition in Afghanistan in 2002." US Department of State, "Daily Press Briefing," 27 June 2014. In 1991, in Iraq and Kuwait, the US used 117,634 antipersonnel mines, mostly air-delivered. US General Accounting Office, "Military Operations: Information on U.S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War," September 2002, pp. 8–9, bit.ly/US-GAOSept2002.

140 Trevor Ball, "Evidence Points to US Scattering Mines over Iranian Village," *Bellingcat*, 26 March 2026, bit.ly/Bellingcat26Mar2026; and HRW, "Letter to Secretary Hegseth on US Landmines in Iran," 3 April 2026, bit.ly/HRW3Apr2026.

141 There are two known variants of the air-dropped GATOR system: CBU-89/B is used by the US Air Force and contains 72 BLU-91/B antivehicle and 22 BLU-92/B antipersonnel mines; the CBU-78/B is used by the Navy and Marine Corps and contains 45 BLU-91/B antivehicle and 15 BLU-92/B antipersonnel mines.

142 Esra Tekin, "US land mines seen in photos from Iran pose 'extreme danger' to civilians," *Anadolu Agency*, 27 March 2026, bit.ly/AnadoluAgency27Mar2026.

143 Of these, 48 NSAGs have committed not to use mines through signing the Geneva Call *Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a total Ban on Anti-personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action*; 20 by self-declaration; four by the Rebel Declaration (two have signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Geneva Call *Deed of Commitment*); and two through a peace accord (in Colombia and Nepal).

COLOMBIA

Dissident groups that emerged following the dissolution of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP or FARC), the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), the Popular Liberation Army (El Ejército Popular de Liberación, EPL), and other NSAGs in Colombia continued to use antipersonnel landmines in the current reporting period.

According to the official government database, 1,339 incidents of new mine use were recorded in Colombia in 2025, a 33% increase from 2024. The vast majority of mine use incidents (856) were attributed to FARC dissidents; 225 were attributed to the ELN, 138 to unidentified armed groups, nine to the organized armed group Clan del Golfo, and two to criminal groups. There was insufficient evidence to attribute the remaining 109 incidents.[144]

In the first six months of 2026, approximately 600 mine incidents were recorded: 333 were attributed to FARC dissidents, 122 to the ELN, 53 to unidentified armed groups, 27 to Clan del Golfo, four to criminal groups, and one to organized armed group Comuneros del Sur; there was insufficient information to attribute responsibility to a specific group for 56 incidents.[145]

INDIA

NSAGs affiliated with the Maoist insurgency in India continued to use improvised antipersonnel landmines during the current reporting period.

There were continuing reports of use of improvised pressure-plate antipersonnel mines in 2025 through mid-2026 by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) and its People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), although the insurgency lost significant numbers of cadre and operational territory during the previous year.[146] The CPI-M has previously issued warnings of mined areas and admitted responsibility for a landmine that killed a villager.[147] Casualties attributed to CPI-M improvised antipersonnel mine use were also reported in 2025 and early 2026 in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, and Telangana.[148] The Monitor has identified civilian casualties caused by CPI-M improvised antipersonnel mine use every year since 2009.

In May 2026, an elephant was injured after stepping on a landmine attributed to the Maoist insurgency, making it the sixth elephant to be injured by a mine in Jharkhand's Saranda forest.[149]

144 Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, sourced from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) database of events by MAP/MUSE, updated 31 July 2026, bit.ly/ColombiaDatabaseAPM.

145 Ibid.

146 "Maoist landmine legacy haunts India," *France 24*, 22 April 2026, bit.ly/France2422Apr2026; and Dhruv Tikekar, Rhea Mogul, and Utpal Pathak, "Some of the world's last Maoist rebels are in India. Their decades-long rebellion is in its death throes," *CNN*, 2 June 2026, bit.ly/CNN2June2026.

147 "Maoists regret death of villager in landmine explosion," *Telangana Today*, 6 June 2024, bit.ly/TelanganaToday6June2024. See also, "Maoists 'impose' 12 hr curfew in Jharkhand's Kolhan," *WebIndia123*, 18 January 2023, bit.ly/WebIndia18January2023.

148 "CRPF's CoBRA jawan injured in IED explosion in Jharkhand's West Singhbhum," *The Hindu*, 6 April 2026, bit.ly/TheHindu6Apr2026; "Eleven security personnel injured as IEDs planted by Maoists go off in Chhattisgarh," *The Hindu*, 26 January 2026, bit.ly/TheHindu26Jan2026; Rashim Drolia, "Teen boy loses leg in Maoist IED blast in Bijapur forest," *The Times of India*, 5 January 2026, bit.ly/TheTimesofIndia5Jan2026; Swati, "Landmine explodes in Saranda of Sundargarh, 1 villager killed," *Kalinga TV*, 1 June 2025, bit.ly/KalingaTV1June2025; "Narrow Escape For Tribal Man As Maoists Trigger Blast In Telangana," *ETV Bharat*, 6 January 2025, bit.ly/ETVBharat6Jan2025; and Amit Bhelari, "Naxal bomb kills seven-year-old girl in Jharkhand's Chaibasa," *The Hindu*, 7 January 2025, bit.ly/TheHindu7Jan2025.

149 Mukesh Ranjan, "Another tusker injured in Maoist-planted IED blast in Jharkhand's Saranda forests," *The New Indian Express*, 5 May 2026, bit.ly/TheNewIndianExpress5May2026.

MYANMAR

Ethnic armed groups have engaged in conflict with the central authorities in Myanmar for decades; the Monitor has documented mine use by such groups for more than 25 years.

Some of this use is carried out by militias sanctioned by the Myanmar Armed Forces, including Pyusawhti, the People's Militia Forces (PMF), and the Border Guard Forces (BGF), which sometimes act under the military's direction and at other times act independently.

Since the military coup in February 2021, more local anti-military resistance groups have been established, some of which identify as part of the People's Defence Force (PDF), which is the armed wing of Myanmar's shadow government, the National Unity Government (NUG).[150] Local media often report the use of "landmines" by such groups. Many of these devices are command-detonated roadside bombs, while others are victim-activated landmines.

Given the number and variety of NSAGs operating in Myanmar, it is often difficult to assign responsibility for use to a specific NSAG, though many have used mines since the Monitor started reporting in 1999.[151] The military frequently claims civilians have been killed or injured by mines laid by anti-military groups.[152]

The following allegations of use of landmines by NSAGs surfaced in the current reporting period:

- In May 2026, near Myanmar-Bangladesh border pillar 42, three indigenous tribesmen were killed by landmines that villagers allege had been planted by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).[153]
- That same month, a woman tending animals was seriously injured by a landmine in Wetlet township of Sagaing region. Locals said it was an improvised mine laid by a PDF group, as the Myanmar Army had not been in the area.[154]
- Local villagers claimed that the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) randomly planted landmines around their villages in the Paw Hklo area of Thayetchaung township of Tanintharyi region in early March 2026.[155]
- In February 2026, a man was injured by a landmine laid by a BGF group in Htee Th'Daw Hta village tract in Hpapun township, Kayin state.[156]

150 As of May 2023, the NUG claimed that there were over 300 People's Defence Forces (PDF) groups organized in 250 townships across Myanmar. The exact figure is difficult to verify. See, "The PDF has established 300 battalions and columns in 2 years," *People's Spring*, 5 May 2023, bit.ly/PeoplesSpring5May2023.

151 On 15 October 2015, eight ethnic armed groups signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the national government, committing to "end planting of mines" and "cooperate on the process of clearing all landmines." Since the February 2021 military coup, this commitment no longer appears to be operational.

152 See, "Innocent Civilian Injured After Stepping on Land Mine Planted by Terrorist Group in Hsihseng Township of Shan State," *Myanmar National News*, 30 August 2025, bit.ly/MyanmarNationalNews30Aug2025. The article states that authorities attributed an injury of a woman foraging in the forest to an NSAG. See also, "Innocent Civilian Injured After Stepping on Land Mine Planted by So-Called PDF Terrorist Group in Salin Township, Magway Region," *Myanmar National News*, 13 July 2025, bit.ly/MyanmarNationalNews13July2025. In January 2025, the Myanmar Police Force stated that a man was injured by a mine left by a PDF in Kyauktaga township in Bago region. "Explosion near Zeegone Village injures local man in Kyauktaga," *Eleven News*, 7 January 2025, bit.ly/ElevenNews7Jan2025.

153 One died first, the two others were killed by another mine while attempting to rescue him. Locals allege that the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) carries its weapons across the border there disguised as government military. Khaing Lu Hla, "Three Hill Tribesmen Killed by ARSA Landmines Along Bangladesh-Myanmar Border," *Narinjara News*, 24 May 2026, bit.ly/Narinjara24May2026.

154 Facebook post by Myaelatt Athan, "Woman injured by a landmine while herding cattle in Wetlet," 20 May 2026, bit.ly/MyaelattAthan20May2026.

155 KHRG, "KHRG Submission to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), August 2025 – July 2026," 11 August 2026.

156 Ibid. A Border Guard Force (BGF) is, in many cases, an ethnic armed group that formerly opposed the Myanmar Army but is now nominally under Myanmar Army control.

- In January 2026, villagers from Sin Hpyu Kyun town in Salin township, Magway region, stated that a PDF group had laid landmines in the town that led to casualties among people fleeing fighting between the PDF and the military.[157]
- During early 2026, the Naypyitaw authorities accused PDF groups in Dawei, Loikaw, Machanbaw, Nawnghkio, Pakokku, Salin, and Tanintharyi townships of laying landmines.[158]
- In November 2025, a Rohingya man was seriously injured by a landmine while herding buffalo east of Kyae Tama village in Maungdaw township, Rakhine state; allegations point to ARSA or the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) as the user.[159]
- Between April and June 2025, local villagers reported that mines had been laid in the area by the KNLA and the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO).[160]
- In June 2025, use of antipersonnel landmines by the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) led to a civilian casualty in Hpa-an township in Kayin state.[161]
- In April 2025, in Salin township, Magway region, several soldiers were injured in a minefield emplaced by an unidentified NSAG.[162]
- In January 2025, the KNLA reportedly laid mines on the Ler Kwel road in Hpapun township in Kayin state, resulting in the death of one Buddhist monk and the injury of another. The KNLA had previously issued verbal warnings to local villagers.[163]

An increasing number of incidents involving explosive devices planted on berms of roadways, and then triggered by motor scooters, were attributed to resistance groups. The devices were likely antipersonnel mines, as these incidents almost always involved injury rather than death.[164]

The Monitor continued to record incidents in 2025 involving the use of victim-activated booby-traps or explosive devices in urban areas. Most of these mine victims were engaged in trash collection or searching rubbish for something to sell.[165]

PAKISTAN

The past decade has seen repeated reporting on use of antipersonnel mines in Pakistan by NSAGs, which has consistently claimed civilian victims in provinces bordering

157 Htet Nadi and Thant Zin, "Roadside landmines laid during PDF offensive in Sin Hpyu Kyun, locals face hardship," *NP News*, 1 January 2026, bit.ly/NPNews1Jan2026.

158 See, for example, "In Certain Townships, Two Innocent Civilians Injured in Improvised Explosive Device Explosions Planted by Terrorists," *Myanmar National News*, 3 June 2026, bit.ly/Myanmar3June2026.

159 "Local Muslim Man Severely Injured After Stepping on Mine Allegedly Planted by ARSA/RSO in Maungdaw, Arakan," *Global Arakan Network*, 17 November 2025, bit.ly/GlobalArakanNetwork17Nov2025.

160 KHRG, "KHRG Submission to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), August 2024–August 2025," 12 September 2025. For personal security, villagers did not detail the exact communities in which the mines were laid.

161 Ibid.

162 On 15 April 2025, in Salin township, Magway region, a military column from the IB-235 stepped on mines planted by the Peacock Brother Urban Guerrilla. See, online database of ACLED.

163 KHRG, "Mu Traw District Short Update: A landmine explosion killed one monk and left another injured in Bu Tho Township (January 2025)," 25 April 2025, bit.ly/KHRG25April2025.

164 The Monitor recorded 136 incidents in Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, and Tanintharyi regions, as well as in Chin, Kachin, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan states, between January 2024 and December 2025.

165 The Monitor recorded at least 49 injuries or deaths among trash collectors or scavengers in towns in the Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi, and Yangon regions and in Shan state between January 2024 and December 2025.

Afghanistan. In Pakistani media reporting on the use of antipersonnel landmines, the authorities have been unable to provide any public information on the perpetrators.[166]

The Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is believed by locals to be behind many incidents of antipersonnel mine use in the country.[167] The TTP is understood to be linked to and supported by the *de facto* authorities (i.e., the Taliban) in Afghanistan, though the degree of the Taliban's involvement in the TTP's choice of weapons is unknown.[168]

In 2025 and early 2026, as in previous years, military personnel and civilians were killed or injured in incidents resulting from new landmine use; the Monitor cannot identify the actor or actors responsible for this use at this time.[169]

GROUPS OPERATING IN WESTERN AND CENTRAL AFRICA

NSAGs have used numerous victim-activated IEDs in 2025 and early 2026 in States Parties located in Western and Central Africa, but it is challenging in each specific case to document such use and confirm if the devices were victim-activated. The following patterns were documented in the current reporting period:

- Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) reportedly used improvised mines in Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Togo.[170]

166 See, ICBL-CMC, "Country Profile: Pakistan: Mine Ban Policy," last updated 22 September 2024, bit.ly/PakistanCountryProfile. News reports usually identify the perpetrators as "miscreants."

167 The ACLED database has attributed many landmine incidents in Pakistan to the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) due to known areas of activity, although source news articles do not directly identify the TTP as the perpetrator. See, online database of ACLED. For example, ACLED reported: "On 24 November 2025, a landmine planted by an unidentified group (coded as TTP) exploded at Mantoi town (South Waziristan district, KP). A minor shepherd was killed in the explosion," citing "Shepherd killed in South Waziristan landmine blast," *Dawn*, 25 November 2025, bit.ly/Dawn25Nov2025.

168 UN Security Council, "Thirty-eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities," 26 June 2026, docs.un.org/S/2026/651.

169 The following media reports do not state when the explosive device was placed there, but as the victims were undertaking activities in areas they were known to frequent, use appeared recent. See, for example, "Three injured in Kurram landmine blasts," *Dawn*, 17 August 2026, bit.ly/Dawn17Aug2026; Mohammad Zafar Baloch, "Boy killed in Dera Bugti landmine blast," *The News International*, 20 July 2026, bit.ly/TheNewsInternational20July2026; "Youth Killed, Two Injured In Kurram Landmine Blast," *Urdu Point*, 11 May 2026, bit.ly/UrduPoint11May2026; "Shepherd killed in South Waziristan landmine blast," *Dawn*, 25 November 2025, bit.ly/Dawn25Nov2025; and "Four killed in Kurram landmine explosions," *Dawn*, 26 June 2025, bit.ly/Dawn26June2025. In addition, the following incidents were attributed to the TTP. On 22 April 2025, in the Jamalkhel Nullah area of Dossali tehsil (Dossali, North Waziristan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), a child was critically injured when he picked up an object resembling a toy, which then exploded. On 26 March 2025, a landmine in Karam Girarai village of Ladha tehsil (Ladha, South Waziristan) exploded, killing a 1-year-old boy. The child was playing near his home when the explosion occurred. See, online database of ACLED.

170 **Benin**: On 20 May 2025, an explosive device attributed to Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) killed a farmer in Materi, in Atacora department in northwestern Benin, as the farmer was returning to his field. **Burkina Faso**: On 25 April 2026, a shepherd was injured after stepping on an improvised explosive device allegedly placed by JNIM near the village of Gonabin, in Centre-Est. Two civilians on motorcycles were killed by an explosive device allegedly placed by JNIM near Ouorowe town in Boucle du Mouhoun province on 8 July 2025. **Mali**: On 22 January 2026, two children were injured when they encountered a landmine in Ahamboubar, Kidal. On 13 January 2026, one person was killed after encountering a landmine allegedly laid by JNIM in Kenewe, Mopti. A civilian aboard a cart on his way to collect wood was killed by an explosive device allegedly planted by JNIM in the village of Yawakanda, Bandiagara region, on 6 August 2025. A civilian was killed by an improvised explosive device (IED) planted by Wagner mercenaries in the village of Tekenkent, in Kidal region, on 13 April 2025. **Togo**: On 15 October 2025, a woman was killed and her daughter injured after encountering an explosive device allegedly left by JNIM in Koundjoare, Savanes region. All five members of a Burkinabe refugee family were killed by an explosive device allegedly planted by JNIM while traveling in a donkey cart in Tonloni, Savanes region, on 14 September 2025. See, online database of ACLED.

- Islamic State West African Province/Boko Haram (ISWAP/BH) reportedly used the devices in both Niger and Nigeria.[171]
- In both the Central African Republic and Mali, deaths and injuries were attributed to victim-activated explosive devices apparently previously emplaced by the now-defunct Wagner Group.[172]
- Other possible use was recorded in Cameroon and the DRC.[173]

UNATTRIBUTED USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

During the reporting period, the Monitor identified the use of antipersonnel mines by unconfirmed actors in the border region between States Parties Thailand and Cambodia, in States Parties Bangladesh, Sudan, and Thailand (near Myanmar and Malaysia), and in state not party Myanmar.

USE IN THE BORDER REGION BETWEEN THAILAND AND CAMBODIA

During the current reporting period, there was one verified instance of new use of antipersonnel mines in disputed territory along the Thailand-Cambodia frontier on 10 November 2025. There were also several serious allegations of use made by Thailand against the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) in that same territory throughout the reporting period. Cambodia has categorically denied any new use, noting its "commitment to the Convention is absolute," and saying, "We have not laid anti-personnel mines since joining the Convention, and we will never do so."[174] At various points, Cambodia has also responded to the claims by stating that no credible independent investigation of the allegations has been made, and that the mines were old and in Cambodian territory, not Thai territory.[175]

171 **Niger**: On 28 August 2025, a pastoralist and his herd encountered an IED attributed to Boko Haram (JAS) outside Barwa, Diffa. A boy died after stepping on an explosive device attributed to Islamic State West African Province/Boko Haram (ISWAP/BH) in Barwa, in Diffa region, on 24 June 2025. **Nigeria**: On 25 June 2026, two metal scavengers were killed after an encounter with an explosive device left by an unknown group in Umuoguma, Imo. On 14 April 2026, a woman was killed after triggering multiple IEDs allegedly left by Boko Haram (JAS) on the outskirts of Madagali town, Adamawa. On 7 January 2026, a woman was injured after a donkey stepped on an explosive device attributed to ISWAP in Goniri, Yobe. On 5 December 2025, four children were killed and another injured after finding an explosive device planted by Boko Haram (JAS) in Banki, Borno. One girl was killed and another injured after stepping on an explosive device attributed to ISWAP/BH on 29 June 2025. They lived in the Government Girls Secondary School (GGSS) internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Monguno, in Borno state. See, online database of ACLED.

172 **Central African Republic**: On 12 September 2025, several people were injured by an explosive planted by the Wagner Group in Mboula, Mambere-Kadei. On 16 July 2025, one person was killed and another injured by an encounter with an explosive device, planted by an unidentified group, while traveling to their fields near Aregue, Haut-Mbomou prefecture. Two civilians, travelling to their fields, were killed by an explosive device allegedly planted by the Wagner Group in Koumboli, Haut-Mbomou prefecture, on 3 July 2025. One refugee was killed and two children injured, while working in their fields, by an explosive device attributed to the Wagner Group in Birao, Vakaga prefecture, on 15 July 2025. See, online database of ACLED.

173 **Cameroon**: On 10 May 2026 a pastoralist stepped on an IED attributed to ISWAP/BH near Baragaram, Extreme-Nord. On 9 April 2026, a man was killed by an explosive device planted by an unidentified group in Bamenda-Nkwen, Nord-Ouest. In February 2026, four children were injured by an encounter with an explosive device left by an unidentified armed group in Njindom, Nord-Ouest. **DRC**: A farmer died from injuries after stepping on a landmine attributed to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Eringeti, North Kivu province, on 18 February 2025. Three civilians returning from their fields were injured after stepping on an explosive device attributed to the ADF near Kambau, North Kivu province, on 5 May 2025. See, online database of ACLED.

174 "Cambodia hits back at Thailand at international mine meeting: 'Which country has ever launched a military attack against its neighbour over unverified landmine incidents?'," *Khmer Times*, 6 December 2025, bit.ly/KhmerTimes6Dec2025.

175 C. Nika, "Cambodia Refutes Thailand's Allegation over Recent Landmine Incident," *Agence Kampuchea Presse*, 18 July 2025, bit.ly/AgenceKampucheaPresse18July2025. See also, May Kunmakara, "Cambodia: Thailand Aware of Minefield, Still Crossed Border," *Kampuchea Thmey Daily*, 14 August 2025, bit.ly/KampucheaThmeyDaily14Aug2025.

In total, Thailand alleged that there were 11 incidents between 16 July 2025 and 29 December 2025 in which 25 Thai military personnel received injuries from antipersonnel landmines allegedly newly placed by Cambodian forces in areas disputed between the two countries.

The initial Thai allegations involved the following incidents, as reported by the Thai military:

- On 16 July 2025, one Thai soldier lost his foot and two others were injured by a landmine while patrolling between Ubon Ratchathani province of Thailand and Preah Vihear province of Cambodia.[176]
- On 23 July 2025, one Thai soldier lost a leg after stepping on a landmine near the Chong An Ma border crossing between Ubon Ratchathani province of Thailand and Preah Vihear province of Cambodia, while four others were also injured.[177]
- On 28 July 2025, one Thai soldier was seriously injured after stepping on a landmine during armed conflict, just prior to a midnight ceasefire, in what the Thai military said was an illegally laid minefield around the Ta Kwai temple.[178]
- On 9 August 2025, a Thai soldier suffered the loss of his foot after stepping on a landmine at Don Ao-Krissana border area between Si Sa Ket province of Thailand and Preah Vihear province of Cambodia, while two others were also injured.[179]
- On 11 August 2025, a Thai soldier lost his leg after stepping on a landmine near the Ta Muen/Moan Thom temple ruins on the edges of Surin province of Thailand and Oddar Meanchey province of Cambodia.[180]
- On 27 August 2025, three Thai soldiers were injured by a landmine while patrolling between two Thai military bases west of the Ta Kwai/Krabey temple ruins on the edges of Surin province of Thailand and Oddar Meanchey province of Cambodia.[181]

On 24 July 2025, after the first reported incident, Thailand submitted a letter to the UN Secretary-General "requesting clarification from Cambodia" regarding the alleged use pursuant to Article 8.2 of the Mine Ban Treaty, which allows states to submit requests for clarification if they wish to "clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party."[182] In October 2025, Cambodia replied to the Secretary-General's request for clarification, which was then delivered by the Secretary-General's office to Thailand.[183]

In August 2025, Thailand convened a meeting for diplomats stationed in Bangkok from States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty at which it presented its evidence of new use of antipersonnel landmines.[184] Specifically, Thailand alleged the injuries to its soldiers were

176 "Landmine dispute escalates tensions between Thailand and Cambodia," *Reuters*, 22 July 2025, bit.ly/Reuters22July2025; and Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement on the Protest Against the Use of Anti-Personnel Mines," 20 July 2025, bit.ly/ThailandStatement20July2025.

177 "New mine blast inflames border tensions," *Bangkok Post*, 23 July 2025, bit.ly/BangkokPost23July2025.

178 "Landmines block Thai military from securing temple site," *Bangkok Post*, 31 July 2025, bit.ly/BangkokPost31July2025. Thailand identified the location as being in Surin province, Thailand.

179 Clea Skopeliti, "Three Thai soldiers injured by landmine on border with Cambodia, army says," *The Guardian*, 9 August 2025, bit.ly/TheGuardian9Aug2025.

180 "Thai soldier loses leg in latest landmine blast on Thai-Cambodian border in Surin," *Thai PBS*, 12 August 2025, bit.ly/ThaiPBS12Aug2025.

181 "Three Thai Soldiers Injured in Border Landmine Attack," *The Nation*, 27 August 2025, bit.ly/TheNation27Aug2025.

182 Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, "Thailand's Response under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Convention) to the Landmine Incidents Involving Thai Military Personnel on 16 and 23 July 2025," 29 July 2025, bit.ly/ThailandMFA29July2025.

183 Interview with Cherdchai Chaivaivid, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Thailand, New York, 15 October 2025.

184 "Thailand condemns Cambodian use of mines before international envoys," *Bangkok Post*, 15 August 2025, bit.ly/BangkokPost15Aug2025.

the result of "recently laid" antipersonnel landmines by the Cambodian military at several locations along the Thai-Cambodian un-demarcated border in July and August 2025.[185]

In October 2025, both Cambodia and Thailand requested ASEAN to establish a multinational framework designed to monitor and ensure the full implementation of the ceasefire between the two countries, and carry out impartial investigation into any ceasefire violation claims.[186]

Later, an additional incident was reported by Thailand, which has subsequently been verified:

- On 10 November 2025, one Thai soldier was seriously injured and three others received minor injuries when they stepped on a newly laid landmine on a patrol route at Huai Ta Maria between Preah Vihear Temple and Phu Makua/Phnom Trap adjacent to Si Sa Ket province of Thailand and Preah Vihear province of Cambodia. In the aftermath, three additional PMN-2 mines were discovered at the location of the incident. According to Thai military forces, the path was in regular use and had been previously patrolled without incident on 8 November.[187]

On 14 November 2025, the ASEAN Observer Team conducted an observation and verification visit to the site of the 10 November incident.[188] This included inspecting the site of the incident, along with remnants of the PMN-2 antipersonnel mine from that incident; it also included inspecting the three additional unexploded PMN-2 antipersonnel mines discovered in the same location after the 10 November incident. On 20 November 2025, the ASEAN Observer Team reported its conclusion that the 10 November incident and the three additional PMN-2 antipersonnel mines were all freshly emplaced, likely on 9 November 2025.[189]

On 13 and 14 November 2025, the Monitor carried out its own research into the incidents, undertaking field visits to the 10 November incident site at Huai Ta Maria, and to the site of the 23 July incident near the Chong An Ma border crossing.

The Monitor team additionally examined PMN-2 antipersonnel mines that Thailand claimed to have captured from a former Cambodian military position on Phu Makua on 4 August 2025. The mines were in factory-new condition.[190] The Monitor also met with Thai civilian and military officials in Bangkok to examine other items relating to Thailand's claim that the incidents resulted from new use. The Monitor also questioned the military officer who undertook the forensic investigation into the incidents for the Thai Army and separately met with the investigating police who undertook a criminal investigation into the

185 Thailand cited specifically the incidents on: 16 July 2025 in Chong Bok area, Ubon Ratchathani province; 23 July 2025 in Chong An Ma area, Ubon Ratchathani province; and 9 August 2025 in Chong Don Ao - Krisana area in Kantharalak district, Si Sa Ket province, in which 11 Thai military personnel were seriously injured after stepping on antipersonnel mines. Thailand claims the mines were recently planted by Cambodian military personnel. Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, "Thailand's Responses under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Convention) to the Landmine Incidents involving Thai Military Personnel," 10 August 2025, bit.ly/ThailandPR10Aug2025.

186 "Joint Declaration by the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand on the Outcomes of their Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia," 26 October 2025, bit.ly/CambodiaThailandDeclaration26Oct2025.

187 "Another Thai soldier maimed by landmine, in Si Sa Ket," *Bangkok Post*, 10 November 2025, bit.ly/BangkokPost10Nov2025.

188 The ASEAN Observer Teams are composed of military attaches stationed at their national embassy in the capital of each country. A team from those stationed in Phnom Penh carried out investigations within Cambodia, and a team from those stationed in Bangkok carried out investigations within Thailand. US White House press release, "Joint Declaration by the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand on the outcomes of their meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia," 26 October 2025, bit.ly/CambodiaThailandDeclaration26Oct2025.

189 ASEAN Observer Team – Thailand, "AOT-TH Special Report Observation and Verification of Mine Laying at Thailand-Cambodia Border," 20 November 2025 (copy on file with the Monitor).

190 The PMN-2 mines had their arming keys attached, which is the condition they come from the factory. The mine is armed through a one-way process in which the arming key is turned, pulled out, and then discarded.

10 November incident. In addition, the Monitor met with the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) in Phnom Penh in January 2026 and during the Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2025 to discuss the new use allegations.

The Monitor's research came to the same conclusion as the ASEAN Observer Team regarding the 10 November incident: it resulted from a newly laid PMN-2 antipersonnel mine.

Subsequently, the following allegations emerged in late 2025, as reported by the Thai government and local media:

- On 21 December 2025, one Thai soldier was seriously injured in the Ban Sam Lang area on the edge of Trat province of Thailand and Pursat province of Cambodia. A Thai military officer stated that remnants of a PMN-2 antipersonnel mine were recovered from the site, which they claimed was newly laid.[191]
- On 25 December 2025, two Thai soldiers were injured while engaged in landmine clearance in the area of Ta Kwai/Krabey temple ruins. The Thai military stated that an inspection of the incident site revealed the emplacement of four additional PMN-2 antipersonnel mines, laid consecutively along the route of troop movements.[192]
- On 27 December 2025, one Thai soldier was seriously injured by an antipersonnel landmine in the Satthasom area on the edge of Si Sa Ket province of Thailand and Preah Vihear province of Cambodia. The Thai military stated the mine was recently laid by Cambodia.[193]
- On 29 December 2025, another soldier was injured while undertaking clearance also in the Satthasom area. A Thai military assessment indicated that a significant number of newly laid landmines were present in the area, particularly those parts that were under Thai control prior to signing the ceasefire agreement at the Special Meeting of the General Border Committee (GBC) between Thailand and Cambodia on 27 December 2025.[194]

Aside from the 10 November 2025 incident, the Monitor cannot determine if the remaining 10 allegations raised by Thailand indeed reflect new use of antipersonnel mines, nor can the Monitor determine which party or parties are responsible.

Thailand has raised serious allegations, both regarding the new use of antipersonnel landmines and in attributing that use to Cambodia which, as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, is prohibited from using antipersonnel mines under any circumstances. The ICBL has called on both parties "to conduct transparent investigations into these allegations and to report their findings to States Parties" and "re-establish dialogue and cooperation to ensure the swift clearance of contaminated border areas."[195]

191 Thailand listed the location as Muang district in Trat province. Jakkrit Waewkhlaihong, "Thai marine loses foot to landmine explosion in Trat," *Bangkok Post*, 21 December 2025, bit.ly/BangkokPost21Dec2025.

192 Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, "Statement on the protest to the Cambodian side concerning the 9th landmine incident," 26 December 2025, bit.ly/ThailandMFA26Dec2025.

193 Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, "Statement on the protest to the Cambodian side concerning the 10th landmine incident," 27 December 2025, bit.ly/ThailandMFA27Dec2025.

194 Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, "Statement on the protest to the Cambodian side concerning the 11th landmine incident," 29 December 2025, bit.ly/ThailandMFA29Dec2025.

195 Statement of ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2025, bit.ly/ICBLStatement4Dec2025.

USE IN BANGLADESH AND MYANMAR, AND ALONG THEIR SHARED BORDER

Several instances of new mine use were reported in Bangladesh in 2025 and through mid-2026. Though all appear to be attributable to NSAGs, the Monitor cannot identify the actors responsible at this time.

According to the Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB), more than 40 landmine incidents occurred along the Naikhongchhari, Teknaf, and Ukhiya border areas between 1 January 2025 and 1 October 2026, in which at least five people, including a BGB member, were killed and more than 42 others were injured.[196] It is unclear if these incidents were due to new mine use.

Displaced Rohingya people from Myanmar, as well as Bangladeshi nationals, have regularly been victimized by landmines at the "zero line" or just after having crossed into Myanmar. Bangladesh police reported that at least 28 people were injured by landmines near or in the border area in 2025.[197] The Monitor has noted that many of these injuries happen between the 46th and 51st border pillars on the Myanmar border.[198]

The beginning of 2026 also saw an increase in the number of mine victims, including some Bangladeshi nationals, along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, with casualties recorded almost monthly.[199] The increase led some Rohingya refugees in the Bangladeshi refugee camps to believe that landmines were being laid to prevent their return.[200] As in previous years, cross-border cattle traders and smugglers



A mechanical clearance team conducts technical survey in an area contaminated with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, in Iraq. The operator maintains a 50m safety distance behind an armored shield while remotely operating the machine.

© Hussein Jabbar/NPA, December 2025

196 "Rohingya youth injured in landmine blast along Myanmar border," *New Age*, 1 October 2026, bit.ly/NewAge1Oct2026.

197 "Landmines destroy limbs and lives on Bangladesh-Myanmar border," *Al Jazeera*, 13 January 2026, bit.ly/AlJazeera13Jan2026.

198 From news reports on landmine incidents monitored by the Monitor. For example, in an April 2025 Bangladeshi news report, a Bangladeshi national was injured by an antipersonnel landmine "along the zero line between border pillars 46 and 47, near Jaruliachhari Border Outpost (BOP)." Shakib Ahmed, "Bangladeshi man loses leg in landmine blast along Myanmar border," *Daily Observer*, 8 April 2025, bit.ly/DailyObserver8Apr2025.

199 Masum Billah and Shahidul Islam, "'My leg was hanging like a fish tail': The landmine victims of Bangladesh's Myanmar border," *Daily Waadaa*, 21 October 2026, bit.ly/DailyWaadaa21Oct2026; and "Rohingya youth injured in landmine blast along Myanmar border," *New Age*, 1 October 2026, bit.ly/NewAge1Oct2026.

200 See, for example, Porimol Palma, Mohammad Jamil Khan, and Mokammel Shuvo, "Bangladesh-Myanmar border: Landmine-related injuries on the rise," *The Daily Star*, 18 August 2025, bit.ly/TheDailyStar18Aug2025. Most news regarding landmine casualties among the Rohingya is solely published in Bangladeshi newspapers.

remained at high risk of landmine injuries and death as they crossed into Myanmar for their livelihood, as were others engaged in activities around the border.[201]

Attribution of this use cannot be determined at this time. In May 2024, the Arakan Army (AA) took control of the Myanmar border with Bangladesh and created routes through border minefields, requiring that people pay in order to be guided across.[202] However, the border area was previously heavily mined by government forces. It is unclear how recently all mines were laid.

In mid-2026, further increases in mine victims on both sides of the border occurred. This may be attributable to new use by the AA and other armed groups operating in the border area.[203]

In August 2025, the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Myanmar made clear that for any return of Rohingya refugees to Rakhine state, or for access for humanitarian assistance, the existing landmine contamination in Rakhine state must be addressed.[204]

Elephants and other animals have also been maimed by mines emplaced along this border, including during the reporting period.[205]

USE IN SUDAN

Since the conflict that erupted in 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), there have been reports of new antipersonnel mine use, though it is not clear when landmines were used and by whom.

There was a spike of reports in mid-2025 following the withdrawal of the RSF from Khartoum, clearly indicating new mine use, but the Monitor cannot identify which actor or actors emplaced the new mines cited in these reports, nor when the mines were emplaced, at this time.[206] The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) office in Sudan published information in August 2025 that landmines were confirmed at several locations, including antipersonnel mines in Mogran, Khartoum, and antivehicle mines in Bahri and Omdurman.[207]

Additionally, the director of Sudan's National Mine Action Center, Major General Khaled Hamdan, told the *Sudan News Agency* that three minefields were discovered in an "acacia

201 Civilians, including Bangladeshi citizens and Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh, were injured or killed by antipersonnel mines in at least 11 incidents from early 2025 through August 2026. See, for example, "Landmine blast inside Myanmar kills youth near Bandarban border," *Daily Sun*, 24 August 2026, bit.ly/DailySun24Aug2026; S Bashu Das, "Rohingya man killed in landmine explosion along Bandarban border," *Dhaka Tribune*, 9 June 2026, bit.ly/DhakaTribune9Jun2026; "Rohingya youth's foot severed in landmine blast near Ukhia border," *Views Bangladesh*, 15 April 2026, bit.ly/ViewsBangladesh15Apr2026; "Bangladeshi man's leg severed as landmine explodes along Bandarban border," *Dhaka Tribune*, 3 February 2025, bit.ly/DhakaTribune3Feb2025; and Khaing Lu Hla (Yoma Myay), "A young woman lost her leg due to a mine explosion at the Bengal-Rakhine border," *Narinjara News*, 8 August 2025, bit.ly/NarinjaraNews8Aug2025. For further information, see ICBL-CMC, "Country Profile: Myanmar/Burma: Mine Ban Policy," last updated 13 November 2025, bit.ly/MyanmarCountryProfile.

202 As of May 2024, the AA guides anyone wishing to traverse the border if they pay tax to the AA soldiers controlling the border post. A Rohingya woman, who traveled from north Buthidaung for medical treatment, told the Monitor, "My brother and I paid 20,000MMK (10,000MMK each) [US$9.42 ($4.71)] to the AA office near the border. They gave us a pass for one month. The AA soldiers also took us to the border point. They showed us safe passage. We reached Lambochari of Naikongchari [in Bangladesh] easily." Exchange rate for 31 May 2024: MMK1,000=US$0.4708. Oanda, bit.ly/OandaCurrencyConverter.

203 Interview with informant who requested anonymity for personal safety reasons, May 2026. See also incidents in UNGA, "Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar: Report of the Secretary General," A/80/307, 5 August 2025, docs.un.org/A/80/307.

204 UNGA, "Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar: Report of the Secretary General," A/80/307, 5 August 2025, docs.un.org/A/80/307.

205 "Wild elephant's ankle blown off by Arakan Army landmine in Naikyangchhari," *BD Digest*, 12 August 2025, bit.ly/BDDigest12Aug2025.

206 See, for instance, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), "Khartoum: Explosive Ordnance Threat – Flash Update No 2 (August 2025)," 1 August 2025, bit.ly/UNMAS1Aug2025.

207 "Sudan: UN confirms the presence of antipersonnel mines in Khartoum State," *UN News*, 4 August 2025, bit.ly/UNNews4Aug2025.

forest and Muqrin [Mogran] areas" of Khartoum after the withdrawal of the RSF.[208] The Sudan National Mine Action Center reported the "recent confirmation of 7 new minefields in urban areas," in a planning document prepared for the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties.[209]

Press reports in April 2026 recounted that deminers spent eight months clearing Mogran Park of landmines, finding dangerous items, including 19 antipersonnel mines. Clearance of some 123,000m² in the park began in August 2025 and was expected to be completed in May 2026.[210]

In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report covering calendar year 2025, the government of Sudan reported that five new known antipersonnel mine contaminated areas measuring a total of 101,134m² were recorded in 2025 in Khartoum, without specifying the type and quantity of each type of antipersonnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced.[211] In a statement at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025, Sudan said: "It has also been confirmed that the [RSF] militia has planted anti-personnel landmines in certain areas; specifically, minefields discovered in Khartoum State contain anti-personnel mines characterized by low metal content, which complicates detection efforts."[212]

USE IN THAILAND (NEAR MYANMAR AND MALAYSIA)

In 2025, the use of antipersonnel mines or improvised antipersonnel mines occurred in several distinct locations in Thailand. Some of these incidents occurred near Thailand's border with Myanmar in the north; other, unrelated incidents occurred in Thailand's southern provinces close to Malaysia. The latter is consistent with patterns in prior years, as sporadic use of victim-activated improvised mines has consistently been reported since 2006 in southern Thailand.[213] These incidents are understood to be attributable to NSAGs.

The following incidents were reported during the current reporting period:

- In June 2025, a police officer lost his foot after stepping on an improvised landmine planted near a water pump in Muang district of Narathiwat province, in southern Thailand; two others were also injured in the incident.[214]

208 "Three minefields unearthed in Sudan capital," *Dabanga*, 29 July 2025, bit.ly/Dabanga29July2025.

209 Presentation of Sudan, "Sudan Individualised Approach: December 2025," 2 December 2025, p. 7, bit.ly/SudanPresentation2Dec2025. Sudan's presentation shows the location of the antipersonnel minefield in Mogran Park (also spelled "Al-Mugran" or "Muqrin") in Khartoum.

210 "Sudan's war leaves Khartoum with unexploded mines and other weapons," *Arab News*, 29 April 2026, bit.ly/ArabNews29Apr2026; and "Explosive Remnants of War Litter Sudan's Capital," *Africa Defense Forum*, 26 May 2026, bit.ly/AfricaDefenseForum26May2026.

211 Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form C. Annex I (List of Remaining Mined Areas) provides the coordinates and size of the five mined areas in Khartoum: four areas covering 95,529m² in Mogran and one area covering 5,605m² in Kadarow.

212 Statement of Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2025, bit.ly/SudanStatement4Dec2025.

213 Incidents reported by the Monitor from 2018–2021 include the following. On 9 August 2021, a territorial defense volunteer lost a leg after stepping on a landmine at his rubber plantation, and his wife suffered facial injuries, in Su-Ngai Padi district, Narathiwat province. "Defense Volunteer has leg blown off after stepping on landmine in his rubber plantation - wife injured," *ASEAN Now*, 10 August 2021, bit.ly/ASEANNow10Aug2021. On 9 October 2020, a Thai ranger was killed after stepping on a landmine while pursuing insurgents in Sai Buri district, Pattani province. "One ranger killed and two injured by suspected insurgents in Pattani province," *Thai PBS*, 9 October 2020. On 2 July 2018, a latex tapper in Krong Penang district, Yala province, lost his foot after stepping on a landmine emplaced by insurgents at a rubber plantation. Two other latex tappers were seriously wounded by mines in separate incidents, in Yaha district on 28 June 2018 and Muang district on 2 July 2018. See, Teeranai Charuvastra, "Landmine Wounds Deep South Farmer," *Khaosod*, 2 July 2018, bit.ly/Khaosod2July2018; Mariyam Ahmad, "Thailand: Landmine Injures Fifth Rubber Farm Worker in a Week," *Benar News*, 5 July 2018, bit.ly/BenarNews5July2018; and HRW, "Thailand: Insurgents Use Landmines in South," 4 July 2018, bit.ly/HRW4July2018. Earlier incidents involving improvised mines have been reported in southern Thailand by the Monitor since 2006.

214 "Three police officers injured by landmine in Narathiwat," *Thai PBS*, 20 June 2025, bit.ly/ThaiPBS20June2025.

- On 6 March 2025, in Wat Kuhaphimuk in Na Tham, Yala province, a civilian kicked a suspicious object in a walkway, triggering a blast that injured two civilians.[215]
- In February 2025, three Thai military officers on patrol along the border with Myanmar, in Chiang Mai province, were injured after stepping on a landmine.[216]

In addition, in May 2026, police in Huai Yai sub-district of Chon Buri province arrested a Chinese national in possession of four POMZ-2 antipersonnel landmines and many other weapons.[217] The mines were later turned over to the Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) for destruction.

PRODUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

More than 50 states produced antipersonnel landmines at some point in the past.[218] As many as 36 states have ceased production, including two states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Israel and Nepal.[219]

"Producers" are all countries either for which there is evidence of current production of antipersonnel landmines or their unique components, or states that are known to have produced antipersonnel landmines in the past and have yet to formally and unequivocally commit to never produce them again.[220] Evidence of current production is understood to mean any evidence that indicates either factual production or a capacity and willingness to produce. Such evidence can take many forms including, among others, calls for tender or contracts for the production of landmines or their components, advertising the capacity to produce or sell landmines or their components, the discovery of remnants of landmines bearing a recent production date, ongoing testing of landmines, and announcements of newly developed landmines or their components.

A total of 16 countries are considered producers of antipersonnel mines under this definition.

During the reporting period, one of the new producers is State Party Ukraine, which is now producing artisanal and 3D-printed mines. Any production of antipersonnel mines is a serious violation of Ukraine's legal obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty. As discussed earlier, Ukraine's attempt to "suspend" the operation of the treaty has no legal effect, and Ukraine remains fully bound by all Mine Ban Treaty obligations, including the ban on production. (See *Ukraine's attempt to "suspend" the Mine Ban Treaty* section.)

The remaining 15 countries that are considered producers of antipersonnel mines—Armenia, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam—are states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Just five of these—India, Myanmar, Poland, Russia, and South Korea—appear to be actively

215 Online database of ACLED.

216 "Three soldiers injured by landmine explosion in northern Thailand," *News Flare*, 13 February 2025, bit.ly/NewsFlare13Feb2025.

217 "Chinese man arrested with military arsenal, C-4 explosives in Pattaya," *Thai PBS*, 9 May 2026, bit.ly/ThaiPBS9May2026.

218 There are 52 confirmed current and past producers. Not included within that list are five States Parties that some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear whether Syria produced antipersonnel mines.

219 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 34 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, Uganda, the UK, and Zimbabwe.

220 These formal and unequivocal statements may take many forms. This can include, for example, an on-the-record statement at multilateral meetings (e.g., at the UNGA, a Meeting of States Parties, or a Review Conference), a statement in an Article 7 transparency report, or a formal declaration of government policy. Such a statement should include both a commitment to never produce antipersonnel landmines again and an avowal that the country's capacity to produce these weapons has been destroyed.

producing or developing antipersonnel mines or to have shown a clear intent to do so in the near future. Notably, this list includes one of the five countries that withdrew from the treaty in 2025–2026. In addition, the landmine policy announced by the US in December 2025 returned it to the list of countries that either actively produce antipersonnel landmines or reserve the right to do so, as it allows the US Department of Defense to "develop, produce, or otherwise acquire" non-persistent landmines.[221]

Finally, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania—all of which withdrew from the Mine Ban Treaty in the current reporting period—have taken steps during the current reporting period to indicate their interest in developing the capacity to produce landmines in the future.

PRODUCTION BY STATE PARTY UKRAINE

Ukraine has long stated that it "has not made and does not produce antipersonnel mines."[222] Its most recent Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report, submitted in April 2025, also states that "Ukraine did not and does not produce anti-personnel mines," and that "ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES ARE NOT PRODUCED IN UKRAINE."[223] Ukraine has not submitted its annual report for 2025, which was due by 30 April 2026.

However, information has continued to emerge since 2024 indicating that antipersonnel mines are being fabricated by companies and individuals in Ukraine, for placement by drones. There are numerous examples posted on social media illustrating that entities in Ukraine have apparently built drone-dropped antipersonnel mines.[224] Social media posts suggest that Ukrainian volunteer organization DrukArmy (3D Print Army), which claims to receive production requests directly from the military, has mass-produced 3D-printed antipersonnel landmines of the "Wing" type since at least June 2025.[225] A social media post from December 2024 claimed that, even before the US's decision to provide Ukraine with antipersonnel mines, the Aidar Battalion had "started making anti-personnel mines themselves in their own workshop using 3D printers." The post further stated, "We are collecting components/ingredients to produce 10,000 anti-personnel mines for drone drops," adding that "these

221 See, Joyce Sohyun Lee, "Hegseth reverses landmine policy to allow use of controversial weapon," *The Washington Post*, 19 December 2025, bit.ly/WashingtonPost19Dec2025; and US Secretary of War, "Memorandum: Review of the Department of War's Policy on Landmines," 2 December 2025, bit.ly/USDoD2Dec2025. The US was previously removed from the list of producers in 2014 and 2022, only to be added back on to the list in 2020 and 2025 following decisions by the administrations of President Donald Trump to roll back the ban on US mine production.

222 For example, in May 2009, Ukraine said that it "did not produce APL [antipersonnel landmines] in the past, doesn't produce at present, and will not produce them in the future." Presentation of Ukraine, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 25 May 2009, bit.ly/UkrainePresentation25May2009. See also, Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form E.

223 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Forms F and G.

224 Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "The Russians complain that this printed Ukrainian mine dropped by drones is almost impossible to see in the grass. The lid is designed to collapse when stepped on, allowing the bolt to contact the battery to complete a circuit. An electric detonator explodes the TNT filling." 16 September 2024, 18:30 UTC. X post, bit.ly/RoyXPost16Sept2024; and HUNGARIANua (robert_magyar), "…Miniatures from the media group of the 414th Separate Assault Brigade. Each crew of strike bombers performs typical tasks: remote mining with anti-tank and antipersonnel candies, working on planned and operational targets, delivering humanitarian cargo to friendly units, escorting deblocking and assault actions, etc." 3 January 2025, 17:31 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/HUNGARIANuaTelegram3Jan2025.

225 PrintArmy (drukarmy), "Wing — DrukArmy's largest initiative to help the military. Load the plastic, print — and bring victory closer! drukarmy.org." 22 June 2025, 10:09 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/PrintArmyTelegram22June2025.

mines are not equipped with a self-destruct mechanism."[226] A subsequent post from April 2025 appears to show a large number of 3D-printed casings for antipersonnel mines of the "Wing" type.[227]

On 2 April 2026, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence stated that in the first three months of 2026, the country's procurement of mines and ammunition for drones increased. However, it did not specify whether it referred to antivehicle mines, antipersonnel mines, or both.[228]

In July 2026, a Ukrainian company showcased the MPP-3/"Wing" antipersonnel mine and a 40-mine release system for UAVs at the Brave1 Advantage exhibition organized by Brave1, a Ukrainian government initiative aimed at developing defense technologies.[229]

Ukrainian 3D printing volunteer organization WinUAHub announced in September 2026 that it had printed a total of over 700,000 plastic casings for mines for Ukraine's military. Although it did not specify what type of mines, the accompanying graphic appeared to show a "Gingerbread" antipersonnel mine.[230] As of September 2026, another 3D printing

226 In Factum (in_factum), "While the US dared to give us antipersonnel mines for remote mining of the area, I remind you that the 'Aydarites' did not wait for the White House's decision. And they began to rivet antipersonnel mines themselves in their own workshop on 3D printers in order to sow all approaches to our infantry positions. We are collecting components/ingredients from which 10,000 antipersonnel mines for dropping from drones will be made. It is important that the mine looks small, and therefore inconspicuous. But if a Russian steps on it, the Russian will no longer be able to walk. Because there will be nothing to do. And we also do not listen to the 'important' opinions of Greta and all kinds of activists from Greenpeace to Amnesty International, and therefore these mines are not equipped with a self-destruct mechanism." 3 December 2024, 12:04 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/InFactTelegram3Dec2024; and In Factum (in_factum), "Gentlemen, I remind you that we are raising funds for a large-scale project to produce 10,000 antipersonnel mines. This is even more than what some countries participating in the 'Ramstein' format have supplied us. We need to collect another 63 thousand hryvnias! After which the project will go into practical implementation. 3D printers will work at full capacity, and the area will be mined on an unprecedented scale." 5 December 2024, 14:10 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/InFactTelegram5Dec2024.

227 In Factum (in_factum), "Remember our collection for components for 3D printing 10,000 antipersonnel mine blanks to sow the area trampled by the enemy from drones? The guys are working. The collection was originally for the pilots of 'Aidar', but the capacity of local production allows sharing the product with allies. Probably one of the most effective collections we have been involved in, considering the amount raised and the final product." 9 March 2025, 12:21 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/InFactTelegram9Mar2025; In Factum (in_factum), "Bazookas, there are 20 thousand left to collect here. The amount needed for the armor plates has been withdrawn from the bank. They are already with our fighter. The report will be out soon. Currently, we are collecting strictly for 100 kg of shrapnel, which will be wrapped around charges for dropping on the Russians. To give you an idea, 100 kg is enough for almost two hundred damn antipersonnel mines, which Russian assault groups will definitely appreciate. Throw in 10 hryvnias each, gentlemen." 13 April 2025, 22:29 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/InFactTelegram13Apr2025.

228 Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, "Record purchases of mines and ammunition for UAVs: Ministry of Defense increases supplies to the front," 2 April 2026, bit.ly/UkraineMoD2Apr2026.

229 Illia Volynskyi, "A Ukrainian manufacturer has showcased its own range of ammunition for drones," *Mezha*, 6 July 2026, bit.ly/Mezha6July2026; Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "A Ukrainian cassette system for dropping up to forty landmines from heavy bomber drones was displayed at the Brave1 Advantage exhibition. The landmines are printed anti-personnel blast devices of the 'Wing' series." 9 July 2026, 17:21 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostRoy9July2026; and LinkedIn post by Dmytro Bazaliiev, 10 July 2026, bit.ly/DmytroBazaliiev10July2026. See also, Brave1, "Homepage: Munitions," accessed 13 September 2026, https://brave1.gov.ua/en. On its website, as of September 2026, Brave1 mentioned "anti-personnel mines" among munitions "in development."

230 "Gingerbread" mines are 3D-printed plastic mines, resembling small, round gingerbread cakes. WinUAHub (winuahub), "August Results: 6,219 kg of Aid. WinUAHub statistics for the final month of summer: 6,219 kg of printed items produced and delivered to the military. This includes 31,459 units of "bombs" for our defenders. Summer has ended, but our 3D-printing front keeps working non-stop. The ordinary plastic in your hands transforms daily into real combat capability and protection for our warriors. It is worth noting that the total weight of aid printed by the community has surpassed the incredible milestone of 248,384 kg! We thank every volunteer printer for their resilience, the time they have dedicated, and their tireless work in the face of any obstacles. We continue printing Victory. Glory to Ukraine!" 2 September 2026, 07:04 UTC. Telegram, t.me/winuahub/1307. See also, WinUAHub, "Product Printing Statistics," accessed 13 September 2026, bit.ly/WinUAHubStatistics; and Kathryn Diss, "Inside Ukraine's secret network of 3D printing farms building bombs," *ABC News*, 12 April 2026, bit.ly/TheABC12Apr2026.

organization, called DrukUkraine, mentioned on its website "Gingerbread" antipersonnel mines as available for order free of charge for members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.[231]

Other antipersonnel mines reportedly produced in Ukraine include a Ukrainian version of the PFM-1S mine, the HFM0050 mine, the OZM-25 bounding fragmentation mine, and the STIK-F mine.[232] (See also *Use by State Party Ukraine* section.)

Ukraine has also modified several types of antivehicle mines for individual delivery by drone.[233]

As a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, these activities represent serious violations of Ukraine's legal obligations. As discussed earlier, Ukraine's attempt to "suspend" the operation of the treaty has no legal effect, and Ukraine remains fully bound by all Mine Ban Treaty obligations. (See *Ukraine's attempt to "suspend" the Mine Ban Treaty* section.)

PRODUCTION BY STATES NOT PARTY

Of the remaining 15 producers, India, Myanmar, Poland, Russia, and South Korea appear to be actively producing or developing antipersonnel mines or have shown a capacity and willingness to do so in the near future, including the procurement of components or other long-lead time actions. The remaining 10 producers are not known to be actively producing but have yet to commit to never do so in the future.[234]

INDIA

India is one of the few remaining countries still actively producing antipersonnel landmines. In September 2018, Indian military officials told the Monitor that production of completed mines remained under the control of state-owned enterprise Munitions India Limited (formerly Indian Ordnance Factories, until 2021).[235] However, there is evidence that several private sector companies are also involved in the production of antipersonnel mines.

In August 2020, India announced plans to increase domestic production of antipersonnel mines and end their importation.[236] The Indian Armed Forces reportedly received the first of 700,000 domestically produced Nipun antipersonnel blast mines at the end of 2021.[237]

231 DrukUkraine, "Catalog - Bombs," undated, accessed 13 September 2026, bit.ly/DrukUkraineCatalog. The website states: "All products are free for servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine." It adds: "The DrukUkraine project works exclusively with military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Only a military serviceman can submit an application and receive products absolutely free of charge." DrukUkraine, "Order sparrows," undated, accessed 13 September 2026, bit.ly/DrukUkraineContact.

232 Collective Awareness to UXO, "PFM-1-S Landmine," undated, bit.ly/PFM1SLandmine; Fenix Insight, "PFM-1S (Ukrainian)," undated, bit.ly/FenixPFM1S; Collective Awareness to UXO, "HFM0050 Landmine," undated, bit.ly/HFM0050Landmine; Fenix Insight, "HFM0050," undated, bit.ly/FenixInsightHFM0050; Fenix Insight, "OZM-25 UAV-Deployed Anti-Personnel Bounding Fragmentation Mine," undated, bit.ly/FenixInsightOZM-25; Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "A new Ukrainian landmine for dropping from drones is designated OZM-25. The body of the device is based on the OZM-72 bounding anti-personnel landmine, with pre-formed fragmentation elements. Six spring-loaded 10-meter-long tripwires are deployed after impacting the ground." 18 June 2026, 18:28 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostRoy18June2026; Fenix Insight, "STIK-F," undated, bit.ly/FenixInsightSTIK-F; and Bomb Techs Without Borders, "Basic Identification of Ammunition in Ukraine: V. 10.0," 25 June 2026, bit.ly/BTWOB25June2026.

233 Frederic Gras (fredgrs), "TM-62 launched by drone, with modified fuzing system." 5 April 2024, 10:03 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostFredericGras5Apr2024.

234 For example, Singapore's only known producer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, a government-linked corporation, said in November 2015 that it "is now no longer in the business of designing, producing and selling of anti-personnel mines." See, PAX, "Singapore Technologies Engineering stops production of cluster munitions," 19 November 2015, bit.ly/PAXSingapore19Nov2015.

235 Monitor meeting with Cmdr. Kumar, India Ministry of External Affairs, and Col. Kabthiyal, India Ministry of Defence, CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), Geneva, 27 August 2018.

236 Rajat Pandit, "India announces progressive arms embargo list in a bid to boost domestic defense production," *The Times of India*, 10 August 2020, bit.ly/TimesofIndia10Aug2020.

237 "Nipun anti-personnel mines: Army gets weapons boost for Pakistan, China borders," *Hindustan Times*, 21 December 2021, bit.ly/HindustanTimes21Dec2021.

At least two other mines have reportedly been under development since 2020 as part of a "New Family of Munitions," including Ulka, a bounding fragmentation antipersonnel mine, and Parth, a directional fragmentation antipersonnel mine.[238] Premier Explosives Limited disclosed that it supplied the first batch of Nipun mines in April 2024 and that it expected to complete deliveries in fiscal year 2025.[239] In February 2026, the company stated that it was still delivering antipersonnel mines (of an unspecified type) to the Indian Army and that it expected more orders in the future.[240]

Munitions India Limited has produced the M-14 and M-16 antipersonnel mines, which are copies of earlier US designs.[241] Tender records retrieved from a publicly accessible online government procurement database from 2016–2023 show that Munitions India Limited has listed tenders for components of M-14, M-16, and APER-1B antipersonnel landmines.[242] However, new production tenders for late 2024 and early 2025 did not show new production.[243]

India has also developed a cargo warhead containing antipersonnel mines for Pinaka 214mm artillery rockets. The warhead dispenses 48 pressure-activated antipersonnel mines (also called "Soft Target Munitions" or STM) equipped with a self-destruct mechanism.[244] The STM warhead is also known as ADM-3 (Area Denial Munition-3), to distinguish it from ADM-1 (a cluster munition warhead containing DPICM bomblets) and ADM-2 (a cargo warhead containing antitank mines).[245] Publicly listed company Solar Industries India Limited has continued to advertise Pinaka ADM-3 rockets on its website as of September 2026.[246] Another publicly listed company, Apollo Micro Systems, advertises the STM fuze, stating that "[t]he primary functions of the fuze include enabling landmine deployment and supporting free-fall operation from altitudes ranging between 750 meters and 1 kilometer."[247]

238 Forum post by srai, "New Family of Munitions (NFM)," *Bharat Rakshak*, 19 January 2020, bit.ly/BharatRakshak19Jan2020. Also detailed are three new models of antivehicle mines.

239 Premier Explosives Limited, "Premier Explosives Limited Q4 & FY 24 Earnings Conference Call," 31 May 2024, bit.ly/PremierExplosivesLtd31May2024; and Premier Explosives Limited, "Premier Explosives Limited Q2 and H1 FY 25 Earnings Conference Call," 12 November 2024, bit.ly/PremierExplosivesLtd12Nov2024.

240 Premier Explosives Limited, "Premier Explosives Limited Q3 FY '26 Earnings Conference Call," 20 February 2026, bit.ly/PremierExplosivesLtd20Feb2026.

241 Email reply from Ordnance Factory Board, India Ministry of Defence, to Right to Information Request by Control Arms Foundation of India, 5 May 2011.

242 The Monitor has reviewed annually the listing on Munitions India Limited/Indian Ordnance Factories BidAssist website (previously the e-Procurement website, titled "current contracts"). BidAssist provides a tender number, opening and closing dates, and a detailed description of the item to be manufactured. Contracts have been concluded with Ordnance Factories in Maharashtra or West Bengal, where mines are assembled with components from private companies. The site shows a tender awarded to Munitions India Limited for components for M-14 mines in September 2023, which was to run until March 2024. See, BidAssist website, bit.ly/IndiaBidAssistTenders.

243 The Monitor reviewed the tender listings from June 2024–June 2025 on the Indian government's BidAssist website (previously the e-Procurement website, titled "current contracts"). BidAssist provides a tender number, opening and closing dates, and a detailed description of the item to be manufactured. In that period, there have been several tenders for inert dummy mines, including Pakistani and Chinese antipersonnel landmine models.

244 Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Ministry of Defence of the Government of India, "Artillery Rocket Systems," *Technology Focus*, Vol. 27, Issue 6, December 2019, bit.ly/IndiaTechnologyFocusDec2019.

245 Indian Government, Tender documents, 2025, bit.ly/IndiaTenderDocs2025.

246 Solar Industries India Limited, "Pinaka ADM 1, ADM 2, ADM 3," accessed 21 September 2026, bit.ly/SolarPinakaADM.

247 Apollo Micro Systems, "STM/ATM Fuze," accessed 21 September 2026, bit.ly/ApolloMicroSystemsSTM-ATM.

MYANMAR

State-owned enterprise Myanmar Defence Products Industries (frequently known by its Burmese language acronym as KaPaSa), which operates under the Myanmar military, produces at least five types of antipersonnel landmine: MM1, MM2, MM3, MM5, and MM6.[248]

During 2026, NSAGs in Myanmar continued to publish photographs showing antipersonnel mines produced by the state that they had captured, seized, or recovered from frontline Myanmar Armed Forces units.[249] Although large numbers of Myanmar Defense Products Industries mines continue to appear in the field, the Monitor does not know how frequently production runs occur, but still considers Myanmar an active producer.

POLAND

Poland restarted production of antipersonnel mines during the current reporting period. In particular, Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna signed a cooperation agreement with Poland's Military Institute of Engineering Technology (WITI) for the production of two types of antipersonnel mines (MOD-26 tripwire-activated mines and MND-26 pressure-activated mines) and announced its intention to "achieve serial production readiness for antipersonnel mines in the fourth quarter of 2026, with a target production capacity of up to 1 million units per year."[250]

This follows a series of developments that indicated Poland was preparing to produce mines, following the country's announcement that it would withdraw from the Mine Ban Treaty.

On 18 March 2025, Poland's Deputy Minister of National Defence Paweł Bejda stated that Poland would restart antipersonnel mine production, aiming to have Poland's state-owned defense group, Polish Armaments Group (Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa, PGZ), produce up to one million mines.[251] On 1 July 2025, Polish publicly listed company Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna announced that it had made a decision to relaunch and expand its capacity for large-scale production of antipersonnel mines.[252] In December 2025, Polish company Belma (part of the state-owned PGZ) told *Reuters* that it was preparing for Polish demand, with an expected amount of 5–6 million mines of all types, and that, even though it had not received an order yet, it would be able to produce up to 1.2 million mines of all types, including antipersonnel mines, in 2026. Deputy Minister of National Defence Pawel Zalewski told *Reuters* that excess production could be exported to allies, such as Ukraine and the Baltic states.[253] In February 2026, Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that Poland would soon have the ability to mine its eastern borders within 48 hours in the case of a threat. The deputy defence minister stated that Poland would only deploy mines along its borders "when there is a realistic threat of Russian aggression."[254]

248 The MM1 is modeled on the Chinese Type-59 stake-mounted fragmentation mine; the MM2 is similar to the Chinese Type-58 blast mine; the MM3 is a bounding fragmentation mine; the MM5 is a Claymore-type directional fragmentation mine; and the MM6 is a copy of the US M14 low metal content antipersonnel mine. Myanmar also produces the MM4 antivehicle mine.

249 Mine Free Myanmar, "Military made antipersonnel landmines continue to be captured by anti-military groups," 1 September 2026, bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar1Sept2026.

250 Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna S.A. presentation, "Publication of results for the first half of 2026," October 2026, p. 16, bit.ly/NiewiadowOct2026; and Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna S.A. press release, "Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna has entered into a strategic partnership with WITI for the production of modern anti-personnel mines," 21 May 2026, bit.ly/NiewiadowPGM21May2026.

251 Jaroslaw Adamowski, "Poland eyes 1 million landmines for borders with Belarus, Russia," *Defense One*, 20 March 2025, bit.ly/DefenseOne20March2025.

252 Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna S.A. press release, "Grupa Niewiadów S.A. ready to start production of mines," 1 July 2025, bit.ly/Niewiadow1July2025.

253 Barbara Erling, "Poland to start producing anti-personnel mines to lay along eastern border," *Reuters*, 17 December 2025, bit.ly/Reuters17Dec2025.

254 Claudia Ciobanu, "Poland withdraws from treaty banning antipersonnel mines and will use them to defend against Russia," *Associated Press*, 20 February 2026, bit.ly/AP20Feb2026.

On 2 March 2026, the Polish Armaments Agency initiated market consultations for the acquisition of four types of antipersonnel mines, to be delivered in 2026–2028:

- 5 million directional fragmentation antipersonnel mines, plus 500,000 training mines;
- 4.5 million bounding fragmentation antipersonnel mines with a 360º blast radius (omnidirectional), plus 450,000 training mines;
- 3 million surface fragmentation antipersonnel mines with a 360º blast radius (omnidirectional), plus 300,000 training mines; and
- 2.2 million antipersonnel pressure mines, plus 220,000 training mines.[255]

A total of 11 entities reportedly participated in the market consultations.[256] Among them:

- Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna, which concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Wifama sp. z o.o. on 2 April 2026, to jointly offer various types of antipersonnel mines to the Armaments Agency, specifically directional, pressure-activated, and pull-type mines.[257] On 21 May 2026, Niewiadów signed a cooperation agreement with WITI for the production of two types of antipersonnel mines (MOD-26 tripwire-activated mines and MND-26 pressure-activated mines) and announced its intention to "achieve serial production readiness for antipersonnel mines in the fourth quarter of 2026, with a target production capacity of up to 1 million units per year."[258] In a May 2026 presentation, Niewiadów stated it planned to launch serial production of antipersonnel mines in September 2026, and mentioned among its offerings MON-100 and Claymore M18A1 directional antipersonnel mines, in addition to MND-26 and MOD-26 antipersonnel mines.[259]
- Polish publicly listed company MBF Group, which announced its participation in the market consultation on 31 March 2026, in partnership with entities from Estonia and Ukraine. The company stated it offered a new generation of mine systems capable of operating in both remote control and autonomous mode.[260]
- Polish company Pronit, based in Pionki, which planned to resume production of antitank and antipersonnel mines. It stated that it intends to launch initial production in June 2026 and mass production later in 2026.[261]

At the International Defence Industry Exhibition (MSPO) in Kielce, Poland, in September 2026, WITI displayed MOD-26 tripwire-activated antipersonnel mines and MND pressure-activated antipersonnel mines. It stated that the MOD-26, developed together with Wifama and Niewiadów, was ready for production and its production line had been prepared. WITI also presented an antipersonnel mine developed and tested with Pronit: the PM-104T

255 Polish Armaments Agency, "Information on the intention to conduct preliminary market consultations for the Anti-personnel mines task," 2 March 2026, bit.ly/ArmamentsAgency2Mar2026; and Piotr Miedziński, "The Polish Army will acquire new anti-personnel mines. The Armaments Agency begins key consultations," *Portal Obronny*, 3 March 2026, bit.ly/PortalObronny3Mar2026. Interested entities had until 20 March 2026 to submit applications to participate in the consultations. The meetings and information exchange were planned for the period from 30 March to 24 April 2026.

256 Lukasz Pacholski, "Eleven entities interested in supplying anti-personnel mines," ZBiAM, 28 March 2026, bit.ly/ZBiAM28Mar2026. The 11 entities were Belma S.A.; IBKOL sp. z o. o.; MBF Group S.A. together with ZMR Systems OÜ; Metalexport-S sp. z o. o.; MILDAT sp. z o. o.; Niewiadów sp. z o. o.; Pronit sp. z o. o.; UMO sp. z o. o.; WB IM sp. z o. o. together with TDM Electronics SA; Wifama sp. z o. o.; and Works 11 sp. z o. o.

257 Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna S.A. press release, "18/2026: Conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding with Wifama sp. z o. o.," 2 April 2026, bit.ly/Niewiadow2Apr2026.

258 Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna S.A. press release, "Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna has entered into a strategic partnership with WITI for the production of modern anti-personnel mines," 21 May 2026, bit.ly/NiewiadowPGM21May2026.

259 Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna S.A. presentation, "A new chapter in the Polish defense sector," May 2026, pp. 19–24, bit.ly/NiewiadowMay2026.

260 MBF Group press release, "Next-generation mine systems: combining commerce and military technologies," 31 March 2026, bit.ly/MBF31Mar2026; and Dmytro Shumlianskyi, "Ukraine, Poland, and Estonia Launch Joint Development of 'Smart' Minefields," *Militarnyi*, 24 March 2026, bit.ly/Militarnyi24Mar2026.

261 Janusz Petz, "Pronit will produce anti-personnel and anti-tank mines and grenades in Pionki! A renowned company in the hands of renowned entrepreneurs," *Echo Dnia*, 18 February 2026, bit.ly/EchoDnia18Feb2026.

bounding fragmentation mine, which can be activated by tripwire, electrically, or by a pressure sensor.[262] At the same event, Belma presented two types of antipersonnel mines: the MPM modular "mine-grenade," designed to be activated by tripwire, including a new bidirectional tripwire with 5-meter wires on each side; and SEK directional fragmentation mines modelled on the Claymore and MON-50, which can be activated on command or by tripwire. A Belma representative stated that, as of September 2026, the Armaments Agency had not yet specified which antipersonnel mines it intended to acquire.[263]

If fulfilled, these production plans would give Poland one of the world's largest stockpiles, prompting concerns of both large-scale use in Poland and a capacity to transfer mines not seen since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force.

RUSSIA

Russia continues to research, develop, and produce both antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines.

Markings on some of the landmines used by Russia in Ukraine since 2022 indicate that they were manufactured as recently as 2021, including POM-3 antipersonnel mines.[264] The POM-3 is produced by Russian company AO "NIII" (Joint-Stock Company "Research Engineering Institute"), which is part of Tecmash, in turn part of the state-owned arms conglomerate Rostec. AO "NIII" advertised the POM-3 on its website until 2021.[265] Tecmash advertised the POM-3 in its 2018 military products catalog, available on its website until 2022.[266] The POM-3 was also exhibited at the Army-2023 arms fair in Moscow in August 2023.[267]

Russian company NPO Splav, also part of Rostec, produces the Zemledeliye ("Agriculture") mine-laying system (ISDM), a truck-mounted multiple rocket launcher that carries two pods of 25 rockets that can be loaded with POM-3 antipersonnel mines or PTM-4M antivehicle mines.[268] The vehicle can mine an area the size of several football fields in minutes, from 5–15 kilometers away. In October 2023, Rostec announced delivering a new batch of

262 Marcin Moneta, "Antipersonnel mines returned to MSPO," *Polska Zbrojna*, 16 September 2026, bit.ly/PolskaZbrojna16Sept2026.

263 "Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. Innovative and difficult to detect," *Polska Zbrojna*, YouTube.com, 10 September 2026, at 1:05–1:56 (MPM), 2:02–2:42 and 3:45–4:05 (SEK), and 4:33–4:57 (Armaments Agency), bit.ly/PolskaZbrojna10Sept2026; Belma press release, "Record-breaking MSPO 2026. BELMA at the center of discussions about the future of security," 15 September 2026, bit.ly/Belma15Sept2026; and Antoni Walkowski, "'Belma' is a pillar of the 'East Shield'. Investing in a secure border," *Defence24*, 9 September 2026, bit.ly/Defence24-9Sept2026.

264 The POM-3 mine is equipped with a sensitive seismic fuze that makes it prone to detonate when approached; it also has a self-destruct feature. Collective Awareness to UXO, "POM-3 Landmine: Description," undated, bit.ly/POM-3Landmine; and HRW, "Ukraine: Russia Uses Banned Antipersonnel Landmines," 29 March 2022, bit.ly/HRWRussia29March2022.

265 AO "NIII", "Anti-personnel mines," archived 10 December 2021, bit.ly/47KM19M. The company's website has become inaccessible since February 2022.

266 Tecmash, "Military products," 2018, p. 156, bit.ly/Tecmash2018. The company's website has become inaccessible since late 2022.

267 "Army 2023. POM-3 and PTM-4(R) mines," *Military Affairs (@Ratnoe-Delo)*, YouTube.com, 21 August 2023, bit.ly/RatnoeDelo21Aug2023.

268 Rostec press release, "Rostec has begun delivering remote-controlled mining vehicles called 'Zemledeliye' to the military," 24 December 2020, bit.ly/Rostec24Dec2020. The rocket carrying antipersonnel mines is named ISDM.KIB-POM, while the rocket carrying antivehicle mines is named ISDM.KIB-PTM. It is estimated that each ISDM.KIB-POM rocket carries 3 KPOM-3 cassettes containing 4 POM-3 antipersonnel mines each, for a total of 12 POM-3 antipersonnel mines per rocket and 600 mines per full 50-rocket load of the minelaying vehicle. See, Mick F. and N. R. Jenzen-Jones, "Russian POM-3 anti-personnel landmines documented in Ukraine (2022)," Armament Research Services, 15 April 2022, bit.ly/ARES15Apr2022; Fenix Insight METIS, "ISDM.KIB-POM," undated, bit.ly/FenixISDM-KIB-POM; and Fenix Insight METIS, "ISDM.KIB-PTM," undated, bit.ly/FenixISDM-KIB-PTM.

Zemledeliye mine-laying systems to the Russian military, confirming their use in Ukraine.[269] In December 2025, Russia's state-owned arms export company, Rosoboronexport, published a promotional video about the Zemledeliye on its YouTube channel.[270]

Russian forces are also modifying POM and PMN-4 antipersonnel mines for deployment by drones.[271] In 2026, information emerged suggesting that Russian forces were also 3D printing new Pryanik/Plushka ("Gingerbread") pressure-activated plastic antipersonnel mines to be dropped from drones.[272]

Ukrainian sources reported that Russia had started producing modern versions of the Soviet, World War II-era PMD-6 antipersonnel mines, and in June 2026 a number of these mines were reportedly discovered in Ukraine's Sumy region.[273] (See also *Use by state not party Russia* section.)

SOUTH KOREA

South Korean officials have stated that there has been no new production of antipersonnel landmines in the country since 2011. However, when asked if mines were being produced in 2025, Ministry of National Defence officials refused to reply, unlike previous years.[274]

South Korean company Korea Defense Industry (KDI), which was established in 2020 as a spin-off of Hanwha Corporation's cluster munitions business, continued to advertise the following antipersonnel mines and their delivery systems on its website as of September 2026: 155mm ADAM (Area Denial Artillery Munition) artillery projectile containing antipersonnel mines (a copy of the US ADAM projectile, containing 36 antipersonnel mines); an aircraft bomb and artillery rocket containing mines (which appear to be copies of US BLU-91/92 antivehicle and antipersonnel mines carried by the GATOR aircraft bomb); and a vehicle-mounted minelaying system (named 'Vehicle Launched Scatterable System-II'), which appears to be a copy of the US Volcano mine system scattering antivehicle and antipersonnel mines.[275] It is unclear if any orders for these weapons have been received. In October 2024 and again in October 2025, KDI displayed ADAM antipersonnel mines and Vehicle Launched Scatterable System-II antipersonnel mines at the Korea Army International Defense Industry

269 Rostec press release, "Rostec has sent its latest 'Zemledeliye' mine-laying system to the military ahead of schedule," 13 October 2023, bit.ly/Rostec13Oct2023. In December 2024, a Rostec executive mentioned the Zemledeliye among the new types of weapons that Rostec was supplying to the Russian Ministry of Defence, describing them as "state-of-the-art systems that have proven their high combat effectiveness in military operations in Ukraine." See, Rostec, "Bekkhan Ozdoyev: 'Meeting the needs of the army is an absolute priority for Rostec State Corporation'," 9 December 2024, bit.ly/Rostec9Dec2024.

270 "ISDM Remote Mine-Laying System," *Rosoboronexport*, YouTube.com, 9 December 2025, bit.ly/Rosoboronexport9Dec2025.

271 Frederic Gras (fredgrs), "Remote mining with a drone. It is made on the basis of a POM-2 mine (without a cup), a rotating mechanism and a stabilizer printed on a 3D printer." 4 November 2023, 16:12 UTC. X post, bit.ly/TweetFredericGras4Nov2023; Frederic Gras (fredgrs), "In the locally made series, PTM 3 launched using PG motor Rocket." 24 September 2023, 13:37 UTC. X post, bit.ly/TweetFredericGras24Sept2023; and Rob Lee (RALee85), "Video about engineers from Russia's 1st Tank Army who are using UAVs to emplace POM, PMN-4, PTM-3, and PTM-4 mines." 12 December 2023, 20:33 UTC. X post, bit.ly/TweetRobLee12Dec2023.

272 Vladislav V., "Russians Drop 3D-Printed Anti-Personnel Mines on Kherson," *Militarnyi*, 8 March 2026, bit.ly/Militarnyi8Mar2026.

273 Vladislav V., "Russians Return to the Concept of World War II-Era PMD-6 Mines," *Militarnyi*, 9 June 2026, bit.ly/Militarnyi9June2026. According to these reports, PMD-6 mines contain 200g or 75g of explosives and are activated by pressure. While the original PMD-6 had a wooden box casing, the new mine's casing is made of molded plastic.

274 Official Information Disclosure Request by World Without War, May 2025.

275 "Hanwha completes disposal of its cluster-bomb business," *Korea JoongAng Daily*, 30 December 2020, bit.ly/KoreaJoongAngDaily30Dec2020; Korea Defense Industry (KDI), "155mm FASCAM (Family of Scatterable Mines)," undated, accessed 17 September 2026, bit.ly/KDInd155mmFASCAM; KDI, "long-distance Scatterable shell," undated, accessed 17 September 2026, bit.ly/KDILongDistanceScatterableShell; KDI, "Vehicle Launched Scatterable System - II," undated, accessed 17 September 2026, bit.ly/KDI-VLSS-II; and email from Jeewoo Yeo, Researcher, World Without War, 26 October 2025. Some sources call this type Artillery Delivered Antipersonnel Mine (ADAM).

Exhibition.[276] According to the budget of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), the ADAM is currently under exploratory development and is slated to go into mass production in 2030–2031.[277]

The last known production of antipersonnel landmines in South Korea was in 2011, when a South Korean company, Hanwha Corporation, manufactured 4,000 KM74 antipersonnel mines.[278]

INDICATIONS OF INTENT TO PRODUCE MINES BY WITHDRAWING COUNTRIES

Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania have taken steps in the current reporting period to indicate their interest in developing the capacity to produce landmines.

FINLAND

In April 2025, Tapio Kolunsarka, the head of Finnish technology conglomerate Insta, said that the company was interested in producing antipersonnel landmines in Finland once the country left the Mine Ban Treaty.[279] Prior to the withdrawal, Insta developed a command-detonated munition as an alternative to antipersonnel mines, called Steel Burst, which can be delivered by a quadcopter drone (Steel Eagle) or from the ground (Steel Lynx).[280] In July 2025, *Reuters* reported that Finnish defense companies Insta, Nammo Lapua, and Raikka had told Finland's parliamentary defense committee they would be interested in producing mines, while another company, Forcit Explosives, said it was ready to discuss possibilities with the military.[281]

In January 2026, Finland announced its intention to start measures for acquiring antipersonnel mines, with the goal of manufacturing the mines in Finland and of having the first new mines available in 2027. Finland declared that "the new anti-personnel mines aimed to be acquired would be simple, affordable and easy to use," while "[m]ore advanced

276 World Without War, "Statement of Condemnation of Inhumane Weapons Exhibition and Export Attempts: Holding KDI and Hanwha Accountable," 21 October 2024, bit.ly/WWW21Oct2024; email from Jeewoo Yeo, Researcher, World Without War, 25 June 2025; Army Recognition, "Korea Defense Industry introduces remote-controlled Mine Spreader-II vehicle with GPS-based mine deployment," 27 August 2025, bit.ly/ArmyRecognition27Aug2025; and Shutterstock, "Goyang, South Korea – October 23, 2025: Korea Defense Industry Mine-Laying Armored Vehicle (VLSS-II, Vehicle Launched Scatterable System-II) Model Displayed at ADEX 2025," 30 November 2025, bit.ly/VLSS-II30Nov2025.

277 Email from Jeewoo Yeo, Researcher, World Without War, 25 June 2025; World Without War, "On the brazen display of a weapon so heinous it is labeled 'inhumane' at an exhibition," 26 October 2024, bit.ly/WWW26Oct2024; and Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea (SPARK), "Are Anti-Personnel Mines Being Produced in Nonsan, Following the UN-Banned Cluster Munitions? - First Discussion with the Company Regarding the Nonsan Cluster Munition Plant," 31 October 2024, bit.ly/SPARK31Oct2024.

278 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Second Secretary, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division, South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 4 April 2012. The KM74 mine is a copy of the US-made M74 self-destructing mine. As of September 2026, South Korean company SNT Dynamics continued to advertise the KM138 mine dispenser for M74 antipersonnel and M75 antivehicle mines on its website. The company specified that it "does not manufacture or sell any landmines." See, SNT Dynamics, "Protection Weapons," undated, accessed 17 September 2026, bit.ly/SNTDynamicsProtectionWeapons.

279 Anne Kauranen, "Tech company Insta eyes land mine production once Finland quits treaty," *Reuters*, 4 April 2025, bit.ly/Reuters4Apr2025.

280 Giulia Bernacchi, "Finnish Firm Unveils 'Steel Eagle ER' Drone Developed for Ukraine," *The Defense Post*, 4 February 2025, bit.ly/TheDefensePost4Feb2025; Mary Wareham and Laura Lodenius, "Leaving the Landmine Ban Treaty Puts Civilians at Risk," HRW, 16 June 2025, bit.ly/HRW16June2025; and Insta, "Insta Steel product family," accessed 15 April 2026, bit.ly/Insta15Apr2026.

281 Andrius Sytas and Anne Kauranen, "Finland and Lithuania set to produce anti-personnel mines, officials say," *Reuters*, 9 July 2025, bit.ly/Reuters9July2025.

technology in landmines will be considered at a later stage."[282] Colonel Riku Mikkonen, inspector of engineering for the Finnish Army, stated that up to one million mines could be procured and that he would rather not acquire antipersonnel mines with a self-destruction mechanism "[b]ecause the war can last for a long time[,] while the self-destruction happens after three to four months. It makes sense of [*sic*] the humanitarian side, not on the military side."[283]

An article in the Finnish Defence Forces magazine in October 2026 confirmed that the military plans to acquire one million antipersonnel mines of two types—high-explosive fragmentation mines (tripwire-activated) and high-explosive blast mines (pressure-activated)—for €100 million (US$113 million) in total, with the intention of starting production in 2028 (with deliveries extending into the 2030s).[284] The Finnish Defence Forces plans to purchase the mines from Finnish manufacturers. The article added that more technically advanced mines, such as the scatterable mines used by Russia in Ukraine, may be acquired in the future.[285] Colonel Riku Mikkonen also told Finnish news agency *STT* that there were around half a dozen companies in Finland able to make mines.[286]

LATVIA

In March 2025, Latvia's Prime Minister Evika Silina noted that the country has "considered the possibility that we could produce" landmines, in light of the withdrawal.[287] Latvia's defense minister similarly confirmed that "there will be the opportunity to secure the production of anti-personnel mines following withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention."[288] In September 2026, it was reported that Latvia planned to spend €28.3 million ($32 million) to purchase landmines from 2026 to 2028. However, the Ministry of Defence did not disclose what types of mines it planned to acquire or whether this planned purchase included antipersonnel mines.[289]

LITHUANIA

In April 2025, Lithuania's Minister of National Defence told parliament that the government was looking into the possibility of producing antipersonnel mines, stating, "We can guarantee opportunities for our defense industry to produce certain mines that would have different …

282 Finnish Defence Forces press release, "The Defence Forces starts measures for acquiring anti-personnel landmines and launching training," 14 January 2026, bit.ly/FinlandMoD14Jan2026; Col. Riku Mikkonen, Inspector of MILENG, "Anti-personnel Landmines - Media Event," Kajaani, Finland, 3 February 2026; and "In Finland's forests, soldiers re-learn how to lay anti-personnel mines," *France 24*, 6 February 2026, bit.ly/France24Finland6Feb2026.

283 "In Finland's forests, soldiers re-learn how to lay anti-personnel mines," *France 24*, 6 February 2026, bit.ly/France24Finland6Feb2026.

284 Ilari Hyvärinen, "'We are talking about a hundred million euros' – Domestic mine production project is progressing," *Ruotuväki*, 9 October 2026, bit.ly/Ruotuvaki9Oct2026. Average exchange rate for 2025: €1=US$1.1306. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 5 January 2026, bit.ly/FederalReserveRelease.

285 Ibid.

286 "Finland buying a million landmines," *Yle*, 19 October 2026, bit.ly/Yle19Oct2026.

287 Evelyn Ann-Marie Dom, "Baltics and Poland announce planned withdrawal from landmine treaty," *EuroNews*, 18 March 2025, bit.ly/EuroNews18Mar2025.

288 Andris Spruds (AndrisSpruds), "We are seriously examining all options to strengthen Latvia's defence and deterrence capabilities. The Defence Ministers of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland have jointly decided on a regional level to reinforce our border by recommending withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention. We have to prepare for Russia continuing to pose threats to our region, irrespective of the outcome of Russia's war in Ukraine. There will be the opportunity to secure the production of anti-personnel mines following withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention. At the same time we will continue to uphold all international norms and humanitarian laws in consultation with our allies." 18 March 2025, 07:44 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostAndrisSpruds18Mar2025.

289 "Latvia to spend EUR 28 million on land mines," *Latvian Public Service Media*, 4 September 2026, bit.ly/LSM4Sept2026. Average exchange rate for 2025: €1=US$1.1306. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 5 January 2026, bit.ly/FederalReserveRelease.

degrees of control over them."[290] In July 2025, the country's deputy defence minister Karolis Aleksa said, "We are going to spend hundreds of millions of euros on anti-tank mines, but also on anti-personnel mines. It will be a significant amount," noting that tens of thousands of antipersonnel mines or more would be ordered. He also said that Lithuania's "national industry will be one of the sources" of those mines.[291] The head of Lithuania's defense industry association, Vincas Jurgutis, added that Lithuania "will be in a position to supply others including Ukraine," a Mine Ban Treaty State Party.[292]

In December 2025, upon withdrawal from the Mine Ban Treaty, Lithuania's Ministry of National Defence stated that, from then on, Lithuania was "allowed to purchase or manufacture anti-personnel mines prioritizing Lithuanian manufacturers corresponding to the defence needs of Lithuania."[293] In February 2026, Lithuania's Minister of National Defence stated that they were in talks with Ukraine and Poland about the joint production of antipersonnel mines.[294]

PRODUCTION OF IMPROVISED MINES BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

NSAGs have produced improvised mines that are victim-activated in Colombia, India, the Sahel region of Africa, and sporadically in Thailand.[295] While detailed information about the production itself is limited, the use of these improvised mines is well documented. (See *Use by non-state armed groups* section.)

TRANSFERS OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

A *de facto* global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel landmines had been in effect since the mid-1990s—up until late 2024 when the US announced two transfers of antipersonnel mines to State Party Ukraine. This quasi-universal halt on transfers was attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the Mine Ban Treaty.

In previous years, at least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty enacted a formal moratorium on exports of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. During the current reporting period, South Korea noted that it maintains its moratorium on export, and Russia noted that its own moratorium is still being observed despite having formally expired in 2002.[296] Despite its prior moratorium, the US resumed exporting antipersonnel landmines when it announced transfers to Ukraine in 2024 (see below).

290 Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania, "Transcript of the evening session No. 36 of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania," 17 April 2025, bit.ly/LithuaniaSeimas17Apr2025.

291 Andrius Sytas and Anne Kauranen, "Finland and Lithuania set to produce anti-personnel mines, officials say," *Reuters*, 9 July 2025, bit.ly/Reuters9July2025.

292 Ibid.

293 Lithuania Ministry of National Defence press release, "Lithuania has officially withdrawn from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty," 27 December 2025, bit.ly/LithuaniaMoD27Dec2025.

294 Vilmantas Venckūnas, "Lithuania intends to spend 812 million euros on anti-tank mines by 2035," *Lithuanian National Radio and Television*, 9 February 2026, bit.ly/LRT9Feb2026.

295 Historically, previous lists of states with NSAG producers have included Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine (Gaza), Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Low-level production of victim-activated IEDs by Islamist groups in the Sahel, and in some other regions, is suspected. See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

296 Statement of South Korea, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15 June 2026, bit.ly/SouthKoreaStatement15June2026. South Korea also stated that the "Government is exercising tight controls over anti-personnel landmines and has been enforcing an indefinite extension of the moratorium on their export since 1997." Explanation of Vote by South Korea on Resolution L.5, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 69th Session, New York, 3 November 2014, p. 18, docs.un.org/A/C.1/69/PV.23. Russia CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form F, 31 March 2026. See, CCW Amended Protocol II Database, bit.ly/CCWAmendedProtocol2Database.

Other past exporters, including Cuba and Vietnam, have made statements declaring that they have stopped exporting antipersonnel mines.

The current reporting period has seen no new evidence of completed transfers of antipersonnel mines, but there were some indications of potential future transfers on the part of Finland, Lithuania, and Poland, all of which withdrew from the Mine Ban Treaty in 2025–2026. There is also evidence of Iran's willingness to transfer antipersonnel mines.

TRANSFERS TO UKRAINE

As reported in *Landmine Monitor 2025*, the US announced two transfers of antipersonnel landmines to Ukraine in late 2024.[297] US officials informed HRW that the transfer included three types: ADAM (Artillery Delivered Antipersonnel Mine), MOPMS (Modular Pack Mine System), and Volcano (Multiple Delivery Mine System).[298] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed the transfers stating, "The United States has announced a new support package worth $275 million. It includes drones, ammunition for HIMARS and artillery, and—critically—essential mines to stop Russian assaults. This will significantly strengthen our troops on the front lines."[299] The Monitor has not seen evidence of additional antipersonnel mine transfers by the US since December 2024, including in the current reporting period.

At least 29 countries and the EU have expressed concern about the US transfers of antipersonnel landmines to Ukraine.[300]

Prior to the US-Ukraine transfer, the Monitor had never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing the annual *Landmine Monitor* report in 1999.

POTENTIAL FUTURE TRANSFERS INVOLVING WITHDRAWING STATES

Finland, Lithuania, and Poland—all of whom withdrew from the Mine Ban Treaty during the reporting period—have expressed an interest in possibly importing and/or exporting antipersonnel mines since their withdrawals.

FINLAND

In January 2026, Finland announced its intention to start measures for acquiring antipersonnel mines. Finland's goal is manufacturing the mines in Finland, but the announcement also notes an interest in exploring "possible supply opportunities from abroad."[301] Finland declared that

297 US Department of State press release, "The United States Announces Significant New Military Assistance for Ukraine," 20 November 2024, bit.ly/USDoS-Ukraine20Nov2024. See also, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin's response to the question, "Why is the US providing anti-personnel landmines to Ukraine now? And is it part of the PDA today?" during a press briefing in Lao PDR. "Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Holds an On-Camera, On-the-Record Press Briefing in Laos," 20 November 2024, bit.ly/USPressBriefing20Nov2024; and US Department of Defense press release, "Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine," 2 December 2024, bit.ly/USPressRelease2Dec2024. See also, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2025* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, December 2025), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports.

298 HRW, "Q&A: US Antipersonnel Landmine Transfers," 13 December 2024, bit.ly/HRW13Dec2024.

299 Volodymyr Zelenskyy (ZelenskyyUa), "The United States has announced a new support package worth $275 million. It includes drones, ammunition for HIMARS and artillery, and—critically—essential mines to stop Russian assaults. This will significantly strengthen our troops on the front lines. This marks the 70th defense package from the United States. Ukraine deeply values the bipartisan support from America and the decision of President Biden. We are grateful for standing with us." 20 November 2024, 19:09 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostVolodymyrZelenskyy20Nov2024.

300 Algeria, Angola, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, France, The Gambia, Germany, Holy See, Ireland, Jordan, Lesotho, Mexico, Mozambique, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Palestine, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, and Switzerland.

301 Finnish Defence Forces press release, "The Defence Forces starts measures for acquiring anti-personnel landmines and launching training," 14 January 2026, bit.ly/FinlandMoD14Jan2026.

"the new anti-personnel mines aimed to be acquired would be simple, affordable and easy to use," while "[m]ore advanced technology in landmines will be considered at a later stage."[302]

LITHUANIA

In July 2025, Lithuanian Deputy Minister of National Defence Karolis Aleksa told *Reuters* that Lithuania planned to order tens of thousands of antipersonnel mines, or more.[303] Aleksa noted that Lithuania's "national industry will be one of the sources," implying they might import and export mines as well.[304]

POLAND

On 18 March 2025, Poland's Deputy Minister of National Defence Paweł Bejda stated that Poland would restart antipersonnel mine production, aiming to have Poland's state-run defense group, PGZ, produce up to a million mines.[305] By the end of 2025, Polish publicly listed company Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna and Polish company Belma (part of the state-owned PGZ) announced that they were preparing to produce antipersonnel mines to meet Polish demand.[306] Poland's Deputy Minister of National Defence Pawel Zalewski told *Reuters* that excess production could be exported to allies, such as Ukraine and the Baltic states, indicating willingness to transfer Polish mines, as well.[307]

POTENTIAL TRANSFERS FROM IRAN

Iran claims to have stopped exporting mines in 1997, despite consistent evidence to the contrary, including both evidence of completed transfers in previous reporting periods and evidence of willingness to transfer antipersonnel mines in the current reporting period.

In the current reporting period, and as of September 2026, Iran's Ministry of Defence Export Center (MINDEX) continued to advertise three types of antipersonnel landmines as available for purchase: the YM-1B scatterable antipersonnel blast mine (a copy of the Italian VS-50/TS-50 mine), the YM-IV antipersonnel fragmentation bounding mine, and the Ababil antipersonnel fragmentation bounding mine.[308]

There is also evidence of completed transfers in prior reporting periods. For example, the Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were removing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date-stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines.[309] Iranian antipersonnel mines were also seized in Afghanistan in 2008, Tajikistan in 2007, and

302 Finnish Defence Forces press release, "The Defence Forces starts measures for acquiring anti-personnel landmines and launching training," 14 January 2026, bit.ly/FinlandMoD14Jan2026; Col. Riku Mikkonen, Inspector of MILENG, "Anti-personnel Landmines - Media Event," Kajaani, Finland, 3 February 2026.

303 Andrius Sytas and Anne Kauranen, "Finland and Lithuania set to produce anti-personnel mines, officials say," *Reuters*, 9 July 2025, bit.ly/Reuters9July2025.

304 Ibid.

305 Jaroslaw Adamowski, "Poland eyes 1 million landmines for borders with Belarus, Russia," *Defense One*, 20 March 2025, bit.ly/DefenseNews20March2025.

306 Niewiadów Polska Grupa Militarna S.A. press release, "Grupa Niewiadów S.A. ready to start production of mines," 1 July 2025, bit.ly/Niewiadow1July2025; and Barbara Erling, "Poland to start producing anti-personnel mines to lay along eastern border," *Reuters*, 17 December 2025, bit.ly/Reuters17Dec2025.

307 Barbara Erling, "Poland to start producing anti-personnel mines to lay along eastern border," *Reuters*, 17 December 2025, bit.ly/Reuters17Dec2025.

308 Iran Ministry of Defence Export Center (MINDEX), "Anti-Personnel SMOKING Mine (YM-I-S, YM-IB)," "Anti-Personnel Jumping Mine (YM-IV, YM-IV-F)," and "Anti-Personnel Jumping Mine (ABABIL 700)," accessed 1 September 2026, bit.ly/MINDEXIranProducts. The website states that mass production of the YM-1B, YM-IV, and Ababil started in 2002, 2012, and 2013, respectively. They are all produced by Iran's Defence Industries Organization (DIO), owned by Iran's Ministry of Defence.

309 Information provided to the Monitor and the ICBL by The HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group (DDG), and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.

Somalia in 2006.[310] Iranian-made landmines were identified in Syria in 2021.[311] According to Ukrainian sources, Iranian YM-1 antipersonnel mines procured by the Syrian Ministry of Defense began to be supplied to Russian-backed forces in eastern Ukraine via Russia in November 2017.[312] PMN pattern blast mines, of unknown manufacture, were reportedly stolen from Iranian stockpiles and purchased by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in neighboring Pakistan in 2020.[313]

STOCKPILED ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

STOCKPILES IN STATES NOT PARTY

The Monitor estimates that as many as 32 of the 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have stockpiled antipersonnel landmines.[314] In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines. Today, the collective total in the stocks of states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty may be less than 50 million.[315]

Largest stockpiles of antipersonnel mines

State	Mines stockpiled
Russia	26.5 million
Pakistan	6 million (estimated)
India	4–5 million (estimated)
China	"less than" 5 million
US	3 million
Total	**approximately 45 million**

310 **Afghanistan**: One report cites 113 mines recovered, including 50 antipersonnel mines. See, "Photo: Landmine depot smuggled from Iran discovered," *Pajhwok Afghan News*, 25 January 2008, bit.ly/PajhwokNews25Jan2008; and Ron Synovitz, "Afghanistan: Official Says Iranian Land Mines Found In Taliban Commander's House," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 25 January 2008, bit.ly/RFERL25Jan2008. **Tajikistan**: Tajikistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form B2, 3 February 2008. **Somalia**: UN Security Council, "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (2006)," S/2006/913, 22 November 2006, p. 62, docs.un.org/S/2006/913.

311 See, Calibre Obscura (CalibreObscura), "#Idlib: A rare look at an Iranian YM-1 AP mine in the hands of HTS/TvJ. This mine is essentially a copy of the Italian TS-50 and was supplied to the regime by #Iran before being captured/sold." 30 November 2021, 08:23 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/TweetCalibreObscura30Nov2021; and Calibre Obscura (CalibreObscura), "New HTS video from #Idlib showing suppressed AM-50 pattern AMR, heavily modified/rebarreled/suppressed Mosin-Nagant, and what looks to be a TS-50 pattern AP mine, rather likely an Iranian copy, the YM-1." 19 August 2021, 17:12 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/TweetCalibreObscura19Aug2021.

312 Engineering Troops Directorate of the Support Forces Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Military Unit A2641, and Centre for Operational Standards and Training Methodology of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, "Methodological Guide 'Engineering Ammunition That was Used (Might be Used) by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or Illegal Armed Groups in Eastern Ukraine'," June 2020, p. 43, bit.ly/AmmunitionUkraine2020; and Sappers, "Iranian YM-1 Anti-Personnel Mine," undated, accessed 1 September 2026, bit.ly/SappersYM-1APmine.

313 Open-source intelligence project Calibre Obscura published photographs on social media of PMN antipersonnel mines that it claimed the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) purchased on the clandestine market in Iran. See, Calibre Obscura (CalibreObscura), "A collection of of [*sic*] PMN pattern APERS mines (Very likely manufactured in Iran) obtained by the BLA in #Balochistan recently. These are used to target Pakistani forces, and cost $75 each from the Iranian black market." 4 December 2020, 18:54 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/TweetCalibreObscura4Dec2020.

314 Three states not party—Estonia, Latvia, and Micronesia—are thought not to have stockpiled antipersonnel landmines prior to initially joining the Mine Ban Treaty, though this remains unconfirmed. Estonia and Latvia are among the five states that recently withdrew from the treaty. State not party Micronesia has said that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines. While Latvia has indicated that it intends to acquire (and stockpile) antipersonnel landmines, there is no evidence to date that Estonia or Latvia in fact currently possess stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines.

315 In 2014, China informed the Monitor that its stockpile was "less than" five million, though there is a degree of uncertainty about the method China used to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely delivered systems, so-called "scatterable" mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, an estimate provided to the Monitor indicated that China had 110 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.

It is unclear whether all 32 states not party thought to stockpile antipersonnel mines are currently doing so. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they possess only small stockpiles, which are used solely for training in clearance and detection techniques.

Four of the five countries that withdrew from the Mine Ban Treaty during the reporting period—Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—have indicated their intention to acquire and stockpile landmines in the future.

States not party that have stockpiled antipersonnel mines[316]

Armenia	India	Libya	Russia
Azerbaijan	Iran	Lithuania	Saudi Arabia
Bahrain	Israel	Mongolia	Singapore
China	Kazakhstan	Morocco	Syria
Cuba	Korea, North	Myanmar	UAE
Egypt	Korea, South	Nepal	US
Finland	Kyrgyzstan	Pakistan	Uzbekistan
Georgia	Lao PDR	Poland	Vietnam

States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as part of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported by China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.

Some NSAGs possess stockpiles of improvised antipersonnel mines. NSAGs in Myanmar now possess a very large quantity of antipersonnel landmines seized through military operations since the 2021 military coup.[317]

STOCKPILING AND STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION BY STATES PARTIES

Of the 162 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 157 report that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines.[318] A total of 94 states have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction, collectively destroying more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines under the treaty. This data includes stocks destroyed by states that have withdrawn from the treaty having previously completed stockpile destruction in line with their Article 4 obligations. Sri Lanka was the last State Party to complete its obligation to destroy its stocks in October 2021.[319]

316 Note that this count includes three of the five countries that recently withdrew from the Mine Ban Treaty: Finland, Lithuania, and Poland, as they stockpiled the weapons prior to first joining the treaty.

317 Between January 2022 and September 2026, through a non-exhaustive survey of media reports and photographs, Mine Free Myanmar found more than 80 instances of mines being captured from the Myanmar Armed Forces, amounting to many hundreds of antipersonnel mines of types MM1 (stake mounted fragmentation, POMZ2 variant), MM2 (blast, PMN variant), MM5 (directional, claymore variant), and MM6 (non-detectable blast, M-14 variant), as well as Myanmar Defence Products Industries (KaPaSa) made antivehicle mines (plastic, VS1.6 variant). See, Mine Free Myanmar, "Military made antipersonnel landmines continue to be captured by anti-military groups," 1 September 2026, bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar1Sept2026; Mine Free Myanmar, "More antipersonnel landmines captured by anti-military groups," 21 August 2025, bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar21Aug2025; Mine Free Myanmar, "More antipersonnel landmines seized by armed groups during first 3 months of 2024," 1 June 2024, bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar1June2024; and Mine Free Myanmar, "Myanmar Armed Forces consistently using antipersonnel landmines over the past 18 months," 9 June 2023, bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar9June2023.

318 Tonga and Lebanon are not included in this figure: Tonga has previously stated that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines, but has not been included in this figure as it must confirm that it has no stockpiles in its initial Article 7 report. Lebanon, the treaty's newest member, has yet to provide an initial Article 7 report. Data on stockpiles, retention for training and research, and destruction is based primarily on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports.

319 In its initial Article 7 report, submitted on 28 November 2018, Sri Lanka declared a total stockpile of 77,865 antipersonnel mines. Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), section 3, table 2.

Another 66 States Parties have confirmed that they never possessed antipersonnel mines, except for, in some cases, training in detection and clearance techniques.[320] While not thought to stockpile antipersonnel mines, Tonga will need to confirm its status in its initial transparency report. Lebanon, the treaty's newest State Party, will likewise have to confirm in its initial transparency report the status of any stockpiles it has. Tuvalu is also not expected to have stocks of antipersonnel mines, but it has not yet provided its initial Article 7 report—which was due by 28 August 2012—to formally confirm that it has no stockpile.[321]

Two States Parties presently possess a combined total of 3.5 million antipersonnel mines left to destroy, in violation of their obligations under Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty: Ukraine (3,364,433 stockpiled mines and a destruction deadline of 1 June 2010) and Greece (144,666 stockpiled mines and a destruction deadline of 1 March 2008).[322] Guyana has reported a small stockpile of mines, in addition to those it reports retaining for permitted training purposes, but indicates these "stockpiled" mines are used for those same purposes, suggesting the report has misclassified the mines as stockpiled. In addition, evidence suggests that there may be newly discovered stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in Cambodia near the border with Thailand, though the size of that stockpile is unknown.

UKRAINE

Ukraine continued to stockpile antipersonnel landmines in the current reporting period and remains in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having failed to complete stockpile destruction by its four-year initial deadline of 1 June 2010.[323] Soon after Ukraine joined the Mine Ban Treaty, it reported stockpiles of around 6.5 million mines of nine different types. The different types were detailed in *Landmine Monitor 2006*.[324]

Ukraine has declared destroying 3,438,948 antipersonnel landmines to date.[325]

In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2024, Ukraine declared a stockpile of 3,364,433 antipersonnel mines, comprising 3,363,828 PFM-series mines and 605 OZM-4 mines.[326] This is the same quantity of antipersonnel mines that Ukraine has reported stockpiling since 2020. As of the end of September 2026, Ukraine had not submitted an Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2025, despite being obligated to do so.

In June 2025, Ukraine stated that it remained committed to its obligations regarding the destruction of antipersonnel mines, but that at present it lacked "both the security conditions and the financial capacity necessary to carry out further destruction of remaining stockpiles. Several storage facilities have been damaged, are located in temporarily occupied territories, or are otherwise inaccessible due to ongoing security risks."[327]

320 This figure does not include Estonia and Latvia.

321 Tuvalu has not made an official declaration but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines.

322 Note that this figure (144,666) derives from Greece's most recent Article 7 report. Greece reported a different figure (25,658) in a statement in June 2026. Statement of Greece, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2026, bit.ly/GreeceStatement18June2026. For stockpile information, the Monitor relies on the statistics reported in Greece's most recent Article 7 report.

323 The Oslo Action Plan urges states that have failed to meet their Article 4 deadlines to "present a time-bound plan for completion and urgently proceed with implementation as soon as possible in a transparent manner." Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, docs.un.org/APLC/CONF/2019/5/add.1.

324 ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 2006: Toward a Mine-Free World* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, July 2006), p. 764, www.the-monitor.org/reports. For a chart showing reported changes in the quantities and types of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by Ukraine from 2006–2009, see ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 2009: Toward a Mine-Free World* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2009), p. 774, www.the-monitor.org/reports.

325 The number of antipersonnel mines destroyed annually by Ukraine for the period 2011–2021 is provided in a table in this section. See also, Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports (for calendar years 2011–2020), Form G.

326 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form B.

327 Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2025, bit.ly/UkraineStatement20June2025.

Ukraine reported in its Article 7 report for 2024 that the PFM-series landmine stockpiles "are in the warehouses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and will be destroyed in accordance with the commitments made after the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders." However, it added that, "if the warehouses and arsenals where anti-personnel mines are stored are located in the territories occupied by Russia, or they have been subjected to air and missile strikes by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, then information about such mines can be obtained only after the territory has been liberated, cleared and carrying out relevant inspections."[328] Ukraine further reported that the stockpile of 605 OZM antipersonnel mines "were left in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea occupied by the Russian Federation" in 2014.[329]

Between 1999 and 2018, Ukraine completed the destruction of all its stocks of antipersonnel mines except for the PFM-1 type.[330] The process for destroying the stockpiled PFM-type antipersonnel mines was overseen by a 2013 agreement between the Ministry of Defence, NATO's Support and Procurement Agency, and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant. However, that agreement expired at the beginning of 2020 and has not been renewed.[331]

Ukraine's purported "suspension" of the treaty has no legal effect, and Ukraine remains bound by the full scope of legal obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, including its Article 4 obligations regarding stockpile destruction and its Article 7 reporting obligations.

Stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed by Ukraine (2011–2021)

Year	Quantity destroyed
2021	Unknown
2020	456
2019	216,252
2018	892,320
2017	438,328
2016	652,840
2015	19,944
2014	576
2013	332,352
2012	22,604
2011	9,890
Total	**2,585,562**

GREECE

Greece initially reported a stockpile of 1,568,167 mines in 2013. It has been progressively destroying these mines despite numerous challenges that have delayed fulfillment of the obligation.[332] Greece remains in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having failed to complete stockpile destruction by its four-year deadline of 1 March 2008.[333]

Greece has, however, made progress toward meeting its stockpile destruction obligations. After some initial progress in prior years, Greece signed an agreement with a Croatian company in May 2023 to destroy the remaining stocks. It transferred 8,475 mines to Croatia for destruction in 2023.[334] In 2024, Greece reported transferring 85,841 M2 mines and

328 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form B.

329 Ibid.

330 In a November 2008 presentation, Ukraine indicated that it had destroyed its entire stockpile of 238,010 POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M mines, as well as all 8,060 PMD-6 mines. Ukraine also destroyed more than 400,000 PMN mines in 2002 and 2003, and 101,088 PFM-1 mines in 1999. In June 2008, Ukraine reported that, between 2005 and 2007, an experimental program to partially dismantle and destroy 8,000 POM-2 landmines was carried out at the Donetsk Chemical Plant, and a further 48 POM-2 mines were destroyed at the Pavlograd Chemical Plant. In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports submitted in 2007, 2008, and 2009, Ukraine also noted that while its MON-type and OZM-type antipersonnel mines could be used in command-detonated mode in compliance with the treaty, these stockpiled mines were excessive and unsuitable for use, and that it had plans to destroy them. The POM-2 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in 2018 by the company Ukroboronprom, as noted in its Article 7 reports submitted in 2019 and 2020.

331 Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2024, bit.ly/UkraineStatement20June2024.

332 For details see, ICBL-CMC, "Country Profile: Greece: Mine Ban Policy," last updated 21 November 2025, bit.ly/GreeceMonitorCountryProfile.

333 The Oslo Action Plan urges states that have failed to meet their Article 4 deadlines to "present a time-bound plan for completion and urgently proceed with implementation as soon as possible in a transparent manner." Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, docs.un.org/APLC/CONF/2019/5/add.1.

334 Greece Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023); and statement of Greece, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2023, bit.ly/GreeceStatement21Jun2023.

20,232 M16 mines to Croatia for destruction, and stated that it had 261,347 antipersonnel mines remaining in stockpile.[335] Greece also provided updates on its progress in statements delivered at the 2025 and 2026 intersessional meetings and at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025.[336] In its Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2025, Greece reported that it had 144,666 antipersonnel mines remaining in stockpile and that it had destroyed 116,681 mines from its stockpiles. It also noted that it had transferred 198,707 mines (66,528 M2 mines, 256 DM31 mines, 131,831 M16 mines, and 92 M14 mines) to Croatia for destruction.[337]

GUYANA

In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report submitted in April 2021, Guyana reported retaining a small stockpile of 80 PPM-2 antipersonnel blast mines; the country also reported dismantling and destroying 601 PMD-6 blast mines during training "over the past decades."[338] In that same report, Guyana noted that the "PPM-2 Anti-Personnel blast mine is currently not used by the Force; however, it remains on [*sic*] our inventory." Note that these mines are in addition to the 360 mines retained for training purposes.

Though the Article 7 report lists these mines as stockpiled and not as retained for permitted research and training purposes, the report likewise states that the mines, "while mostly dismantled, are used exclusively for training."[339] If these mines are retained for training purposes, they should be counted as retained mines rather than stockpiles. If, on the other hand, they are indeed stockpiled mines, then Guyana should immediately destroy, or arrange for the destruction of the 80 PPM-2 antipersonnel mines held in stocks and update States Parties on the status of its efforts to fulfill its Article 4 obligation.

REPORTS OF RESIDUAL STOCKPILES IN CAMBODIA

Reports that emerged during the current reporting period suggest there may be remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines in Cambodia, near the country's disputed border with Thailand.

This evidence first surfaced in Cambodian social media posts, in Khmer language, documenting retained stocks of PMN-2 antipersonnel landmines. The photos appeared on the Facebook page of a Cambodian pro-military blogger Pheap Pheara in late July 2025, immediately after armed conflict halted. The blogger was visiting Cambodian soldiers who at that time occupied the disputed Ta Krabey/Ta Kwai ruins. Apparently, the blogger unintentionally recorded images of landmines and packing boxes for PMN-2 antipersonnel landmines. The blogger was subsequently arrested and, according to HRW, charged "with supplying a foreign state with information prejudicial to national defence," a treason charge; he is now serving a 14-year prison sentence for treason after the country's Supreme Court rejected his final appeal.[340]

A former Cambodian parliamentarian placed photos on his Facebook page on 31 July 2025 with the statement that the Ta Krabey/Ta Kwai ruins were, after the July conflict with Thailand, totally under Cambodian control. The photos show the visitors with Cambodian soldiers standing next to a foam packaging container of the type that contains PMN-2 antipersonnel mines, as well as some visible PMN-2 antipersonnel mines in the lower right-

335 Greece Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Forms B and D.

336 Statement of Greece, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2025, bit.ly/GreeceStatement20June2025; statement of Greece, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2025, bit.ly/GreeceStatement4Dec2025; and statement of Greece, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2026, bit.ly/GreeceStatement18June2026.

337 Greece Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Forms B and D.

338 Guyana Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 1 January 2019 to 20 April 2021), Forms B, D, and H. Guyana did not declare stockpiles in its initial transparency report submitted in October 2006 or the update it provided in July 2010.

339 Ibid.

340 Bryony Lau, "Cambodian Journalists Unjustly Sentenced to 14 Years," HRW, 26 February 2026, bit.ly/HRW26Feb2026.

hand corner. The images remained on the former parliamentarian's Facebook page as of September 2026.[341]

Previously, on 27 April 2024, an explosion at an ammunition depot of the Royal Cambodian Army 3rd Tactical Command killed at least 20 people and injured more.[342] Among the ammunition that exploded during the accident were over 9,000 PMN-2 antipersonnel mines, reportedly transferred from an arsenal in Koh Kong, among many other types of ammunition.[343]



A Greek government delegate provides an update to Mine Ban Treaty States Parties on progress in implementing its Article 4 stockpile destruction obligations at the intersessional meetings in June 2026.

© Mine Ban Treaty ISU, June 2026

These mines have not been previously documented in Cambodia's Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency reports. Cambodia's Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2025 states: "The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces and the Directorate General of the National Police (Ministry of Interior) reported that they *do not have any stockpiles of anti-personnel mines* after [*sic*] the first four years after the treaty entered into force."[344]

As a State Party to the treaty, Cambodia is obligated both to report on remaining stockpiles and to meet its Article 4 obligations on stockpile destruction, either by the original deadline of 1 January 2004 or, if the mines were discovered afterward, as soon as possible thereafter; this is also consistent with Cambodia's commitment to destroy previously unknown stockpiles, under Action 15 of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan.[345]

MINES RETAINED FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows States Parties to retain or transfer "a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques … The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes."

A total of 59 States Parties retain antipersonnel landmines for training and research purposes. Before withdrawing from the Mine Ban Treaty, Finland topped the list with more than 15,000 mines. Currently, Bangladesh retains the largest stocks of antipersonnel landmines for research and training purposes (11,924) among States Parties.

Twenty-one States Parties retain between 1,000 mines and 6,000 mines each.[346] Thirty-seven States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines. Another 100 States Parties do not

341 Facebook post by Um Sam An, 31 July 2025, bit.ly/UmSamAn31July2025.

342 See, for example, Facebook post by MCTV, 28 April 2024, bit.ly/MCTV28Apr2024.

343 Ibid.

344 Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 2.

345 Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 29 November 2024, Action 15, bit.ly/SRAAP2025-2029. Cambodia deposited its ratification document at the UN on 28 July 1999. The treaty entered into force in Cambodia on 1 January 2000. In addition, Cambodia's implementation legislation bans use, possession, or transfer of antipersonnel mines, and provides for criminal penalties, including fines and imprisonment for offences committed by civilians, or members of the police and the armed forces. See, *Law on the Prohibition of the Use of All Types of Anti-Personnel Mines* (Law No. NS/RKM/0599/03), 28 May 1999, bit.ly/CambodiaMBTLaw1999.

346 States retaining between 1,000 and 6,000 mines: Türkiye (5,717), Sri Lanka (5,613), Greece (5,466), Venezuela (4,874), Sweden (4,742), Belarus (4,478), Tunisia (4,259), Yemen (3,760), Croatia (3,490), Bulgaria (3,416), Serbia (3,134), Djibouti (2,996), Indonesia (2,050), Oman (1,970), Romania (1,836), Tanzania (1,780), Cambodia (1,725), Namibia (1,634), Canada (1,475), Uganda (1,348), and Kenya (1,020).

retain any antipersonnel mines, including 45 states that stockpiled or retained landmines in the past.[347]

In addition to the States Parties each retaining over 1,000 mines, listed in the following table, the 37 States Parties each retaining fewer than 1,000 mines collectively possess a total of 13,869 mines.[348]

Five of the 22 States Parties that report retaining more than 1,000 mines for permitted purposes consumed mines in line with those purposes during the reporting period: Croatia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, and Uganda. Of those, four reported the form of consumption. Sri Lanka reported that 635 mines were consumed during the reporting period "for authorized training and development purposes."[349] Sweden reported that 299 mines were used "for training of personnel," and noted that no mines were consumed "for development of mine clearance techniques."[350] Tunisia reported that 17 mines were "used for the purpose of training."[351] Uganda reported consuming 312 mines "for training purposes."[352]

States Parties retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines

State	Last declared total (for year)	Initial declaration	Consumed during 2025	Year of last declared consumption	Total quantity reduced as excess to need
Bangladesh	11,924 (2025)	15,000	0	2013	–
Türkiye	5,717 (2025)	16,000	0	2023	5,159
Sri Lanka	5,613 (2025)	21,153	635	2025	–
Greece	5,466 (2025)	7,224	0	2024	–
Venezuela	4,874 (2011)	4,960	N/R	2010	–
Sweden	4,742 (2025)	13,948	299	2025	–
Belarus	4,478 (2025)	7,530	0	2022	–
Tunisia	4,259 (2025)	5,000	17	2025	–
Yemen	3,760 (2023)	4,000	0	2008	–
Croatia	3,490 (2025)	17,500	93	2025	–
Bulgaria	3,416 (2024)	10,466	0	2024	6,446
Serbia	3,134 (2024)	5,000	0	2017	1,970
Djibouti	2,996 (2004)	2,996	N/R	Unclear	–
Indonesia	2,050 (2020)	4,978	N/R	2009	2,524
Oman	1,970 (2024)	2,000	0	2024	–
Romania	1,836 (2023)	4,000	0	2022	1,500
Tanzania	1,780 (2008)	1,146	N/R	2007	–

347 Tuvalu has not submitted an initial Article 7 report so is not reflected in these figures.

348 States Parties retaining under 1,000 mines for research and training: Spain (923), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Mozambique (900), Belgium (899), Honduras (826), France (814), BiH (803), Czech Republic (655), Mauritania (588), Italy (563), South Africa (545), Japan (541), Peru (482), Togo (436), Guyana (360), Cyprus (357), Zimbabwe (350), Republic of the Congo (322), Côte d'Ivoire (290), Slovenia (193), the Netherlands (170), Suriname (150), Cabo Verde (120), Tajikistan (113), Eritrea (101), The Gambia (100), Jordan (100), Germany (67), Bhutan (66), Rwanda (65), Senegal (50), Ireland (40), Denmark (30), Ecuador (30), Guinea-Bissau (9), and Burundi (4).

349 Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form C.

350 Sweden Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form D.

351 Tunisia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form D.

352 Uganda Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form B.

State	Last declared total (for year)	Initial declaration	Consumed during 2025	Year of last declared consumption	Total quantity reduced as excess to need
Cambodia	1,725 (2025)	2,035	0	2024	–
Namibia	1,634 (2009)	9,999	N/R	2009	–
Canada	1,475 (2025)	1,781	0	2024	–
Uganda	1,348 (2025)	2,400	312	2025	–
Kenya	1,020 (2007)	3,000	N/R	2007	–
Total	**78,707**	**162,116**	**1,356**	**–**	**17,599**

Note: N/R=not reported.

The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that retain mines but are apparently not using them for the permitted purposes. For these states, the number of retained mines has stayed the same each year, indicating that none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research. No other details have been provided about how these mines are being used. The ICBL has noted that mines retained for long periods without use for permitted purposes could amount to stockpiling, which is not permitted under the treaty.

Three States Parties have never reported consuming landmines retained for the permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Burundi, Cabo Verde, and Togo, each of which retains less than 1,000 mines.

Similar to the Oslo Action Plan (2020–2024), the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan (2025–2029) requires that each State Party "annually review the number of anti-personnel mines retained for permitted purposes under Article 3 to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary, destroy as soon as possible all anti-personnel mines that exceed that number, report annually on their use and planned use and on their destruction."[353]

Action 47 of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan gives the president of the Mine Ban Treaty a new role in ensuring compliance with Articles 3, 4, and 5. Action 47 states that "should no information on implementation be submitted for two consecutive years, the President will assist and engage with the State Party concerned in cooperation with the relevant Committee."[354]

While laudable in terms of transparency, several States Parties still report retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel landmine. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty. At least 12 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines in this condition.[355]

353 Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 29 November 2024, Action 16, bit.ly/SRAAP2025-2029; and Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, Action 16, docs.un.org/APLC/CONF/2019/5/add.1.

354 Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 29 November 2024, Action 47, bit.ly/SRAAP2025-2029.

355 States Parties retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine: Afghanistan, Australia, BiH, Canada, Eritrea, France, The Gambia, Germany, Mozambique, Senegal, Serbia, and the UK.

TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party "report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party" regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on developments during the preceding calendar year.

The Marshall Islands submitted its initial report in March 2026. Lebanon is required to submit an initial report by 30 April 2027. Two countries have outstanding deadlines for submitting their initial reports: Tuvalu (due 28 August 2012) and Tonga (due 30 May 2026).



The Swiss EOD Center presents alternatives to the use of live antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes during the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in June 2026.

© ICBL, June 2026

As of 1 October 2026, 78 States Parties (48%) had submitted their Article 7 reports for calendar year 2025. A total of 83 States Parties (52%) had not submitted a report for calendar year 2025, of which 65 have failed to provide a transparency report for three or more years.[356]

Notably, Ukraine did not provide a transparency report for 2025—only the second time it has failed to do so since becoming a State Party in 2006.[357] As noted elsewhere, Ukraine's purported "suspension" of the treaty has no legal effect, and Ukraine remains fully bound by its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, including transparency reporting.

The submission rate of reports for calendar year 2025 was slightly higher than in both 2022 and 2023.[358]

356 Lithuania and Poland also submitted their Article 7 reports for 2025, but they are no longer States Parties to the treaty. Lebanon, for which the treaty entered into force on 1 November 2026, is due to submit its initial Article 7 transparency report by 30 April 2027.

357 Ukraine did not provide a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report in 2022 (for calendar year 2021).

358 Note that the rate was not calculated in 2024, due to technical issues with the UN's online depositary database.

States Parties that have failed to submit Article 7 reports for three or more years

State Party	Date of most recent submission
Antigua & Barbuda	March 2000
Gabon	September 2002
Togo	March 2003
Fiji	April 2003
Barbados	May 2003
Kiribati	June 2004
Grenada	June 2004
Timor-Leste	June 2004
Guinea	June 2004
Comoros	June 2004
Nauru	July 2004
Saint Vincent & The Grenadines	September 2004
Papua New Guinea	November 2004
Saint Lucia	November 2004
Djibouti	December 2005
Seychelles	December 2005
Maldives	December 2006
Honduras	December 2007
Jamaica	December 2007
Niue	December 2007
Dominica	December 2008
Rwanda	December 2008
Sao Tome & Principe	December 2008
Vanuatu	December 2008
Dominican Republic	December 2009
Haiti	December 2009
Tanzania	December 2009
Bahamas	December 2009
Cabo Verde	December 2009
Congo, Rep.	December 2009
Kuwait	December 2010
Malawi	December 2010

State Party	Date of most recent submission
Namibia	December 2010
Turkmenistan	December 2010
Lesotho	December 2011
Madagascar	December 2011
Trinidad & Tobago	December 2012
Venezuela	December 2012
Belize	December 2012
Eswatini	December 2013
Equatorial Guinea	December 2014
Eritrea	December 2014
Liberia	December 2014
Saint Kitts & Nevis	December 2016
North Macedonia	December 2018
Palau	December 2018
Samoa	December 2018
Solomon Islands	December 2018
Cook Islands	December 2019
The Gambia	April 2020
Panama	August 2020
Indonesia	November 2020
Paraguay	November 2020
Guyana	April 2021
Suriname	July 2021
Burundi	August 2021
Kenya	December 2021
Malaysia	April 2022
Costa Rica	May 2022
Brunei Darussalam	June 2022
South Africa	July 2022
Malta	October 2022
Guatemala	April 2023
Botswana	May 2023
Ghana	August 2023

STATUS OF THE 1997 MINE BAN TREATY



MAP KEY

States Parties (162)

States not party (35)

DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.



A farmer in Logar province, Afghanistan, with his crop of onions grown on land cleared of landmines.

© Abdul Haq Azimi/The HALO Trust, November 2025

THE IMPACT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an overview of achievements and challenges in assessing and addressing the devastating impact of antipersonnel landmines. It reports on global casualties from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) and on efforts by States Parties to assist victims, while also covering the extent of landmine contamination and efforts to address it through clearance and risk education. It reflects on progress towards meeting Mine Ban Treaty obligations during the first year of implementation of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan (2025–2029), adopted in November 2024 at the Fifth Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty. This chapter presents data on the situation in 2025 and, where relevant, includes updates up until the beginning of November 2026.

In 2025, global mine and ERW casualties rose to 6,929 (1,955 killed; 4,930 injured; and 44 of unknown status), the highest annual total since 2020. Mine/ERW casualties were recorded in 54 countries and areas, with civilians comprising 84% of casualties where the status was known, and children accounting for 50% of the civilian total. Myanmar, a state not party, recorded the highest number of casualties for the third consecutive year, followed by state not party Syria. Ten States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty were among those with the highest annual casualty numbers.

Victim assistance efforts in the current reporting period remained uneven both across and within countries with responsibilities to victims. Sustainability of vital support to mine/ERW victims was most evident in States Parties where victim assistance was already integrated into national social protection, health, rehabilitation, and disability sectors. While the integration process and shift towards national ownership was underway for many states, these advancements remained incomplete, with services uneven across regions and health and social protection sectors. As in previous years, survivors in rural and remote areas often faced additional barriers related to distance, transport costs, inaccessible infrastructure, weak referral systems, and shortages of trained personnel and assistive products.

Rehabilitation services and assistive technology remained the most extensively reported areas of victim assistance. Provision was frequently concentrated in urban centers and dependent on external support, while conflict drove rapidly increasing demand in States Parties Palestine, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. Psychological and psychosocial support, though limited in provision, was increasingly integrated into rehabilitation, public health, and community-based services. Peer support and survivor-led initiatives were reported in at least

10 States Parties, including Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Colombia, Uganda, and Tajikistan. Social and economic inclusion measures included vocational training, income-generation support, education, disability allowances, employment assistance, and sport. However, many initiatives remained small-scale, reliant on international funding, or were available through broader disability and social protection systems rather than dedicated victim assistance programs.

Conflict, insecurity, inadequate funding, and limited national capacity continued to restrict the availability, accessibility, and sustainability of services. Furthermore, massive funding cuts in 2025–2026 severely impacted the broader disability and development sector, which provides essential support within victim assistance frameworks.[1] The impacts were particularly severe regarding prosthetic limb provision, rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration services.[2]

Antipersonnel mine contamination remained extensive, with at least 65 states and other areas suspected or confirmed to be contaminated by antipersonnel mines or facing a threat from improvised mines, as of November 2026. Of these, 32 were States Parties with clearance obligation deadlines under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Four States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations—Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, and Ukraine—were known or assessed to have massive antipersonnel mine contamination of more than 100km^2, while another four had large contamination of 20–99km^2. In several States Parties, the full extent of contamination remained unknown or changed as ongoing survey identified previously unrecorded hazardous areas, while ongoing conflict created new contamination and restricted access, notably in Sudan and Ukraine. At least 17 States Parties with current Article 5 clearance obligations were also known or suspected to be affected by improvised antipersonnel mines.

In 2025, 22 States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligation deadlines reported releasing a combined 388.3km^2 of hazardous area and destroying at least 96,879 antipersonnel mines, including 15,518 improvised mines.[3] Total land release decreased by 18.4% compared to 2024, while land released through clearance decreased by 6%. Progress in land release remained uneven, with nine States Parties releasing more land in 2025 than in 2024, while eight reported no land release. Funding shortfalls, insecurity, access restrictions, and newly identified contamination continued to constrain operations in several countries.

Progress towards completion of Article 5 clearance obligations remained slow. As of October 2026, 32 States Parties had completed clearance since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999—including Croatia in March 2026 and Oman in 2025. However, nine States Parties submitted Article 5 extension requests in 2026.[4] The requests highlighted persistent obstacles to completion, including insufficient or unpredictable funding, insecurity and restricted access, limited operational capacity, difficult terrain and climatic conditions, and an incomplete understanding of the extent of remaining contamination.

1 Humanity & Inclusion (HI), "HI Warns of Drastic Cuts to International Aid for People with Disabilities," 18 March 2026, bit.ly/HI18Mar2026.

2 International Campaign to Ban Landmines–Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), "Impacts of 2025 United States Funding Cuts on Mine Action," 1 December 2025, p. 6, bit.ly/MonitorUSFundingCuts1Dec2025; and Global Protection Cluster, "Protection Capacities Under Pressure: Mine Action Analytical Note," 24 August 2026, pp. 2–3, bit.ly/ProtectionCluster24Aug2026.

3 The contamination and land release figures presented in this report are rounded to the nearest hundredth. Land release findings are based on data collected and analyzed by Mine Action Review, an independent project of Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). NPA is a member of the ICBL-CMC. Mine Action Review provided the Monitor with the contamination and land release data used in this chapter under a Memorandum of Understanding. Mine Action Review's country profiles and additional information are available at www.mineactionreview.org.

4 States Parties that submitted Article 5 extension requests in 2026 were: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand. Tajikistan had also submitted a request in 2025, but its late submission did not allow for it to be fully considered during last year's extension request process. It was therefore granted a one-year extension to 31 December 2026 and requested to submit a detailed extension request in 2026.


Risk education was conducted in 27 States Parties with clearance obligations in 2025, but significant gaps in reporting, planning, and delivery remained. Funding and operational constraints limited delivery, and economic necessity continued to drive risk-taking behaviors. Only four of nine States Parties requesting Article 5 extensions in 2026 provided multi-year risk education plans with implementation projections.

To reach affected populations, risk education combined community-based engagement with mass media and digital communication. Risk education adapted to evolving threats in conflict and emergency settings, including drone and explosive device threats in Ukraine; large-scale returns in Afghanistan, Sudan, and Syria; and explosive attacks and contamination in Gaza, Lebanon, and Myanmar, where risk education was increasingly combined with conflict preparedness and protection (CPP). The withdrawal of Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland from the Mine Ban Treaty also raised new questions about civilian protection and risk education as several of these states indicated an intention to restore the option of landmine use in future defence operations.

CASUALTIES

Landmines of all types, as well as ERW including cluster munition remnants, remain a major threat as they continue to kill and injure thousands of civilians every year and cause indiscriminate harm globally.[5] Since 1999, Monitor casualty records have included 172,653 people recorded as killed (49,859) or injured (118,525) or of unknown survival outcome (4,269) in incidents involving mines/ERW detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle.[6]

Mine/ERW casualties, 1999–2025




In the five-year period 2021–2025, annual casualties fluctuated, from a low of 4,709 in 2022 to a high of 6,929 in 2025, driven by recent mine/ERW contamination from conflict, especially in Myanmar, Syria, and Ukraine, and by people returning to contaminated areas in Syria after the end of the Assad regime.

5 Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor's global mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualty data. Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are reported in the Impact chapter of the annual *Cluster Munition Monitor* report. For more details on cluster munition casualties, see, ICBL-CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2026* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2026), bit.ly/CMMonitorReports.

6 Casualties recorded include people killed and injured, and those for whom the survival status was not reported.


Mine/ERW casualties, 2021–2025



MINE/ERW CASUALTIES IN 2025

The Monitor recorded 6,929 mine/ERW casualties in 2025 (1,955 people killed and 4,930 injured). For 44 casualties, the survival outcome was not known.[7] The annual total of recorded casualties for 2025 was the highest since 2020, and 10% higher than in 2024.

Casualties by type of mine/ERW in 2025



Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; AVM=antivehicle mines; CMR=cluster munition remnants; ERW=explosive remnants of war.

CASUALTIES BY DEVICE TYPE

Landmine casualties

Collectively, landmines of all types caused the majority of all recorded casualties from mines/ERW (4,400 or 64%) during 2025. This included mines recorded as: antipersonnel mines (1,318 or 19% of all casualties), improvised mines (1,530 or 22%), unspecified mine types (1,490 or 22%), and antivehicle mines (62 or 1%). As with the global mine/ERW casualty totals for 2025, Myanmar had the highest number of casualties recorded as occurring due to mines of all types in 2025 (1,455), followed by Syria (1,245).

7 As in previous years, there was no substantial data available on the number of people indirectly impacted by mines/ERW or mine/ERW casualties, and this information was not included in the Monitor's casualty database.



U Min Aung repairs a bicycle outside his home in Kani township, in Myanmar's Sagaing region. He lost his left leg after stepping on a landmine several years ago and now works as a bicycle repairer.

© Khun Sit Paing, June 2026

In 2025, of the 1,318 antipersonnel mine casualties recorded, 88% of them were recorded in Myanmar (1,159). The number of casualties recorded as occurring annually from antipersonnel mines more than tripled during the five-year period 2021–2025, increasing from 412 in 2021 to 1,318 in 2025.

In 2025, improvised mines caused 1,530 recorded casualties—surpassing both manufactured antipersonnel mines (1,318) and unspecified mine types (1,490), which likely include many improvised mines. Improvised mines caused significant numbers of casualties throughout the five-year period 2021–2025: 1,741 recorded in 2021, 1,517 in 2022, 2,071 in 2023, 2,077 in 2024, and 1,530 in 2025.

Improvised mines are improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—"homemade" or assembled explosive weapons that are designed to cause death or injury—that are victim-activated and detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle. Improvised mines that can be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person fit the definition of antipersonnel landmines and are therefore prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.[8] While rarely distinguishable in casualty data due to the absence of forensic investigations and indistinct reporting classifications, available information indicates that, worldwide, the fusing of most improvised mines causing casualties allows them to be activated by a person, thus effectively making them prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Unspecified mine types likely included improvised mines and antipersonnel mines, as the overall reporting indicates. Casualties from unspecified mine types fluctuated according to reporting availability and detail: 1,594 casualties were recorded in 2021, 504 in 2022, 351 in 2023, 761 in 2024, and 1,490 in 2025. In 2025, most unspecified mine casualties (1,217) were recorded in Syria, where landmines from previous fighting killed and injured people returning to their land.

Casualties from cluster munition remnants and other ERW

Cluster munition remnants, primarily unexploded submunitions, caused 117 casualties in 2025, while other ERW caused 1,435 casualties.[9]

Undifferentiated mine/ERW casualties

A total of 977 casualties (14%) resulted from mine/ERW items detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle where the type of device was either not identified initially, or was otherwise undifferentiated, unknown, or not disaggregated during casualty recording.

8 These landmines are sometimes referred to in reporting and data as victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs (VO-IEDs), or by the type of construction, such as pressure plate IEDs (PP-IEDs) and crush wire IEDs.

9 Cluster munition remnant casualties as reported in *Cluster Munition Monitor 2026*: Syria (68), Ukraine (25), Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) (8), Afghanistan (5), Iraq (4), Russia (3), Cambodia (2), and Lebanon (2). See, ICBL-CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2026* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2026), bit.ly/CMMonitorReports.

CASUALTY DEMOGRAPHICS

Civilian status

The devastating and disproportionate impact of mines and ERW on civilians was once again evident in the Monitor casualty statistics for 2025. Civilians made up 84% of all casualties where the civilian, deminer, or military status of the casualty was known.[10]

Status of mine/ERW casualties in 2025, where known[11]

Civilian	5,078	84%
Deminer	119	2%
Military	868	14%

Age and gender of mine/ERW casualties

In 2025, the gender was known for 3,654 of the reported casualties. Men and boys accounted for the majority of those casualties, totaling 3,029 (or 83%), while women and girls made up the remaining 625 (or 17%).[12]

Child casualties

Children are extremely vulnerable to the harm caused by antipersonnel landmines, improvised mines, and ERW, and in particular any explosive items that lie above ground and are visible. Driven by curiosity, a lack of awareness, or high-risk behavior and bravado, children in general are more likely to deliberately handle explosive items than adults, often mistaking them for toys or other play objects. Children have made up 36% of all civilian casualties recorded by the Monitor since 1999, where the age was known.

In 2025, at least 1,690 child casualties were recorded, making up 50% of civilian casualties where the age group was known.[13] Children were killed or injured by mines/ERW in 38 countries in 2025, four more countries than in 2024.[14]

COUNTRIES WITH MINE/ERW CASUALTIES IN 2025

Mine/ERW casualties were recorded in 53 countries and one other area in 2025. The country with the most recorded total mine/ERW casualties was state not party Myanmar (1,891 casualties), followed by state not party Syria (1,602 casualties). Ten States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, along with three states not party, each recorded more than 100 casualties in 2025.

10 For 864 (12%) of casualties in 2025 the status (civilian, deminer, or military) was not reported.

11 The category "military" includes police forces and private security forces when active in combat, as well as members of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and militias. Direct participation in armed conflict, also called direct participation in hostilities, distinguishes persons who are not civilians in accordance with international humanitarian law (IHL), which dictates that "those involved in the fighting must make a basic distinction between combatants, who may be lawfully attacked, and civilians, who are protected against attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities." International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "Direct participation in hostilities: questions & answers," 6 February 2009, bit.ly/ICRCDirectParticipationFeb2009. Military or police casualties during clearance or defusal are counted as deminers.

12 A further 577 casualties were security or armed personnel whose sex was not reported; though likely male, they are not assumed to be so in the dataset.

13 Child mine/ERW casualties are recorded when the age of the victim is less than 18 years at the time of the explosion, or when the casualty was reported by the source (such as a media report) as being a child. For 1,696 civilian casualties, the age group was not recorded.

14 In 2025, child casualties of mines/ERW were recorded in Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Russia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yemen.

CASUALTIES IN STATES PARTIES IN 2025

Mine/ERW casualties were recorded in 39 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty during 2025, accounting for 2,985 casualties—or 43% of all annual casualties. This reflects a sharp decline from 2022, when the proportion of annual casualties occurring in States Parties accounted for 65% of all casualties.[15]

Afghanistan remained the most affected State Party, with 497 casualties, though this was a decrease from 624 in 2024. Palestine followed with 319 recorded casualties. Significant numbers of casualties were also recorded in Ukraine, due to the extensive and ongoing contamination following the Russian invasion that began in 2022. The Sahel region of Africa—including Burkina Faso, Mali, and Nigeria—remained heavily impacted by improvised mines, which are the principal cause of mine/ERW casualties in those countries.

Globally, many mine/ERW casualties go unrecorded each year, including in States Parties, and therefore are absent from the sources that contribute to annual Monitor casualty data. Some countries, especially those experiencing conflict, do not have functional casualty surveillance systems in place, while other reporting mechanisms fail to provide comprehensive or disaggregated casualty data, leading to persistent underreporting.

Countries with over 100 mine/ERW casualties in 2025

Country	Casualties in 2025
Myanmar	1,891
Syria	1,602
Afghanistan	497
Palestine	319
Nigeria	298
Ukraine	275
Mali	222
Burkina Faso	177
Sudan	172
Yemen	164
Colombia	139
Iraq	127
Pakistan	111

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**.

CASUALTIES IN STATES NOT PARTY IN 2025

The Monitor recorded 3,941 mine/ERW casualties in 14 states not party in 2025. Myanmar accounted for nearly half of this total (1,891), remaining the most-affected country for the third consecutive year. While recorded casualties in Myanmar decreased slightly in 2025, that drop followed two significant increases where casualties doubled from 545 in 2022 to 1,003 in 2023, and doubled again to a high of 2,029 in 2024.

While casualties fell slightly in Myanmar, they rose sharply in Syria in 2025 compared to 2024. Syria had the second highest number of new casualties in 2025. Casualties in Syria rose from 834 in 2022, 933 in 2023, and 1,015 in 2024 to 1,602 in 2025, as people returned from displacement after the fall of the Assad government in December 2024. Additionally, three casualties were identified in other area, Western Sahara.

15 States Parties recorded 3,040 of 4,709 casualties in 2022.

States and areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2025[16]

Americas	East and South Asia and the Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
Colombia **Ecuador** **Mexico** **Venezuela**	**Afghanistan** **Bangladesh** **Cambodia** India **Indonesia** Lao PDR Myanmar Nepal Pakistan **Sri Lanka** **Thailand**	Armenia Azerbaijan **Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)** **Croatia** Kyrgyzstan Russia **Türkiye** **Ukraine**	Egypt Iran **Iraq** Lebanon* Libya **Palestine** Syria **Tunisia** **Yemen**	**Angola** **Benin** **Burkina Faso** **Cameroon** **Central African Republic** **Chad** **Côte d'Ivoire** **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)** **Ethiopia** **Ghana** **Guinea-Bissau** **Mali** **Mozambique** **Niger** **Nigeria** **Senegal** **Somalia** **South Sudan** **Sudan** **Togo** **Uganda** *Western Sahara*

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**. Other areas are indicated in *italics*.
*Although Lebanon was not party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2025, it acceded to the treaty on 1 May 2026.

Mine/ERW types causing casualties: terminology

Category of mine/ERW	Term used in data	Description
Mines, including improvised mines	Antipersonnel mines	**Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, and are therefore prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty**.
	Antivehicle mines	Also referred to as "antitank mines," antivehicle mines are munitions designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to that of a person, and tend to contain a larger explosive charge than antipersonnel mines. **Antivehicle mines are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty unless they are fitted with fuzes that can be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person**.

16 This table lists countries and areas with recorded casualties from mines and ERW. Inclusion does not necessarily indicate antipersonnel mine contamination specifically. Reported incidents in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Uganda, and Venezuela involved isolated ERW or unspecified mines/ERW.

Category of mine/ERW	Term used in data	Description
Mines, including improvised mines	Improvised mines	Improvised mines are types of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are "homemade" explosive weapons designed to cause death or injury. Improvised mines are victim-activated IEDs that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle. These are landmines and are sometimes referred to as artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs (VO-IEDs), or by the type of construction, such as pressure plate IEDs (PP-IEDs). In Monitor casualty reporting, the terms "victim-activated improvised mines" and "improvised mines" are synonyms for victim-activated IEDs.
	Antipersonnel improvised mines, including booby-traps	**Antipersonnel improvised mines—including booby-traps that can be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person—fit the definition of antipersonnel landmines and are therefore prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty**. A booby-trap is an antipersonnel explosive device deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is performed.
	Unspecified mine	The Monitor uses the term "unspecified mine" when an incident is reported as a "mine" or "landmine" incident, but where the information to distinguish if it was an antipersonnel or antivehicle mine or a victim-activated IED is lacking.
Unexploded cluster submunitions and bomblets	Cluster munition remnants	Cluster munition remnants are submunitions or bomblets dispersed or released by, or otherwise separated from, a cluster munition, that failed to explode, or that have not been used and that have been left behind or dumped.
Other explosive remnants of war (ERW)	ERW	Unexploded ordnance (UXO) are explosive weapons that have been primed, fuzed, armed, or otherwise prepared for use or used. They may have been fired, dropped, launched, or projected, yet remain unexploded.
		Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) are explosive weapons that have not been used during an armed conflict or that have been left behind or dumped.
Victim-activated explosive items, type unknown	Unknown mines/ERW	Unknown mines/ERW are explosive items causing casualties that were detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle that were not attributed to a specific mine/ERW type either because it was not known what type of mine or ERW caused the casualty when information was recorded, or because of a lack of disaggregation within datasets between casualties caused by victim-activated explosives and those caused by ERW.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Victim assistance seeks to reduce fatalities, support the recovery and rehabilitation of mine/ERW survivors, improve psychological wellbeing, and promote the full inclusion and equal participation of victims in society. It is a long-term obligation under the Mine Ban Treaty requiring sustained efforts by all States Parties, including those still affected by contamination, as well as those that have completed clearance and been declared mine-free.



A member of the Afghan Landmine Survivors Organization (ALSO) provides peer support in Kabul under an ICBL-CMC Investing in Action grant. More than 50 survivors and persons with disabilities benefited from the program in 2025.

© ALSO Afghanistan, September 2025

The number of States Parties with victim assistance responsibilities has grown since the Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference in Nairobi in 2004, when an initial group of 24 States Parties had indicated that "there likely are hundreds, thousands or tens-of-thousands of landmine survivors" on their territory and, as such, acknowledged that they have the greatest responsibility to act, and also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance.[17] As of October 2026, at least 41 States Parties are observed in Monitor reporting as having responsibility for significant numbers of mine victims.[18] This includes Lebanon, which acceded to the treaty on 1 May 2026 and actively records and reports casualties resulting from mines and ERW.[19]

Despite a longstanding commitment to act, the collective response has often failed to meet the needs of survivors. In the current reporting period, services have been curtailed in many countries due to a range of factors, such as a lack of national resources, coordination challenges, diminishing international funding, insecurity, and conflict.[20]

In 2025, States Parties—including Burundi, Cambodia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Yemen—reported financial or operational constraints affecting victim assistance. The impact

17 Mine Ban Treaty, "Final Report. First Review Conference, Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004," 9 February 2005, pp. 33 and 99, bit.ly/MBT1RevConFinalReport. Of these countries, 23 reported responsibility at the First Review Conference in Nairobi, held from 29 November to 3 December 2004. With Ethiopia's ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty on 17 December 2004, the number increased to 24.

18 At the close of the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in June 2026, 39 States Parties had "reported mine victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control": Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Victim Assistance, "General Observations: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026, p. 1, bit.ly/VACommitteeJune2026. In addition to new State Party Lebanon in 2026, Burkina Faso is included in Landmine Monitor reporting because it has reported hundreds of casualties of improvised mines on its territory. Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 3. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7MBT; and Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 July 2025, p. 21, bit.ly/BurkinaFasoArt5ExtRequestJuly2025.

19 Lebanon officially became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty when the treaty entered into force for the country on 1 November 2026.

20 Global Protection Cluster, "Protection Capacities Under Pressure: Mine Action Analytical Note," 24 August 2026, bit.ly/ProtectionCluster24Aug2026.

of deficient resourcing on victim assistance has been acute. Conflict and insecurity continued to restrict access to affected communities and interrupt services, while increasing demand for emergency care and longer-term support. In rural and remote areas, distance, transport costs, inaccessible infrastructure, and shortages of trained personnel often prevented survivors from reaching services. These conditions also complicated identification of survivors, needs assessments, and follow-up, leaving gaps in information on who required assistance and whether that assistance was received.

The Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan directly addresses these systemic gaps. Actions 30 and 31 of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan set the plan's foundational commitments by requiring the appointment of a relevant government entity to lead the integration of victim assistance into broader national frameworks, as well as the establishment of interministerial and multisectoral coordination mechanisms to secure victims' rights within national policies, legal frameworks, and budgets.

To translate this framework into practical measures, the plan prioritizes targeted strategic actions. Action 32 focuses on the systematic collection of disaggregated data regarding victims, their specific needs, and locations, while Action 33 concentrates on strengthening emergency response and medical care where survivors need it most. To ensure these immediate services remain sustainable and reachable, Action 34 mandates the maintenance of accessible service directories and functioning referral mechanisms.

For long-term recovery, the plan requires sustained, comprehensive care pathways. Actions 35 and 36 guarantee survivor access to physical rehabilitation services, assistive technology, and vital psychological and psychosocial support. Action 37 further ensures that survivors can access and benefit from broader existing health, disability, education, employment, and social protection programs. In conflict-affected settings, Action 38 mandates that these specialized survivor needs are seamlessly integrated into national humanitarian response and preparedness plans. Finally, Action 39 seeks to ensure the full inclusion and effective participation of mine victims and their representative organizations in all matters that affect them.[21] This section assesses the progress, implementation gaps, and national efforts corresponding to each of these strategic action points.

DATA COLLECTION

States Parties committed in the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan to "[c]arry out efforts to identify all mine and other explosive ordnance victims and collect accurate and comprehensive information on their needs, challenges and geographic locations in a manner disaggregated by gender, age, disability, and other considerations," and to make the data available "by integrating [it] into a national centralised database" (Action 32).

During the reporting period, identification of needs data came mainly from surveys and assessments, most of them partial in coverage such as periodic data collection, sample surveys, or surveys still under way, rather than national and systematic approaches. Elaboration of findings on efforts to improve disaggregation of data by groups and specific needs still require more attention in reporting. Efforts to build or improve records and database systems took place in several States Parties during the reporting period. This was mainly through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which continued to roll out its Digital Centre Management System across the physical rehabilitation centers it supports, despite delays due to a lack of resources.

21 Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 29 November 2024, bit.ly/SRAAP2025-2029. See also, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), "Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029: Victim Assistance Checklist," 17 March 2025, bit.ly/MBTVictimAssistance.

IDENTIFYING VICTIMS AND COLLECTING COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION ON NEEDS, CHALLENGES, AND LOCATIONS

Cambodia continued to undertake a survivor-led Quality of Life Survey in 2025, with landmine survivors among the persons with disabilities interviewed.[22] In **Palestine**, the ICRC, in conjunction with local facilities in Palestine, collected data on the rehabilitation and social needs of over 10,000 people with physical disabilities in Gaza in order to refer them for further assistance.[23] Although Palestine cited limited mechanisms for counting victims and assessing needs, it also noted difficulty reaching survivors.[24]

Sri Lanka's Victim Assistance Needs Assessment Survey, launched in 2024, covered a 20% sample of recorded victims (41 of 207) in the Northern and Eastern provinces as of June 2026, with preliminary findings pointing to gaps in services and weak referral mechanisms, as well as limited livelihood and housing support.[25] **Zimbabwe** reported that a nationwide landmine victim survey was under way through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project RECLAIM and the Zimbabwe Mine Action Center (ZIMAC). However, it signaled that it had no comprehensive disaggregated database yet, even though profiling across all 10 provinces remained a priority.[26]

INTEGRATING VICTIM DATA INTO DIGITAL AND NATIONAL CENTRALIZED DATABASE SYSTEMS

Within ICRC-supported rehabilitation centers, the ICRC's Digital Center Management system—a standardized, transparent, and auditable digital tool that helps physical rehabilitation centers operate more efficiently and cost-effectively—went live in centers in **Iraq** and **Syria** in early 2025; it later launched in the **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)** and **Pakistan**. Thirteen other centers completed assessments and capacity-building in preparation for the adoption of the new digital system. There were also plans to deploy it in more centers, including in Afghanistan, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Togo in 2026.[27] As a result of budget reductions, deployment in 2026 was to rely on local teams leading training, with remote technical support from the ICRC headquarters in Geneva.[28]

Yemen developed a national database, but with limited involvement of affected communities in its planning.[29]

EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE AND CONTINUING MEDICAL CARE

States Parties committed in the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan to "[p]rovide effective and efficient context-specific emergency medical care to new casualties and improve national capacity through training, including on psychosocial first care, specialized training for health professionals and layperson first responder training in affected communities and ensure

22 Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/CambodiaStatement16June2026.

23 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 431, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

24 Statement of Palestine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/PalestineStatement16June2026.

25 Statement of Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/SriLankaStatement16June2026.

26 Statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2026, bit.ly/ZimbabweStatement17June2026.

27 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 8, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

28 Ibid.

29 Statement of Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/YemenStatement16June2026.

that mine and other explosive ordnance survivors have access to health services including in rural and remote areas" (Action 33).

The availability of emergency medical care and continuing medical care depends on the broader functioning of national health systems. Because funding insecurity and conflict disrupt all areas of medical care in many countries, including in under-reached rural and remote areas, these effects are often necessarily reported together.

Several States Parties—including Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Chad, the DRC, Mali, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen—continued to experience major setbacks, restrictions, and disruptions to their healthcare systems, as well as in the provision of emergency care. In many of these States Parties, health facilities, ambulances, and health workers came under direct attack in the context of ongoing conflicts. Reductions in international humanitarian health funding from early 2025 further compounded the disruptions, forcing partner-supported health facilities to close or suspend services in countries including Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.

Improving the survival rate of people injured by mines and ERW was a prominent concern in the lead-up to the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan, notably through the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the Explosive Weapons Trauma Care Collective (EXTRACCT).[30] In response, Action 33 includes a specific reference to layperson first responder training in affected communities. However, support during the reporting period often focused on providing staff, supplies, and equipment to meet immediate needs, while few countries reported training to strengthen national capacity. Greater investment in training, alongside better reporting on training needs, activities, and outcomes, is needed to build and maintain adequate capacity.

ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES INCLUDING EMERGENCY CARE

In parts of sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali, access to emergency and ongoing medical care remained limited in rural and remote mine-affected areas, owing to geographic isolation, a lack of first-aid and organized medical transport, and a shortage of specialized medical personnel.

In **Burkina Faso**, where there are high numbers of casualties from improvised mines, emergency medical care was inadequate to meet the extent of needs. Alarmingly, a recent report covering 2020–2024 showed delays in care in remote regions and a lack of organized prehospital transport, with 63% of casualties recorded at one military hospital arriving 12–24 hours after injury.[31] The closure or minimal functioning of numerous health facilities due to conflict-related insecurity resulted in restricted movement and deployment of health personnel. Shortages of qualified staff and resources also reduced access to essential services. In 2025, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) supported the reopening of 30 closed facilities, while the ICRC supported 36 health centers.[32]

30 The Explosive Weapons Trauma Care Collective (EXTRACCT) was formerly the Mine Action Trauma Care Collaborative. Hannah Wild et al., "The Mine Action Trauma Care Collaborative: Enhancing Coordination Between Humanitarian Mine Action and the Emergency Health Response to Civilian Casualties of Explosive Ordnance," *Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction*, Vol. 28, Issue 1, 27 March 2024, bit.ly/EXTRACCT27Mar2024; and Hannah Wild et al., "The Explosive Weapons Trauma Care Collective (Extracct): A Roadmap For Reducing Preventable Death Among Civilian Casualties Of Explosive Injury," *Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction*, Vol. 28, Issue 3, 21 October 2024, bit.ly/EXTRACCT21Oct2024.

31 Abdoulahi Boris Traore, "When Mine Risk Education Becomes a Lifeline: Evidence from the Field," Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), 10 April 2026, bit.ly/IPA10Apr2026.

32 ICRC, "Burkina Faso: our activities in 2025," 13 March 2026, bit.ly/ICRCBurkinaFaso2025; and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), "Burkina Faso Humanitarian Situation Report No. 4: 1 January to 31 December 2025," 16 February 2026, bit.ly/UNICEFBurkinaFasoFeb2026.

Burundi cited gaps in rural health infrastructure.[33] In the **Central African Republic**, although mine victims received free treatment in public hospitals, these facilities were generally severely under-equipped. A key challenge remained the shortage of medical expertise, infrastructure, and emergency transport needed for the adequate treatment of victims, particularly in regional areas.[34] In **Chad**, survivors' access to care and reintegration services was hindered by geographic isolation, precarious socio-economic conditions and a shortage of specialized medical personnel in areas where mine/ERW incidents occurred.[35] Chad reported that victim assistance was largely ineffective in 2025, citing insufficient technical and financial support for the victim assistance component of its mine action program.[36] In eastern **DRC**, around 73% of health facilities surveyed had run out of medicine, and 60% had been looted.[37] **Mali** cited the absence of first-aid and medicalized transport as the primary causes of death in rural and remote areas.[38]

Mozambique reported that community networks, often supported by local communities and survivors' associations, provided first-aid. Patients who lacked the means to pay for treatment were transferred to referral hospitals for free, continuing medical and pharmaceutical care.[39] **Senegal** reported that financing agreements for victim assistance, including with hospitals and a pharmacy in Ziguinchor, increased from three in 2025 to 27 in 2026.[40] Senegal also reported agreements that enabled mine survivors to access medical care and medicines free of charge.[41] In **Somalia**, national Red Crescent Society teams provided first-aid and medical evacuation, while ICRC-supported hospitals admitted weapon-wounded patients. The ICRC reported, however, that hospitals were struggling to meet a surge in needs amid declining humanitarian resources.[42]

In **South Sudan**, from early 2025, Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) recorded attacks on its facilities, forcing the closure of four hospitals. The hospital in Lankien, Jonglei state, the only advanced-level health facility for some quarter of a million people, was struck in an aerial attack in February 2026 that destroyed its main medical supply warehouse. The hospital was subsequently looted, and MSF closed it in April 2026.[43] South Sudan reported the attack as a direct disruption to services in an area with ongoing mine/ERW casualties.[44] ICRC-supported hospitals continued to treat weapon-wounded patients in 2025.[45]

33 Statement of Burundi, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/BurundiStatement16June2026.

34 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alioune Menane, Mine Action Capacity Building Advisor, United Nations Mine Action Service–United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (UNMAS-MINUSCA), 27 May 2025.

35 Statement of Chad, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2025, bit.ly/ChadStatement17June2025.

36 Chad Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 4.

37 ICRC, "DRC: Health-care system on verge of collapse in North and South Kivu," 17 June 2025, bit.ly/ICRCKivu17June2025.

38 Statement of Mali, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2025, bit.ly/MaliStatement17June2025.

39 Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J.

40 Statement of Senegal, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2026, bit.ly/SenegalStatement17June2026.

41 Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Action 33, p. 16.

42 ICRC, "Somalia: Frontline hospitals under pressure as fighting escalates," 10 April 2025, bit.ly/ICRCSomalia10Apr2025.

43 Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) press release, "South Sudan: Government forces bombarded MSF hospital in Lankien, Jonglei state," 4 February 2026, bit.ly/SouthSudanMSF4Feb2026; and MSF press release, "Bombarded, looted, vandalized: MSF forced to close Lankien hospital after 31 years," 29 April 2026, bit.ly/SouthSudanMSF29April2026.

44 Statement of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/SouthSudanStatement16June2026.

45 ICRC, "South Sudan: January to December 2025 Facts and Figures," 25 February 2026, bit.ly/ICRCSouthSudanFeb2026.

In **Sudan**, 37% of health facilities across the country's 18 states remained non-functional as of April 2026.[46] There was an increase in the provision of first-aid to victims in affected communities in 2025, yet an ongoing lack of such services in remote and insecure areas. Rapid response teams required specific training in the evacuation of mine/ERW casualties, amid an acute shortage of ambulances.[47] Sudan did not report whether this training was provided. Emergency medical care reached children with the support of Save the Children and UNICEF.[48] In 2025, the ICRC provided emergency medical supplies to 26 hospitals.[49]

Access to emergency care and medical services varied considerably elsewhere.

In **Afghanistan**, more than 400 health facilities across 30 provinces closed in 2025 following the suspension of United States (US) foreign assistance. A further 150 facilities closed in the first half of 2026.[50] The health system remained critically under-resourced, with limited access to emergency, surgical, and trauma care. Facilities lacked staff and equipment, and referral and transport were limited, with gaps most acute in rural areas.[51] Afghanistan reported that the Danish Refugee Council covered immediate medical treatment costs for new explosive ordnance casualties in Ghazni, Kabul, Kandahar, and Nangarhar provinces.[52] Restrictions affecting women's access to healthcare and the participation of female health and humanitarian workers constrained service provision, while women with disabilities faced discrimination, accessibility barriers, and insufficient specialized services.[53] In several provinces, health facilities were instructed not to treat women unless accompanied by a male guardian (*mahram*).[54] The continued exclusion of women from medical education also reduced the availability of female health professionals and weakened health-service delivery.[55] These barriers were compounded by distance and limited services in rural and underserved areas, as well as severe health sector funding shortfalls.[56]

46 World Health Organization (WHO), "After three years of conflict, Sudan faces a deeper health crisis," 14 April 2026, bit.ly/WHOSudan14Apr2026.

47 Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J.

48 Statement of Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/SudanStatement16June2026.

49 ICRC, "Sudan Facts and Figures: January to December 2025," 5 March 2026, bit.ly/ICRCSudanMarch2026.

50 "Over 400 health centers shut down in Afghanistan following US aid suspension," *Ariana News*, 15 June 2025, bit.ly/ArianaNews15June2025; and Yasin Shayan, "Funding shortfall forces hundreds of Afghanistan's health facilities to close," *Amu TV*, 10 July 2026, www.amu.tv/246821.

51 EMERGENCY, "Access to Emergency, Critical, and Operative Care in Afghanistan: Perspectives from Afghan People and Healthcare Workers in 11 Provinces," June 2025, bit.ly/AfghanistanEMERGENCYJune2025.

52 Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J.

53 United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General," A/80/658–S/2026/99, 27 February 2026, pp. 11–12, bit.ly/UNSG27Feb2026; and WHO, "Public Health Situation Analysis: Afghanistan," 4 March 2026, pp. 6–7, bit.ly/WHOAfghanistan4Mar2026.

54 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), "Update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan: January–March 2025 Update," 1 May 2025, bit.ly/UNAMA1May2025; UNAMA, "Update on the human rights situation in Afghanistan: April–June 2025 Update," 10 August 2025, bit.ly/UNAMA10Aug2025; UN Women, "FAQs: What it's like to be a woman in Afghanistan today," updated 12 August 2026, bit.ly/UNWomenAfghanistanFAQ; ACAPS, "Afghanistan: Third update on Taliban decrees and directives relevant to the humanitarian response (July–December 2024)," 24 December 2024, bit.ly/AfghanistanACAPS24Dec2024; and Human Rights Watch (HRW), "A Disaster for the Foreseeable Future: Afghanistan's Healthcare Crisis," 12 February 2024, bit.ly/HRWAfghanistanHealthcare12Feb2024.

55 UN Secretary-General, "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the Secretary-General," A/80/658–S/2026/99, 27 February 2026, pp. 11–12, bit.ly/UNSG27Feb2026.

56 WHO, "Public Health Situation Analysis: Afghanistan," 4 March 2026, pp. 2 and 6–7, bit.ly/WHOAfghanistan4Mar2026.

In **Colombia**, assistance to survivors continued to take place in remote territories where health services often did not reach communities.[57] In some of the most affected areas, restrictions on movement limited access to health services.[58] Notably, conflict-affected communities more broadly faced obstacles to accessing healthcare, with the ICRC reporting that some communities were confined by armed actors, preventing access to medical care.[59]

In **Iraq**, the government reported that emergency units and public hospitals near mine-affected communities provided first-aid, stabilization, and referral for further medical treatment in 2025.[60] The ICRC supported emergency care capacity in Baghdad and Mosul.[61] Reporting has yet to establish whether responses were timely for mine/ERW victims, particularly in remote areas.



A workshop on sustainable agriculture and the rights of persons with disabilities organized by the Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Bombs (CCBL) in Siem Reap, Cambodia. The workshop aimed to promote food security and income generation for persons with disabilities.

© So Not/CCBL, April 2025

In **Lebanon**, access to health and rehabilitation services remained constrained by conflict-related damage, attacks on health facilities and ambulances, the loss and displacement of health workers, and the continuing economic crisis. Following the renewed escalation of conflict since April 2026, only 4% of households surveyed by the World Health Organization (WHO) in southern Lebanon and Beirut's southern suburbs reported full access to healthcare. In 2026, the ICRC supported more than 70 facilities and services, including hospitals and emergency medical service centers.[62]

In **Nicaragua**, access to medical care for persons with disabilities, including mine victims, is provided for under the Ministry of Health's "Todos con Voz" program, which covers 100% of medical costs.[63]

In **Palestine**, access to appropriate care remained constrained, with reports of difficulty reaching survivors and a shortage of specialized personnel. At the end of 2025, 18 of Gaza's 36 hospitals (50%) were partially functioning, but no hospital remained functional in northern Gaza. Emergency medical teams performed surgeries and managed more than 100,000 trauma cases in Gaza during 2025.[64] Shortages of medical supplies further constrained care, contributing to avoidable pain, complications, and deaths.[65] Surgery and amputations

57 Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, AICMA), "'Restore to Heal': an exhibition bringing the reality of territories affected by antipersonnel mines to Bogotá," April 2026, bit.ly/AICMAApril2026.

58 ICRC, "Latin America and the Caribbean: When seeking medical care is dangerous," 20 May 2026, bit.ly/ICRC20May2026.

59 ICRC, "Treatment of civilians in Colombia during 2025," 8 May 2026, bit.ly/ICRC8May2026.

60 Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), 30 April 2026, p. 68.

61 ICRC, "Activity report 2025: Iraq," April 2026, p. 10, bit.ly/ICRCIraqApr2026.

62 ICRC, "Lebanon: Humanitarian needs remain acute amid continued uncertainty," 11 September 2026, bit.ly/ICRC11Sept2026.

63 Nicaragua Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J.

64 WHO, "Health conditions in the occupied Palestinian territory, including east Jerusalem: Report by the Director-General," A79/12, 8 May 2026, bit.ly/WHO8May2026.

65 Physicians for Human Rights, "'We Could Have Saved So Many More': Anguish and Death Caused by Israel's Restrictions on Medical Supplies in Gaza," 9 July 2025, bit.ly/PHR9July2025.

were carried out with inadequate or no pain relief. Doctors interviewed in 2025 described shortages of anesthetics, opioids, and basic analgesics, including paracetamol, forcing them to ration what remained. The injuries they treated included open fractures and amputations that require round-the-clock pain relief, yet patients were often limited to a single injection per day.[66] In June 2026, 31 emergency medical teams were deployed across Gaza and some health facilities continued to function.[67]

Thailand reported emergency care arrangements for mine casualties that included first-aid and evacuation by emergency medical teams, with aeromedical transport by rotorcraft to reach casualties in remote areas.[68] It also continued to report that its Universal Coverage for Emergency Patients policy enabled mine victims to receive necessary medical treatment free of charge.[69] In 2025, most casualties were among the armed forces, and Thailand reported that injured military personnel were provided with emergency care as part of a survivor-centered response.[70]

Ukraine's emergency medical care system remained severely strained following Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. In 2025, the ICRC provided emergency and ongoing support to hospitals and primary healthcare centers treating war-wounded patients.[71] To improve local emergency service availability, the WHO and the Ministry of Health installed two modular stations serving as operational bases for ambulance teams.[72] Emergency care for people with mine and other blast and fragmentation injuries included first-aid, hospital treatment, and referral abroad for specialized care. The Medevac Ukraine program provided eligible civilian and military patients—including those with mine injuries—access to treatment abroad, with treatment costs covered by the receiving countries and medical institutions.[73]

Yemen reported that hospitals and clinics existed across all governorates but did not meet the required level of care.[74] In 2025, shortages of staff and equipment constrained services, while economic hardship forced some families to sell property to afford healthcare. The ICRC deployed mobile surgical teams to strengthen surgical capacity at several hospitals, and the Yemeni Red Crescent Society operated ambulances on both sides of the front lines.[75] Mine survivors and their families faced additional treatment and care costs due to limited health services in 2026.[76] Medical care and other services for children were critically

66 Misbah Khan, "'Most people are just toughing it out': shortage of drugs leaves Gaza's wounded without pain relief," *The Guardian*, 29 September 2025, bit.ly/TheGuardian29Sept2025.

67 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), "Humanitarian Situation Report: 26 June 2026," 26 June 2026, bit.ly/OCHA26June2026.

68 Committee on Victim Assistance, "Thailand, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/ThailandVACommitteeJune2025; and Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Action 33, pp. 17 and 20.

69 Committee on Victim Assistance, "Thailand, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/ThailandVACommitteeJune2025; and Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Action 33, p. 17.

70 Statement of Thailand, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2026, bit.ly/ThailandStatement17June2026.

71 ICRC, "Facts and Figures: Ukraine Delegation, January–December 2025," January 2026, bit.ly/ICRCUkraineJan2026.

72 WHO, "Continuity of care: European Union and WHO install modular health facilities in Ukraine," 4 July 2025, bit.ly/WHOUkraine4July2025.

73 "Over 5.6 thousand Ukrainians participated in the medical evacuation program abroad Medevac Ukraine," *Ukrinform*, 7 June 2025, bit.ly/Ukrinform7June2025.

74 Statement of Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/YemenStatement16June2026.

75 ICRC, "Yemen: ICRC's humanitarian impact in 2025, a year of deepening crisis," 13 February 2026, bit.ly/ICRCYemen13Feb2026; and ICRC, "ICRC delivers 22 tonnes of medical supplies to support Yemen's front-line hospitals," 18 September 2026, bit.ly/ICRCYemen18Sept2026.

76 Mwatana for Human Rights, "On the International Day for Mine Awareness," 4 April 2026, bit.ly/Mwatana4Apr2026.

under-funded, while victim assistance activities had been scaled back following aid cuts.[77] Access to treatment was further constrained by damage to healthcare infrastructure.[78] In early 2026, the WHO reported that only around 60% of health facilities were fully functional and warned that funding shortages threatened further reductions in services.[79] By September 2026, intensified fighting had overwhelmed hospitals with wounded patients and there were critical shortages of medical supplies.[80]

IMPROVING NATIONAL CAPACITY THROUGH TRAINING

Training in first-aid and trauma care continued in mine/ERW-affected countries but remained limited and was primarily provided through ICRC. Gaps also remained in emergency assistance capacity and specialized training for the evacuation of mine/ERW casualties, as well as in layperson first responder training.

In **Burkina Faso**, a pilot project led by EXTRACCT, in partnership with Mines Advisory Group (MAG), integrated community first-aid responder training into explosive ordnance risk education.[81] By April 2026, 67 local trainers had delivered 56 community sessions to over 1,300 participants. Preliminary findings indicated significant improvements in participants' knowledge and skills. More than 33 incident reports documented trained community members providing first-aid to injured people.[82]

In 2025, the ICRC reinforced emergency primary care training in **Mali**'s northern and central regions, where there are high numbers of casualties from improvised mines.[83] It also trained health professionals in trauma and emergency care and delivered first-aid training in **Sudan**.[84] National Red Cross Societies in **Burundi**, **Rwanda**, and **Uganda** strengthened emergency preparedness and response, including first-aid and ambulance services, with ICRC training.[85]

Cambodia identified gaps in emergency assistance as a key constraint. In 2025, eight first-aid training sessions were conducted for health center staff and village health volunteers in Banteay Meanchey province.[86]

In **Iraq**, the ICRC provided training for 76 ambulance responders and 183 healthcare professionals in 2025.[87] In 2026, the ICRC reported providing a two-week blast trauma care course for medics from the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) in Erbil.[88]

In **Ukraine**, the national Red Cross trained State Emergency Service rescuers through a rapid 48-hour first-aid program covering bleeding control, stabilization before ambulance

77 Save the Children, "Yemen: One Child Killed or Injured Every Day on Average in 2025 as Child Casualties Surged," 13 January 2026, bit.ly/SaveTheChildren13Jan2026.

78 Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP), "2025 Annual Report," January 2026, p. 9, bit.ly/CIMPAnnualReport2025.

79 WHO press release, "World Health Organization appeals for urgent health funding to protect millions of lives in Yemen in 2026," 12 February 2026, bit.ly/WHOYemen12Feb2026.

80 ICRC, "ICRC delivers 22 tonnes of medical supplies to support Yemen's front-line hospitals," 18 September 2026, bit.ly/ICRCYemen18Sept2026.

81 Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), "Saving lives in the golden hour: a new model for risk education and first aid in areas with high risk of explosive weapon harm," 3 May 2025, bit.ly/AOAVRiskEducation3May2025.

82 Abdoulahi Boris Traore, "When Mine Risk Education Becomes a Lifeline: Evidence from the Field," Innovations for Poverty Action, 10 April 2026, bit.ly/IPA10Apr2026.

83 ICRC, "Mali: our actions in 2025," 2 February 2026, bit.ly/ICRCMaliFeb2026; and ICRC, "Mali: ICRC steps up support to people affected by armed violence," 10 June 2026, bit.ly/ICRCMaliJune2026.

84 ICRC, "Sudan Facts and Figures: January to December 2025," 5 March 2026, bit.ly/ICRCSudanMarch2026.

85 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 102, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

86 Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 13; and statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/CambodiaStatement16June2026.

87 ICRC, "Activity report 2025: Iraq," April 2026, p. 10, bit.ly/ICRCIraqApr2026.

88 ICRC, "Weapon Contamination and Victim Assistance," March 2026, p. 6, bit.ly/ICRC-VAMar2026.

arrival, and care for mine-blast injuries.[89] The ICRC also trained health workers and first responders in mass casualty incident management and delivered first-aid training.[90]

REFERRAL MECHANISMS

States Parties have committed in the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan to "[e]nsure that a national/sub-administrative area referral mechanism is in place to facilitate access to services for mine and other explosive ordnance victims, including by creating and disseminating a comprehensive directory of services available, accessible, and inclusive for all mine and other explosive ordnance victims" (Action 34).

Referral mechanisms and directories of services helped connect mine/ERW victims with assistance. However, these arrangements often operated only locally or through individual organizations, while some broader systems remained fragmented or under development. In many cases, referral arrangements were linked to specific services or facilitated by organizations with established service-provider connections, rather than being implemented through clearly defined referral systems.

In **Ethiopia**, the ICRC established structured referral and reporting systems between physical rehabilitation centers and the relevant ministry.[91]

In **Palestine**, a new integrated referral system was developed by UNMAS in June 2025, through an agreement with the Danish Refugee Council, to ensure a defined chain of steps for identifying survivors' needs and connecting them to services. This centralized system verified data on explosive ordnance accidents and victims and supported referrals to medical, psychological, and financial support.[92] However, protection actors reported limited referral options due to key service gaps.[93]

Serbia reported a referral mechanism between rehabilitation services and the relevant ministry, but did not report a directory of services.[94]

In **Tajikistan**, the national mine action center worked with the survivor organization Taqdir to identify and refer vulnerable survivors from remote regions to a rehabilitation workshop.[95] Tajikistan also updated a directory of services prepared in 2025, with initial distribution launched at the victim assistance technical working group in Khorog in September 2026. The directory is meant to improve victims' access to existing services and will be distributed to survivors at victim assistance events and field visits, together with a peer-to-peer support guide and a Tajik translation of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan.[96]

89 Ukrainian Red Cross Society, "The first training of rescuers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine have already been held under the Ukrainian Red Cross's 48-hour first aid program," 23 May 2025, bit.ly/RedCrossUkraineMay2025.

90 ICRC, "Facts and Figures: Ukraine Delegation, January–December 2025," January 2026, bit.ly/ICRCUkraineJan2026.

91 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 14, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

92 Statement of Palestine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/PalestineStatement16June2026; and UNMAS, "Occupied Palestinian Territory: Annual Report 2025," 21 April 2026, bit.ly/UNMASPalestineApril2026.

93 Ibid.

94 Committee on Victim Assistance, "Serbia, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026, bit.ly/SerbiaVACommitteeJune2026.

95 "OSCE, TNMAC Boost Support for Mine Survivors in Tajikistan," *Mirage News*, 19 August 2026, bit.ly/MirageNews19Aug2026.

96 Email from Reykhan Muminova, Victim Assistance Officer, Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC), 11 October 2026.

SPOTLIGHT: REFERRAL PATHWAYS IN COLOMBIA

Colombia uses a system of schematic and individual referral pathways, known as *rutas de atención*, that provide links between the different relevant institutions and services required for assistance.

At the national level, two of the pathways play key roles for mine victims.

The first is the **reparation referral pathway**, which begins when a victim makes a declaration to the Public Ministry. The Unit for Victims then assesses eligibility for inclusion in the Unique Registry of Victims and proposes a reparation plan that covers compensation, rehabilitation, and guarantees of non-repetition.[97]

The second is the **health and functional rehabilitation referral pathway**, which is mandatory for territorial health entities, health insurers, and service providers. It sets out responsibilities across five stages: pre-hospital care, emergency care, hospital care, physical rehabilitation, and comprehensive rehabilitation and inclusion.[98] The pathway provides for referral between services and for case-management meetings at municipal, departmental, and national levels to follow up on individual cases and address barriers to accessing care and rehabilitation.[99]

Despite the comprehensive design of referral pathways, their effectiveness depends on the victim knowing they exist and how to access them, and on the victim being formally registered. In 2025, the national mine action authority, Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, AICMA) conducted outreach to explain the referral pathways, strengthen inter-institutional referral arrangements, and develop a national standard on comprehensive victim assistance. This initiative included guidance for public officials on implementing the pathways, as well as awareness-training for survivors and their families on their rights and access to assistance.[100] In addition, Colombia's mine action program conducted technical assistance visits to clarify the victim assistance referral pathways to government bodies, territorial authorities, and civil society organizations.

Colombia reported that, in 2025, progress was made in developing a directory of services to facilitate access to available support. The directory would be updated and maintained on a periodic basis within the framework of inter-institutional coordination.[101]

Colombia also reported that, although the status of victims is monitored daily during pre-hospital and hospital care, the national mine action office lacked the necessary staff capacity in 2025 to follow up with the more than 5,000 civilian mine/ERW victims potentially requiring referrals to services.[102]

In **Ukraine**, efforts were made to establish referral systems and streamline referrals despite the challenging conditions of ongoing armed conflict. The UNDP had previously developed, in December 2024, a Model of Victim Assistance in Mine Action in Ukraine that recommends the establishment of coordination mechanisms for collecting and sharing information on

97 ICRC, "Care pathway for victims of explosive devices in Colombia," 31 March 2021, bit.ly/ICRCColombiaMar2021.

98 International Organization for Migration (IOM), "Comprehensive Healthcare and Functional Rehabilitation Pathway for Victims of APMs/UXO," April 2016, bit.ly/IOMColombiaApr2026.

99 Ministry of Health and Social Protection, "APM-UXO Program: Comprehensive healthcare and functional rehabilitation pathway for victims of Antipersonnel mines—APMs or unexploded ordnance—UXO," July 2025, p. 6, bit.ly/MinSaludJuly2025.

100 AICMA, "2023–2025 Operational Plan," undated, bit.ly/AICMAPlan2023–2025.

101 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029 reporting checklist.

102 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 30.

pathways, types of assistance, and services, including provider contact details, locations, and opening hours.[103] By May 2025, UNDP reported that its victim assistance model had been rolled out in more than 60 communities across conflict-affected regions of Ukraine.[104] Progress towards digital access to referrals was also underway, with the national mine action platform listing 13 categories of state and non-governmental organization (NGO) services alongside direct links to referral points.[105]

In **Yemen**, the ICRC referred victims of mine-related accidents for rehabilitative care and financial assistance.[106]

Zimbabwe reported a referral process through district-level social protection mechanisms and a directory of services, updated regularly.[107]

Several States Parties reported working toward the establishment of a referral mechanism and/or directory of services.

In **BiH**, the revised Mine Action Strategy for 2025–2027 outlined initial steps towards facilitating referrals through the sharing of information on mine/ERW victims with relevant ministries and the integration of victim assistance into state support systems; however, it failed to specify plans to establish a referral mechanism or directory of services.[108]

Cambodia reported on a national referral mechanism and service-mapping directory initiated in 2024, stating that it was in the process of finalization following further consultations in May 2026.[109] **Sri Lanka** continued working toward a formal referral mechanism and national directory of services; however, its 2026 needs survey revealed that existing referral mechanisms remained weak.[110]

In **Sudan**, a 2026 workshop organized by the national mine action center, UNMAS, and the ICRC addressed victim referral pathways and service mapping. Additionally, UNMAS co-led a victim assistance training workshop for partners covering identification, referral pathways, inclusion, and reporting.[111]

REHABILITATION AND ASSISTIVE TECHNOLOGY

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have committed in the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan to "[t]ake steps to ensure that … all mine and other explosive ordnance victims including in rural and remote areas have access to comprehensive rehabilitation services and assistive technology," including "through the provision of outreach and innovative rehabilitation services" (Action 35).

Efforts to meet these obligations are increasingly supported by wider global health and human rights initiatives. Rehabilitation 2030, the WHO's call for action to strengthen rehabilitation in health systems, and the World Health Assembly resolution on strengthening rehabilitation in health systems (WHA76.6) propose integrating rehabilitation into health

103 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "The Guide on Implementation of Model of Victim Assistance in Mine Action in Ukraine," 18 December 2024, bit.ly/UNDPUkraineVA.

104 UNDP press release, "Ukraine holds conference on explosive ordnance victim assistance," 20 May 2025, bit.ly/UNDP20May2025.

105 Demine Ukraine, "Victim Assistance from the State and NGOs," 2 July 2024, bit.ly/DemineUkraineVA2024.

106 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 472, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

107 Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Annex A.

108 BiH, "Mine Action Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Revised document for the period 2025–2027," 2024, pp. 34–36, bit.ly/BiHStrategy2025–2027.

109 Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/CambodiaStatement16June2026.

110 Statement of Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2025, bit.ly/SriLankaStatement17June2025; and statement of Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/SriLankaStatement16June2026.

111 Statement of Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/SudanStatement16June2026; and UNMAS, "Sudan Factsheet: April–June 2026," 1 September 2026, bit.ly/UNMASSudanSept2026.

systems and universal health coverage.[112] Reinforcing this global momentum, in September 2026, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted by consensus its first resolution specifically on access to assistive technology. It calls for assistive technology to be integrated into health, education, employment, and social protection systems and humanitarian response plans.[113]

While some States Parties integrated rehabilitation into broader health and social inclusion systems, persistent gaps in financing, coordination, and accessibility limited survivors' access to sustained care during the reporting period. Furthermore, rehabilitation in mine-affected States Parties was often constrained by insecurity, limited national capacity, and dependence on international support.[114] Reporting was strongest on the availability and funding of services and on the role of international actors. It was more limited regarding outreach and how states are trying to address access issues for the most vulnerable. Although innovative rehabilitation techniques, like 3D printing, are increasingly being explored to improve access to prosthetic rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors, such services remain limited, and further investigation is required to assess their long-term viability in remote, mine-affected settings.

ACCESS TO COMPREHENSIVE REHABILITATION SERVICES AND ASSISTIVE TECHNOLOGY, CONSIDERING LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND REGIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Americas

In the Americas, rehabilitation services were generally provided through public health coverage and through national systems for conflict victims and war-wounded beneficiaries, with eligibility defined by victim assistance and disability frameworks, while limited resources continued to constrain specialized services.

In **Colombia**, victim assistance pathways operating under the national victim assistance system covered rehabilitation among other services.[115] Survivors also obtained services through the public health insurance scheme.[116] To expand access, the ICRC had been developing a network of providers to support conflict victims in Colombia—both civilians and armed actors—who could not access rehabilitation services offered by the state or other institutions. As part of a broader shift in operational priorities, the ICRC progressively ended its physical rehabilitation program in Colombia during 2025, completing the withdrawal by the end of the year, with local partners continuing to deliver services under the handover plan.[117]

In **El Salvador**, all rehabilitation services were regulated through the Institute for the Administration of Benefits for Veterans and Ex-Combatants, which provides rehabilitation and support services to civilian victims of mines and ERW. Mine/ERW survivors registered as persons with disabilities resulting from armed conflict were eligible.[118] In **Peru**, the

112 WHO, "Rehabilitation 2030: A call for action," 7 February 2017, bit.ly/WHO7Feb2017; and World Health Assembly, "Strengthening rehabilitation in health systems," WHA76.6, 30 May 2023, bit.ly/WHA76-6Resolution.

113 HI, "A United Nations resolution to change the lives of 2.5 billion people," 7 September 2026, bit.ly/HI7Sept2026; and ATscale, "UN General Assembly adopts landmark resolution on access to assistive technology," September 2026, bit.ly/ATscaleSept2026.

114 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, pp. 14, 18, and 30–31, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025; and statements of Burundi, Cambodia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026, bit.ly/MBTStatementsIM26.

115 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029 reporting checklist, Action 34, p. 44.

116 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 219, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

117 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, pp. 8 and 26–27, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

118 El Salvador Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024).

National Rehabilitation Institute provided specialized care for mine/ERW survivors, but faced limitations due to insufficient resources.[119] Civilian survivors who had not been in the military or police force, and had no health insurance, received free care in Ministry of Health and social security facilities.[120] The mine action center engaged in outreach by conducting in-person follow-up visits with landmine survivors to assess their rehabilitation needs.[121]

Asia

In Asia, rehabilitation services relied on a mix of state and international support, with approaches varying according to country-specific circumstances and capacities. While national authorities took on greater responsibility in Cambodia, and some improvements were reported in the provision of rehabilitation services in Sri Lanka, significant resource gaps persisted elsewhere. This shortfall was particularly evident in Afghanistan, where funding gaps were only partially filled by international organizations. Regionally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC) emphasized sharing information and approaches on victim assistance in order to improve rehabilitation services at the national level.[122]

In **Afghanistan**, rehabilitation services remained concentrated in certain provinces and were strained due to a lack of financial resources.[123] The Ministry of Public Health funded physical rehabilitation services at centers in Kabul and Khost, while NGOs and other ministries supported services in 20 provinces.[124] Four projects—covering Baghlan, Kabul, Kunar, and Uruzgan—provided rehabilitation during 2025; two of them were funded through humanitarian mine action organizations.[125] The ICRC maintained support for 17 physical rehabilitation centers; seven were managed directly and the other 10 were supported.[126] The ICRC continued to transfer responsibilities to Afghan staff, while warning that the socio-economic crisis posed risks to the program's sustainability.[127] Women and girls with disabilities continued to face particular barriers to accessing rehabilitation. Along with restrictions on movement and autonomy, they faced difficulties associated with transport costs, inaccessible facilities, shortages of trained personnel (especially female staff), and gender and disability discrimination.[128] Restrictions on women's higher education also disrupted physiotherapy training for female students, requiring arrangements for training to continue at the Kabul Physical Rehabilitation Centre.[129]

119 Response to Monitor questionnaire by David Fernández Fernández, Victim Assistance Coordinator – Humanitarian Demining, Peruvian Center for Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (Centro Peruano de Acción Contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS), 13 March 2025.

120 Peru Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J, pp. 19–20.

121 Peru Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J; and statement of Peru, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 28 November 2024, bit.ly/PeruStatement28Nov2024.

122 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC), "Regional Consultative Meeting: To Promote the Establishment of Regional Victim Assistance Network under the project Enhance Victim Assistance Programme in the ASEAN Member States," 2025, bit.ly/ARMACVictimAssistance2025.

123 Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), "Suspension of SCA leaves thousands without orthopedic aids," 9 April 2024, bit.ly/SCA9Apr2024.

124 Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7CCM.

125 Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J, p. 18.

126 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 260, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

127 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 30, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

128 HI, "Rehabilitation matters: The appeal made by people in conflict-affected areas," October 2025, pp. 8 and 30–32, bit.ly/HIRehabiliationOct2025; IOM, "Afghanistan Crisis Response Plan 2026," updated 12 March 2026, bit.ly/IOMAfghanistanCRP2026; and UN Women Australia, "FAQs: What it's like to be a woman in Afghanistan in 2025," 7 August 2025, bit.ly/UNWomenAfganistanFAQ2025.

129 ICRC, "Afghanistan Operational Facts and Figures: January to December 2025," February 2026, p. 4, bit.ly/ICRCAfghanistanFeb2026; and UN Women Australia, "FAQs: What it's like to be a woman in Afghanistan in 2025," 7 August 2025, bit.ly/UNWomenAfganistanFAQ2025.

In **Cambodia**, rehabilitation services reached almost 30,000 people—about a third of whom were mine/ERW survivors—through 11 centers.[130] ICRC supported two centers, which provided around 45% of all physical rehabilitation services in the country. State authorities assumed over half of the running costs of the ICRC-supported centers in 2025.[131] Cambodia identified gaps in resources in the long-term, including for rehabilitation and occupational therapy.[132] In **Sri Lanka**, the Ministry of Health introduced national rehabilitation guidelines to improve the quality, accessibility, and effectiveness of rehabilitation services for landmine survivors.[133] Where possible, the mine action center in **Thailand** worked closely with the local health authorities to assist survivors who were prosthesis users. Thailand also reported expanding the number of "one-stop" prosthetic services to reduce travel barriers for survivors in remote border areas.[134]

Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

In Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, rehabilitation services were generally integrated into broader health and social inclusion systems. In many countries, these services were underpinned by national legislation defining the rights of war victims and the rights of persons with disabilities, establishing entitlements to rehabilitation and assistive devices, and assigning responsibilities for service provision. However, gaps in financing and coordination continued to limit the realization of these rights. In Ukraine, this was compounded by the impact of conflict and additional pressures on services. Despite these challenges, new initiatives and reforms were introduced, including efforts to expand access to assistive products and strengthen service delivery—most notably in Ukraine as a response to the impacts of ongoing conflict, and in Tajikistan with the expansion of the "one-stop shop" system. Significant challenges such as fragmentation, bureaucratic barriers, and insufficient resources continued to hinder survivors' access to their rights throughout the region.

In **Albania**, rehabilitation was part of a broader social inclusion strategy. However, ongoing gaps in financial support for the sector were identified.[135] Albania reported that in some rural areas there were no prosthetic and orthotic devices.[136]

BiH offered rehabilitation services but lacked a functioning coordination body for victim assistance to ensure survivors could overcome hurdles to accessing services, including gaps in availability of services and bureaucratic barriers to the fulfillment of their rights.[137] Survivors relied mainly on NGOs, local health and social services, and survivor networks for information and referrals, with those in rural areas facing particular barriers. Gaps persisted in prosthetics and specialized rehabilitation. Approximately 60 community-based rehabilitation centers reportedly exist, but many lacked specialized staff or equipment tailored to the needs of mine survivors and amputees.[138] The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—one of the country's two main administrative units, alongside Republika Srpska—adopted a strategy

130 Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/CambodiaStatement16June2026; and Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 11.

131 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 267, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025; and ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 31, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

132 Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/CambodiaStatement16June2026; and Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 11.

133 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nayeemudeen Meera Muhiadeen, National Director – Mine Action, Sri Lanka National Mine Action Center, 27 March 2025.

134 Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form J; and statement of Thailand, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2026, bit.ly/ThailandStatement17June2026.

135 Albania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form J.

136 Albania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), 14 April 2026, bit.ly/APMBCAlbania.

137 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Enis Horozović, Director, Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC), 14 March 2025.

138 BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J.

for improving the rights of persons with disabilities. The strategy reported that services are not uniform across all cantons of the federation due to varying financial capacity, and highlighted the need to identify solutions to ensure access to high-quality assistive devices at affordable prices.[139]

Croatia has a rehabilitation framework that is supported by a complex array of legislation and national structures. Its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for calendar year 2025 described a public health system that includes rehabilitation in centers covered by the Croatian Health Insurance Institute.[140] In 2026, Croatia amended the 2021 law for civilian war victims, lowering the minimum impairment threshold for recognition from 60% to 20%. It also increased disability and family benefits and expanded access to health insurance, preventive examinations, inpatient rehabilitation, and assistive devices.[141] Croatia also continued expanding rehabilitation services for people affected by the 1991–1995 war. In May 2025, the government allocated €80 million (US$90 million) to establish five additional veterans' centers, supplementing the four existing centers that also cover registered civilian war victims with disabilities and family members of civilians killed or missing during the war.[142]

In **Serbia**, civilian war victims are entitled to prosthetics, rehabilitation, annual spa visits, and financial assistance during rehabilitation.[143] Despite the availability of services, veterans' organizations reported gaps in access.[144] Following years of disrepair at the main Special Hospital for Rehabilitation and Orthopedic Prosthetics in Belgrade, in September 2026, part of the structure collapsed in a patient room, though nobody was injured.[145] A project launched in 2022 continued to provide select survivors with rehabilitation at the University Rehabilitation Institute Soča in Slovenia.[146]

In 2025, ITF Enhancing Human Security supported physical rehabilitation and prosthetic care in **Slovenia** for two survivors. It was preparing rehabilitation and prosthesis manufacture for two more survivors in early 2026.[147]

In **Tajikistan**, the ICRC's support to physical rehabilitation concluded at the end of 2025, after an exit strategy was fast-tracked. In its final year, it supported two state-run centers and helped reopen prosthetics service branches in Khorog, Khujand, and Kulob.[148] In June 2026, Tajikistan stated the need for modernization of its prosthetics production and support for continuity of the supply of quality prostheses.[149] A WHO and ATscale partnership continued to expand community-level "one-stop shops" in several districts, with the goal of increasing access to assistive products.[150]

139 BiH, "Strategy for improving the rights and position of persons with disabilities in the Federation of BiH 2025–2030," October 2025, pp. 23–34, bit.ly/BiHDisabilityStrategy2025-2030.

140 Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J, p. 27.

141 *Act on Amendments to the Act on Civilian Victims of the Homeland*, 6 February 2026, bit.ly/CroatiaLawCivilianVictims2026.

142 Ministry of Regional Development and European Union Funds, "80 million euros for five new veterans' centers," 13 May 2025, bit.ly/CroatiaEUFundsMay2025; and Veterans' Center, "Regulations on the conditions and procedure for exercising the right to use Veterans' Center services," 14 September 2023, bit.ly/VeteransCenter2023. Average exchange rate for 2025: €1=US$1.1306. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 5 January 2026, bit.ly/FederalReserveRelease.

143 Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Section G, "Victim Assistance," pp. 10–15.

144 "War-disabled veterans increasingly invisible to the state," *Bačka Press*, 23 October 2025, p. 7, bit.ly/BackaPress23Oct2025.

145 Ana Marković, "Part of wall collapses at 'Rudo' Special Hospital, patients shouted and calls for help were heard: Director says no one was injured," *Nova.rs*, 14 September 2026, bit.ly/NovaRS14Sep2026.

146 Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form G.

147 ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2025," 23 March 2026, pp. 60–61, bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2025.

148 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 379, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025; and ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 36, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

149 Statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/TajikistanStatement16June2026.

150 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 13 March 2025.

SPOTLIGHT: RAPID EXPANSION OF REHABILITATION SERVICES IN UKRAINE

Demand for prosthetic and orthotic services has surged since the full-scale Russian invasion of the country in 2022. In response, Ukraine has prioritized the development of rehabilitation services.[151] In fact, the number of registered rehabilitation providers rose from 50 in 2022 to 93 in 2025.[152]

Capacity has been increasing through NGOs and hospitals as well as the state, resulting in a rapidly expanding range of physical rehabilitation and prosthetics services including new clinics, NGO programs, and state programs.[153] Notably, the Protez Foundation initiated a third clinic in 2025, while the U+ System opened a large integrated center in Kyiv in 2025.[154] With ITF Enhancing Human Security support, the Superhumans Center has fitted both upper-limb and lower-limb prostheses.[155] The UNBROKEN center in Lviv combines prosthetics, physical rehabilitation, and mental health services, functioning as a model for integrated service provision.[156] The WHO has also led the mapping of rehabilitation availability and services.[157]

Parallel efforts are underway to create professional pathways and sustainable financing. To enlarge the pool of qualified personnel, a Ministry of Health working group developed a bachelor's degree in prosthetics and orthotics.[158] In 2026, the Ministry of Health also launched a technical working group on financing rehabilitation assistance, marking the first institutional step towards implementing a coherent rehabilitation financing model.[159]

Despite this rapid infrastructural growth, Ukraine's prosthetics market faces systemic fragmentation due to the existence of two distinct procurement channels. Public buyers are legally bound to tender competitively through Ukraine's electronic public procurement platform, which makes their purchasing tightly regulated. Private providers and NGOs buy under private law and donor requirements, which gives them the flexibility to source components as individual patients need them. While the two channels complement each other, with accountability on the public side and responsiveness on the private side, demand is split across a range of buyers. Because not all public providers use the public procurement platform for prosthetics, and private providers and NGOs are not obliged to, opportunities to consolidate purchasing volumes and negotiate prices are limited, and suppliers must fill many small orders rather than coordinated ones.[160]

151 The dedicated online prosthetics platform is: bit.ly/UkraineRehabilitationPlatform. See also, Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine, "Free Prosthetics in 2025: Over 56,000 Ukrainians Received 208,000 Rehabilitation Aids Under State Program," 17 July 2025, bit.ly/UkraineProsthetics17July2025.

152 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 36, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025; and Aadrian Sullivan, Volodymyr Golyk, Marlee Elizabeth Quinn, and Oleh Karpov, "Procurement architecture as a determinant of rehabilitation system performance: insights from Ukraine's prosthetics sector," *Frontiers in Rehabilitation Sciences*, Vol. 7, 29 June 2026, bit.ly/Frontiers29June2026.

153 Nick Allen, "Ukrainian Organizations Focused on Prosthetics Hit Their Stride as Demand Grows," Direct Relief, 24 December 2025, bit.ly/DirectReliefUkraineDec2025.

154 Ibid.

155 ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2025," 23 March 2026, pp. 75–83, bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2025.

156 Nick Allen, "Ukrainian Organizations Focused on Prosthetics Hit Their Stride as Demand Grows," Direct Relief, 24 December 2025, bit.ly/DirectReliefUkraineDec2025.

157 Trauma and Rehabilitation Technical Working Group, "Rehab mapping tool: Rehab 2024–2026," updated 10 September 2026, bit.ly/WHOUkraineRehab2024–2026.

158 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 387, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

159 WHO, "WHO Ukraine Newsletter: August 2026," 2 September 2026, bit.ly/WHOUkraine2Sep2026.

160 Aadrian Sullivan, Volodymyr Golyk, Marlee Elizabeth Quinn, and Oleh Karpov, "Procurement architecture as a determinant of rehabilitation system performance: insights from Ukraine's prosthetics sector," *Frontiers in Rehabilitation Sciences*, Vol. 7, 29 June 2026, bit.ly/Frontiers29June2026.

Complex administrative hurdles also exist for patients, many of whom face delays in receiving mobility devices due to lengthy documentation processes and reliance on private providers. To address this, the ICRC tested a model for rehabilitation inside tertiary hospitals, so that physiotherapy, prosthetic and orthotic services, and mental health and psychosocial support are delivered together.[161] Since January 2025, a new legal mechanism has also been introduced in Ukraine to change the way disability is assessed. The reforms have included the establishment of standard operating procedures, the adoption of international medical standards, and a hotline for injured veterans. The reform followed significant corruption scandals tied to the process of determining individuals' disability status.[162]

Despite these reforms, key shortcomings continue to limit full and transparent program functioning. Professional standards remain unclear due to the lack of regulation, leading to inadequate oversight of prosthetics and orthotics providers and weak enforcement of existing laws and standards. Other issues to be tackled include an outdated, poorly integrated user database, the absence of clear prescription criteria, and ongoing instances where users' right to freely choose their provider is not upheld.[163]

Middle East

In the Middle East, rehabilitation services expanded through new centers and partnerships, while handover to state management occurred in Iraq. Demand continued to outpace available resources and longstanding barriers remained, while the impacts of conflict limited consistent access.

In **Iraq**, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) distributed mobility aids and assistive devices through the Ministry of Health, but local resources could not meet demand.[164] By the end of 2025, the ICRC's physical rehabilitation program in Federal Iraq had ended direct service provision and moved toward providing vocational training and supporting national procurement systems. A systemic impact evaluation was planned for 2026.[165] In Iraqi Kurdistan, the handover of the Erbil center to the Directorate of Health progressed under a two-year memorandum of understanding.[166] In 2025, some 13,300 people with physical disabilities, including 1,092 mine/ERW victims, obtained services at the ICRC-run center in Erbil and at two ICRC-supported centers run by the federal government.[167]

In **Jordan**, survivors received healthcare, prosthetics, and rehabilitation through two main providers: the Royal Medical Services, which operates across regional hospitals, and the Ministry of Health, which serves civilians through Al-Bashir Hospital in Amman and the rehabilitation center of Princess Basma Hospital in the north.[168] The Paola Biocca Center in Amman continued operations and provided free services to those in need.[169]

161 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 36, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

162 Igor Kossov and Alexander Khrebet, "'Abandon all hope:' Ukraine's wounded warriors compare military medical system to the Inferno," *Kyiv Independent*, 13 March 2024, bit.ly/KyivIndependent13March2024.

163 Protez Hub, "Strategy for the development of Ukraine's prosthetics and orthotics industry 2025–2028," 7 August 2025, bit.ly/ProtezHub7Aug2025.

164 Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

165 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 40, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

166 Ibid.

167 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, pp. 416 and 419, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

168 Jordan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J, p. 5.

169 Paola Biocca Center, "Paola Biocca Rehabilitation Center, Annual Report 2025," undated [January 2026], bit.ly/PaolaBioccaAnnualReport2025.

In **Lebanon**, the once-large-scale operation of civil society organizations, charities, and private providers in the rehabilitation sector has mostly ceased to function as a result of multiple shocks to health financing and infrastructure following the 2019 economic crisis.[170] The number of rehabilitation services are far fewer than before 2021 and are now unevenly distributed. Those that exist are mainly in cities and availability is very scarce in rural areas. In a 2023 survey, just over half of the rehabilitation users surveyed reported that services were not available.[171] Large numbers of Syrian refugees also increased the need for prosthetic and rehabilitation services.

In **Palestine**, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) opened the Nahla Prosthetics and Orthotics Center in Khan Younis in January 2025, providing temporary prosthetic devices. Despite ongoing barriers and relocation challenges due to the conflict, the HI team continued to provide services.[172] The Artificial Limbs and Polio Center (ALPC) in Gaza City was able to resume operations in 2024, and the ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme in Gaza continued to provide material, technical, and managerial support to the center.[173] In 2025, the ALPC delivered 1,199 prosthetic and orthotic devices, 1,642 mobility aids, and 10,477 physiotherapy sessions.[174] The ICRC helped more than 1,900 people obtain services at the ALPC and at a Palestine Red Crescent hospital workshop in Khan Younis; however, this figure was far fewer than planned due to limits on the entry of goods and security constraints.[175] The prosthetic workshop in Khan Younis, southern Gaza, run in collaboration with the Palestine Red Crescent Society and ALPC, began pilot operations, with full services planned for 2026. A stump revision project, providing post-amputation surgical care, was also initiated in coordination with the ICRC field hospital in Rafah.[176] ITF Enhancing Human Security began procuring prosthetic and orthotic components and fabrication materials for Harmalah Hospital in Bethlehem.[177] Palestine cited a shortage of specialized personnel and weak resources for comprehensive support.[178]

In **Yemen**, physical rehabilitation and prosthetic services continued through internationally supported centers. The ICRC supported five physical rehabilitation centers run by the Ministry of Public Health, two wheelchair service providers, and a prosthetics and orthotics program at Sana'a University, while access to care for persons with disabilities in remote areas was improved through outreach clinics organized by physical rehabilitation centers in Mukalla, Sa'ada, Sana'a, and Taiz.[179] Four rehabilitation centers in Aden, Hadhramaut, Marib,

170 Habib Abdo, "Who Killed Solidarity? The Political Economy of Health Financing Collapse in Lebanon and Fragile States," *National Defense Magazine*, Issue 133, April 2026, bit.ly/NationalDefenseMagazineApr2026; and Rouham Yamout, Joanna Khalil, Joanna Raven, Fouad M. Fouad, and Wesam Mansour, "Navigating turbulence: analyzing the resilience of Lebanon's healthcare system in a multi-crisis scenario," *Health Research Policy and Systems*, Vol. 23, Article 120, 6 October 2025, bit.ly/HealthResearch6Oct2025.

171 HI, "Rehabilitation in Lebanon," September 2023, bit.ly/HILebanonSep2023.

172 HI, "Care Amid Crisis: How HI is still fitting prosthetics in Gaza," undated, bit.ly/HIGazaProsthetics; and HI press release, "More than 6 thousand prosthetic limbs needed in Gaza," 5 June 2025, bit.ly/HIGaza5June2025.

173 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2024 Annual Report," July 2025, p. 40, bit.ly/ICRC-PRPAnnualReport2024.

174 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 40, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

175 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 431, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

176 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 40, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025; and ICRC, "Israel and the Occupied Territories: Key Facts and Figures (07 October 2023–31 October 2025)," 11 August 2025, bit.ly/ICRCIsraelPalestineAug2026.

177 ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2025," 23 March 2026, pp. 100–105, bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2025.

178 Statement of Palestine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/PalestineStatement16June2026.

179 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 471, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025; and ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 41, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

and Taiz governorates provided physiotherapy and prosthetics with support from KSrelief and UNICEF, yet services were limited by inadequate funding.[180]

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Rehabilitation services in many African States Parties remained heavily reliant on international support, with limited national capacity, geographic and financial barriers, and insecurity continuing to restrict access despite some new facilities and projects.[181] In West Africa and the Sahel region, high numbers of casualties from improvised mines have generated substantial victim assistance needs. While these needs have recently begun to receive greater attention, operations have continued to experience setbacks in some locations.

Angola reported the provision of prosthesis physiotherapy, acupuncture, and specialized developmental rehabilitation services.[182] The ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme supported rehabilitation services in **Benin** and **Togo** during 2025 through material, technical, managerial, and financial assistance.[183] **Burundi** cited shortages of raw materials for fabricating orthopedic devices and a lack of qualified prosthetics and orthotics personnel.[184] **Chad** reported that no assistance for mine victims was implemented in 2025 due to a lack of technical and financial support.[185] Physical rehabilitation services remained extremely limited, with only two functional rehabilitation centers, both of which charge for services. Survivors lacked access to rehabilitation services outside of the capital, N'Djamena.[186]

In the **DRC**, HI implemented two rapid health response projects in the province of North Kivu in partnership with Première Urgence International (PUI), incorporating early rehabilitation into projects while delivering mental health care to crisis-affected people. Rehabilitation services provided by HI included prostheses and other mobility devices. Technical support was also given to hospital rehabilitation services to strengthen quality of care.[187] Following the escalation of conflict in the eastern provinces, the ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme concentrated on hospitals' emergency response, though insecurity limited access to rehabilitation services and communities.[188] In 2025, people with physical disabilities, including people injured by mines or ERW, received services at five ICRC-supported centers. The ICRC concluded its involvement with the center in Kinshasa at the end of 2025 for financial reasons and due to reprioritization.[189]

In **Ethiopia**, the ICRC supported 13 rehabilitation centers.[190] Early rehabilitation was introduced in selected hospitals to strengthen referral between acute care and rehabilitation.[191] HI identified, assessed, and referred people with physical disabilities for

180 Statement of Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/YemenStatement16June2026.

181 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, pp. 14–15 and 18, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025; and statements of Burundi, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026, bit.ly/MBTJune2026Statements.

182 Statement of Angola, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/AngolaStatement16June2026.

183 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 18, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

184 Statement of Burundi, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/BurundiStatement16June2026.

185 Chad Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025).

186 Marie-Capucine Gaitte, "Chad: spotlight on two centers caring for disabled patients," Fondation Raoul Follereau, 3 January 2025, bit.ly/FondationFollereau3Jan2025.

187 HI, "Country sheet: Democratic Republic of Congo," September 2024, p. 7; and HI, "Where we work: Democratic Republic of Congo," undated, bit.ly/HI-DRC.

188 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 22, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

189 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 79, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

190 Ibid., pp. 90 and 96.

191 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 14, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

support. Physiotherapy sessions and assistive devices were also provided, along with training on their use.[192]

In **Guinea-Bissau**, physical rehabilitation was not included as a priority under national health development policy, resulting in major shortages of physiotherapy materials at the national rehabilitation center.[193]

In **Mali**, the ICRC gave regular support to five centers.[194] It also strengthened referral and outreach networks, provided professional training, and supported prosthetics and orthotics education.[195]

Mauritania has only one rehabilitation center, located in the capital , Nouakchott, far from areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions.[196] An agreement between the national mine action center and the Ministry of Health was established for the provision of assistive devices for landmine survivors.[197] National capacity for rehabilitation, however, remained inadequate and the national orthopedic and functional rehabilitation center needed support from the international community.[198]



Within the framework of its project *Creating Economic Opportunities for Landmine Victims – Phase 3*, the Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (AzCBL) has established small family businesses for landmine survivors.
© AzCBL, April 2026

In **Niger**, ICRC-supported activities ceased in February 2025 when the ICRC was asked to leave the country, just before a renovated rehabilitation center in Niamey was to be handed over.[199] In **Nigeria**, the ICRC supported centers in Kano and Maiduguri, but concluded its support for the National Orthopaedic Hospital in Kano in December 2025.[200]

In **Senegal**, the older regional rehabilitation center in Ziguinchor continued to lack adequate equipment and capacity to adopt newer prosthetic-production technologies in 2025.[201] However, the newer Ziguinchor Physical Rehabilitation Center (Centre de Réadaptation physique de Ziguinchor, CRPZ) in Boutoute expanded its capacity. The center also represents a groundbreaking example of inclusive practice in that it is directly managed by the Senegalese Association of Mine Victims (Association Sénégalaise des Victimes de Mines, ISAD/ASVM). In 2025, the center hosted training for around 20 technicians in producing lighter, durable, and lower-cost devices. SwissABILITY also donated a vehicle to extend rehabilitation services to persons with disabilities in remote areas.[202]

192 HI, "Country sheet: Ethiopia," 2024, p. 11; and HI, "Where we work: Ethiopia," undated, bit.ly/HI-Ethiopia.

193 Aguinaldo Ampa, "World Clubfoot Day: Quelelé Motor Rehabilitation Center Calls for Help from Authorities," *O Democrata Guiné-Bissau*, 3 June 2025, bit.ly/ODemocrataGB3Jun2025.

194 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 117, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025; and ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 18, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

195 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, pp. 18–19, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

196 Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Vadel Saleck, Head of Victims' Unit, National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD), 20 May 2024.

197 Committee on Victim Assistance, "Mauritania, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026, bit.ly/MauritaniaVACommitteeJune2026; and Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 6.

198 Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 7.

199 Ibid., p. 18.

200 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 144, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

201 Barou Dembélé, "In southern Senegal, the challenges of caring for mine victims," *Allo Docteurs*, 25 June 2025, bit.ly/AlloDocteurs25June2025.

202 "Ziguinchor: around twenty ortho-prosthetists trained in techniques for manufacturing rehabilitation prostheses," *APS*, 25 May 2025, bit.ly/APS25May2025; and Senegalese Association of Mine Victims (Association Sénégalaise des Victimes de Mines, ISAD/ASVM), "Overview of the Ziguinchor Physical Rehabilitation Center (CRPZ)," undated, www.isad-asvm.org.

In **Somalia**, physiotherapy and assistive devices were available at rehabilitation centers run by the Somali Red Crescent Society. The ICRC provided technical and material support, while the Norwegian Red Cross funded the centers' operations. Ongoing insecurity made it difficult to provide and access rehabilitation services, but some services were provided to remote areas through outreach.[203] In 2025, Norwegian Red Cross funding ended after decades, but the ICRC mitigated the shortfall through efficiency measures that maintained and expanded access across the physiotherapy centers.[204]

In **South Sudan**, physical rehabilitation services have decreased, and access has been constrained by geography, costs, and lack of funding.[205] While some rehabilitation and assistive devices were available through the ICRC and HI, national capacity has remained insufficient.[206] The ICRC supported three rehabilitation centers, run by the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare, and provided outreach services to remote areas.[207] South Sudan reported, however, that rural outreach in areas where there are no other available services is not sustainable.[208] The ICRC developed a 2026–2030 transition strategy to strengthen localization and national ownership.[209]

In **Sudan**, rehabilitation needs remain extensive due to the impact of widespread conflict. The conflict caused an 18-month disruption in the ICRC's partnership with the National Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics. After operations resumed in June 2025, services were restored at centers in Damazine, Dongola, Gadaref, Kadugli, and Kassala.[210] Some 1,000 people with conflict-related physical disabilities obtained care at four centers run by the National Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics.[211] Sudan said only seven physical rehabilitation centers were functioning nationwide, and that the National Authority for Artificial Limbs, in conjunction with the ICRC, had provided physical rehabilitation services.[212]

In **Zimbabwe**, there was limited availability of specialized care, rehabilitation services, and assistive devices in remote areas.[213]

INNOVATIVE REHABILITATION SERVICES

A massive rise in amputees caused by the use of mines/ERW in several countries experiencing conflict, including Palestine and Ukraine, has placed heavy strain on rehabilitation services, including the manufacture of prosthetic devices.[214] As a result, there is a growing need for innovative, agile manufacturing solutions to rapidly scale up production and bypass traditional supply chain bottlenecks.

203 ICRC, "Annual Report 2024," June 2025, pp. 152–153, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2024.

204 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 14, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025; and ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 160, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

205 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), 4 April 2025.

206 Committee on Victim Assistance, "South Sudan, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026, bit.ly/SouthSudanVACommitteeJune2026.

207 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, pp. 171 and 175, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

208 Statement of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/SouthSudanStatement16June2026.

209 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 15, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

210 Ibid.

211 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 181, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

212 Statement of Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/SudanStatement16June2026.

213 Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Annex A, p. 23; and statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2026, bit.ly/ZimbabweStatement17June2026.

214 HI press release, "Amputation Crisis in Conflict Zones: Report Reveals Urgent Need for Rehabilitation Services in Gaza, Syria and Ukraine," 2 April 2025, bit.ly/HI2Apr2025.

3D printing is increasingly being explored as a way to improve access to prosthetic rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors, particularly where services are distant, overstretched, or lack specialist personnel. Digital scanning can reduce reliance on plaster casting, allow designs to be transmitted for remote manufacture, and retain files for adjustment or replacement.[215] These features could help address some of the access barriers faced by survivors in rural, conflict-affected, and underserved areas. Along these lines, the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029 explicitly calls for improved access to comprehensive rehabilitation and assistive technology, including through outreach and innovative service delivery.[216]

3D printing offers potential to improve access to affordable, customized prostheses for mine/ERW survivors. HI has successfully piloted combinations of digital scanning, 3D printing, and telerehabilitation in low-resource and humanitarian settings, including in Togo and Uganda, to reach people with limited access to services.[217] In Uganda, HI produced 3D-printed orthoses in refugee settlements, with scans modified remotely and devices printed in nearby towns.[218] Japan has funded United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) projects to strengthen local prosthetic production in Ukraine and Nigeria. In Ukraine, the project introduced Japanese 3D-printing technology and provided training to 10 prosthetists, while delivering 3D-printed prostheses to 30 veterans.[219] In Nigeria, a project specifically targeting landmine survivors is introducing Japanese technology through Instalimb, which combines equipment supply with training in scanning, fitting, and production, and aims to fit 100 amputees.[220] Equipment installation was reported complete in May 2026.[221]

Overall, evidence supporting 3D-printed lower-limb prostheses is growing but remains limited. Some field research has found generally positive short-term outcomes for fit, comfort, and use, although results vary between settings.[222] Longer-term follow-up in Sierra Leone revealed sustained use of printed sockets, but also material damage after extended use, highlighting durability concerns.[223] A 2025 systematic review found promising outcomes for comfort, fit, function, and patient satisfaction, yet emphasized the limited evidence available.[224] Similarly, a 2026 review found that much of the existing research remains focused

215 Matt Ratto, "Designing a Digital Toolchain for Prosthetics: a Retrospective," *Canadian Prosthetics & Orthotics Journal*, Vol. 4, Issue 2, 21 September 2021, bit.ly/RattoSep2021.

216 Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 29 November 2024, Action 35, bit.ly/SRAAP2025-2029.

217 HI, "Innovation," TeReFA (Telerehabilitation For All), www.hi.org/en/innovation.

218 "Katalemwa Cheshire Home Introduces 3D Printing for Assistive Technology," *IMEA CPO*, 9 October 2026, bit.ly/IMEACPO9Oct2026; and HI, "3D printing innovation restores hope in Uganda: Hakim's story," 16 February 2021, bit.ly/HIUgandaFeb2021.

219 United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), "UNIDO Achieves Significant Milestone with First 3D-Printed Prosthetic Fitting in Ukraine," 24 June 2024, bit.ly/Unidojune2024; and UN in Ukraine, "War and its Consequences: The Path to Recovery for Veterans with UNIDO," 2 June 2025, bit.ly/UNUkraineOct2026.

220 UNIDO, "Transferring Japanese 3D-Printed Prosthetics Technology to Support Landmine Victims in Africa: Progress Report, March 2025–December 2025," January 2026, bit.ly/UNIDOJan2026.

221 Edino Chubiyo Cornelius, "UNIDO Boosts Nigeria Rehabilitation Services with Advanced 3D Prosthetic Technology," *Africa Health Report*, 15 May 2026, bit.ly/AHR15May2026; and Mendemwelabou Timothée Pakouyowou, "From aid dependency to market transformation," *Frontiers in Rehabilitation Sciences*, Vol. 7, 17 September 2026, bit.ly/PakouyowouSep2026.

222 Matt Ratto et al., "An International, Multicenter Field Trial Comparison Between 3D-Printed and ICRC-Manufactured Transtibial Prosthetic Devices in Low-Income Countries," *Journal of Prosthetics and Orthotics*, Vol. 33, Issue 1, 2020, bit.ly/RattoEtAl2020.

223 Merel van der Stelt, Lars Brouwers, Sallieu Jalloh, Osman Kamara, Martin Grobusch, Thomas Maal, and Ruud Leijendekkers, "Longevity and effectiveness of 3D-printed transtibial prosthetic sockets in rural Sierra Leone: A pilot study with 2.5-year follow-up," *Prosthetics and Orthotics International*, Vol. 50, Issue 3, 1 June 2026, bit.ly/VanDerSteltJune2026.

224 Huthaifa Atallah, Titeana Qufabz, Rabee Naeem, Hadeel R Bakhsh, Giorgio Ferriero, Dorottya Varga, Evelin Derkács, and Bálint Molics, "The Current State of 3D-Printed Prostheses Clinical Outcomes: A Systematic Review," *Journal of Functional Biomaterials*, Vol. 16, Issue 10, 1 October 2025, bit.ly/AtallahOct2025.

on mechanical testing and prototypes rather than longer-term clinical outcomes.[225] The potential contribution of 3D printing therefore lies in whether it can strengthen continuity, reach, and sustainability of rehabilitation services, rather than simply reduce production time or cost.[226] Further data is needed to determine how 3D printing can improve sustained access to appropriate rehabilitation for survivors in mine-affected settings, particularly rural and remote areas.[227]

Several countries have adopted the "one-stop shop" model for rehabilitation services to landmine survivors. Through these one-stop shops, assistive products are combined with a variety of services including assessment, fitting, user training, and follow-up, all available at the same location.[228] In **Tajikistan**, where the model was previously piloted, a WHO and ATscale partnership continued to expand community-level "one-stop shops" in several districts, with the goal of increasing access to assistive products.[229] **Thailand** also reported expanding the number of "one-stop" prosthetic services to reduce travel barriers for survivors in remote border areas.[230]

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT

States Parties have committed in the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan to "[e]nsure mine victims have access to psychological and psychosocial support services including to mental health, peer-to-peer support, community support, and other available services" and to "increase national capacity in mental health and psychological support and peer-to-peer support" (Action 36).

Where psychological and psychosocial support was reported to be available for mine/ERW survivors during the reporting period, it was often provided through a combination of national health services, international organizations, and survivor-led initiatives. Integration into national health systems remained uneven. Peer support initiatives, although expanding, required sustained funding, training, and institutional support to maintain their activities and connect survivors with other services.

225 Sattam Alharbi, Philip Sewell, Bryce Dyer, Abigail Batley, and Diogo Montalvão, "Additive manufacturing of lower-limb prosthetic sockets: a scoping review with a focus on multi-material approaches," *Journal of Medical Engineering & Technology*, Vol. 50, Issue 4, May 2026, bit.ly/AlharbiMay2026.

226 Matt Ratto, "Designing a Digital Toolchain for Prosthetics: a Retrospective," *Canadian Prosthetics & Orthotics Journal*, Vol. 4, Issue 2, 21 September 2021, https://bit.ly/RattoSep2021; Merel van der Stelt et al., "Longevity and effectiveness of 3D-printed transtibial prosthetic sockets in rural Sierra Leone: A pilot study with 2.5-year follow-up," *Prosthetics and Orthotics International*, Vol. 50, Issue 3, 1 June 2026, bit.ly/VanDerSteltJune2026; Huthaifa Atallah et al., "The Current State of 3D-Printed Prostheses Clinical Outcomes: A Systematic Review," *Journal of Functional Biomaterials*, Vol. 16, Issue 10, 1 October 2025, bit.ly/AtallahOct2025; and Sattam Alharbi et al., "Additive manufacturing of lower-limb prosthetic sockets: a scoping review with a focus on multi-material approaches," *Journal of Medical Engineering & Technology*, Vol. 50, Issue 4, May 2026, bit.ly/AlharbiMay2026.

227 Merel van der Stelt et al., "Longevity and effectiveness of 3D-printed transtibial prosthetic sockets in rural Sierra Leone: A pilot study with 2.5-year follow-up," *Prosthetics and Orthotics International*, Vol. 50, Issue 3, 1 June 2026, bit.ly/VanDerSteltJune2026; Huthaifa Atallah et al., "The Current State of 3D-Printed Prostheses Clinical Outcomes: A Systematic Review," *Journal of Functional Biomaterials*, Vol. 16, Issue 10, 1 October 2025, bit.ly/AtallahOct2025; and Sattam Alharbi et al., "Additive manufacturing of lower-limb prosthetic sockets: a scoping review with a focus on multi-material approaches," *Journal of Medical Engineering & Technology*, Vol. 50, Issue 4, May 2026, bit.ly/AlharbiMay2026.

228 ATscale, "One-Stop-Shops in Tajikistan making large strides to integrate AT into national health systems," 22 August 2025, bit.ly/ATscaleTajikistan22Aug2025.

229 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 13 March 2025.

230 Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form J; and statement of Thailand, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2026, bit.ly/ThailandStatement17June2026.

ACCESS TO MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT

Psychological and psychosocial support were often integrated into rehabilitation services; however, in some cases mental health services were integrated more broadly into primary healthcare, or were provided through other mechanisms.

In **Afghanistan**, rehabilitation providers offered psychosocial support, which was carried out by three NGOs and coordinated by the Ministry of Public Health.[231] In **Croatia**, psychological and psychotherapeutic services were included in rehabilitation, with psychosocial rehabilitation centers present in all 21 counties and in the capital, Zagreb. Croatia reported that psychosocial support workshops, trainings, and counseling were held for over 70 mine/ERW victims.[232]

In **Iraq**, the ICRC-run rehabilitation center in Erbil offered mental health and psychosocial support.[233] Iraq also reported efforts to integrate mental health services into primary healthcare, but noted shortages of trained staff, medicine, and referral systems. The newly established Ministry of Health mobile teams provided psychological support to victims in rural areas.[234]

Mauritania also reported that psychological support was included in rehabilitation services.[235]

In **Palestine**, patients and families received mental health and psychosocial support at the Artificial Limbs and Polio Center, a community mental health center in Gaza, and some ICRC-supported primary healthcare centers, where care was delivered by professionals trained or supervised by the ICRC.[236] UNMAS developed trauma-sensitive psychosocial training with the Gaza Community Mental Health Program.[237] ITF Enhancing Human Security equipped the psychotherapy service at Harmalah Hospital in Bethlehem.[238]

In **South Sudan**, the ICRC-supported centers in Juba, Rumbek, and Wau combined psychosocial support with physical rehabilitation.[239] However, psychological support services decreased overall and access remained very limited, with persons with disabilities in some states lacking services.[240]

In **Ukraine**, the ICRC's hospital-based model included mental health and psychosocial support.[241] School-based psychosocial activities supported by ITF Enhancing Human Security were also provided for children and caregivers, while mental health professionals received training.[242]

231 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), 2 April 2025; and Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

232 Committee on Victim Assistance, "Croatia, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026, bit.ly/CroatiaVACommitteeJune2026.

233 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 416, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

234 Committee on Victim Assistance, "Iraq, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026, bit.ly/IraqVACommitteeJune2026.

235 Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 7.

236 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 432, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

237 UNMAS, "Occupied Palestinian Territory: Annual Report 2025," 21 April 2026, bit.ly/UNMASPalestine2025.

238 ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2025," 23 March 2026, pp. 100–105, bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2025.

239 ICRC, "South Sudan at 15: A humanitarian journey through conflict, resilience and hope," 9 July 2026, bit.ly/ICRCSouthSudanJuly2026.

240 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, NMAA, 4 April 2025.

241 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 36, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

242 ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2025," 23 March 2026, pp. 75–83, bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2025.

In **Chile**, **Colombia**, and **El Salvador**, psychological support was provided through broader state assistance schemes for war victims, while in **Nicaragua** and **Peru**, such support was provided through programs operating to ensure the rights of persons with disabilities.[243]

PEER-TO-PEER SUPPORT AND COMMUNITY NETWORKS

Peer-to-peer activities help mine/ERW survivors manage stress, trauma, living with disabilities, and adhere to medical and rehabilitative therapies, enhancing their overall life-satisfaction. Activities in this area can include individual peer-to-peer counseling, community-based support groups, survivor networks, and the support of broader associations of persons with disabilities.

In **Afghanistan**, psychosocial support coordinated by the Ministry of Public Health included peer-to-peer support and counseling; in some cases peer support was included in psychosocial support at rehabilitation centers.[244] **Croatia** reported efforts to make peer-to-peer support available, including by integrating it into public healthcare and other relevant systems.[245]

SPOTLIGHT: COMBINING PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT WITH PEER-TO-PEER SUPPORT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (BiH)

Mine/ERW survivors in BiH can obtain psychological or psychosocial support through several independent systems. These include community mental health services, psychological counseling and group workshops, survivor-to-survivor peer support, and family involvement and referrals.

Community mental health centers attached to primary healthcare facilities provide the principal route to professional psychological and psychiatric care in BiH. However, psychosocial support specific to mine survivors is more visible through the UDAS Amputees Organization of the Republic of Srpska (UDAS). Its peer support model connects survivors with people who have experienced similar injuries, incorporates families and professionals into individual recovery planning, and provides referrals, rights information, social reconnection, and support for autonomy and self-advocacy.[246]

UDAS has been instrumental in providing psychoeducational and peer-advocacy workshops. In May 2026, 20 mine survivors participated in the first of four workshops on leadership, communication, mutual networking, and exchange of experience. Participants reported increased confidence and recommended continued mentoring support.[247] In July 2026, UDAS and a partner organization completed four psychologist-led workshops for approximately 70 women with disabilities, though participation was not restricted to mine survivors. The workshops covered resilience, self-confidence, and coping with difficult experiences. Ultimately, participants identified a continuing need for both group and individual psychological counseling.[248]

243 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029 reporting checklist, Action 36, p. 47; and Peru Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J, p. 19.

244 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 2 April 2025; and Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

245 Committee on Victim Assistance, "Croatia, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026, bit.ly/CroatiaVACommitteeJune2026.

246 UDAS Amputees Organisation of the Republic of Srpska (UDAS), "User services," undated, accessed 19 September 2026, bit.ly/UDASUserServices.

247 UDAS, "Strengthening the capacity of mine victim networks," 26 May 2026, bit.ly/UDAS26May2026.

248 UDAS, "Psychological workshops for the empowerment of women," 22 July 2026, bit.ly/UDAS22July2026.

In **BiH**, **Cambodia**, **Colombia**, the **DRC**, **Ethiopia**, **Mozambique**, **Senegal**, and **Uganda**, survivor organizations provided vital peer support roles and, in some cases, referrals.[249]

In **Tajikistan**, an annual rehabilitation camp organized by Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD) allowed mine survivors to engage in physiotherapy, art therapy, and adaptive leisure activities.[250] Tajikistan reported that peer support networks were also part of these summer camps.[251] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Program Office in Dushanbe and the national mine action center held a workshop in August 2026 for 16 survivors that included psychologist-led sessions on stress management and coping, relaxation techniques, and peer exchange.[252]

INCREASING NATIONAL CAPACITY IN MENTAL HEALTH AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT

Sustained investment is needed to build national capacity to provide mental health and psychosocial support for mine/ERW victims. This includes training and retaining personnel, strengthening referral systems, and supporting peer and community-based support to ensure continued access to care, including in remote and conflict-affected areas.

In **Ethiopia**, the ICRC trained social workers and other stakeholders to provide psychosocial support to persons with disabilities.[253]

In **South Sudan**, a national mental health and psychosocial support strategic plan for 2025–2029 was reported to have been implemented in conflict-affected areas.[254]

In **Sri Lanka**, psychological support for survivors experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder was reported to be available, and a referral system was being developed in 2025 to ensure that landmine victims receive comprehensive support across relevant sectors.[255] The Ministry of Health said it was scaling up mental health and psychosocial services through capacity-building, had appointed Medical Officers of Mental Health, and was encouraging peer support networks in the areas most affected by mine contamination.[256] A psychosocial wellbeing program for mine/ERW victims was also scheduled to launch in Kilinochchi district in July 2026, run jointly with the Regional Director of Health Services.[257]

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have committed in the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan to "[s]trengthen efforts to meet the social and economic inclusion needs of mine victims by ensuring their access to education, capacity-building, employment referral services,

249 Committee on Victim Assistance, "Senegal, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/SenegalVACommitteeJune2025; Explosive Ordnance Network Survivors (EONS) website, https://eonsug.org; and email from Bekele Gonfa, Executive Director, Survivors Recovery and Rehabilitation Organization (SRaRO), 4 September 2026.

250 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 3 April 2024.

251 Email from Reykhan Muminova, Victim Assistance Officer, TNMAC, 11 October 2026; and statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/TajikistanStatement16June2026.

252 "OSCE, TNMAC Boost Support for Mine Survivors in Tajikistan," *Mirage News*, 19 August 2026, bit.ly/MirageNews19Aug2026.

253 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 90, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

254 Committee on Victim Assistance, "South Sudan, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026, bit.ly/SouthSudanVACommitteeJune2026.

255 Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 13; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Nayeemudeen Meera Muhiadeen, National Director – Mine Action, Sri Lanka National Mine Action Center, 27 March 2025.

256 Statement of Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2025, bit.ly/SriLankaStatement17June2025.

257 Statement of Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/SriLankaStatement16June2026.



Women landmine survivors from Lira and Pader districts, Uganda, participate in a peanut butter production skills development training at the Uganda National Industrial Research Institute in Lira, under an ICBL-CMC Investing in Action grant.

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finance institutions/services, business development services, rural development, vocational training and social protection programmes including in rural and remote areas" (Action 37).

There is a recognized need to increase socio-economic opportunities for survivors. Several States Parties provided different forms of financial assistance and livelihood support to survivors during the reporting period, often through broader programs for conflict victims or persons with disabilities. Support also included grants and loans for small businesses, vocational training, employment assistance, and education. Coverage remained uneven, however, particularly in rural and remote areas, while funding constraints limited some programs.

ACCESS TO SOCIAL PROTECTION PROGRAMS AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

In some countries, survivors and other persons with disabilities, as well as the families of victims, received support through national social welfare programs or other financial assistance. The availability and type of support varied, including cash transfers, pensions, and disability allowances.

In **Afghanistan**, the Taliban authorities had previously indicated that social protection would cover all persons with disabilities, rather than only war victims.[258] However, Afghanistan's latest Article 7 report stated that the Ministry of Martyrs and Disability Affairs provided pensions only to persons with war-related disabilities, amounting to AFN2,500–5,000 (US$35–70) per month. The report also noted that no inclusive national budget existed for disability-related services.[259] Furthermore, payments did not consistently reach eligible persons. In 2025, persons with disabilities, including conflict amputees, reported delayed or unpaid allowances, reduced payments, and removal from eligibility lists.[260] These concerns persisted in 2026, when conflict survivors with renewed disability cards reported receiving no government assistance, forcing them to rely on begging and support from neighbors.[261]

Angola folded disability inclusion into its cash transfer program and informal-economy retraining program.[262]

In **Colombia**, social protection for mine/ERW victims was provided through the general state assistance framework for victims of armed conflict. In 2025, 44 mine/ERW victims received compensation payments; however, it is not known how many survivors benefited from other socio-economic support delivered under general programs.[263] In **El Salvador**, pensions and other economic benefits are available to mine/ERW victims and their families

258 Afghan Landmine Survivors Organization (ALSO), "Persons with Disabilities' Access to Humanitarian Aids in Afghanistan," August 2022, p. 14; "Ministry: Payments for Disabled People Will Resume in 2 Months," *TOLOnews*, 27 July 2022, bit.ly/ToloNews27July2022; and "Afghans Complain About Lack of Disability Payments," *TOLOnews*, 3 June 2022, bit.ly/Tolonews3June2022.

259 Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J, pp. 17–18.

260 "Afghanistan's Disabled Left Waiting: Fear Mounts as Taliban Withholds Payments," *Hasht-e Subh Daily*, 26 May 2025, bit.ly/Hasht-eSubhDaily26May2025.

261 Farahmand Jawzjani, "Couple disabled by war in Sheberghan now rely on begging," *Amu TV*, 28 August 2026, www.amu.tv/251220/.

262 Statement of Angola, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/AngolaStatement16June2026.

263 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 42.

through the Institute for the Administration of Benefits for Veterans and Ex-combatants (Instituto Administrador de los Beneficios de los Veteranos y Excombatientes, INABVE).[264]

In **Iraq**, monthly salaries were provided to survivors according to their degree of disability.[265]

Sri Lanka's national cash grant program provided financial assistance to low-income individuals affected by the country's economic crisis. Eligible persons with disabilities, including mine survivors, could receive support.[266] However, Sri Lanka's needs survey also pointed to limited livelihood and housing support for victims.[267] **Thailand** provided disability allowances, rehabilitation grants, housing modifications, and loans through the national disability fund.[268]

Zimbabwe provided social protection services to mine victims, including cash transfers, and food support.[269]

EDUCATION, VOCATIONAL TRAINING, AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT SERVICES

Socio-economic inclusion opportunities for mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities remained limited and uneven. Several States Parties reported national or government-supported measures to promote and ensure socio-economic opportunities for mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities. Much of the remaining support was provided or funded by international organizations, primarily the ICRC.

In **Afghanistan**, the ICRC provided vocational training, educational and employment assistance, micro-credit initiatives, and disability sports, but had to limit its support in some districts because of reduced funding.[270] In **Algeria**, small enterprises were created by persons with disabilities, including mine victims, under its job-quota and micro-enterprise scheme.[271]

In **BiH**, public funding through entity-level funds was available for capacity-building and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors.[272] In 2025, ITF Enhancing Human Security also supported projects on sports, beekeeping, and renewable energy.[273] **Burundi** reported grants for income-generating activities through disability associations and built houses for mine/ERW survivors.[274]

In **Cambodia**, the ICRC supported three institutions to improve the social inclusion of persons with disabilities through employment, vocational training, education, and sport.[275] In

264 El Salvador Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 7.

265 Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

266 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nayeemudeen Meera Muhiadeen, National Director – Mine Action, Sri Lanka National Mine Action Center, 27 March 2025.

267 Statement of Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/SriLankaStatement16June2026.

268 Statement of Thailand, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2026, bit.ly/ThailandStatement17June2026.

269 Presentation of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2025, bit.ly/ZimbabwePresentation17June2025.

270 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 260, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025; and Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form H.

271 Statement of Algeria, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2026, bit.ly/AlgeriaStatement17June2026.

272 Committee on Victim Assistance, "Bosnia and Herzegovina, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026, bit.ly/BiH-VACommitteeJune2026.

273 ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2025," 23 March 2026, pp. 45–49, bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2025.

274 Statement of Burundi, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/BurundiStatement16June2026.

275 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 267, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

addition, Cambodia trained 578 mine survivors in business development through a partnership with the Maybank Foundation in order to help build lasting financial independence.[276] Cambodia noted, however, that continued reliance on international donors made programs susceptible to funding instability, particularly in rural and mine-affected areas, undermining comprehensive support including livelihoods.[277]

In **Colombia**, social and economic inclusion of mine/ERW victims was provided through the general state assistance framework for victims of armed conflict, which covers education, training, employment, productive inclusion, financial services, and social protection. Colombia reported that these services were concentrated in municipal capitals and main cities, yet many victims live in rural areas. Furthermore, there is no priority access or standardized prioritization for mine/ERW survivors.[278] Access to education and employment opportunities was further supported by the ICRC, which launched a project with Fundación A-Kasa to strengthen the technical capacities of companies led by persons with disabilities.[279] **El Salvador** reported that victims had access to education, social protection, income-generating initiatives, and financial assistance, while identifying mobility limitations and the cost of travel as the main barriers to access.[280]

In **Ethiopia**, the ICRC supported multiple initiatives—self-employment grants, inclusive job placements, educational assistance, and adaptive sports programs—aimed at fostering economic and social independence.[281]

In **Benin** and **Togo**, social inclusion activities supported by the ICRC included career development and vocational training for persons with disabilities in northern areas, while in **Mali**, the ICRC focused on career development programs, but also supported sports and microeconomic initiatives.[282] In **Nigeria**, the ICRC implemented social inclusion initiatives and facilitated referrals to psychosocial support.[283]

South Sudan noted that economic inclusion had "remained low since 2020."[284] In **Sudan**, the ICRC stated that it had to focus resources on emergency response rather than broader social inclusion initiatives in 2025.[285] Sudan did report, however, that psychosocial and economic reintegration support reached 35 victims.[286]

Tajikistan requested support for micro-credit and vocational training for survivors in remote rural areas.[287] FSD constructed greenhouses as livelihood support in three affected

276 Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/CambodiaStatement16June2026.

277 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mao Bunnhath, Advisor and Director of Victim Assistance Department, Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), 4 June 2025.

278 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 42.

279 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 26, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025; and Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029 reporting checklist, Action 37, p. 42.

280 El Salvador Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 18.

281 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 96, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025; and ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 14, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

282 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 18, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025; and ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 118, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

283 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 19.

284 Statement of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/SouthSudanStatement16June2026.

285 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 15.

286 Statement of Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/SudanStatement16June2026.

287 Statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/TajikistanStatement16June2026.

districts of Tajikistan and handed them over to 18 survivors.[288] ITF Enhancing Human Security also provided beekeeping training in **Ukraine**.[289]

Zimbabwe provided social protection services to mine victims, including education, vocational training, livelihood initiatives, and empowerment loans.[290]

EMERGENCY AND HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE AND PREPAREDNESS

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have committed in the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan to "[e]nsure that relevant national emergency/humanitarian response and preparedness plans integrate the safety and protection of mine survivors and populations in affected communities in situations of risk," including in "situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters" (Action 38).

Emergency preparedness and humanitarian responses need to address the distinct barriers mine/ERW survivors face in receiving warnings, evacuating, and accessing assistance, while also maintaining essential care and support. This work aligns directly with Article 11 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) concerning protection and safety in situations of risk.

During acute crises, maintaining the continuity of services and protecting infrastructure remain major operational challenges. Conflict and acute emergencies disrupted victim assistance during the reporting period, requiring providers to adapt how and where they delivered services. In some cases, there were also efforts to further strengthen national frameworks in emergency preparedness.

In **Afghanistan**, the ICRC reported that the August 2025 earthquake triggered an early-rehabilitation response by ICRC-supported clinical teams.[291] After the earthquake, the ICRC launched a social media campaign, in Pashto and Dari, to help people in the earthquake-affected eastern provinces learn more about mine/ERW hazards. It also provided the Afghan Red Crescent Society comprehensive support for developing organizational capacities, implementing programs, and improving its response to emergencies.[292]

In the **DRC**, renewed fighting in the east in early and late 2025 led the ICRC to reorient its rehabilitation programming toward improving hospital emergency responses.[293]

In **Palestine**, the WHO recorded 216 attacks on healthcare in Gaza in 2025, and a further 233 such attacks in the West Bank.[294] To preserve specialized care amidst these disruptions, the ICRC supported the relocation of a children's wheelchair workshop following the evacuation of Gaza City.[295]

In **Sudan**, the WHO verified 217 attacks on healthcare between April 2023 and April 2026. Patients in urgent need of care were forced to undertake long and dangerous journeys to reach the nearest functioning health facilities.[296] To help better prepare hospital staff, ICRC

288 Email from Reykhan Muminova, Victim Assistance Officer, TNMAC, 11 October 2026.

289 ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2025," 23 March 2026, pp. 75–83, bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2025.

290 Presentation of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2025, bit.ly/ZimbabwePresentation17June2025.

291 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 260, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

292 Ibid., pp. 259–260.

293 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 22, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

294 WHO, "Health conditions in the occupied Palestinian territory, including east Jerusalem: Report by the Director-General," A79/12, 8 May 2026, bit.ly/WHO8May2026.

295 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 40, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

296 WHO, "After three years of conflict, Sudan faces a deeper health crisis," 14 April 2026, bit.ly/WHOSudan14Apr2026.

information sessions provided instruction on the basic principles of the Health Care in Danger initiative.[297]

The WHO recorded a 20% increase in attacks on healthcare in **Ukraine** in 2025 compared with 2024; attacks on medical warehouses tripled.[298] Ambulances in Kherson province were targeted by short-range drones to prevent them from reaching wounded people. Attacks on energy infrastructure and resulting power outages further hindered emergency response and evacuation.[299] To preserve essential infrastructure, the ICRC in Ukraine renovated surgical facilities and heating, water, and electrical systems, and provided generators at hospitals and rehabilitation centers, leaving them better prepared for blackouts.[300]

ACCESSIBILITY, PARTICIPATION, AND INCLUSION

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have committed in the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan to "[i]mprove accessibility and strive to remove physical, social, cultural, political, attitudinal, and communications barriers to ensure the full inclusion and effective participation of mine victims and their representative organisations including in rural and remote areas in all matters that affect them" (Action 39).

Due to infrastructure and transport limitations, as well as the ongoing impacts of conflict and insecurity, accessibility remained severely hampered in many States Parties in 2025, especially in remote and rural areas. Although states and organizations reported efforts to address physical and geographic barriers, structural inequalities persisted. Efforts to combat deep-seated cultural stigma relied heavily on awareness-raising workshops. Efforts to combat gender disparities were more limited, with domestic caregiving for survivors remaining a burden borne disproportionately by women and girls. Regarding participation, States Parties often reported including survivors in state consultations and supporting their travel to international treaty meetings, in line with the principle of "nothing about us without us," but provided little detail on the tangible outcomes of these efforts.

GEOGRAPHIC BARRIERS INCLUDING IN RURAL AND REMOTE AREAS

Geographic isolation, including distance, was a significant barrier to reaching services for mine/ERW survivors in many countries. For example, in **Burundi**, **Ethiopia**, **South Sudan**, **Tajikistan**, **Thailand**, and **Zimbabwe**, services, assistive devices, or livelihood support in rural, remote, or border areas were reported as hard to reach or sustain.[301] **Yemen** said some survivors living in contaminated areas remained unable to access services.[302]

In an attempt to address these issues, several states and international partners implemented targeted solutions. **Iraq** scaled up community-based rehabilitation to reach victims in remote and rural areas, with the aim of reducing the barriers created by the distance and costs involved.[303] **Thailand** expanded its "one-stop" prosthetic services to reduce

297 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 181, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

298 UN in Ukraine, "Attacks on Ukraine's health care increased by 20% in 2025," 26 February 2026, bit.ly/UNUkraine26Feb2026.

299 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), "UN Commission concludes that Russian armed forces' drone attacks against civilians in Kherson Province amount to crimes against humanity of murder," 28 May 2025, bit.ly/OHCHRUkraine28May2025; and Physicians for Human Rights and Truth Hounds, "Health Care in the Dark: The Impacts of Russian Attacks on Energy in Ukraine," 4 December 2024, bit.ly/PHRTruthHoundsUkraine4Dec2024.

300 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 388, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

301 Statements of Burundi, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026, bit.ly/MBTStatementsIM26.

302 Statement of Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/YemenStatement16June2026.

303 Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 68.

referral and travel barriers for survivors in remote border areas.[304] **Türkiye** operated first-aid posts near remote contaminated areas and trained family members to assist with therapy in remote areas.[305] The ICRC reported taking rehabilitation services to remote or previously inaccessible areas of **Ethiopia**, **Somalia**, **South Sudan**, **Tajikistan**, and **Yemen**, and covering transport, food, and accommodation costs for patients from hard-to-reach areas in **South Sudan**.[306]

PHYSICAL BARRIERS IN INFRASTRUCTURE AND HOUSING

While physical accessibility of buildings and services was often addressed in a way that benefited persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, progress remained uneven. **Guinea-Bissau** completed accessibility improvements in schools in six areas, and **Thailand** listed housing modifications among the support available to survivors.[307] **Jordan** made public buildings accessible.[308] **Nicaragua** continued to promote the elimination of accessibility barriers, reporting that 60% of its hospitals were now accessible.[309] In **Türkiye**, students with disabilities received free transport to school.[310]

Despite these positive advancements, accessibility barriers continued to restrict persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, from navigating public infrastructure, accessing vital services, and participating in community life. For example, in **Ethiopia**, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission held public hearings that revealed barriers affecting accessibility of roads, buildings, and public services, including health facilities, schools, and workplaces.[311] In **Lebanon**, HI reported that persons with disabilities in collective shelters had to deal with overcrowded pathways and toilets accessible only by stairs.[312]

ATTITUDINAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL BARRIERS

Social stigma against mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities remained a common attitudinal barrier. For women survivors, social stigma often resulted in an inability and/or reluctance to access healthcare.[313] **Burundi** reported that social stigma remained an obstacle to full inclusion.[314] The same was reported in **Chad**.[315] HI described cultural attitudes in **Sri Lanka** that associate disability with punishment and burden, contributing to the stagnation of disability policy.[316]

304 Statement of Thailand, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2026, bit.ly/ThailandStatement17June2026.

305 Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J, pp. 22 and 24.

306 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, pp. 14, 36, and 41, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025; and ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, pp. 160 and 171, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

307 Statements of Guinea-Bissau and Thailand, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026, bit.ly/MBTStatementsIM26.

308 Jordan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J.

309 Nicaragua Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J.

310 Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J.

311 Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, "Accessibility of Roads and Buildings for Persons with Disabilities Remains a Pressing Human Rights Concern," 19 June 2026, bit.ly/EHRC19June2026.

312 HI, "Leaving no one Behind: Making Persons with Disabilities Visible in Lebanon's Crisis," April 2026, bit.ly/HILebanonApr2026.

313 OHCHR, "The lasting human rights impact of anti-personnel mines," 14 July 2026, bit.ly/OHCHR14July2026.

314 Statement of Burundi, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/BurundiStatement16June2026.

315 Mine Ban Treaty, "Status of implementation of the Convention by States Parties, Progress Report 2024–2025. Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025," 25 March 2026, p. 94, docs.un.org/APLC/MSP.22/2025/8.

316 HI, "Country Sheet: Sri Lanka," 2024, p. 4.

The measures reported to address these types of barriers mainly involved awareness -raising. **Afghanistan** reported disability awareness and advocacy training for almost 5,000 people in 2025.[317] In **BiH**, UDAS held awareness workshops for employers and workshops on discrimination against persons with disabilities.[318] In **Colombia**, schoolteachers and health workers received training on disability inclusion at ICRC workshops.[319] In **South Sudan**, awareness sessions on CRPD were held for religious leaders, parliamentarians, and other officials.[320] **Türkiye** reported training male family members in supportive care for survivors so that the burden does not fall exclusively on women and girls.[321]

REPRESENTATION, INCLUSION, AND MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty made commitments under the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan to include survivors and their representative organizations in all matters that affect them. States Parties have recognized that victims must be included in planning and implementation at both national and community levels, while further committing to ensure more meaningful participation of survivors within formal meetings.

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) also stressed that to be more effective, mine and ERW survivors should be actively consulted and participate meaningfully in all levels of the decision-making processes, including the planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of projects and programs.[322] To facilitate this, ICBL supported survivors from BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, Senegal, Serbia, Tajikistan, and Uganda to participate in treaty meetings in 2025 and 2026. Survivors were invited to speak at the opening of all treaty meetings, contributed to high-level opening sessions and panels, and met with States Parties and the Mine Ban Treaty Special Envoys.[323]

Similarly, a regional dialogue on victim assistance and Article 5 implementation in the Americas, held in San Salvador and funded by the European Union (EU), concluded with recommendations to strengthen survivor participation.

Translating these global and regional pledges into national frameworks, however, has yielded mixed results. Mine survivors have been represented in national planning and coordination activities in several States Parties—including Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Türkiye—either through direct participation in coordination mechanisms, or indirectly via development partners that engage survivors. While States Parties generally demonstrated enthusiasm when reporting survivor participation, their updates frequently lacked information on concrete outcomes.

During the reporting period, there were some notable advancements, including one instance of a formalized, long-term cooperation agreement with representative organizations. In **Serbia**, the national mine action center and the national survivor network

317 Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 18.

318 BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J, pp. 28–31.

319 ICRC, "Annual Report 2025," June 2026, p. 219, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2025.

320 Ibid.; and ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 15, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025.

321 Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J.

322 ICBL-CMC, "Guiding Principles for Victim Assistance," January 2021, bit.ly/VAGuidingPrinciplesICBL-CMC2021.

323 ICBL-CMC, "Annual Report 2025," undated, p. 7, bit.ly/ICBL-CMCAnnualReport2025; and ICBL, "ICBL Opening Remarks by Mirsad Tokić," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15 June 2026, bit.ly/ICBLOpeningStatement15July2026.

signed a memorandum of understanding to strengthen cooperation on victim assistance in December 2025. Crucially, the memorandum marks the country's first formal agreement to explicitly recognize victim assistance as an integral component of its national mine action framework.[324] (See also *Coordination and integration* section.)

Additionally, in **Colombia**, survivors took part in developing its national victim assistance standard with other stakeholders.[325] In June 2026, **Tajikistan** reported improved survivor inclusion in decision-making.[326] In **Uganda**, survivor networks trained survivor team leaders, supported the registration of regional survivor associations, and convened survivors and government representatives to discuss inclusion in national development strategies in 2025.[327] **Zimbabwe** said the survivor organization Mine Victims Assistance Zimbabwe had been registered and accredited.[328]

COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION

States Parties committed in the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan to "[c]arry out inter-ministerial and multi-sectoral efforts to ensure that the needs and rights of victims of mines and other explosive ordnance are effectively addressed through relevant national policy and legal frameworks and budgets" across health, disability, education, employment, and environmental domains (Action 31).

Coordination structures continued to develop in 2025 and 2026, although several remained incomplete.

Algeria's interministerial coordinating committee continued to operate and run the national victim database.[329] **Angola** reported revitalized provincial coordination bodies, new disability focal points and the development of a new national plan for victims of violence.[330] In **Ethiopia**, in May 2026, the Ministry of Women and Social Affairs and HI convened a workshop to initiate the national Victim Assistance Technical Working Group to strengthen national coordination, including information-sharing and referral pathways.[331]

In **Serbia**, the memorandum signed by the national mine action center and the national survivor network in 2025 recognizes that victim assistance requires a long-term, comprehensive, and sustainable approach involving state institutions, international organizations, and civil society and includes monitoring, national adaption, and implementation of International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 13.10 on Victim Assistance. It marks the first such agreement to identify victim assistance as an integral component of mine action in the country.[332]

324 Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC), "Memorandum of Understanding signed with AAAS Association in the field of mine action, with a focus on victim assistance," 17 December 2025, bit.ly/MoU-AAASDec2025.

325 Mine Ban Treaty, "Status of implementation of the Convention by States Parties, Progress Report 2024–2025. Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025," 25 March 2026, p. 13, docs.un.org/APLC/MSP.22/2025/8.

326 Statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/TajikistanStatement16June2026.

327 ICBL-CMC, "Annual Report 2025," undated, p. 11, bit.ly/ICBL-CMCAnnualReport2025.

328 Statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2026, bit.ly/ZimbabweStatement17June2026.

329 Statement of Algeria, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2026, bit.ly/AlgeriaStatement17June2026.

330 Statement of Angola, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/AngolaStatement16June2026.

331 Email from Bekele Gonfa, Executive Director, SRaRO, 4 September 2026; and LinkedIn post by HI, 12 June 2026, bit.ly/HI12Jun2026.

332 SMAC, "Memorandum of Understanding signed with AAAS Association in the field of mine action, with a focus on victim assistance," 17 December 2025, bit.ly/MoU-AAASDec2025.

South Sudan established a national technical working group on disability inclusion that meets quarterly.[333] **Sri Lanka**'s national mine action completion strategy 2023–2027 provides the framework for its needs survey.[334]

In **Yemen**, a General Authority for War-Wounded Affairs was established by decree in June 2026 in order to provide comprehensive care for war-wounded people, in coordination with the ministries of health, defense, and interior and other relevant bodies. As of June 2026, its leadership had not yet been appointed.[335]

Zimbabwe established National and Provincial Technical Committees on Disability Inclusion to promote multisectoral collaboration across health, education, employment, and disaster management systems, and is cascading them to the district level to ensure well-coordinated and timely support for survivors. The country also introduced its new National Disability Identification, Assessment, Determination and Referral Framework. This system attempts to resolve long-standing identification gaps and lays the groundwork for a future disability card to facilitate streamlined access to healthcare and social protection.[336]

However, in some countries with victim assistance efforts ongoing, plans for active coordination remained stalled; for example in **BiH**, the state-level Coordination Body for Victim Assistance had not yet held its constituting meeting, as envisaged, in 2025.[337]

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION

STATES PARTIES CONTAMINATED BY ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

STATES PARTIES WITH ARTICLE 5 CLEARANCE OBLIGATION DEADLINES

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties with contamination are required to clear and destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the treaty for that country.

As of the beginning of November 2026, a total of 33 States Parties had current Article 5 clearance deadlines.[338] Oman declared completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations in 2025, followed by Croatia in March 2026, while Burkina Faso was granted a new Article 5 clearance deadline in December 2025 for its newly identified improvised mine contamination.

333 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2025 Annual Report," June 2026, p. 14, bit.ly/PRPAnnualReportICRC2025; and statement of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/SouthSudanStatement16June2026.

334 Statement of Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/SriLankaStatement16June2026.

335 "The decision to establish the Yemeni Wounded Persons Authority comes to light after a difficult process, pending the appointment of its leadership," *Yemen Daily News*, 24 June 2026, bit.ly/YDNNews24June2026; and statement of Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/YemenStatement16June2026.

336 Statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2026, bit.ly/ZimbabweStatement17June2026.

337 BiH, "Mine Action Activity Plan in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2025 and 2026," 15 July 2025, bit.ly/BiHArt5WorkplanJuly2025.

338 This includes Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Cyprus, the DRC, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Lebanon acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 May 2026 and its Article 5 clearance obligations took effect on 1 November 2026.

Lebanon acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty in May 2026 and its Article 5 clearance obligations took effect on 1 November 2026 when the treaty entered into force for the country.

STATES PARTIES THAT HAVE COMPLETED CLEARANCE

As of October 2026, 32 States Parties had completed clearance of all antipersonnel mines from their territory since the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999.[339] Croatia was the most recent to announce completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations in March 2026.[340]

States Parties that have declared fulfillment of clearance obligations since 1999[341]

1999	Bulgaria
2002	Costa Rica
2004	Djibouti, Honduras
2005	Guatemala, Suriname
2006	North Macedonia
2007	Eswatini
2008	France, Malawi
2009	Albania, Greece, Rwanda, Tunisia*, Zambia
2010	Nicaragua
2012	Republic of the Congo, Denmark, The Gambia, Jordan, Uganda
2013	Bhutan, Germany, Hungary, Venezuela
2014	Burundi
2015	Mozambique*
2017	Algeria*
2020	Chile, United Kingdom (UK)**
2025	Oman
2026	Croatia

*Algeria, Mozambique, and Tunisia have reported, or are suspected to have, residual contamination. Mozambique and Tunisia are also suspected to have improvised mine contamination.
**The UK reported completion of mine clearance in 2020. However, Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion of clearance in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, over which both Argentina and the UK claim sovereignty.

Three States Parties that previously reported completion—Nigeria in 2011, Guinea-Bissau in 2012, and Mauritania in 2018—subsequently reported newly discovered mined areas under their jurisdiction or control and were granted new Article 5 clearance deadlines following submission of extension requests.[342]

EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION IN STATES PARTIES WITH CLEARANCE OBLIGATION DEADLINES[343]

As of October 2026, four States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty—Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, and Ukraine—were known or assessed to have massive antipersonnel landmine contamination (more than 100km²). The extent of contamination in Ukraine remains a rough estimation



A Croatian government delegate provides an update to Mine Ban Treaty States Parties on progress in implementing its Article 5 clearance obligations at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025.

© Mine Ban Treaty ISU, December 2025

339 State Party El Salvador completed mine clearance in 1994, before the treaty entered into force, and thus is not included in the list of 32 States Parties.

340 Civil Protection Directorate, "Deputy Prime Minister Božinović: The Republic of Croatia is a country free of mine threats!," 9 March 2026, bit.ly/CroatiaArt5Completion9Mar2026.

341 APMBC, "Article 5: Clearance of Mined Areas," undated, bit.ly/MBTStatusA5Implementation.

342 Previously unknown mined areas are often identified through reports of incidents and casualties, or after reports of possible contamination are made by civilians living close to the areas.

343 For further information on antipersonnel mine contamination in States Parties, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

while the conflict is ongoing, as access to the line of contact remains limited, and large-scale survey is ongoing.

Four States Parties are assessed to have large contamination by antipersonnel landmines (20–99km²): Angola, BiH, Türkiye, and Yemen.

Medium contamination (5–19km²) is present in 13 States Parties: Chad, Colombia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Mauritania, Palestine, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.[344]

Eleven States Parties have small contamination of less than 5km²: Burkina Faso, Cyprus, the DRC, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, and South Sudan.

Argentina is not known to have contamination but has a current clearance obligation deadline due to its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The United Kingdom (UK) also claims sovereignty over the territory and reported completion of mine clearance in 2020. Argentina has thus far not acknowledged the completion announced by the UK.

Estimated antipersonnel mine contamination in States Parties with clearance obligations as of November 2026[345]

Massive (more than 100km²)	Large (20–99km²)	Medium (5–19km²)	Small (less than 5km²)
Afghanistan Cambodia Iraq Ukraine*	Angola Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Türkiye Yemen	Chad Colombia Eritrea Ethiopia Lebanon** Mauritania Palestine Somalia Sri Lanka Sudan Tajikistan Thailand Zimbabwe	Burkina Faso Cyprus*** Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Ecuador Guinea-Bissau Niger Nigeria Peru Senegal Serbia South Sudan

*Ukraine has reported massive contamination, though this cannot be reliably verified until survey has been conducted.
**Lebanon's Article 5 clearance obligations took effect on 1 November 2026.
***Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control but claims there are 21 minefields of unknown size and contamination type in Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus and in the buffer zone.

344 Lebanon's Article 5 clearance obligations took effect on 1 November 2026 when the treaty entered into force for the country.

345 One other State Party, Mali, has acknowledged contamination but is not included in this table as it does not currently have a clearance obligation deadline. However, Mali submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request in July 2026 for newly acknowledged improvised mine contamination. Mali's extension request will be considered during the Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Third Meeting of States Parties in December 2026. Mali Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, bit.ly/MaliArt5ExtRequestJuly2026. The extension request itself is dated 1 July 2025 but was formally submitted in 2026. Contamination figures are based on data collected and analyzed by Mine Action Review, an independent project of NPA. NPA is a member of the ICBL-CMC. Mine Action Review provided the Monitor with the contamination and land release data used in this chapter under a Memorandum of Understanding. Mine Action Review's country profiles and additional information are available at www.mineactionreview.org.

SUSPECTED OR CONFIRMED IMPROVISED (ANTIPERSONNEL) MINE CONTAMINATION IN STATES PARTIES[346]

Victim-activated IEDs that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person are considered to be improvised mines that fall under the prohibition and clearance obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty.[347]

At least 17 States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations are also known or suspected to be currently affected by improvised antipersonnel mines.[348]

Several States Parties without current clearance obligations are also suspected or known to face a threat from improvised mines, although the strength of the available evidence varies considerably.

Bangladesh is affected by antipersonnel mines (see *Unattributed use of antipersonnel mines* section in *Ban Policy*), potentially including improvised mines.[349]

In **Cameroon**, years of reported IED incidents have included victim-activated devices.[350] However, Cameroon considers the threat sporadic and localized and has stated that no areas are known or suspected to be contaminated by antipersonnel mines as defined by the treaty.[351]

In the **Central African Republic**, antipersonnel mines have been found and numerous incidents involving victim-activated explosive devices have been reported, however, the nature and extent of the threat requires further assessment.[352]

Mali, by contrast, has formally entered the Article 5 process, moving beyond initial uncertainty regarding the nature and extent of its contamination. Following two consecutive years of acknowledging the presence of mines of an improvised nature, Mali submitted its first Article 5 extension request in July 2026 to further assess the contamination and develop a comprehensive plan to address it.[353]

346 For further information on improvised mine contamination in States Parties, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

347 Improvised mines are sometimes referred to in reporting and data as victim-activated IEDs, artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs (VO-IEDs), or by the type of construction, such as pressure plate IEDs (PP-IEDs) and crush wire IEDs.

348 Afghanistan, BiH, Burkina Faso, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Lebanon, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Ukraine, and Yemen.

349 In August 2026, an IED incorporating a victim-activated booby-trap mechanism caused casualties in Bakerganj, Barishal, Bangladesh. See, "'Booby Trap' Hidden Behind a Packet of Chips," *Prothom Alo*, 4 August 2026, bit.ly/ProthomAlo4Aug2026.

350 Cameroon Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 3, 7–8, and 21; Cameroon Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form J; and statement of Cameroon, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 December 2025, bit.ly/CameroonStatement3Dec2025. As of October 2026, Cameroon had not submitted an Article 7 report for calendar year 2025.

351 Statement of Cameroon, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 December 2025, bit.ly/CameroonStatement3Dec2025; and Cameroon Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form E.

352 Central African Republic Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form C; Central African Republic Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C; and statement of the Central African Republic, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/CARStatement18June2025.

353 Mali Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, bit.ly/MaliArt5ExtRequestJuly2026. The extension request itself is dated 1 July 2025 but was formally submitted in 2026.



Staff from DanChurchAid (DCA) and implementing partners undergo field accreditation after non-technical survey training in Bangui, Central African Republic.

© Noe Falk Nielsen/DCA, December 2025

In **Mexico**, incidents involving devices apparently activated by civilians have been reported, but the State Party has not acknowledged improvised antipersonnel mine contamination.[354]

In **Mozambique**, available reporting confirms an ongoing IED threat, particularly in Cabo Delgado, but often lacks sufficient information on activation mechanisms to determine whether the devices constitute improvised antipersonnel mines.[355]

Tunisia, which previously reported completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations, has subsequently faced a new threat from improvised mines, including reported contamination or repeated incidents and casualties involving such devices.[356]

In **Benin** and **Togo**, improvised mine incidents and casualties have been reported since 2022, including among civilians. However, neither State Party has formally acknowledged improvised antipersonnel mine contamination or clarified the nature and extent of the threat.[357]

STATES PARTIES WITH RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION[358]

Within the Mine Ban Treaty, "residual contamination" is understood as unknown antipersonnel mine contamination under a State Party's jurisdiction or control after all known or suspected mined areas have been processed and considered fit for normal human use.[359] Three States Parties had known or suspected residual mine contamination as of October 2026.

354 **Mexico**: Carlos Arrieta, "Landmine explosion leaves two day laborers dead in Apatzingán, Michoacán; they activated the device by accident," *El Universal*, 23 May 2026, bit.ly/ElUniversal23May2026; Ernesto Martínez Elorriaga, "Two day laborers injured by landmine explosion in Apatzingán," *La Jornada*, 19 June 2026, bit.ly/LaJornada19June2026; Keegan Hamilton and Kate Linthicum, "Soldiers and civilians are dying as Mexican cartels embrace a terrifying new weapon: Land mines," *Los Angeles Times*, 9 March 2024, bit.ly/LosAngelesTimes9Mar2024; and Juan Pablo Reyes, "Army destroyed 621 mines in Michoacán planted by drug traffickers; 6 soldiers died after explosion," *El Sol de México*, 28 May 2025, bit.ly/ElSolDeMexico28May2025.

355 **Mozambique**: UNOCHA, "Mozambique: Access Snapshot - Cabo Delgado Province, as of 31 July 2025," 31 July 2025, bit.ly/UNOCHAMozambique31July2025; UNOCHA, "Mozambique Access Snapshot - Cabo Delgado Province - April 2024," 31 May 2024, bit.ly/UNOCHAMozambique31May2024; UNOCHA, "Mozambique Access Snapshot - Cabo Delgado Province - as of 31 July 2024," 13 September 2024, bit.ly/UNOCHAMozambique13Sept2024; Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and *Zitamar News*, "Mozambique Conflict Monitor," undated, bit.ly/ACLEDMozambique; Omardine Omar, "Terrorists say they used explosive devices to destroy a military vehicle in Cabo Delgado," *Integrity Magazine*, 16 January 2023, bit.ly/IntegrityMagazine16Jan2023; and WHO, "Mozambique: Cabo Delgado Humanitarian Response - Health Cluster Bulletin No. 03 (March 2023)," 31 March 2023, bit.ly/WHOCaboDelgado31March2023.

356 Monitor media monitoring and analysis of ACLED data for Tunisia for 2013–2025. See, ACLED website, www.acleddata.com.

357 **Benin**: Small Arms Survey, "Out of Control: The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa," November 2023, pp. 47–48, bit.ly/SmallArmsSurveyNov2023; and Monitor analysis of ACLED data for Benin for 2022–2025. **Togo**: "Terror Attacks Increase in Togo as Sahel Extremists Encroach," *Africa Defense Forum*, updated 25 July 2024, bit.ly/AfricaDefenseForum25July2024; "Togo: Over 30 dead in 'terrorist attacks' in 2023," *Africanews*, undated, bit.ly/AfricanewsTogo2023; Monitor analysis of ACLED data for Togo for 2022–2025; and Kars de Bruijne, "Conflict in the Penta-Border Area: Benin's Northern Jihad from the perspective of its neighbours," The Clingendael Institute, December 2022, p. 9, bit.ly/BeninBorderConflictDec2022.

358 For further information on residual contamination in States Parties, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

359 Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Reflections and understandings on the implementation and completion of Article 5 mine clearance obligations," 22 October 2018, p. 6, bit.ly/MBTArt5Committee22Oct2018.

Algeria, which formally declared completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations in February 2017, has continued to find significant numbers of antipersonnel mines every year, including mines displaced from historic minefields by environmental factors. Its Article 7 reports also document continued clearance operations in identified locations along the Algerian–Moroccan border and the clearance of contaminated land. Notably, its 2025 report identifies border areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines.[360] Under the decision of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, a State Party that discovers previously unknown mined areas under its jurisdiction or control after its Article 5 deadline has expired is required to clear these areas as soon as possible, but no later than the next Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference, or submit a request for a new Article 5 deadline.

Mozambique, which completed clearance in 2015, subsequently reported isolated residual contamination consisting of four small suspected mined areas underwater in Inhambane province, although no progress on these areas has been reported since 2019.[361]

Tunisia, which reported completion of clearance of its known border minefields in 2009, has continued to report suspected residual mine and ERW contamination dating from World War II, but has provided no update on efforts to address this contamination as of October 2026.[362]

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION IN STATES NOT PARTY AND OTHER AREAS

Twenty-one states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and three other areas are, or are believed to be, contaminated by antipersonnel mines.

States not party and other areas with confirmed or suspected antipersonnel mine contamination[363]

Massive (more than 100km²)	Large (20–99km²)	Medium (5–19km²)	Small (less than 5km²)	Unknown
Azerbaijan Morocco North Korea South Korea	Israel Myanmar Syria *Western Sahara*	Egypt Georgia Vietnam	Armenia *Kosovo* Libya *Somaliland*	China Cuba India Iran Kyrgyzstan Lao PDR Pakistan Russia Uzbekistan

Note: Other areas are indicated in *italics*.

360 Algeria has destroyed several thousand antipersonnel mines annually since 2017. See, Algeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form D; and Algeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form F.

361 Statement of Mozambique, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018, bit.ly/StatementMozambiqueJune2018; and Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 20 April 2017 to 1 April 2018), Form F. Mozambique erroneously reported that the total of the areas was "18.888 square meters" in its statement at the intersessional meetings in 2019, and "1.118m²" across four tasks in its 2019 Article 7 transparency report. See, Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 1 April 2018 to 31 March 2019), Form C.

362 APMBC, "Tunisia: Article 5 (Mine Clearance)," undated, bit.ly/MBTMembershipTunisia; and Tunisia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period April 2025–April 2026), Form C.

363 Contamination figures are based on data collected and analyzed by Mine Action Review, an independent project of NPA. NPA is a member of the ICBL-CMC. Mine Action Review provided the Monitor with the contamination and land release data used in this chapter under a Memorandum of Understanding. For further information on contamination in states not party, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION IN STATES NOT PARTY AND OTHER AREAS[364]

Four states not party—Azerbaijan, Morocco, North Korea, and South Korea—have massive antipersonnel mine contamination. In **Azerbaijan**, the precise extent remains unquantified, but contamination is particularly extensive along the former line of contact and in territories brought under Azerbaijani control following the conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. **Morocco** likewise lacks a credible quantitative estimate of the extent of contamination, which predominantly results from minefields laid along the Berm during the 1975–1991 conflict over Western Sahara. **North Korea** is believed to have extensive contamination, particularly in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).[365] Reports from 2024 indicated new mine laying in the DMZ and along the border with China, while reports from 2025 stated that mines were also being laid in mountainous areas and fields—including on Arrowhead Hill, where joint demining operations with South Korea had previously taken place.[366] **South Korea** remains contaminated in and around the DMZ, although the full extent is unknown.[367]

Three states not party—Israel, Myanmar, and Syria—are confirmed or assessed to have large antipersonnel mine contamination, though the exact extent remains unknown. In **Israel**, minefields remain distributed across several parts of the country, while additional areas are suspected to be mined due to the displacement of mines from marked minefields over time.[368] In **Myanmar**, contamination is believed to be spreading amid ongoing mine use, with suspected mine/ERW contamination reported in 211 townships as of October 2025—accounting for 64% of all townships.[369] In **Syria**, widespread contamination from landmines, including improvised mines, and other explosive ordnance has been recorded across the country, but a country-wide survey has yet to establish its full extent.

Georgia has medium contamination, although the known extent does not represent a complete national baseline. **Egypt** and **Vietnam** are also estimated to have medium contamination, but the extent remains unknown. **Armenia** and **Libya** both have a small extent of antipersonnel mine contamination, although no reliable estimate of its extent is available for Libya.

The extent of antipersonnel mine contamination remains unknown in China, Cuba, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Pakistan, Russia, and Uzbekistan. However, in Iran, casualty data indicates a significant and geographically widespread problem, with the greatest impact reported in the western provinces bordering Iraq and Türkiye.[370]

364 For further information on contamination in states not party, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

365 Joe He-rim, "Tall order to transform DMZ minefield into peace zone," *The Korea Herald*, 28 October 2019, bit.ly/KoreaHerald28Oct2019; and Guy Rhodes, "Confidence-Building through Mine Action on the Korean Peninsula," *The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction*, Vol. 24, Issue 1, July 2020, p. 11, bit.ly/GuyRhodesJul2020.

366 Emails from Soohong Eum, Peace Sharing Association (PSA), 29 April, 18 May, 27 May, 18 June, and 17 July 2024; and Jooheon Kim and Joon Ha Park, "North Korean troops suffer multiple casualties in border landmine explosion: ROK," *NK News*, 27 March 2025, bit.ly/NKNews27March2025.

367 "Military warns of North Korean land mines washing into South," *Korea JoongAng Daily*, 23 June 2025, bit.ly/KoreaJoonAngDaily23June2025; "Military Calls for Caution after N. Korea's Land Mines Swept Away in Monsoon Rain," *KBS World*, 17 July 2024, bit.ly/KBSWorld17July2024; Hyung-Jin Kim, "North Korean land mines could float into South Korea, South warns," *Associated Press*, 17 July 2024, bit.ly/AP17July2024; email from Soohong Eum, PSA, 17 July 2024; "Parts of North Korean land mines washing up in South," *Associated Press*, 29 July 2011, bit.ly/AssociatedPress29July2011; and "North Korea Wooden Land Mine Swept into South Korea," *Sputnik International*, 28 July 2017, bit.ly/SputnikInternational28July2017.

368 Israel National Mine Action Authority (INMAA), "Information to the public," undated, bit.ly/INMAAInformation.

369 Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), "Insights on Suspected Landmine/ERW Contamination (1999 - 2025) and Casualties (2020 - 2024)," undated, bit.ly/MIMUInsights. The MIMU infographic uses data collected by the Monitor.

370 Mines Action Canada, "The Human Impact of Antipersonnel Mines in Iran," 2 October 2026, bit.ly/MACIranOct2026.

Three other areas are also known to be contaminated: Kosovo, Somaliland, and Western Sahara. **Kosovo** and **Somaliland** have a small extent of antipersonnel mine contamination, while **Western Sahara** has extensive mine contamination along and east of the Berm, predominantly from antivehicle mines, though antipersonnel mines are also found occasionally.

STATES PARTIES PROGRESS TOWARDS CLEARANCE OBLIGATION DEADLINES

An Article 5 extension request is a formal submission by a State Party seeking additional time beyond its current treaty-mandated clearance deadline in order to complete its obligations to clear all known or suspected mined areas. Article 5 extension requests are considered and decided upon by the States Parties at the treaty's Meetings of States Parties and Review Conferences.

If a State Party discovers new or previously unknown mined areas after its Article 5 deadline has expired, or if no previous clearance deadline exists, the State Party must promptly notify all States Parties and destroy the mines as soon as possible. If it is not able to complete clearance before the next formal meeting of the treaty (Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference), it should submit a request for an extended Article 5 clearance deadline.

STATES PARTIES PROGRESS TOWARDS CLEARANCE OBLIGATION DEADLINES: 2025 OVERVIEW[371]

In 2025, 22 of the 32 States Parties with clearance obligations in 2025 released a combined total of 388.3km² of hazardous area and destroyed at least 96,879 antipersonnel mines including 15,518 improvised mines.[372] Total land release in 2025 decreased by 18.4% compared with 2024, even when excluding Ethiopia, which accounted for more than half of the land released in 2024.[373] By contrast, the decrease in land released through clearance was considerably smaller, at 6%, while the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed decreased by 22.5% compared with 2024.[374]

Of the 22 States Parties that reported releasing mine contaminated land in 2025, Angola, BiH, Croatia, Mauritania, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Türkiye, and Ukraine released more land in 2025 than in 2024. With the exception of Colombia, Palestine, and Peru, all 22 states released land using more than one method: clearance, technical survey, and/or non-technical survey.

Excluding Ethiopia, several States Parties reported substantial decreases in land release compared with 2024, including Yemen (–62.6%), Afghanistan (–57.2%), Iraq (–54.6%), and Cambodia (–17.2%).[375] The reasons for these decreases varied. In Afghanistan, reduced donor funding resulted in severe cuts to operational capacity, while in Cambodia operations were affected by a temporary suspension of US-funded activities and renewed border

371 For further information on land release in States Parties, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

372 The 32 States Parties with clearance obligation deadlines in 2025 do not include Oman, which had a clearance deadline of 1 February 2025 and reported having completed its clearance obligations by the end of 2024 (announced officially in June 2025), or new State Party Lebanon, which joined the treaty in 2026 with its clearance obligations coming into effect on 1 November 2026. The 15,518 improvised mines were reported by Afghanistan (1,558), Colombia (94), Iraq (13,798), Senegal (1), and Sri Lanka (67). Land release figures are based on data collected and analyzed by Mine Action Review, an independent project of NPA. NPA is a member of the ICBL-CMC. Mine Action Review provided the Monitor with the contamination and land release data used in this chapter under a Memorandum of Understanding. For further information on land release in States Parties, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

373 In 2024, Ethiopia reported releasing 600.2km² almost exclusively through cancellation, primarily as a result of database cleanup followed by on-site assessments. See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2025* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, December 2025), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports.

374 Land release figures for 2024 and 2025 are based on data collected and analyzed by Mine Action Review. Mine Action Review's country profiles and additional information are available at www.mineactionreview.org.

375 Ethiopia is excluded from this comparison because its exceptionally high 2024 figure of 600.2km² resulted almost entirely from cancellation, primarily through database cleanup followed by on-site assessment.


hostilities with Thailand. In Yemen, both funding constraints and insecurity continued to restrict operations. Conversely, Iraq's apparent sharp decline largely reflects an unusually high amount of land reported as canceled in 2024, rather than a substantial decrease in operational output in 2025. Despite its decrease, Cambodia still released more land than any other State Party in 2025 and was the only State Party to release more than 100km² in 2025. Another six States Parties with clearance obligations that released more than 10km² in 2025 were: Afghanistan, BiH, Croatia, Iraq, Ukraine, and Yemen.

Angola, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe all released between 1km² and 10 km², while Colombia, the DRC, Mauritania, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, South Sudan, and Tajikistan released less than 1km². Eight States Parties reported no release of areas contaminated with antipersonnel mines in 2025, despite having Article 5 clearance obligation deadlines: Argentina, Chad, Cyprus, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, and Serbia.

Five States Parties with clearance obligation deadlines reported clearing improvised mines in 2025: Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Senegal, and Sri Lanka.

As of October 2026, Eritrea and Niger had not reported land release data for 2025.

Land release by States Parties with clearance obligations in 2025



Release of antipersonnel mine contaminated land in contaminated States Parties with clearance obligations in 2025 compared with 2024[376]

State Party	2025		2024	
	Land Release (km²)	APM destroyed	Land Release (km²)	APM destroyed
Afghanistan	21.29	2,150	49.78	5,376
Angola	6.84	9,268	5.55	5,680
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	52.43	3,117	15.45	574
Cambodia	107.87	2,573	130.35	10,534
Chad	0	0	0	7

376 Land release figures for 2024 and 2025 are based on data collected and analyzed by Mine Action Review. The 2024 figures therefore differ from those published in Landmine Monitor 2025, which were based on Monitor reporting. Mine Action Review's country profiles and additional information are available at www.mineactionreview.org.

State Party	2025		2024	
	Land Release (km²)	APM destroyed	Land Release (km²)	APM destroyed
Colombia	0.64	94	1.47	193
Croatia	60.08	1,945	51.73	1,533
Cyprus*	0	0	0	0
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	0.02	7	0.06	29
Ecuador	0	0	0.01	367
Eritrea	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R
Ethiopia**	0	0	600.2	23
Guinea-Bissau	0	0	0.04	2
Iraq	67.91	24,682	149.55	14,644
Mauritania	0.47	61	0.06	17
Niger	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R
Nigeria	0	0	0	0
Oman	Clearance completed		0.09	0
Palestine	0.01	719	0.03	1,455
Peru	0.18	392	0.02	746
Senegal	0.01	34	0.12	19
Serbia	0	0	0.12	0
Somalia	1.77	170	2.71	151
South Sudan	0.96	78	0.77	159
Sri Lanka	4.96	11,938	7.18	16,510
Sudan	1.03	17	0	0
Tajikistan	0.67	2,576	1.7	2,795
Thailand	4.33	8,035	5.22	17,600
Türkiye	5.78	1,808	5.75	179
Ukraine	33.31	1,224	4.14	14,142
Yemen	14.9	317	39.85	545
Zimbabwe	2.84	25,674	4.39	31,672
Total	**388.3**	**96,879**	**1,076.34**	**124,952**

Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; N/R=not reported. Argentina, not included in this table, was mine affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty and exercises control over the territory and reported completion of mine clearance in 2020. Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.
*Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.
**In 2024, Ethiopia released 599.67km² of land through cancellation—more specifically through database cleanup followed by on-site assessments, whereby land previously suspected to be contaminated was deemed not to be contaminated and removed from the national database.

STATUS OF ARTICLE 5 COMPLETION (AS OF NOVEMBER 2026)

Of the 33 States Parties with Article 5 clearance deadlines as of November 2026, only three were working towards their initial 10-year clearance deadlines. Palestine and Sri Lanka both have initial deadlines of 1 June 2028. New State Party Lebanon, whose clearance obligations only came into force on 1 November 2026, is at the beginning of its initial 10 year clearance



A deminer conducts clearance using a metal detector within a marked clearance lane in Nyamapanda, Mashonaland East province, Zimbabwe.

© NPA, November 2025

period. Only two States Parties—Peru and Zimbabwe—were on target to meet their respective current deadlines.

As of November 2026, all other States Parties were either behind target for meeting their respective deadlines or had previously requested extensions. Eight of these States Parties—BiH, Mauritania, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand—submitted an extension request in 2026, all of which are due to be considered at the Twenty-Third Meeting of States Parties in December 2026.[377]

In addition, in accordance with the decision of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties concerning cases in which States Parties discover previously unknown mined areas, Mali submitted an extension request in 2026 to further assess the extent of its improvised mine contamination.[378] Burkina Faso had submitted an extension request on the same basis in 2025.[379]

The scope and level of detail of the workplans submitted with Article 5 extension requests in 2026 varied considerably. While several States Parties presented multiyear plans for continued land release, others placed greater emphasis on survey and reassessment to establish a more reliable contamination baseline before developing more comprehensive clearance plans.

The reasons for requesting additional time varied, but recurring challenges cited in the extension requests included insufficient or uncertain funding, insecurity and restricted access, newly identified or changing contamination, difficult terrain and environmental conditions, and limited institutional, technical, or operational capacity.

Summary of Article 5 deadline extension requests[380]

State Party	Original deadline	Extension period (Number of requests)	Current deadline	Status
Afghanistan	1 March 2013	10 years (1st) 2 years (2nd) 5 years (3rd)	1 March 2030	Not on track to meet deadline
Angola	1 January 2013	5 years (1st) 8 years (2nd) 5 years (3rd)	31 December 2030	Not on track to meet deadline
Argentina	1 March 2010	10 years (1st) 3 years (2nd) 3 years (3rd) 3 years (4th)	1 March 2029	Has not acknowledged completion

377 APMBC, "Extension Requests," undated, bit.ly/MBTArticle5Extensions.

378 Mali Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, bit.ly/MaliArt5ExtRequestJuly2026. The extension request itself is dated 1 July 2025 but was formally submitted in 2026.

379 Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 July 2025, bit.ly/BurkinaFasoArt5ExtRequestJuly2025.

380 Where the status is reported to be "not on track to meet deadline," it indicates that the relevant State Party will not be able to fulfill its current Article 5 clearance deadline if it maintains the clearance pace reported for 2025.

State Party	Original deadline	Extension period (Number of requests)	Current deadline	Status
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	1 March 2009	10 years (1st) 2 years (2nd) 6 years (3rd)	1 March 2027	Requested extension until 1 March 2032 (5 years)
Burkina Faso*	1 March 2009	3 years (1st)	31 December 2028	Not on track to meet deadline
Cambodia	1 January 2010	10 years (1st) 6 years (2nd) 5 years (3rd)	31 December 2030	Not on track to meet deadline
Chad	1 November 2009	1 year and 2 months (1st) 3 years (2nd) 6 years (3rd) 5 years (4th) 5 years (5th)	1 January 2030	Not on track to meet deadline
Colombia	1 March 2011	10 years (1st) 4 years and 10 months (2nd) 5 years (3rd)	31 December 2030	Not on track to meet deadline
Cyprus	1 July 2013	3 years (1st) 3 years (2nd) 3 years (3rd) 3 years (4th) 3 years (5th)	1 July 2028	Not on track to meet deadline
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	1 November 2012	2 years and 2 months (1st) 6 years (2nd) 1 year and 6 months (3rd) 3 years and 6 months (4th) 3 years (5th)	31 December 2028	Not on track to meet deadline
Ecuador	1 October 2009	8 years (1st) 3 months (2nd) 5 years (3rd) 3 years (4th) 2 years (5th)	31 December 2027	Not on track to meet deadline
Eritrea	1 February 2012	3 years (1st) 5 years (2nd) 11 months (3rd) 2 years (4th) 3 years (5th)	31 December 2027	Not on track to meet deadline
Ethiopia	1 June 2015	5 years (1st) 5 years and 7 months (2nd) 5 years (3rd)	31 December 2030	Not on track to meet deadline

State Party	Original deadline	Extension period (Number of requests)	Current deadline	Status
Guinea-Bissau	1 November 2011	2 months (1st) 1 year (2nd) 2 years (3rd) 3 years (4th)	31 December 2027	Not on track to meet deadline
Iraq	1 February 2018	10 years (1st)	1 February 2028	Not on track to meet deadline
Lebanon	1 November 2036	N/A	1 November 2036	Not on track to meet deadline
Mali**	1 March 2009	N/A	1 March 2009 (expired)	Requested extension until 31 December 2028 (2 years)
Mauritania	1 January 2011	5 years (1st) 5 years (2nd) 1 year (3rd) 5 years (4th)	31 December 2026	Requested extension until 31 December 2031 (5 years)
Niger***	1 September 2009	2 years (1st) 1 year (2nd) 4 years (3rd) 4 years (4th) 5 years (5th)	31 December 2029	Not on track to meet deadline
Nigeria****	1 March 2012	1 year (1st) 4 years (2nd) 3 years (3rd)	31 December 2028	Not on track to meet deadline
Palestine	1 June 2028	N/A	1 June 2028	Not on track to meet deadline
Peru	1 March 2009	8 years (1st) 7 years and 10 months (2nd) 5 years (3rd)	31 December 2029	On track to meet deadline
Senegal	1 March 2009	7 years (1st) 5 years (2nd) 5 years (3rd) 1 year (4th)	1 March 2027	Requested extension until 1 March 2037 (10 years)
Serbia	1 March 2014	5 years (1st) 4 years (2nd) 1 year and 10 months (3rd) 2 years (4th)	31 December 2026	Requested extension until 31 December 2029 (3 years)
Somalia	1 October 2022	5 years (1st)	1 October 2027	Requested extension until 1 October 2032 (5 years)
South Sudan	9 July 2021	5 years (1st) 4 years (2nd)	9 July 2030	Not on track to meet deadline

State Party	Original deadline	Extension period (Number of requests)	Current deadline	Status
Sri Lanka	1 June 2028	N/A	1 June 2028	Not on track to meet deadline
Sudan	1 April 2014	5 years (1st) 4 years (2nd) 4 years (3rd)	1 April 2027	Requested extension until 31 March 2029 (2 years)
Tajikistan	1 April 2010	10 years (1st) 5 years and 9 months (2nd) 1 year (3rd)	31 December 2026	Requested extension until 31 December 2032 (6 years)
Thailand	1 May 2009	9 years and 6 months (1st) 5 years (2nd) 3 years and 2 months (3rd)	31 December 2026	Requested extension until 31 December 2031 (5 years)
Türkiye	1 March 2014	8 years (1st) 3 years and 10 months (2nd) 5 years (3rd)	31 December 2030	Not on track to meet deadline
Ukraine	1 June 2016	5 years (1st) 2 years and 6 months (2nd) 10 years (3rd)	1 December 2033	Not on track to meet deadline
Yemen	1 March 2009	6 years (1st) 5 years (2nd) 3 years (3rd) 5 years (4th)	1 March 2028	Not on track to meet deadline
Zimbabwe	1 March 2009	1 year and 10 months (1st) 2 years (2nd) 2 years (3rd) 3 years (4th) 8 years (5th) 5 years (6th)	31 December 2030	On track to meet deadline

Note: N/A=not applicable.
*In 2008, Burkina Faso declared that there were no areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction or control. In 2024, Burkina Faso informed States Parties of the presence of improvised mines and submitted its first extension request in April 2025.
**In 2001, Mali declared that there were no areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction or control. In 2024, Mali informed States Parties of the presence of improvised mines and submitted its first extension request in July 2026. Mali's extension request is dated 1 July 2025 but was formally submitted in July 2026. The request does not specify a duration in years but requests an extension until 31 December 2028.
***In 2008, Niger declared that there were no remaining areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines. In May 2012, Niger informed States Parties of suspected and confirmed mined areas. Not until July 2013 did Niger request its first extension to the deadline that had already expired in 2009.
****In 2019, seven years after its initial deadline expired, Nigeria declared newly mined areas and, in 2020, submitted a first extension request.

STATES PARTIES INDIVIDUAL PROGRESS TOWARDS THEIR CLEARANCE OBLIGATION DEADLINES[381]

State Party Croatia officially declared all known mined areas cleared in March 2026, including territory under military control. Of the 33 States Parties that still have Article 5 clearance deadlines as of November 2026, only two—Peru and Zimbabwe—are on track to meet their current Article 5 clearance obligation deadlines.

Peru, whose current Article 5 deadline is 31 December 2029, met its 2025 clearance targets and reduced remaining contamination to less than 0.1km^2.[382]

Zimbabwe was granted a five-year extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline in 2025, until 31 December 2030. Land release decreased by more than 35% in 2025 compared with 2024, largely due to reductions in operational capacity following donor funding cuts.[383] Despite falling behind its annual land release targets since 2023, Zimbabwe is also considered on track to meet its new deadline—although securing sufficient funding remains the principal challenge to completion.[384]

Eight States Parties—BiH, Mauritania, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand—requested extensions to their Article 5 clearance deadlines in 2026, reflecting continued challenges in meeting their clearance obligations. State Party Mali also requested an extension, in order to assess the extent of newly acknowledged improvised mine contamination.



A non-technical survey team member uses a drone to look for evidence of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Kharkiv region, Ukraine.

© FSD, April 2026

In **BiH**, land release increased substantially in 2025 compared with 2024 but remained below BiH's annual target of 75km^2.[385] In 2026, BiH requested a further five-year extension until March 2032, explicitly stating that it does not expect to complete its Article 5 clearance obligations during the extension period.[386] The extension will instead focus on further defining the remaining contamination and addressing priority areas through survey and clearance. BiH therefore remains without a projected date for completing its Article 5 clearance obligations, almost three decades after these obligations first took effect.

Mali has requested an extension until 31 December 2028, primarily to better understand the extent and nature of its contamination with improvised mines and develop the national capacity needed to address it. The extension period will focus on strengthening national coordination and information management, as well as conducting an initial threat

381 For further information on land release in States Parties, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

382 Peru Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form F.

383 Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form D.

384 Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Sixth Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 6 August 2025, pp. 9 and 20, bit.ly/ZimbabweArt5ExtRequestAug2025.

385 BiH Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 1 August 2020, p. 17, bit.ly/BiHArt5ExtRequest1Aug2020.

386 BiH Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 23 July 2026, bit.ly/BiHArt5ExtrequestJuly2026.

assessment.[387] However, implementation remains uncertain amid ongoing conflict, restricted access, and limited national capacity, funding, and international assistance.

Mauritania requested a further five-year extension until 31 December 2031 after new survey substantially increased its estimate of remaining contamination.[388] Despite achieving a five-year peak in annual land release in 2025, significant challenges remain in completing clearance within the proposed new deadline, including the identification of additional hazardous areas, slow progress under the current extension period, and continued reliance on international funding.

While **Senegal**'s known remaining contamination of around 1.93km² could be addressed within the requested 10-year extension, until 1 March 2037, completion will depend on sufficient funding and operational capacity and could be affected by the identification of previously unrecorded contamination and continued access constraints in border areas.[389]

Serbia did not release any mined areas in 2025, while survey to establish the extent of remaining contamination only began during the year.[390] Whether Serbia can meet the requested new deadline of 31 December 2029 will depend on the results of ongoing survey and clarification of possible additional contamination.

Somalia requested a further five-year extension until 1 October 2032 but does not expect to complete its Article 5 clearance obligations within the requested period. Insecurity continues to prevent access to many contaminated areas, the national contamination baseline remains incomplete, and funding constraints limit available survey and clearance capacity.[391]

Sudan requested a two-year extension until March 2029 to re-establish a reliable contamination baseline and rebuild operational capacity following the significant changes caused by the conflict since April 2023, including new contamination and severely restricted access.[392]

Tajikistan requested an extension until the end of 2032, citing newly identified contamination, access and terrain constraints, and insufficient funding and operational capacity.[393]

Thailand requested a further extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline in 2026. Land release declined in 2025—including a significant decrease in clearance—while newly identified contamination, difficult terrain, and access constraints continued to affect progress. Renewed conflict along the border with Cambodia further disrupted survey and clearance and increased uncertainty over the extent of remaining contamination.[394]

Progress among the remaining States Parties varied, with insecurity, funding constraints, and the continued identification of contamination affecting implementation.

At the current rate of land release, neither Afghanistan nor Angola is on track to meet its respective 2030 Article 5 clearance deadline. In **Afghanistan**, land release decreased

387 Mali Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 21 July 2026, bit.ly/MaliArt5ExtRequestJuly2026. The extension request is dated 1 July 2025 but was formally submitted in 2026.

388 Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 4 August 2026, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt5ExtRequestAug2026; and Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), pp. 3 and 8.

389 Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 March 2026, pp. 21–30, bit.ly/SenegalArt5ExtRequestMar2026.

390 Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form D.

391 Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 31 August 2026, p. 34, bit.ly/SomaliaArt5ExtRequestAug2026; and Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 13.

392 Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 4 August 2026, pp. 6–7, bit.ly/SudanArt5ExtRequestAug2026.

393 Tajikistan Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2026, pp. 10–12, bit.ly/TajikistanArt5ExtRequestMar2026.

394 Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 12 June 2026, pp. 4 and 10–12, bit.ly/ThailandArt5ExtRequestJune2026.



A clearance team prepares for operations in a hazardous area in Urrao, Antioquia department, Colombia.

© Sebastián Caro/CCCM, March 2026

substantially in 2025 compared with 2024, falling below the annual rate envisaged in the workplan submitted with its latest Article 5 extension request in 2024.[395] In **Angola**, overall land release increased compared with 2024, driven by increased survey, while clearance declined. Total land release nevertheless remained below the annual target. In both States Parties, ongoing survey also continued to identify additional contamination. Angola reported increased government funding for mine action and continued efforts to strengthen national operational capacity to meet its Article 5 clearance obligations.[396]

Argentina is mine affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty and exercises control over the territory and reported completion of mine clearance in 2020, although isolated mines have subsequently been found and destroyed.[397] Argentina has not acknowledged the completion announced by the UK and without control over the territory, was granted a fourth Article 5 clearance deadline extension request in 2025, extending its clearance deadline until March 2029.[398]

In **Burkina Faso**, implementation of the 2025–2028 workplan was slow to start.[399] The national contamination assessment planned for 2025 was not conducted, and no survey outputs or data on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks or mines destroyed were reported for the year. Although steps were taken in 2026 to strengthen information management and initiate contamination assessments, the extent of antipersonnel mine contamination remains unknown. Consequently, Burkina Faso is unlikely to meet the benchmarks set in its current extension request.

Cambodia's land release declined in 2025, with operations disrupted by funding suspensions and conflict along the border with Thailand.[400] **Chad** reported no release of mined areas for 2025, with insecurity and funding shortages continuing to impede operations, particularly in Tibesti province.[401] **Colombia**'s land release also declined, narrowly missing its annual clearance target amid reduced donor funding and worsening insecurity.[402] If the situation does not improve, Colombia is not expected to meet its 2030 deadline.

Cyprus reported no release of mined areas for a sixth consecutive year. Although the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders agreed in March 2025 to pursue demining as a confidence-building measure, no subsequent United Nations (UN) update confirming

395 Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 5 November 2024, pp. 64–65, bit.ly/AfghanistanArt5ExtRequest2024.

396 Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J.

397 "Controlled mine explosion in the Falklands: the threat persists after the 2020 declaration," *El Observador*, 13 December 2024, bit.ly/ElObservador13Dec2024; Falkland Islands Association, "Falkland Islands Newsletter," No. 127, October 2024, p. 7, bit.ly/FalklandIslandsAssociationOct2024; "Falklands: Explosive Disposal team locate and destroy a live anti vehicle landmine," *MercoPress*, 9 September 2024, bit.ly/MercoPress9Sept2024; Evelina Mezennaja, "Hell's Kitchen on the Murrell Peninsula is mine free," *Falkland Islands Television*, 13 April 2024, bit.ly/FITV13Apr2024; and "Falklands: mines discovered on a beach in Murrell Peninsula, north of Stanley," *MercoPress*, 29 November 2023, bit.ly/MercoPress29Nov2023.

398 Mine Ban Treaty, "Final Report. Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025," 18 May 2026, p. 11, bit.ly/MBT22MSPFinalReport.

399 Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 July 2025, pp. 50–51, bit.ly/BurkinaFasoArt5ExtRequestJuly2025.

400 Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 5.

401 Chad Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 4.

402 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 4 August 2025, pp. 65–69, bit.ly/ColombiaArt5ExtRequestAug2025.

an agreement on demining had been identified as of October 2026.[403] In the **DRC**, land release decreased in 2025. Insecurity in the east and insufficient funding, including the impact of US grant terminations, constrained operations. Several national and international operators ceased field activities.[404]

Ecuador reported no land release after national resources were redirected to public security, health, and emergency response, resulting in a further extension of its Article 5 clearance deadline to December 2027.[405] **Eritrea** did not report any survey or clearance for 2025 and, as of August 2026, had yet to submit an Article 7 report covering 2025; it has not submitted an Article 7 report since 2014.[406] **Ethiopia** also reported no survey or clearance in 2025, as delays in the accreditation and deployment of operators continued to prevent nationally coordinated land release operations.[407] **Guinea-Bissau**, as well, reported no land release in 2025, after the cessation of international funding at the end of 2024 resulted in the suspension of mine action operations.[408]



An explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team member places a warning sign in an area contaminated with landmines in Taftanaz, in Syria's Idlib governorate.

© T. Mayer/HI, October 2025

In **Iraq**, total land release fell substantially in 2025 compared with 2024, largely reflecting the exceptionally high amount of land canceled through non-technical survey in Federal Iraq in 2024. Clearance nevertheless increased in Federal Iraq in 2025, while remaining broadly unchanged in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.[409]

Lebanon's Article 5 clearance obligations only entered into force in November 2026, with an initial deadline of 1 November 2036. However, current land release rates would need to increase for Lebanon to meet this deadline.[410] Continuing instability and restricted access to mined areas in the south, where most contamination is located, remain significant constraints.

Niger is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2029, having conducted no clearance of known mined areas since 2020. Clearance has yet to resume at its sole remaining mined area in Madama, while limited resources, declining international support, insecurity, and the lack of active clearance capacity continue to constrain implementation.

Nigeria's extension period is intended primarily to establish a better understanding of the extent of contamination through improved information management and survey, while

403 "Rival Cypriot sides to work on removing landmines, other peace initiatives," *Reuters*, 2 April 2025, bit.ly/Reuters2Apr2025; and UN Mission of the Secretary-General's Good Offices in Cyprus (GOM-Cyprus) press release, "The Secretary-General remarks to the media after meeting Cypriot leaders," 17 July 2025, bit.ly/GOMCyprus17July2025.

404 DRC Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), pp. 3–4. See also *Funding for Mine Action* section.

405 Ecuador Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J; and Ecuador Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 July 2025, bit.ly/EcuadorArt5ExtRequestJuly2025.

406 APMBC, "Eritrea," undated, bit.ly/MBTMembershipEritrea.

407 As of October 2026, Ethiopia had not submitted an Article 7 report for calendar year 2025. For further information on land release in Ethiopia, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

408 Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Forms A and I.

409 Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), pp. 26–27 and 47.

410 Lebanon released 0.22km² of land contaminated with antipersonnel mines in 2025, compared with 0.51km² in 2024. Based on the contamination baseline at the end of 2025, Lebanon would need to release approximately 0.8km² annually to meet its Article 5 deadline, compared with a historical annual average of approximately 0.6km². This estimate does not account for possible additional contamination. For further information on land release in Lebanon, see the relevant Mine Action Review country profiles at www.mineactionreview.org.

strengthening national capacity to address it. However, no mined areas were surveyed or cleared in 2025, and the full scope of contamination remains unknown due to the ongoing conflict, particularly in the northeast.[411] National coordination, information management, and operational capacity also remain under development, making it unlikely that Nigeria will meet its extended deadline of 31 December 2028.

Palestine is not on track to meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 June 2028, primarily because it does not exercise effective control over the remaining mined areas. Clearance nevertheless continued at the Sokot minefield in 2025, although operations were suspended for several months due to re-registration requirements affecting international mine action operators.

South Sudan was unable to meet its previous Article 5 clearance deadline and received a further extension until July 2030, after releasing less than 1km² of antipersonnel mined area in 2025. Funding shortfalls, insecurity, and access constraints continue to affect implementation.[412]

Sri Lanka released almost 5km² of antipersonnel mined area in 2025 but is no longer expected to meet its initial Article 5 deadline of 1 June 2028, due to the continued identification of previously unknown contamination and declining donor funding.[413]

Türkiye, whose Article 5 deadline was extended in 2025 until 31 December 2030, released a similar amount of land in 2025 as in 2024, largely through non-technical survey. Clearance, however, decreased compared with 2024. Türkiye plans to increase its operational capacity—and has set higher clearance targets for 2026—but will need to accelerate clearance to meet its new deadline.[414]

Ukraine increased its reported land release substantially in 2025, including through greater use of non-technical survey, while clearance also increased compared with 2024. However, the ongoing conflict is generating new contamination and preventing a reliable assessment of the overall extent of contamination. Consequently, Ukraine is not considered on track to meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 December 2033.

Yemen is also not expected to meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2028. Land release fell substantially in 2025, as ongoing conflict, insecurity, new contamination, and funding constraints continued to impede survey and clearance. In 2026, Yemen acknowledged that it would not meet its deadline and indicated that it would submit another extension request in March 2027.[415]

RISK EDUCATION

Risk education is an important means of preventing incidents and reducing risk among affected populations. Protecting affected populations from mine risks is an important element of States Parties' obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty. Article 5 requires States Parties to identify areas where antipersonnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from mined areas until clearance. Article 7 further requires States Parties to report on measures taken to provide "an immediate and effective warning to the population" in relation to these areas. Through the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan, States Parties committed to provide detailed, costed, and multiyear plans for context-specific mine risk education and reduction in affected communities.[416]

411 Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form D.

412 South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), pp. 6–7.

413 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023–2027 (reviewed), July 2025, pp. 7–8, bit.ly/SriLankaStrategy2023-2027; and presentation of Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025, bit.ly/SriLankaPresentation18June2025.

414 Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form D.

415 Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form D; and statement of Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 16 June 2026, bit.ly/YemenStatementArt5June2026.


416 Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 29 November 2024, Action 18, bit.ly/SRAAP2025-2029.

PROVISION OF RISK EDUCATION IN 2025

RISK EDUCATION IN STATES PARTIES WITH CURRENT CLEARANCE OBLIGATION DEADLINES

Risk education was conducted in 27 out of 32 States Parties with clearance obligations in 2025.[417] However, as of October 2026, only 19 States Parties had provided cumulative national sex- and age-disaggregated beneficiary data for 2025.[418] Disability-disaggregated reporting also declined, with only four States Parties reporting data on risk education beneficiaries with disabilities in 2025, compared with six in 2024.[419] However, while the lack of disaggregated data limits assessment of who was reached, it does not necessarily indicate gaps in delivery.

Risk education beneficiaries in States Parties with clearance obligations in 2025, by age and gender[420]



417 Chad reported that no risk education activities were conducted in 2025 due to a lack of funding. Guinea-Bissau reported that all mine action activities had ceased after international funding ended on 31 December 2024. Argentina and Peru did not report risk education activities in 2025. (Argentina retains an Article 5 clearance deadline because it has not acknowledged the UK's reported completion of clearance in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.) At the time of reporting, insufficient information was available to confirm whether risk education activities had been conducted in Eritrea.

418 Of these 19 States Parties, 17 provided sex- and age-disaggregated beneficiary data through their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports (for calendar year 2025). See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7MBT. The other two, Afghanistan and Mauritania, provided disaggregated data through responses to the Monitor questionnaire. Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmad Zia Nizami, Senior Explosive Ordnance Risk Education/Victim Assistance (EORE/VA) Manager, DMAC, 13 June 2026; and by Col. Mohamed Laghdaf Mohamedou Baham, Coordinator, PNDHD, 14 May 2026. Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Niger, Serbia, Thailand, and Ukraine did not provide sufficiently disaggregated cumulative national beneficiary data. In 2024, the same number of States Parties provided sex- and age-disaggregated beneficiary data, all 19 through their Article 7 reports.

419 Cambodia and Palestine provided disability-disaggregated beneficiary data through their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports (for calendar year 2025), while Mauritania and South Sudan provided this disaggregated data directly to the Monitor. Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Col. Mohamed Laghdaf Mohamedou Baham, Coordinator, PNDHD, 14 May 2026; and by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, NMAA, 24 April 2026.

420 The data used for this Monitor analysis was drawn from national reporting, including Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports and responses by national authorities to Monitor questionnaires. The analysis covers beneficiaries reached through interpersonal risk education activities where reporting was sufficiently disaggregated to identify the type of activity. Where beneficiary data was not disaggregated by activity, the total number of reported beneficiaries was used. Reporting did not always allow beneficiary data to be disaggregated by the type of contamination addressed.

Children remained a key target group for risk education, accounting for 48% of beneficiaries for whom age-disaggregated data was available, while adults accounted for 52%. Men and boys were frequently identified as being at heightened risk, particularly due to livelihood activities in contaminated areas and intentional risk-taking driven by economic necessity. Women and girls were generally reported to engage less frequently in unsafe behaviors but remained important target groups, both because of their own livelihood activities and their role in promoting safer behavior within households and communities. This was also reflected in the broad reach of risk education across sex groups, with women and girls accounting for 55% of beneficiaries for whom sex-disaggregated data was available, compared with 45% for men and boys.

Progress in risk education planning, as in previous years, remained limited. Of the nine States Parties that submitted Article 5 clearance deadline extension requests in 2026, only four—BiH, Serbia, Somalia, and Tajikistan—provided multiyear risk education plans with annual or phased implementation projections, as required under the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan.[421] While several States Parties strengthened risk education planning in revised extension requests, gaps remained even among the more developed plans. This included insufficiently detailed annual beneficiary targets, a lack of indicators to measure effectiveness and behavioral change, and the absence of comprehensive or clearly disaggregated budgets for risk education activities.

RISK EDUCATION IN STATES PARTIES WITHOUT CLEARANCE OBLIGATION DEADLINES IN 2025

Among the States Parties that did not have clearance obligation deadlines in 2025, but that are known or suspected to be affected by improvised mines, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Lebanon, Mali, and Togo all reported risk education activities for that year.[422] In Mexico, a national media report indicated that residents in an area affected by improvised mines installed warning signs.[423]

Mozambique and Tunisia—both affected by residual contamination and facing IED threats, including victim-activated devices—also recorded risk education activities in 2025.[424] Algeria continued to provide risk education in areas affected by residual contamination, including through mine/ERW victim associations.[425]

421 See, APMBC, "Extension Requests," undated, bit.ly/MBTArticle5Extensions.

422 Although several sources are available for most of these countries, only one source per country is listed here. **Benin**: LinkedIn post by Mines Advisory Group (MAG), "In #Benin, MAG is partnering with SODEB ONG, ECI'IPSE and ABEC to jointly implement community-based armed violence reduction and explosive ordnance risk education activities, with the support of Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada [...]." 24 June 2025, bit.ly/MAGBenin24June2025. **Burkina Faso**: Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 July 2025, pp. 24–31, bit.ly/BurkinaFasoArt5ExtRequestJuly2025. **Cameroon**: UNDP, "Hope on Crutches: Protecting Children Through Awareness in Ngouma," 18 February 2026, bit.ly/UNDPCameroon18Feb2026. **Central African Republic**: Central African Republic Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I. **Lebanon**: Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Makki, EORE Section Head, Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC), 1 April 2026. The country's obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty only came into force on 1 November 2026. **Mali**: Mali Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form I. **Togo**: United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), "Protecting civilians from the risks of Improvised Explosive Devices," October 2025, bit.ly/UNOCTOct2025.

423 "Residents Place Signs to Warn Risk of Mined Areas in Michoacán," *N+*, 5 February 2025, bit.ly/N5Feb2025.

424 Although several sources are available for both of these countries, only one source per country is listed here. **Mozambique**: Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form E. **Tunisia**: "Tunisia: 491 improvised mines neutralized by the army," *La Presse de Tunisie*, 7 January 2025, bit.ly/LaPresse7Jan2025.

425 Algeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form E.

RISK EDUCATION IN STATES NOT PARTY AND OTHER AREAS WITH KNOWN OR SUSPECTED MINE CONTAMINATION

Several contaminated states not party—Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, Georgia, Iran, Israel, Lao PDR, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, and Vietnam—along with other areas Kosovo, Somaliland, and Western Sahara, are all known to provide risk education or, at a minimum, to disseminate risk awareness messages addressing the threat of explosive ordnance, including antipersonnel mines.[426]

MAIN RISK EDUCATION GAPS AND CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED BY CONTAMINATED COUNTRIES

Mine contaminated countries identified several recurring challenges to the effective delivery of risk education in 2025, although the nature and severity of these challenges varied considerably across contexts, and included: funding and operational constraints, insecurity and access restrictions, coverage gaps, and behavioral-change gaps.

Insufficient funding and operational resources were reported by a number of countries as limiting the reach, continuity, or responsiveness of risk education. For example, **Afghanistan** reported that funding and resource shortages hindered timely responses, particularly at border entry points receiving large numbers of returnees from Iran and Pakistan.[427] Meanwhile, **Chad** reported that neither the government nor its financial partners had directed resources toward risk education during 2025 and that, consequently, no risk education sessions were conducted.[428]

Insecurity and access restrictions were also reported in several conflict-affected contexts. State not party **Myanmar** cited ongoing armed conflict, restricted humanitarian access, and telecommunications disruptions as the major challenges to reaching high-risk

426 Although several sources are available for most of these countries and other areas, only one source per country/area is listed here. **Armenia**: Response to Monitor questionnaire by Meri Mkhitaryan, Mine Risk Education (MRE) Leading Specialist, Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE), 30 March 2026. **Azerbaijan**: Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ramil Azizov, Head of the Risk Education and Victim Assistance Department, Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA), 18 May 2026. **China**: "Cherish Life and Stay Away from Unexploded Ordnance—Unexploded Ordnance Awareness and Warning," *Zhao'an News Network*, 27 June 2025, bit.ly/ZAXWW27June2025. **Egypt**: State Information Service, "SIS Chairman: SIS Provides Balanced and Objective Media Message Reflecting the Reality of the Situation in Egypt," 26 April 2026, bit.ly/SIS26Apr2026. **Georgia**: Georgia Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form C. See, CCW Protocol V Database, bit.ly/CCWProtocolVDatabase. **Iran**: ICRC, "Mine action," undated, bit.ly/ICRCIranMineAction. **Israel**: The Mine Clearance Authority, "About," undated, bit.ly/INMAAAbout. **Kosovo**: Response to Monitor questionnaire by Selimi Muzafer, Demining and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Coordinator, Kosovo Security Forces (KSF), 9 April 2026. **Lao PDR**: Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form G. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7CCM. **Libya**: "The UN mission is conducting an awareness campaign on the dangers of unexploded ordnance in Tripoli," *Libyan News Agency*, 23 May 2025, bit.ly/LANA23May2025. **Morocco**: Morocco Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (voluntary, for calendar year 2025). **Myanmar**: Response to Monitor questionnaire by Oo Kyaw Win, Child Protection Officer, UNICEF, 13 May 2026. **Pakistan**: UNICEF, "UNICEF Statement on Mortar Shell Explosion in Lakki Marwat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan," 5 August 2025, bit.ly/UNICEFPakistan5Aug2025. **Russia**: Russian Red Cross, "The Russian Red Cross is stepping up first aid training and other lifesaving skills in regions under shelling," 10 February 2026, bit.ly/RussianRedCross10Feb2026. **Somaliland**: The HALO Trust, "The HALO Trust Annual Report and Financial Statements," 31 March 2025, p. 13, bit.ly/HaloTrustAnnualReport2025. **South Korea**: Kim Ji-heon, "Military warns of North Korean mines being carried in by heavy rain… Do not touch, report them," *Yonhap News Agency*, 22 June 2025, bit.ly/YNA22June2025. **Syria**: Response to Monitor questionnaire by Basel Awad, EORE Lead, UNMAS, 27 May 2026. **Vietnam**: Quang Tri Mine Action Center (QTMAC), "Data & Statistics: Risk Education," updated daily, bit.ly/QuangTriRiskEducation. **Western Sahara**: Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kebe Elhadji, Chief of Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, 28 March 2025.

427 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmad Zia Nizami, Senior EORE/VA Manager, DMAC, 13 June 2026.

428 Chad Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 4.

communities.[429] In **Palestine**, movement restrictions, damaged infrastructure, and ongoing insecurity in Gaza limited both access to affected communities and the safe mobility of risk education teams.[430] In **Somalia**, areas affected by armed groups remained inaccessible, including some newly recovered areas, limiting the ability of mine action operators to reach affected communities.[431]

Ensuring adequate coverage and reaching specific at-risk groups was another challenge (and priority) identified across different contexts. State not party **Syria** reported that, despite ongoing efforts to reach displaced people and other vulnerable groups, risk education coverage remained insufficient to meet the needs of displaced people, persons with disabilities, and older people. Furthermore, adult men engaged in high-risk livelihoods remained particularly difficult to reach.[432] While **Thailand** reported continued risk education in mine affected communities, it also noted the need to review and adjust future activities to ensure comprehensive coverage of affected areas.[433]

Achieving behavior change also remained challenging. In **Cambodia**, livelihood pressures led some forest foragers, agricultural workers, and tractor operators to continue accessing or working in contaminated areas despite the risks.[434] Similarly, in **Palestine**, economic necessity and the normalization of explosive ordnance risks following prolonged exposure to contamination contributed to unsafe practices in Gaza.[435] In **Ukraine**, studies found that high levels of awareness did not necessarily translate into safe behavior, with risky behavior often linked to work-related needs and overconfidence arising from familiarity with potentially contaminated areas.[436]

DELIVERY AND ADAPTATION OF RISK EDUCATION IN EMERGENCY AND CHANGING CONTEXTS

The Siem Reap–Angkor Action Plan recognizes that risk education programs may be among the few interventions feasible in emergencies, armed conflict, and other situations where access is restricted, making them an important component of frontline mine action response. Accordingly, the plan calls for effective, context-specific programs that account for the heightened risks arising from conflict and requires affected States Parties to establish sustainable national capacities able to adapt risk education to changing needs and contexts, including in emergency settings.[437]

The need for such adaptation is particularly evident during active conflict. Shifting frontlines, displacement, and changes in the nature and use of explosive weapons can rapidly alter both the threat and civilian exposure, while insecurity, damaged infrastructure, and disrupted communications constrain risk education delivery.[438] In urban and other

429 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Oo Kyaw Win, Child Protection Officer, UNICEF, 13 May 2026.

430 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kateryna Templeton, Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) Coordinator, UNMAS, 9 April 2026.

431 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hussein Ahmed, Project Manager, UNMAS, 5 April 2026.

432 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Basel Awad, EORE Lead, UNMAS, 27 May 2026.

433 Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 12 June 2026, p. 34, bit.ly/ThailandArt5ExtRequestJune2026.

434 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Eng Pheap, Director of Public Relations Department, CMAA, 2 April 2026.

435 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kateryna Templeton, MA AoR Coordinator, UNMAS, 9 April 2026.

436 UNDP press release, "Ukraine explosive ordnance risk: Understanding public perceptions and promoting safe behaviour," 4 April 2025, bit.ly/UNDPUkraine4Apr2025; UNICEF press release, "53% of Ukrainian teenagers engage in risky behaviour despite being well-informed about risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance," 6 June 2024, bit.ly/UNICEFUkraine6June2024; and email from Paul Heslop, Senior Mine Action Advisor to the UN Resident Coordinator and UN Country Team in Ukraine, 22 September 2026.

437 Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 29 November 2024, Actions 27 and 28, bit.ly/SRAAP2025-2029.

438 HI, "Saving Lives in Conflicts: Risk Education and Conflict Preparedness to Protect Civilians in EWIPA Settings," August 2025, pp. 37–38, bit.ly/HI-CPPAug2025.

populated areas, explosive ordnance risks are often compounded by the wider effects of attacks, including damage to buildings and infrastructure, rubble, and disruption to essential services. Furthermore, civilians may have little choice but to enter or return to hazardous areas to reach their homes, retrieve belongings, or access essential services.[439]

Risk education has therefore increasingly had to adapt to rapidly changing threats and operating environments by shifting its targeting, messaging, and delivery methods. This has included responding to active conflict, evolving weapons and explosive ordnance threats (including from mines), sudden population movements, and natural disasters. In some conflict settings, the overlap between risks from explosive ordnance and those arising during explosive attacks has also led to increased efforts to combine risk education with CPP.



A risk education session for students takes place at La Venta Rural Educational Center in Urrao, Antioquia department, Colombia.

© Sebastián Caro/CCCM, March 2026

Reflecting the growing need to adapt risk education to emergency and changing contexts, the Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Advisory Group (EORE AG) established an Emergency Risk Education Task Team in 2024 to facilitate the exchange of good practices, lessons learned, and tools among mine action actors. Its work has focused on CPP, risk education related to incendiary weapons, and risk education in natural-hazard settings. In early 2026, work was also underway to establish an Early Response Network to provide anticipatory and rapid technical support for emergency risk education and CPP.[440] In parallel, a Technical Working Group was established to develop a new mine action technical note addressing how risk education can better integrate CPP regarding explosive weapons.[441]

Recent examples illustrate how risk education has been adapted to emergencies and rapidly changing contexts.

In **Ukraine**, risk education delivery has been adapted to the constraints of active conflict through alternative locations and communication channels. For example, mobile safety classes have enabled activities to reach children in conflict-affected communities where access to conventional in-person education is restricted due to safety risks. Additionally, risk education and CPP messages have been disseminated through television, public display systems, transport networks, and local media.[442]

The need to move beyond conventional risk education in Ukraine has also become more pronounced as the threat from drones has evolved. The increasing range of drones, along with their use to deliver mines, submunitions, and other explosive devices, has extended risks beyond areas previously prioritized for risk education. Furthermore, because drones are used for both surveillance and attack, there is greater need for messaging that helps civilians understand the nature of the threat and the protective actions they can take. UNMAS has highlighted, for example, the substantial difference in risk between remaining exposed in the street during a drone attack and moving under cover, illustrating how relatively simple behavioral guidance can reduce exposure.[443]

439 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), "Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas," 18 November 2022, Sec. 1.2–1.6, www.ewipa.org/the-political-declaration.

440 Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Advisory Group (EORE AG), "Minutes of the EORE AG Meeting," 30 January 2026, pp. 2–3, bit.ly/EORE-AG30Jan2026.

441 EORE AG, "Work Plan 2025–2026," undated [2025], p. 2, bit.ly/EOREAGWorkPlan2025; and International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) Review Board, "Minutes: IMAS Review Board Meeting," 5 November 2025, pp. 2–3, bit.ly/IMAS5Nov2025.

442 UNICEF, "Fostering a culture of safety among children and youth: Making mine safety rules known to children," 21 January 2025, bit.ly/UNICEF21Jan2025; and HI, "Saving Lives in Conflicts: Risk Education and Conflict Preparedness to Protect Civilians in EWIPA Settings," August 2025, pp. 49–50, bit.ly/HI-CPPAug2025.

443 Email from Paul Heslop, Senior Mine Action Advisor to the UN Resident Coordinator and UN Country Team in Ukraine, 22 September 2026.

Rapid changes in the appearance and construction of explosive devices, including mines, present a further challenge, as risk education messaging may struggle to keep pace. Emerging trends—including changes in the shape and color of devices and the use of 3D-printed components—therefore need to be identified and rapidly translated into updated risk education messaging, an approach currently being explored in Ukraine.[444]

In **Palestine**, mine action operators in Gaza have broadened risk education to incorporate CPP, with combined risk education and CPP sessions delivered at scale during 2025.[445] UNMAS also developed trauma-sensitive mental health and psychosocial support training with the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme to support safe and inclusive delivery.[446] The Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) developed harmonized risk education and CPP messaging adapted to different phases of the conflict, drawing on content from multiple organizations and sharing the resulting messaging with practitioners.[447] **Lebanon** as well has made efforts to address overlapping risks. Following the 2023–2024 escalation of hostilities, risk education has addressed hazards arising from the recent conflict, while the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) and partners have worked to integrate CPP into the risk education response.[448]

In state not party **Myanmar**, humanitarian mine action operators provide another example of risk education being broadened in response to active conflict, with CPP training integrated into risk education activities to address the wider risks faced by conflict-affected populations.[449] Furthermore, the March 2025 earthquake created an additional emergency requiring rapid adaptation: earthquake-specific risk education guidance was disseminated by the MA AoR for humanitarian partners, while risk education was also provided to earthquake first responders.[450]

Population movements and changing patterns of access have also led to operational adaptation.

In **Afghanistan**, the influx of forced returnees from Iran and Pakistan prompted further adaptations in 2025. Approaches to reach these populations included use of mobile awareness activities, distribution of risk education materials in temporary camps, and integration of risk education into other humanitarian services. Tailored key messages were also developed in response to ongoing deportations and returns from neighboring countries.[451]

In **Sudan**, changing patterns of conflict and population movements created heightened risks in 2025, particularly in Khartoum, where returnees were entering areas affected by

444 Ibid.

445 UNOCHA, "Gaza Humanitarian Response Update, 20 July–2 August 2025," 6 August 2025, bit.ly/UNOCHAGazaAug2025; and UNMAS, "Occupied Palestinian Territory: Annual Report 2025," 21 April 2026, p. 36, bit.ly/UNMASPalestineApril2026.

446 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kateryna Templeton, MA AoR Coordinator, UNMAS, 9 April 2026; and UNMAS, "Occupied Palestinian Territory: Annual Report 2025," 21 April 2026, p. 38, bit.ly/UNMASPalestineApril2026.

447 HI, "Saving Lives in Conflicts: Risk Education and Conflict Preparedness to Protect Civilians in EWIPA Settings," August 2025, p. 61, bit.ly/HI-CPPAug2025; and EORE AG, "Progress Report 2023–2024," August 2025, p. 5, bit.ly/EOREAGAug2025.

448 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Makki, EORE Section Head, LMAC, 1 April 2026; LMAC, "*Annual Report 2024*," undated, p. 37, bit.ly/LMACAnnualReport2024; and Convention on Cluster Munitions, "Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) in the Convention on Cluster Munitions: from national ownership to national leadership, Report by the Risk Education Coordinator. Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 16–19 September 2025," 16 September 2025, p. 2, docs.un.org/CCM/MSP/2025/13.

449 RISkey GmbH, "Summative Evaluation: MAG's Humanitarian Mine Action Multi-Country Programme 2022–2025 funded by the Government of Norway," August 2025, p. 32, bit.ly/MAGNorwayAug2025; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Oo Kyaw Win, Child Protection Officer, UNICEF, 13 May 2026.

450 UNOCHA, "Myanmar Earthquake Flash Update No. 3," 3 April 2025, p. 4, bit.ly/UNOCHAMyanmarApr2025; and UNICEF, "UNICEF Myanmar Humanitarian Situation Report No. 4," 18 February 2026, pp. 5–6, bit.ly/UNICEFMyanmarFeb2026.

451 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmad Zia Nizami, Senior EORE/VA Manager, DMAC, 13 June 2026; and Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form J.

explosive ordnance. Risk education was expanded with dedicated teams targeting these displaced communities. Returnee-specific materials were developed and the reach of safety messages was extended through the use of mobile teams, radio, and social media.[452]

In state not party **Syria**, large-scale returns following the political transition required risk education providers to adapt both their targeting and delivery methods to reach newly exposed populations.[453] Operators developed approaches specifically aimed at people returning to potentially contaminated areas, including delivering risk education at border crossings, using communication channels frequented by displaced people and returnees, and extending digital and mass media messaging across borders to reach refugees before their return.[454]

Other contexts have also raised questions and challenges for risk education that, while not new, remain highly relevant. For example, where improvised mines and other explosive devices are used in ongoing conflict involving NSAGs, approaches need to account not only for the explosive threat but also for issues of trust and potential protection risks. Participation in risk education, reporting, or information-sharing may expose individuals or communities to suspicion, retaliation, or perceived association with a party to the conflict. This underscores the importance of conflict sensitivity and the principle of "do no harm."[455]

Remote areas where access to emergency medical care is limited also present challenges. Efforts to combine risk education with basic first-aid preparedness have been and are being explored. However, these initiatives raise questions about appropriate training, the availability of material resources, sustainability, and where responsibility for such activities should lie.[456]

These and other emerging approaches illustrate the increasingly diverse, complex, and demanding circumstances in which risk education is delivered, and the growing efforts to move beyond its traditional focus to protect civilians more holistically from the risks posed by explosive ordnance and weapons.

RISK EDUCATION AND CIVILIAN PROTECTION FOLLOWING TREATY WITHDRAWAL

Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland became the first former States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty following their withdrawals in 2025 and 2026. While withdrawal does not in itself indicate that antipersonnel mines will be used, these decisions were made in the context of revised national defense planning and, in several cases, with the stated intention of restoring the option to acquire, produce, or use antipersonnel mines. (See *Banning Antipersonnel Mines* section.) Any future use could introduce new risks for civilians, including

452 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sahar Mustafa, EORE Officer, Sudan National Mine Action Center, 10 April 2026; UNICEF, "Humanitarian Situation Report No. 35: Sudan," 31 October 2025, p. 6, bit.ly/UNICEFSudanOct2025; and UNMAS, "Sudan," updated 10 June 2026, bit.ly/UNMASSudanJune2026.

453 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Basel Awad, EORE Lead, UNMAS, 27 May 2026.

454 RISkey GmbH, "Summative Evaluation: MAG's Humanitarian Mine Action Multi-Country Programme 2022–2025 funded by the Government of Norway," August 2025, p. 32, bit.ly/MAGNorwayAug2025; HI, "Syria: HI aware on the risk of explosive devices," 4 February 2025, bit.ly/HISyria4Feb2025; and MAG, "Saving lives in Syria: MAG's emergency digital risk education reaches millions amidst returnee crisis," 12 September 2025, bit.ly/MAGSyriaSep2026.

455 CCW, "Report on improvised explosive devices. Twenty-Seventh Annual Conference of the High Contracting Parties to Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 11 November 2025," 3 October 2025, pp. 4–5, bit.ly/CCW-IEDsOct2025; and Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), "Improvised Explosive Devices in the Sahel: Humanitarian Responses and Current Capacities," April 2026, p. 45, bit.ly/GICHDSahelApr2026.

456 Hannah Wild, Aparna Cheran, Abby Willging, Christelle Loupforest, Sebastian Kasack, Tim Gargan, Barclay Stewart, International Blast Injury Research Network, and Adam L. Kushner, "The Explosive Weapons Trauma Care Collective: A Roadmap for Reducing Preventable Death Among Civilian Casualties of Explosive Injury," *Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction*, Vol. 28, Issue 3, October 2024, bit.ly/HannahWildOct2024.



A mural promoting mine awareness outside a primary school in Maaret Tamsrin, in Syria's Idlib governorate.

© G. Diffidenti/ICBL-CMC, August 2025

the potential for long-term contamination, requiring measures to warn and educate affected populations alongside other measures to reduce civilian exposure.


The potential reintroduction of antipersonnel mines raises questions about how these countries would prepare for and address the resulting humanitarian risks. While the five former States Parties remain subject to relevant international humanitarian law (IHL) obligations, including under Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), these obligations do not eliminate the risks posed by antipersonnel mines to civilians.[457] Should antipersonnel mines form part of future military operations, additional risk education planning, capacity, and resources may be required, potentially extending well beyond the period of active hostilities. The responsibility for addressing such risks, including through public warnings and risk education, would therefore need to be considered as part of national preparedness and civilian protection planning.

There is currently limited information on how the five former States Parties are preparing to address these potential risks. In July 2026, Poland's Ministry of National Defence stated that information activities would be undertaken if the security situation changed and genuine threats were identified. These efforts would be undertaken in cooperation with relevant state institutions and targeted according to the nature and scale of the threat.[458] However, no specific risk education plan or budget had been developed at that time. This response concerns preparedness for a potential mine threat and does not clarify how Poland would address risks arising from its own possible use of antipersonnel mines. As national policies evolve, monitoring how these former States Parties prepare for the potential risk education and wider civilian protection implications of antipersonnel mine use will be important.

457 CCW Amended Protocol II, Articles 3(7)–3(11), 5, 6, and 9, and Technical Annex, para. 1, bit.ly/CCW-APII.

458 Request for access to public information sent by Amnesty International Poland, 10 June 2026; and response from the Ministry of National Defence of Poland sent to Amnesty International Poland, 13 July 2026.

ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINE CONTAMINATION: 2025



MAP KEY

- Contaminated States Parties with clearance obligations***
- Other States Parties with a mine threat
- Residual contamination in States Parties
- Contaminated states not party and other areas
- Clearance reported complete

Note: **States Parties** to the Mine Ban Treaty are **bold**, states not party are plain text, *other areas* are *italics*.

*Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control.


**Argentina was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The United Kingdom (UK) also claims sovereignty and exercises control over the territory and announced completion of mine clearance in 2020. Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.

***Lebanon is retrospectively included in this category, to reflect its more recent status as a State Party with clearance obligations since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for the country on 1 November 2026.

DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.

LANDMINE/EXPLOSIVE REMNANT OF WAR CASUALTIES: 2025



MAP KEY

Number of recorded casualties in 2025

- 1–9
- 10–49
- 50–199
- 200–499
- 500 or more

Note: **States Parties** to the Mine Ban Treaty are **bold**, states not party are plain text, *other areas* are *italics*.

DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.



A prosthetics specialist adjusts a new prosthetic leg for a 12-year-old patient at the Prosthetics and Orthotics Department of Raqqa National Hospital in Raqqa, Syria.

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MINE ACTION FUNDING

INTRODUCTION

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in order to fulfill its treaty obligations. Such international cooperation and assistance has been vital to the treaty's implementation. This chapter examines the financial contributions made in 2025 by affected countries and international donors to advance mine action efforts globally in addressing the impacts of landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).[1] It reviews funding from Mine Ban Treaty States Parties to affected states, including those with Article 5 obligations, and assesses progress on the international cooperation and assistance commitments of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029. Funding for States Parties with cluster munition contamination and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 obligations is covered separately in *Cluster Munition Monitor 2026*.[2]

In 2025, 43 donors and 23 affected states and other areas reported providing a total of $1.1 billion in global funding for mine action.[3] This global figure represents an increase of around 5% (US$51.9 million) from 2024. International funding to mine action increased

1 While this chapter focuses on financial support for mine action, the cooperation and assistance specified in Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions are not limited to financial assistance. Other forms of assistance include the provision of equipment, expertise, and personnel, as well as the exchange of experience and skills. The costs of in-kind assistance are not included in the figures in this chapter. The Monitor data records donor disbursements to mine action by calendar year and may as such differ from reporting by states and operators as to who funds their activities in a year, particularly if programs receive multi-year funding.

2 See, Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), *Cluster Munition Monitor 2026* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2026), bit.ly/CMMonitorReports.

3 Mine action funding includes financing specifically related to landmines, cluster munitions, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), but is rarely disaggregated as such. State reporting on contributions varies in the level of detail, and some states utilize the fiscal year rather than the calendar year. The figures in this report are presented in United States dollars (US$) using an average exchange rate for 2025, and rounded to the nearest hundred thousand, million, or billion. However, calculation of totals and percentages are made prior to rounding figures; as such, the rounded numbers presented in this document may not add up precisely to the totals listed, and percentages may not add up to 100%. In 2025, 14 of the 27 States Parties documented in this chapter reported disaggregated data on international funding for mine action in their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports. One State Party (Japan) reported fiscal year funding. Four States Parties—Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, and the Netherlands—reported disaggregated funding data in their Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports. As of August 2026, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports had not been submitted or were not available for four donor States Parties—Estonia, Finland, Monaco, and Slovakia.

by 11% compared to 2024, totaling $850 million in 2025.[4] Reported national funding by affected states to their own mine action programs decreased by 10% compared to 2024, with at least $276.9 million reported in 2025.[5]

In 2025, the global donor base remained broad, with contributions reported by 32 states, the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) institutions, trust funds, and humanitarian organizations. States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty provided more than half of all international support, rising to 68% when EU funding is included.[6] Several donors, including Canada, the EU, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom (UK), increased funding in 2025, with much of the increase directed to urgent needs in Gaza, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. Land release and integrated land release programs accounted for 76% of all international support ($643.8 million). Croatia received substantial EU support as it worked towards meeting its Article 5 deadline, which, in March 2026, it announced had been achieved.[7]

National contributions to mine action decreased slightly in 2025, but significant funding was reported by some affected states, including Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Colombia, Croatia, and Türkiye. The general increase in national funding in the last five years reflects both an increase in reporting of national contributions and, in some cases, increased capacity by affected states to finance their own mine action programs.

However, the overall picture for mine action funding is uneven and uncertain. In 2025, as in previous years, a small group of donors continued to provide the majority of funding, with the United States (US), the EU, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Germany accounting for 62% of international contributions. US funding was unpredictable, with a 90-day foreign assistance freeze that began on 20 January 2025, followed by subsequent grant terminations of some programs, all of which disrupted mine action in many countries. Though the US subsequently restored funding to some programs, the priority appears to have shifted to Southeast Asian countries contaminated by the remnants of cluster munitions dropped by the US in the 1960s and 1970s, leaving some Mine Ban Treaty States Parties without the US funding they previously received.[8] Programs addressing gender, inclusion, and diversity have also been impacted by US restrictions on development aid. This disruption coincided with announcements from some of the major European donors, including Germany and the UK, that they will reduce mine action budgets over the next few years.

4 Data on international funding for mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports; Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports; the annual reports of ITF Enhancing Human Security and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS); responses to Monitor questionnaires by donors, mine action authorities, and operators; and media reports. Data is also sourced from publicly available funding data, including the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) database, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), the US Foreign Assistance database, and the European Union (EU) Team Europe Explorer. See, IATI, "Country Development Finance Data," bit.ly/IATIdata2024; UNOCHA FTS, "Humanitarian aid contributions 2025," bit.ly/UNOCHAFTSDonors2025; US Department of State, "Foreign Assistance Data Dashboard," bit.ly/USForeignAssistanceDashboard; and EU, "Team Europe Explorer," bit.ly/TeamEuropeExplorer. See also the Monitor country profiles for Funding for Mine Action for further information on donors and recipients, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

5 Data on national funding for mine action is based on responses to Monitor questionnaires; reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension requests, workplans, and Article 7 reports; Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports; and media reporting. National funding is often inconsistently reported, although the increased figures indicate reporting is improving.

6 In 2025, all EU member states were States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. However, five EU member states—Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—gave notice of their intention to leave the treaty in 2025, with the withdrawals taking place on 27 December 2025 (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and 10 January and 20 February 2026 (Finland and Poland, respectively).

7 Civil Protection Directorate, "Deputy Prime Minister Božinović: The Republic of Croatia is a country free of mine threats!," 9 March 2026, bit.ly/CroatiaArt5Completion9Mar2026; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Neven Karas, Acting Director, Civil Protection Directorate, Croatia Ministry of the Interior, 2 April 2026.

8 Countries impacted by US grant terminations included: Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq, Mali, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

Funding remained highly concentrated among recipients. Ukraine remained the top recipient, as it has been since 2022, receiving $237.2 million, or 28% of all international funding. The top 10 recipients combined received 75% of all assistance. A large portion of land release funding ($312.6 million, or 49% of the total) went to just three States Parties—Croatia, Ukraine, and Yemen. Several States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations experienced significant declines or received no funding in 2025. Afghanistan and Iraq both saw funding decrease and BiH saw program closures linked to reduced funding. Türkiye did not receive international funding in 2025, although significantly increased its national contribution. Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Niger faced resource constraints despite repeated Article 5 deadline extension requests. Programs focusing on advocacy, risk education, and victim assistance continued to receive a relatively small proportion of international donor funds (1%, 2%, and 5%, respectively). Victim assistance funding remained limited and difficult to track, as did funding for risk education.

The Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, agreed at the Fifth Review Conference in Cambodia in November 2024, recognized cooperation and assistance as critical to implementing the Mine Ban Treaty. Affected States Parties agreed to commit resources, explore alternative funding sources and mechanisms, and strengthen resource mobilization planning and coordination. States Parties able to assist committed to support affected States Parties, including providing earmarked victim assistance funding and coordinating support for effective treaty implementation. The sharing of expertise and best practices among States Parties and international, regional, and bilateral cooperation remain crucial aspects of cooperation and assistance.

International donors, both States Parties and states not party, have demonstrated their ability to respond to the acute needs of States Parties experiencing conflict, most notably with increased funding provided for Ukraine since 2022, and for Palestine in 2025. However, there are clear indications that mine action funding is increasingly affected by budget cuts, shifting political and economic priorities, and narrowing geographic focus. The full consequences of these funding decisions are not immediately apparent in the 2025 funding figures, but it is likely that the impact—including delays in clearance, increased risk to civilians, and decreased support for victims—will become more pronounced in the coming years as resources dwindle and needs increase. To mitigate these challenges and ensure continued progress in mine clearance, risk education, and victim assistance, States Parties need to take timely action to address funding gaps and maintain robust international cooperation to ensure that the commitments laid out in the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan are fulfilled.

INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL FUNDING TO MINE ACTION: 2021–2025


In 2025, 43 donors and 23 affected states and other areas reported providing a total of $1.1 billion in global funding for mine action. This global figure represents an increase of around 5% (US$51.9 million) from 2024. Over the past five years (2021–2025), total funding to mine action (including international and national contributions) amounted to $4.8 billion, an average of $952.3 million per year. This is a 41% increase on the $3.4 billion provided in the previous five-year period from 2016–2020.[9]

Although data on national funding for mine action remains incomplete, such support accounted for at least 21% of mine action funding from 2021–2025, totaling just over $1 billion.[10] International funding over the period totaled $3.8 billion, averaging some $751.8 million per year and representing 79% of all funding.

9 According to Monitor data, from 2016–2020, total funding for mine action amounted to $3.4 billion ($2.9 billion from international donors and $432.3 million provided by Mine Ban Treaty affected states to their own mine action activities).

10 Funding by affected Mine Ban Treaty States Parties amounted to at least $499.2 million (50% of the total).


Summary of contributions: 2021–2025 (in US$ million)



INTERNATIONAL FUNDING IN 2025

Reported international funding for mine action totaled $850 million in 2025, an 11% increase from $768.7 million in 2024.[11]

International funding for mine action: 2016–2025 (in US$ million)



Note: Totals not adjusted for inflation.

INTERNATIONAL DONORS

In 2025, 32 states, one other area, one British crown dependency, the EU, six UN institutions, one trust fund, and one humanitarian organization contributed a total of $850 million to mine action.

11 The 2024 total for international funding was updated to include corrected figures for the EU and the Netherlands.

DONORS IN 2025

Top five international donors in 2025

In 2025, as in previous years, a small number of donors continued to provide the majority of international mine action funding. Five donors—the US, the EU, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Germany—accounted for 62% of all international funding in 2025, providing a combined total of $522.9 million.[12] State not party Saudi Arabia entered the top five group for the first time. Germany remained among the top five despite contributing less than in 2024.

Despite the US foreign assistance freeze implemented towards the end of January 2025 and the grant terminations that followed, the US remained the largest donor in 2025 with a total contribution of $186.9 million, representing 22% of all international funding.[13] The 2025 US contribution was a 6% decrease from its 2024 contribution of $198.1 million and a sharp decrease from contributions in 2022 and 2023.

Contributions by donors: 2021–2025[14]

Donor	Contribution (US$ million)					
	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	Total
United States (US)	186.9	198.1	309.8	310.2	194.5	1,199.5
European Union (EU)	121	89.6	68.5	124.2	37.8	441.1
Japan	97.1	37.4	67.5	45.3	42.3	289.6
Saudi Arabia	61.8	44.8	6.6	33.3	N/R	146.5
Germany	56.0	100.4	80.3	78.8	64.8	380.3
Switzerland	51.8	45.3	35.8	19.7	15.2	167.8
Norway	50.6	57.9	50.8	44.7	35.5	239.5
Canada	45.0	27.6	40.7	22.6	16.3	152.2
United Kingdom (UK)	34.7	25.2	15.2	24.7	38.2	138
Netherlands	27.3	28.4	24.6	25.0	21.5	126.8
France	15.5	18.0	22.0	10.9	9.6	76.0
Denmark	15.4	19.1	8.3	10.3	14.8	67.9
Sweden	13.0	4.0	11.7	12.5	14.3	55.5
Luxembourg	10.6	9.2	3.4	2.3	1.5	27.0
Italy	10.2	11.9	11.7	8.1	5.4	47.3
South Korea	9.3	6.8	3.5	1.6	0.3	21.5
Australia	6.9	5.5	5.4	3.1	4.4	25.3
New Zealand	6.5	6.4	7.9	4.7	9.9	35.4
Ireland	5.3	4.9	4.7	3.6	3.7	22.2

12 In 2024, the combined annual contributions from the top five donors accounted for 64% of all international funding. From 2020–2023, the combined annual contributions from the top five donors each year accounted for between 70–77% of all international funding.

13 Due to the US freeze of foreign assistance in early 2025, data sources such as the US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), and its annual report, "To Walk the Earth in Safety," were not available. The US Department of State provided the Monitor with an overall figure for its Conventional Weapons Contamination funding in 2025, but this was not disaggregated. The US funding data in this report was therefore obtained from international mine action operators and available online sources and may not completely reflect the full amount provided in 2025. The data does not include funding for Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) and Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM).

14 The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. The totals are not adjusted to inflation. This data is drawn from information provided by donors in their Article 7 transparency reports, as well as responses to Monitor questionnaires and other sources.

Donor	Contribution (US$ million)					
	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	Total
China	4.7	0.1	N/R	N/R	N/R	4.8
Belgium	3.1	5.1	3.0	3.0	3.5	17.7
Austria	2.3	5.4	7.6	3.3	3.5	22.1
Finland	2.2	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.7	15.5
Slovenia	1.7	1.8	2.6	1.6	0.3	8.0
Other donors*	11.1	12.7	3.4	1.7	2.5	31.4
Total	**850.0**	**768.7**	**798.3**	**798.4**	**543.5**	**3,758.9**

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**. N/R=not reported.
*Other donors included the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), which provided almost $4.9 million to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF); and the United Nations Development Programme Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UNDP MPTF), which provided $1.8 million to mine action activities. Donors providing less than $1 million each were: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties **Andorra**, the **Czech Republic**, **Estonia**, **Liechtenstein**, **Monaco**, **Poland**, **Slovakia**, and **Spain**; other areas Jersey and Taiwan; state not party Qatar; and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN Foundation, UN Habitat, the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund (UNPDF), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the Dutch humanitarian organization, Stichting Vluchteling.

Contributions by States Parties in 2025

Funding provided by States Parties to affected States Parties is a key indicator for Action 43 on international cooperation and assistance under the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan, which commits States Parties in a position to do so to support affected States Parties.[15] States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty provided over half (54%) of all international support in 2025 with 27 countries providing $456.3 million, excluding EU funding.[16] With EU funding, the States Parties' contribution in 2025 increased to $577.3 million, or 68% of all international support.[17] Twenty-four States Parties provided bilateral funding to 32 affected States Parties, including 21 States Parties with Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 clearance obligations in 2025.[18]

In 2025, Estonia, Finland, and Poland notified States Parties of their intention to withdraw from the Mine Ban Treaty. Estonia's withdrawal took effect on 27 December 2025, followed by Finland on 10 January 2026, and Poland on 20 February 2026. Despite their intention to leave the Treaty, all three states provided mine action funding bilaterally in 2025. In 2026, Finland announced a new 2027–2029 funding call, stating that it would provide €12 million (US$13.6 million) for mine action activities, with a tentative €3 million (US$3.4 million) planned for 2030.[19]

15 Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 29 November 2024, Action 43, bit.ly/SRAAP2025-2029.

16 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties providing funding in 2025 were: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

17 All EU member states were States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2025, although five EU member states—Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—gave notice of their intention to leave the treaty, with the withdrawals taking place on 27 December 2025 (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and 10 January and 20 February 2026 (Finland and Poland, respectively).

18 The States Parties providing funding to affected States Parties in 2025 were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Recipient affected States Parties were: **Afghanistan**, **Angola**, Benin, **BiH**, **Cambodia**, Cameroon, Central African Republic, **Colombia**, the **DRC**, **Ethiopia**, **Iraq**, Kiribati, Mali, Nauru, **Nigeria**, Palau, **Palestine**, **Peru**, the Philippines, **Senegal**, the Solomon Islands, **Somalia**, **South Sudan**, **Sri Lanka**, **Sudan**, **Tajikistan**, **Thailand**, Togo, Uganda, **Ukraine**, **Yemen**, and **Zimbabwe**. States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations are in **bold**.

19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, "Finland's Humanitarian Mine Action Concept 2026–2029," 18 December 2025, pp. 1–2, bit.ly/FinlandMA2026-2029. Average exchange rate for 2025: €1=US$1.1306. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 5 January 2026, bit.ly/FederalReserveRelease. Finland provided $15.5 million to mine action for the period 2021–2025.

Contributions by states not party in 2025

Five states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty reported contributions to mine action in 2025: China, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and the US. The reported contributions accounted for $263.6 million (31% of all international donor funding). While Saudi Arabia's contribution was significant, it had a limited geographic focus compared to other major donors, with contributions provided to Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen only, channeled through three organizations: Dynasafe International Group, King Salman Humanitarian and Relief Centre, and the International War and Disaster Victim Protection Association-Al Ameen.[20]

India, which reported mine action funding for Cambodia and Senegal in 2024, did not report any contributions in 2025, although an agreement was made for further funding to Cambodia in 2026.[21] Tracking funding from states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty or the Convention on Cluster Munitions is challenging as contributions are not systematically reported.

Changes in donor contributions in 2025

Annual changes in donor funding can be due to funding cycles and the timing of funding disbursements and are not necessarily an indication of an overall increase or decrease in donor funding. Exchange rates also impact the US dollar value of international contributions from year to year.

Summary of changes in 2025

Change	Donors	Combined total (US$)
Increase of more than 20%	**Australia**, **Canada**, China, EU, **Japan**, **Poland**, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, **Spain**, **Sweden**, **UK**, UNICEF, UNOCHA	$155.3 million increase
Increase of less than 20%	**Andorra**, **Ireland**, **Luxembourg**, **Monaco**, **New Zealand**, **Switzerland**, UNDP MPTF	$8.3 million increase
Decrease of more than 20%	**Austria**, **Belgium**, **Czech Republic**, **Finland**, **Germany**, Jersey, **Liechtenstein**	$51.1 million decrease
Decrease of less than 20%	**Denmark**, **France**, **Italy**, **Netherlands**, **Norway**, **Slovenia**, Taiwan, US	$27.6 million decrease
Donors that reported funding in 2025, but not in 2024	**Slovakia**, Qatar, UN Foundation, UN Habitat, UNPDF, WFP	$2.6 million provided in 2025
Donors from 2024 that did not report new funding in 2025	India, **Portugal**, United Arab Emirates (UAE)	$6.2 million provided in 2024

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold.** UNDP MPTF=United Nations Development Programme Multi-Partner Trust Fund; UNICEF=United Nations Children's Fund; UNOCHA=United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; UNPDF=United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund; WFP=World Food Programme.

In 2025, 13 States Parties contributed more than they did in 2024, including a $59.7 million increase from Japan, a $17.3 million increase from Canada, and a $9.1 million increase

20 UNOCHA FTS, "Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of), Government of 2025," undated, bit.ly/UNOCHAFTSSaudiArabia2025.

21 Chhorn Norn, "India, Cambodia agree to Pursat demining project," *The Phnom Penh Post*, 27 July 2026. bit.ly/PhnomPenhPost27July2026.

from Sweden.[22] In 2025, Japan significantly increased disbursements to Ukraine, with a total of $65.9 million (68% of its total contribution) supporting activities implemented by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Canada also made significant disbursements to projects in Ukraine totaling $12.3 million (27% of its total contributions). Another large contribution from Canada was to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in Sudan, with C$10 million (US$7.2 million) provided. The increase in Sweden's financial contributions also supported Ukraine, with $11.9 million (92% of its total contribution). The UK provided $33.9 million to its Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP 3) 2023–2025 (later extended through 2026), operating in 11 affected states.[23] The UK also disbursed £3 million ($4 million) to UNMAS to support the humanitarian mine action response in Gaza, following the ceasefire in October 2025.[24] However, the UK has reported that its funding to mine action operations will reduce in 2026 compared to 2025.[25]

State not party Saudi Arabia increased its contribution to mine action by $17 million (a 38% increase from its 2024 contribution), with the majority of the contribution, $53 million, going to clearance activities in Yemen.[26]

In 2025, 15 donors (including 12 States Parties) provided smaller contributions compared to 2024, including a $44.4 million (44%) decrease from Germany and a $3.1 million (57%) decrease from Austria. Germany reported funding to Burkina Faso, Jordan, Syria, Türkiye, and Ukraine in 2025 through the German Society for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, GIZ), to the value of $41.2 million (compared to $8.1 million in 2024). However, the funding was allocated to development and humanitarian activities, and as the specific amount allocated to mine action could not be identified, it was not included in the total.

Six donors who did not report contributions in 2024 reported contributions in 2025: State Party Slovakia; state not party Qatar; and several UN organizations and funds: the UN Foundation, UN Habitat, the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund, and the World Food Programme (WFP).

Three donors from 2024—India, Portugal, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—did not report any funding contributions to mine action in 2025.

The 2025 US Funding Freeze, Grant Terminations, and Impacts

In January 2025, the US administration imposed a 90-day freeze on foreign assistance, followed by significant cuts to international aid, including humanitarian mine action funding. As the largest global donor to mine action, contributing approximately $1.2 billion over the five-year period 2021–2025, the actions severely disrupted clearance operations, risk education, and victim assistance programs worldwide. The pause in operations slowed delivery, and

22 Japan reported its mine action contributions in US dollars for the fiscal year 1 April 2025 to 31 March 2026 in its 2025 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report and for the fiscal year 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025 in its 2024 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report. Japan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports (for calendar years 2024 and 2025), Form J. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7MBT. The total funding reported by Japan for the 2024–2025 fiscal year was $72.1 million, and $80.5 million for the 2025–2026 fiscal year. The figures reported by the Monitor are based on calendar years 2024 and 2025 as provided by the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The fluctuations in funding between 2024 and 2025 are due to the timing of funding disbursements. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Takanobu Ameya, Deputy Director, Conventional Arms Division, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May 2026.

23 Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, Somalia (including Somaliland), South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe. In addition to the Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP 3), the UK also provided $0.8 million to Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD) via the Integrated Security Fund for land release in Tajikistan.

24 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Georgia Newman, Programme Manager and Policy Officer, Demining Team, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), 28 April 2026.

25 Ibid.

26 IATI, "Country Development Finance Data," undated, bit.ly/IATIdata2025; and UNOCHA FTS, "Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of), Government of 2025," undated, bit.ly/UNOCHAFTSSaudiArabia2025.



An Austrian government delegate announces a commitment of support for the treaty during the Eleventh Mine Ban Treaty Pledging Conference in Geneva in March 2026.

© Mine Ban Treaty ISU, March 2026

crucial months of operational time were lost. Many organizations were forced to lay off experienced staff, reducing organizational capacity and institutional memory. These layoffs also led to unexpected costs such as redundancy payments and legal costs and subsequent recruitment and training costs. In Afghanistan, 67 teams ceased operations affecting 543 mine action personnel, including 30 women and three persons with disabilities.[27] The Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas, CCCM) reported 188 jobs lost due to the 90-day funding freeze, with more than 50% of these former employees being heads of households.[28]

On 10 March 2025, the US administration announced the cancellation of 83% of US foreign aid contracts, including grants provided by the Department of State to mine action programs.[29] Some contracts in their closing phases were not granted the expected continued funding. A second review, conducted from 20 April 2025 until the beginning of July 2025, also led to some additional mine action project terminations. The US grant terminations affected mine action programs in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq, Mali, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

While the US is not a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, its funding has supported numerous affected States Parties in making progress towards their clearance obligations. Indeed, most of the terminated grants addressed landmine clearance. The US has, however, renewed program contracts with operators clearing remnants of US-dropped cluster munitions in Southeast Asia.[30] According to some mine action operators, the US grants now prioritize mine action in the Asia-Pacific region, while deprioritizing funding for sub-Saharan Africa and some parts of the Middle East.[31] Six sub-Saharan African countries that received US funding in 2024, did not receive US funding in 2025: Chad, the DRC, Mali, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. The grant terminations also impacted international operators differently, with some receiving a consistent amount from the US from 2024 through 2026, albeit with a shift in geographic priorities, and others seeing a major reduction in US funding.[32]

27 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), 3 April 2025; and by international mine action operators, 12 August 2025 and 31 August 2025.

28 Alejandra Uscategui, Diego Cortéz, Juliana Valencia, Katherine Otálora, "Impact of Funding Cuts on Humanitarian Mine Action in Colombia: Case Study: Putumayo," Mines Action Canada, 2025; and Alfie Pannell, "U.S. Aid Cuts Impact Landmine Programs In Colombia, Posing 'Imminent Risk' To Civilians," *The Latin Times*, 15 April 2025, bit.ly/LatinTimes15Apr2025.

29 EvalCommunity, "USAID's Fate in 2025: What Trump's Aid Cuts Mean for Global Development," undated, bit.ly/EvalCommunityUSAID2025.

30 Alexandra Vittrup, "Norwegian People's Aid partners with U.S. in renewed mine-clearing support for Cambodia," *ScandAsia*, 4 October 2025, bit.ly/ScandAsia4Oct2025; "US provides US$15 million for UXO clearance in Xiengkhouang," *Vientiane Times*, 27 August 2026, bit.ly/VientianeTimes27Aug2026; and K. Rithy Reak, "Cambodia Launches US$5 Million U.S.-Funded Demining Initiative to Clear War Remnants," *Agence Kampuchea Presse*, 6 February 2026, bit.ly/AKP6Feb2026.

31 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by mine action operators, 26 May 2026 and 2 June 2026.

32 See also, International Campaign to Ban Landmines–Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), "Impacts of 2025 United States Funding Cuts on Humanitarian Mine Action," 1 December 2025, bit.ly/MonitorUSFundingCuts1Dec2025.

In February 2026, the US policy, "Promoting Human Flourishing in Foreign Assistance (PHFFA)" became mandatory for all US, foreign, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) receiving new US foreign assistance grants. The policy comprises a set of rules that places restrictions on abortion services, "gender ideology," and diversity, equity, and inclusion programming.[33] In September 2026, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) announced it would phase out cooperation with the US, citing that the US requirements conflicted with the organization's values.[34]

The program terminations also impacted the capacity-building work of international mine action organizations with national authorities and national and local organizations. Several operators reported that partnerships with local organizations had to be stopped following contract terminations, reducing the operational and financial capacity of these organizations.[35] Programs assisting national mine action authorities with technical support, capacity development, secondment, and staff training experienced terminations and reduced funding.[36]

Risk education projects were also impacted. A risk education program on the Thai-Myanmar border, which for many years provided life-saving risk education messages to civilians in Myanmar, was terminated. The closure of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the restructuring in the State Department severely impacted services to mine victims. Humanity & Inclusion (HI) reported that 19 out of its 32 US-funded grants were terminated in countries including Cambodia, Nepal, Rwanda, and Syria.[37] A 2026 HI factsheet reported that combined funding cuts by the US and other major donors, including France, Germany, and the UK, triggered a "cascade effect" of disrupted programs, weakened capacity, and loss of staff and expertise amid rising humanitarian needs and widening inequalities.[38]

Innovative finance for mine action

At the Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference held in Siem Reap, Cambodia, in November 2024, States Parties agreed to explore all possible sources of funding, including innovative sources and mechanisms of funding.

Since 2021, the UK government has supported initiatives to explore innovative financing for mine action.[39] In 2023, the UK began work with APOPO and agricultural NGOs to deliver a Development Impact Bond (DIB) pilot project in Cambodia, "From Minefields to Rice Fields."[40] In 2024, a second pilot project began with DanChurchAid (DCA) and national partners in northeast Syria to explore the potential for DIBs to add value in a fragile and conflict-affected context. The UK also funded a 2024 UNDP feasibility study on enhancing finance for mine action in Ukraine.[41]

33 Chetan A. Patil, Stephen D. Sencer, Leslie A. Thornton, Evelyn Jackson, and Andrea Millard, "State Department Issues New Foreign Assistance Rules, Expanding the Mexico City Policy," Ropes & Gray, 30 January 2026, bit.ly/RopesGray30Jan2026.

34 Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) press release, "Norwegian People's Aid says no to U.S. Department of State funding under new conditions," 3 September 2026, bit.ly/NPA3Sep2026.

35 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by mine action operators, 14 August 2025, 18 August 2025, and 3 September 2025.

36 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by mine action operators, 29 August 2025 and 31 August 2025.

37 Humanity & Inclusion (HI), "From Lifeline to Limbo: 90 Days of U.S. Funding Cuts Leaves Millions Vulnerable Without Vital Support," 24 April 2025, bit.ly/HI24April2025.

38 HI, "'Funding cuts turn inequalities into permanent exclusion', a regional OPD from Sub-Saharan Africa," 17 June 2026, bit.ly/HIDisabilityAidCutsJune2026.

39 The HALO Trust and Social Finance, "Innovative Finance for Mine Action," June 2021, bit.ly/HALOInnovativeFinanceJune2021; and Wilton Park, "Utilising innovative financing models to further the goal of a landmine free world", 6 May 2022, bit.ly/WiltonPark6May2022.

40 Under a Development Impact Bond (DIB) model, service providers are not paid in full unless and until agreed outcomes are fully achieved, with private sector investors covering costs incurred during the project. Email from Andrew Griffiths, Head of Demining Team, FCDO, 7 September 2025.

41 Ibid.; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Georgia Newman, Programme Manager and Policy Officer, Demining Team, FCDO, 28 April 2026.

In September 2025, an innovative finance secretariat was established within the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), co-funded by the EU, the Netherlands, and the UK. The secretariat serves as a focal point to explore approaches to mobilizing and deploying resources for mine action alongside official development aid.[42]

INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS: 2021–2025

International donors contributed a total of almost $3.8 billion in the five-year period 2021–2025. This is a 27% increase from the $2.9 billion contributed during the previous five-year period (2016–2020).[43]

International support was below $600 million in 2021, but increased to almost $800 million in 2022 and 2023, and a high of $850 million in 2025. Although the funding increase appears positive, it has to be seen in the context of donors narrowing priorities and geographic focus at a time of increased conflict and insecurity, new contamination, and greater numbers of casualties. There is also broader uncertainty surrounding the future of mine action funding as several European donors began reducing allocations in response to changing political and economic priorities.[44]

The EU, Germany, and the US have consistently been within the group of top five donors from 2021–2025. The US contributed $1.2 billion, representing 32% of all international funding during the five-year period. Together with State Party Germany ($380.3 million) and the EU ($441.1 million), these three donors contributed $2 billion, or more than half of total international funding (54%). Two other donors—States Parties Japan and Norway—contributed more than $200 million each; while States Parties Canada, Switzerland, and the UK ranked among the top 10 mine action donors for the five-year period. For the first time, state not party Saudi Arabia ranked among the top 10 mine action donors for the five-year period, despite contributions only being recorded since 2022.

CONTRIBUTIONS BY AND TO STATES PARTIES OF THE MINE BAN TREATY: 2021–2025

Support from States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty accounted for over half (51%) of all international funding provided in 2021–2025, with a total of 28 States Parties reporting a combined contribution of $1.9 billion (not including EU contributions) to affected states.[45] This is an increase from the support provided by States Parties in 2016–2020, when $1.4 billion was provided, representing 48% of all international funding during the period.

Of the $1.9 billion provided in 2021–2025, $1.4 billion went to affected States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. The increase in funding by States Parties to States Parties since 2023 (see chart below) is largely explained by the increase in funding provided to Ukraine. Ukraine remains a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty despite its attempt in July 2025 to "suspend the operation" of the convention. States Parties affirmed at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States

42 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Georgia Newman, Programme Manager and Policy Officer, Demining Team, FCDO, 28 April 2026; and Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), "What we do: Innovative Finance," undated [2026], bit.ly/GICHDInnovativeFinance.


43 See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2021* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2021), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports.

44 See, ICBL-CMC, "Impacts of 2025 United States Funding Cuts on Humanitarian Mine Action," 1 December 2025, bit.ly/MonitorUSFundingCuts1Dec2025.

45 Twenty-eight Mine Ban Treaty States Parties reported mine action contributions during the period 2021–2025: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Twenty-four of those States Parties (excluding Monaco, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain) provided contributions each year in the five-year period.

Parties in Geneva that "the convention does not allow the suspension of its operation and consequently its obligations."[46]

Funding by and to States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty: 2021–2025




Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate contributions from States Parties to affected States Parties in US$ million, with the percentages in brackets as a proportion of total international funding.

FUNDING PATHS

International funding for mine action is channeled through a variety of funding paths, from multilateral funding mechanisms to funding provided directly from states to implementers, often UN organizations and international NGOs. Funding provided directly to mine affected states is limited.

Allocation of international mine action funding across implementing partners in 2025 (in US$ million)[47]



Note: NGOs=non-governmental organizations; ICRC=International Committee of the Red Cross. Percentages in brackets reflect funding as a proportion of total international funding.

46 United Nations (UN), "Ukraine: Communication. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," depositary notification C.N.385.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5, 21 July 2025, bit.ly/UkraineSuspension21July2025; and Mine Ban Treaty, "Final Report. Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1–5 December 2025," 18 May 2026, p. 8, bit.ly/MBT22MSPFinalReport.

47 Some donors did not disaggregate the type of implementing partner. This has been represented within the "various" category, and mainly includes multilateral organizations, international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and UN agencies.

International assistance to international NGOs decreased by 13% in 2025, with at least $444.5 million received (compared to $510.6 million in 2024). The decrease may be attributed to the pause in US funding and the termination of some US grants. The Danish Refugee Council reported a 71% reduction in funding from the US to its humanitarian mine action programs from 2024 to 2025.[48] Organizations that received a significant proportion of the mine action contributions to international NGOs in 2025 included The HALO Trust (24% of the total), Mines Advisory Group (MAG) (19% of the total), and NPA (17% of the total).

International NGOs also received funding from several philanthropic foundations including the Gould Foundation, the Howard G. Buffett Foundation, the Oak Foundation, the Sisley Foundation, and World Without Mines (Stiftung Welt ohne Minen). Since 2022, the Howard G. Buffett foundation has invested more than $83 million in support to mine action in Ukraine and also funded mine action in Colombia and Iraq.[49] The amount provided annually by foundations to international NGOs was not available at the time of this report and it is not included in the funding totals.

In 2025, donors contributed to mine action through several trust fund mechanisms, including the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), administered by UNMAS, the ITF Enhancing Human Security, established by the government of Slovenia, the United Nations Development Programme Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UNDP MPTF), and the United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund (UNPDF).[50]

International funding to UN agencies accounted for 19% of total funding in 2025, with $160.2 million received. UNDP and UNMAS were the main recipients of mine action funding, although other UN agencies receiving funds included the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), UN Women (for gender and mine action work in Ukraine), and the WFP.

In 2025, 25 donors reported providing $66.5 million to UNMAS for work in Colombia, the DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Western Sahara. As in previous years, several donors providing financial assistance under $1 million used the VTF to contribute to mine action, including Andorra, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, and Spain, as well as a number of UN institutions including UN Habitat, UNICEF, and the WFP. UNMAS received $1.8 million in funding for mine action through the Ukraine Community Recovery Fund, the Trust Fund for Peace and Development in Colombia, the Internal Displacement Solutions Fund in Nigeria, and the Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People. The UNPDF contributed $0.8 million to the VTF for UNMAS activities in Iraq.[51]

The UNDP received at least $69.6 million from 10 donors, supporting activities implemented by UNDP and partner organizations in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Lebanon, the Solomon Islands, Togo, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. The majority of funding, 75% of the total, was provided for UNDP mine action work in Ukraine.

48 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Rune Persson, Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding (HDP) Global Advisor, Danish Refugee Council, 20 May 2026.

49 See, for example, The HALO Trust, "Howard G Buffett makes 'moonshot' investment of $33 million to clear landmines in Ukraine," 25 November 2023, bit.ly/HALO25Nov2023; Mines Advisory Group (MAG), "Howard G. Buffett Foundation to fund mine detection dogs to clear Ukrainian agricultural land," 6 August 2025, bit.ly/MAG6Aug2025; The Howard G. Buffett Foundation, "The Howard G. Buffett Foundation: 2025 Annual Report," 2026, bit.ly/HGBFAnnualReport2025; and World Without Mines, "What we do," undated, accessed 18 September 2026, bit.ly/WoMWhatWeDo.

50 See, UNMAS, "How we are funded," updated 10 September 2026, bit.ly/UNMASFunding; ITF Enhancing Human Security, "About us: ITF in a Nutshell," undated, accessed 15 September 2026, bit.ly/ITFInANutshell; and UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund, "Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office: Gateway," undated, accessed 15 September 2026, bit.ly/MPTFOffice.

51 UNMAS, "UNMAS Annual Report 2025," 17 April 2026, pp. 12–13, bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2025.

Six donor states—the Czech Republic, France, Qatar, Slovenia, South Korea, and the US—reported allocating a combined total of $8.6 million for mine action programs in 2025 through ITF Enhancing Human Security. Recipient countries were Afghanistan, BiH, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Serbia, Syria, and Ukraine.[52]

Financial support provided directly to national institutions, including national mine action authorities and national mine action centers, increased in 2025, with $86.1 million provided (10% of total contributions) compared to $57.7 million in 2024 (8% of total contributions). National agencies working in mine action in Benin, Cambodia, Croatia, Jordan, Palau, Tajikistan, and Ukraine all benefited from the 2025 funding. The majority of this funding, $64.7 million, or 75% of the total, was provided by the EU to the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) to support Croatia in completing its Article 5 obligations.[53] Croatia officially declared itself free of all known landmine contamination in March 2026. Ukraine received $6.4 million (7% of the total). However, funding for national institutions in Ukraine and other countries were also channeled through UNDP and UNMAS. Approximately $30.4 million was identified as funding for activities supporting national institutions in Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Colombia, the DRC, Ethiopia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Vietnam in 2025.

International assistance provided directly to national NGOs in 2025 accounted for only 2% ($14.8 million) of all international contributions. This amounted to a slight increase from the $13.7 million in funding from 2024, yet represented the same percentage of overall international funding (2%). Eight donors supported local organizations in Colombia, Lao PDR, Libya, Sri Lanka, Syria, Uganda, Ukraine, and Vietnam.[54] National NGOs also received funding through mechanisms such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) administered Humanitarian Fund in Myanmar and through grants provided by international NGOs under partnership contracts. National NGOs often work in partnership with international NGOs, although donor funding is provided to the international NGOs, making it harder to track the amount received by national organizations.

Funding provided from states to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and National Societies decreased, with $8.6 million received in 2025 compared to $10.5 million received in 2024, and $23.5 million in 2023. The EU, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland all reported providing funding to the ICRC in 2025.

RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL FUNDING

RECIPIENTS IN 2025

A total of 48 states and two other areas received $804.3 million from 43 donors in 2025. Another $11.6 million went to mine action activities for multi-country projects or specific regions, including West Africa, Central Sahel, the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, and Europe and the Caucasus.[55] Canada, Finland, Ireland, Norway, South Korea, and Switzerland reported funding regional and multi-country activities. Another $34.1 million, designated as "global" in the table below, was provided to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area. Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco only reported contributions to "global" activities.

52 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Tjaša Vučko, Third Secretary, Security Policy Department, Slovenia Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 10 April 2026; and ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2025," 23 March 2026, pp. 21–24, bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2025.

53 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nevan Karas, Acting Director, Civil Protection Directorate, Croatia Ministry of the Interior, 2 April 2026.

54 Donors supporting national NGOs in 2025 were: Austria, Canada, the EU, Ireland, Japan, Norway, the US, and the Dutch humanitarian organization, Stichting Vluchteling. A further $20.2 million was provided to NGOs by Australia, Canada, the EU, France, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the UK, but the amount provided to international NGOs and national NGOs was not disaggregated and therefore has not been included in the $14.8 million.

55 This includes regional programs and support to countries in the same region, but where funds were not disaggregated by country.

Top 10 recipients of international funding in 2025

As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding. The top 10 recipients of international funding in 2025—Ukraine, Yemen, Croatia, Lao PDR, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Colombia—received $638.2 million combined, which accounted for 75% of all international assistance in 2025.[56] Seven of these recipient countries—Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Palestine, Ukraine, and Yemen—are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with Article 5 obligations; Iraq is also a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions with Article 4 obligations, as is Lao PDR. Two—Syria and Vietnam—are not party to either treaty.

International funding recipients in 2025

Recipient	Amount (US$ million)	Recipient	Amount (US$ million)
Ukraine	237.2	**Mali***	2.3
Yemen	71.7	**Philippines**	1.9
Croatia	64.7	**Palau**	1.9
Lao PDR*	51.7	**Nauru**	1.8
Palestine	42.2	**Solomon Islands**	1.6
Iraq*	40.7	**Senegal**	1.3
Syria	40.3	**Peru**	1.1
Cambodia	39.4	Armenia	1.0
Vietnam	26.1	Micronesia	0.7
Colombia	24.2	**Thailand**	0.6
Afghanistan*	17.7	**Cameroon**	0.6
Sri Lanka	15.7	*Kosovo*	0.5
Lebanon*	15.7	**Marshall Islands**	0.5
Sudan	14.6	**Serbia**	0.5
Zimbabwe	11.3	**Benin**	0.3
South Sudan*	11.2	**Kiribati**	0.2
Myanmar	11.1	**Fiji**	0.2
Somalia*	9.1	Israel	0.1
Angola	8.0	**Togo**	0.1
Libya	7.0	*Western Sahara*	<0.1
Azerbaijan	5.5	**Jordan**	<0.1
Ethiopia	5.0	**Central African Republic**	<0.1
Papua New Guinea	4.3	**Uganda**	<0.1
Nigeria	3.7	**Sub-total**	**804.3**
Tajikistan	3.4	Regional	11.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	2.8	Global	34.1
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	2.5	**Total**	**850**

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated in *italics*. Lebanon acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 May 2026.
*States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions with cluster munition remnant contamination.

Since 2021, only 14 countries have appeared in this group of 10 largest recipients, with seven of them present every year over the five-year period: Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Lao

56 Although not in the top 10 in 2025, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka were included in the top 10 in 2024 and 2023. Croatia did not appear in the top 10 for 2024 in *Landmine Monitor 2025*, however, due to a revised funding figure from the EU, Croatia would be included in the top 10, just above Sri Lanka, in 2024.

PDR, Syria, Ukraine, and Vietnam.[57] Afghanistan, which was in the top 10 from 2021–2024, dropped out of the top 10 in 2025. Palestine entered the top 10 for the first time in 2025.

Changes in recipient funding in 2025

Summary of changes in 2025

Change	Recipients	Combined total (US$)
Increase of more than 20%	**Benin**, **Cambodia**, **Croatia**, Lao PDR, Libya, **Marshall Islands**, Myanmar, **Nauru**, **Nigeria**, **Palestine**, **Philippines**, **Serbia**, **South Sudan**, **Sudan**, Syria, Vietnam, *Western Sahara*, **Yemen**	$169.8 million increase
Increase of less than 20%	**Mali**, **Palau**, **Tajikistan**	$0.6 million increase
Decrease of more than 20%	**Afghanistan**, Armenia, Azerbaijan, **BiH**, **Cameroon**, **Central African Republic**, **Colombia**, **DRC**, **Fiji**, **Iraq**, *Kosovo*, **Senegal**, **Solomon Islands**, **Togo**	$56.5 million decrease
Decrease of less than 20%	**Angola**, **Ethiopia**, **Jordan**, Lebanon, **Somalia**, **Sri Lanka**, **Thailand**, **Ukraine**, **Zimbabwe**	$9 million decrease
Recipients from 2024 that did not receive new funding in 2025	**Burkina Faso**, **Chad**, **Guinea-Bissau**,* **Mauritania**, Pakistan, **Türkiye**	$4 million received in 2024
New recipients in 2025	Israel, **Kiribati**, Micronesia, **Papua New Guinea**, **Peru**, **Uganda**	$6.5 million received in 2025

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated in *italics*. Lebanon acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 May 2026. State Party Niger did not receive funding in 2024 or 2025.
*Guinea-Bissau received funding in 2024 but as part of a regional program and the exact amount disbursed to each country was not disaggregated.

In 2025, nine States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with Article 5 obligations saw an increase in funding, with eight of these experiencing a change of more than 20%. Thirteen States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with Article 5 obligations saw a decrease in funding, with six of these experiencing a change of more than 20%.

In 2025, **Croatia** received almost $42 million more in EU funding than in 2024 to help the State Party meet its Article 5 obligations. Provided through the European Regional Development Fund to CROMAC, EU support accounted for 63% of Croatia's 2025 mine action budget, with the remainder financed by the state.[58]

Mine action funding for **Palestine** rose sharply in 2025, from $7.1 million in 2024 to $42.2 million. Most funding supported emergency mine action in the Gaza Strip following the Israel-Hamas conflict, including risk education and conflict preparedness and protection (CPP), hazard assessment and clearance, coordination, and victim assistance. **Sudan** also received more funding, rising from $4.5 million in 2024 to $14.6 million in 2025, largely for emergency mine action to facilitate humanitarian aid and support conflict-affected communities.

In 2025, funding fell by more than 20% for six Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with Article 5 obligations: Afghanistan, BiH, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, and Senegal. Several of these States

57 The 14 countries appearing in the list of the 10 largest recipients of international funding between 2021 and 2025 were: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Syria, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen.

58 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nevan Karas, Acting Director, Civil Protection Directorate, Croatia Ministry of the Interior, 2 April 2026.

Parties were impacted by the US Department of State stop-work order in January 2025 and its subsequent decision to terminate some grants.

In **Afghanistan**, international funding has declined since the Taliban returned to power in 2021. US funding cuts in early 2025 further affected the program, with several grants terminated, including for Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD), The HALO Trust, and NPA. **BiH** saw a 70% funding decrease. In December 2025, MAG announced it would close its BiH program following the discontinuation of US funding.[59] NPA also closed its BiH program after Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs funding ended in late 2025 due to a change in the funding priorities of the Norwegian government.[60] **Colombia**'s funding fell by 22% in 2025. Two US-funded projects run by the CCCM were canceled, with the budgets reduced before closure, while the Danish Refugee Council also had two US contracts terminated.[61] No international funding was provided for clearance or survey in the **DRC** in 2025, although it received funding from Japan via ICRC (for victim assistance) and from South Korea via UNMAS (for capacity-building within the national mine action authority).[62] DCA's US mine action contract in the DRC was also terminated in 2025.[63] **Iraq**, the largest recipient of mine action assistance from 2016 to 2021, has experienced declining funding since 2021, with decreases of 11% in 2024 and 33% in 2025. **Senegal**'s funding also decreased, partly because of EU and Netherlands support finishing in 2025. However, in 2025, HI received funding from Luxembourg and Belgium for risk education and land release in Senegal, and MAG and CARITAS received funding for risk education from Norway.[64]

Reported annual funding disbursements to **Ukraine** decreased slightly in 2025, but the country remained the largest recipient of mine action assistance. Ukraine received $237.2 million from 23 donors, representing 28% of all international donor funds in 2025. While funding to international operators in Ukraine was impacted by the US funding suspension in January 2025, the majority of support was later reinstated.[65] Furthermore, these reported figures do not reflect the full extent of funding received. Ukraine also received mine action support through other channels, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ukraine Comprehensive Assistance Package (U-CAP) for non-lethal assistance. Belgium made a significant contribution to U-CAP in 2025 (€22.9 million, or $25.8 million), which supported the provision of demining equipment for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the "Ukraine Mine Action Project," a five-year project to enhance the capacity of Ukraine's security and defense sector for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and humanitarian demining.[66] Although

59 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kathy Keary, Head of Strategic Partnerships, MAG, 2 June 2026; and MAG, "MAG announces the closure of its Bosnia and Herzegovina programme," 19 December 2025, bit.ly/MAG19Dec2025.

60 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Enis Horozović, Director, Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC), 20 April 2026.

61 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Katherine Otálora Ibarra, Donor Management Manager, Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas, CCCM), 25 May 2026; and by Rune Persson, HDP Global Advisor, Danish Refugee Council, 20 May 2026.

62 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ameya Takanobu, Deputy Director, Conventional Arms Division, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May 2026.

63 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Rune Persson, HDP Global Advisor, Danish Refugee Council, 20 May 2026; and by Lene Rasmussen, Operations and Humanitarian Response Team Leader – Senior Mine Action Program Advisor, DanChurchAid (DCA), 29 May 2026.

64 Belgium Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Tim Reding, Security Policy Desk, Directorate of Political Affairs, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2026; and by Anne Karine Jahren, Senior Advisor, Section for Humanitarian Policy and Long-term Development Initiatives, Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 April 2026; and email from Emilie Sauvanet, Country Director, MAG, to Mine Action Review, 12 May 2026.

65 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Angela De Santis, Deputy Head of Operations, FSD, 20 May 2026; by Ingebjørg Sørenes, Senior Advisor Policy, NPA, 26 May 2026; and by Kathy Keary, Head of Strategic Partnerships, MAG, 2 June 2026.

66 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine, 29 June 2026, bit.ly/NATOUkraineCAP29June2026; and email from Sigurd Schelstraete, Director of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Belgium Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 August 2026.

international NGOs are contracted through UNOPS to deliver specific services funded by U-CAP, it is difficult to determine how much funding supported humanitarian activities and how much went to defense-related work. Funding provided through the U-CAP program was therefore not included in the total amount of international funding granted in 2025.

Mine action funding also increased by more than 20% in states not party Syria and Myanmar, rising by 41% in Syria and 96% in Myanmar compared to 2024. The additional funding for Myanmar was largely directed to emergency mine action in areas affected by the 28 March 2025 earthquake.

States Parties facing challenges in securing international funding

Five African States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty received no funding in 2025: Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Niger. **Burkina Faso** identified suspected antipersonnel mine contamination in 2024 and submitted its first extension request in 2025. It sought $3.9 million in international support for its 2025–2028 workplan and committed $1.7 million in national resources.[67] No international funding was reported in 2025, and Burkina Faso did not report on whether national funding had been provided. **Guinea-Bissau**'s 2024 extension request set out a $7.6 million budget for a three-year extension to 31 December 2027.[68] Guinea-Bissau received funding from Norway and the Netherlands for activities conducted by MAG until 31 December 2024, but no funding was secured in 2025.[69] HAMAP-Humanitaire, which was funded by France, completed mine clearance and risk education activities in Mauritania in January 2025, and no further funding was secured.[70] In April 2026, **Mauritania** submitted its fifth Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 clearance deadline extension request, seeking an extension of five years (from 31 December 2026 to 31 December 2031). It cited insufficient funding as the main reason for limited progress under its previous extension and estimated that around €6.1 million ($6.9 million) would be needed from international donors to complete clearance.[71]

No international funding was reported for Chad or Niger in 2025. In its Article 5 extension request approved at the Fifth Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2024, **Chad** requested and was given a five-year extension until 31 December 2029, noting the need for $52 million in international funding.[72] In 2025, Chad received no funding to address its Article 5 obligations.[73] **Niger** received no international funding in 2024 or 2025, though its five-year demining workplan (for the period until 31 December 2029) stated that Niger required international support of $2,370,500.[74] Both Chad and Niger have cited insufficient financial resources as one of the reasons they have been unable to meet their

67 Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 July 2025, pp. 46–49, bit.ly/BurkinaFasoArt5ExtRequestJuly2025.

68 Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 April 2024, pp. 25–26, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauArt5ExtRequestApr2024.

69 Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I.

70 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Yves Marek, Ambassador for Mine Clearance, France Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 28 June 2025; and by Col. Mohamed Laghdaf Mohamedou Baham, Coordinator, National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD), 14 May 2026.

71 Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 4 August 2026, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt5ExtRequestAug2026.

72 Chad Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 August 2024, p. 21, bit.ly/ChadArt5ExtRequestAug2024.

73 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmat Ngartoloum, Administration and Finance Department, National High Commission for Demining (Haut-Commissariat National au Déminage, HCND), 14 May 2026.

74 Niger reported an annual national contribution of $100,000 over five years would be made. See, Niger Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 15 August 2024, p. 14, bit.ly/NigerRevisedArt5ExtRequest2024.



A clearance team leader prepares to destroy a landmine found during clearance operations in Galmudug state, Somalia.

© Mohamed Sadaq Hassan/The HALO Trust, September 2025

clearance deadlines under Article 5 of the treaty.[75] Both States Parties are on their fifth extension request.

State Party **Türkiye** received no international funding in 2025 and has not secured support for the fourth phase of its Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project, estimated to cost more than €32.5 million ($36.7 million) to clear minefields along the Iranian border. The project was previously financed with support from the EU through UNDP.[76] However, Türkiye has 50 humanitarian demining teams and is able to continue some operations with national funding from the Ministry of National Defence.

States Parties have recognized the need to consider how all affected States Parties can be supported to meet their clearance obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, especially those that regularly receive little or no international support. Action 44 of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan refers to the possibility of establishing a voluntary trust fund for this purpose. A voluntary trust fund working group, chaired by Norway, was set up in 2025 to study the feasibility of setting up such a fund.[77]

To address the challenges sub-Saharan African States Parties face in securing donor funding and meeting their Article 5 obligations, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) launched a three-year initiative in June 2026 with €3 million ($3.4 million) in EU support. The initiative targets five African states receiving limited international assistance—Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe—with the priority to build national capacity and promote knowledge-sharing and exchange of experience. The capacity support will include the piloting and use of a prioritization tool and assistance in preparation of annual reports; additional support, provided by MAG, may also include survey, clearance operations, and institutional and operational capacity-building.[78]

RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION FUNDING: 2021–2025

In 2021–2025, the 10 largest recipients of international mine action support received the majority of available funding, totaling almost $2.7 billion. Of these 10 recipient states, one is in Europe, three are in the Middle East and North Africa region, five in the Asia-Pacific region, and one in the Americas.

Although eight countries from sub-Saharan Africa have large (between 20–99km²) or medium mine contamination (between 5–19km²)—Angola, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe—no country from sub-Saharan Africa was among the top 10 recipients during this five-year period.[79] Two affected states from sub-Saharan Africa were

75 Ibid., p. 7; and Chad Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 August 2024, p. 16, bit.ly/ChadArt5ExtRequestAug2024.

76 Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form D.

77 Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 29 November 2024, Action 44, bit.ly/SRAAP2025-2029.

78 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), "New initiative paves the way towards a mine-free Africa," 15 July 2026, bit.ly/UNIDIR15July2026.

79 Ethiopia was classified as having massive contamination (more than 100km²) from 2021–2024. It was re-categorised with medium contamination in 2025 following survey and cancellation.

among the 15 largest recipients of mine action funding in 2021–2025: Somalia ranked 14th ($52.4 million) and Zimbabwe ranked 15th ($51.5 million).

From 2021 to 2025, the composition of the top 10 group of recipients remained relatively similar compared to the previous five-year period, 2016–2020. There has, however, been a noticeable change in ranking. Whereas, in the previous five-year period, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria were ranked first to third, only Iraq remains in the top three in the 2021–2025 period. Ukraine, which ranked eighth in the list of recipients in 2016–2020, is ranked first in the top 10 group for 2021–2025.

Iraq has seen a noticeable decline in annual funding over the five-year period 2021–2025, with a 41% reduction in funding compared to the previous five-year period (2016–2020). Syria has seen a 35% reduction in funding, and Afghanistan a 31% reduction. Colombia, which ranked fifth in the 2016–2020 period, is ranked eighth in 2021–2025, with a 21% decrease in funding.

Summary of changes: top 10 recipients of international mine action funding

Recipient	2021–2025 contributions (US$ million)	2021–2025 ranking	2016–2020 contributions (US$ million)	2016–2020 ranking	% change from the previous five-year period
Ukraine	981.5	1	66.2	8	+1,383%
Iraq*	354.7	2	600.6	1	-41%
Lao PDR*	238.7	3	226.2	4	+6%
Yemen	207.3	4	62.4	9	+232%
Afghanistan*	187.1	5	272.8	2	-31%
Cambodia	177.6	6	112.7	6	+58%
Syria	157.5	7	243.9	3	-35%
Colombia	152.6	8	193.9	5	-21%
Vietnam	118.6	9	82.8	7	+43%
Sri Lanka	84.5	10	51.7	10	+63%
Total	**2,660.1**	**N/A**	**1,913.2**	**N/A**	**+39%**

Note: N/A=not applicable; States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**.
*States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions with cluster munition remnant contamination.

The 10 smallest recipients of international mine action funding changed each year from 2021 to 2025. Twenty-seven countries and other areas appeared among the bottom 10 recipients of mine action funding during the five-year period.[80] Of those, six appeared on the list for three or more years—three from sub-Saharan Africa (Central African Republic, Chad, and other area Western Sahara), two from Europe and the Caucasus (Georgia and Serbia), and one from the Middle East (Jordan).

Of the States Parties with Article 5 obligations, the smallest recipients of international assistance in the five-year period 2021–2025 were Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Niger, and Thailand.

Chad received a total contribution of $1.4 million over the five-year period, with no contribution received in 2025. Chad has received very limited international funding for clearance and risk education since the conclusion of the four-year EU-funded PRODECO

80 Of the 27 countries and other areas, 21 are States Parties: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Fiji, Jordan, Kiribati, Mali, the Marshall Islands, Moldova, Mozambique, Nauru, Niger, the Philippines, Rwanda, Serbia, Thailand, Togo, and Uganda. Four are states not party: Armenia, Georgia, Israel, and Pakistan. Two are other areas: Abkhazia and Western Sahara.

Smallest recipients of international mine action funding: 2021–2025 (States Parties with Article 5 obligations)

Recipient	2021–2025 contributions (US$ million)
Thailand*	2.9
Mauritania	2.8
Chad	1.4
Niger	1.3
Guinea-Bissau	0.3
Total	**8.7**

*Thailand self-funds its national mine action program.

project in 2022.[81] From 2022 to 2024, Guinea-Bissau received funding through the Netherlands' regional support for MAG in West Africa, which ended in late 2024.[82] Mauritania received funding from France for the period 2022–2024 for operations by HAMAP-Humanitaire, and MAG also received funding from Norway as part of regional support in West Africa.[83] The contributions received by Niger in the period totaled less than $1.3 million, with $0.1 million provided in 2023, $1.1 million provided in 2022, and less than $0.1 million provided in 2021. In contrast to the four sub-Saharan African countries, Thailand funds most of its mine action budget with a modest international budget provided by Norway in support of the NPA mine action program in Thailand.

INTERNATIONAL FUNDING BY THEMATIC SECTOR

In 2025, 76% of international mine action funding went to support land release and integrated land release programs. Capacity-building made up 8% of global mine action funding, victim assistance 5%, risk education 2%, and advocacy less than 1%. "Various" funding represented 9% of all international mine action support. This included contributions not disaggregated by donors, funding for activities such as coordination and core costs, as well as funding not earmarked for any particular sector. In some active conflict zones, such as Gaza, mine action activities were often complex and varied and could not be easily disaggregated.

Contributions by thematic sector in 2025[84]

Sector	Total contribution (US$ million)	% of total contribution	Number of donors
Land release and integrated land release programs	643.8	76%	33
Various	77.3	9%	23
Capacity-building	70.2	8%	19
Victim assistance	38.3	5%	19
Risk education	13.8	2%	17
Advocacy	6.6	<1%	9
Total	**850.0**	**100%**	**N/A**

Note: N/A=not applicable.

81 Chad Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 5; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmat Ngartoloum, Administration and Finance Department, HCND, 14 May 2026.

82 Netherlands Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form I; and Netherlands Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form I.

83 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Yves Marek, Ambassador for Mine Clearance, France Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 28 June 2025; by Col. Mohamed Laghdaf Mohamedou Baham, Coordinator, PNDHD, 28 February 2025; and by Anne Karine Jahren, Senior Advisor, Section for Humanitarian Policy and Long-term Development Initiatives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 April 2026.

84 In 2024, international funding was distributed among the following sectors: land release and integrated land release programs ($578.7 million, or 75% of total international support), capacity-building ($66.4 million, or 9%), victim assistance ($36.6 million, or 5%), risk education ($17.2 million, or 2%), advocacy ($6.3 million, or 1%), stockpile destruction ($2.4 million, or 0%), and various activities ($61.1 million, or 8%). See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2025* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2025), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports. The 2024 figures for international funding have been adjusted to include corrected figures for the EU and the Netherlands.

LAND RELEASE AND INTEGRATED LAND RELEASE PROGRAMS

In 2025, $643.8 million, or 76% of all funding went to land release and integrated land release programs. The integrated land release category includes clearance and survey combined with risk education, victim assistance, capacity-building, and other activities such as information management and gender mainstreaming.[85] This amount represented an increase of $65.1 million from 2024.

A total of 33 donors reported contributions to land release and integrated land release programs in 2025. Six donors—the EU, Germany, Japan, Norway, Saudi Arabia, and the US—provided the majority ($488.4 million, or 76%), with the US contributing 33% of this amount ($162.9 million), a decrease from the $179.2 million provided in 2024.

In 2025, Ukraine received the most funding for land release, receiving 29% of the total. Croatia received 10% of the total, and Yemen 9% of the total. Cambodia, Iraq, and Lao PDR each received around 6% of the total.

Recipients of land release funding in 2025

Recipient	Amount (US$ million)	Recipient	Amount (US$ million)
Ukraine	187.6	**Palestine**	17.4
Croatia	64.7	**Sri Lanka**	15.6
Yemen	60.3	**Afghanistan***	14.7
Iraq*	37.9	**Sudan**	14.2
Lao PDR*	37.8	Lebanon*	11.9
Cambodia	37.0	**Zimbabwe**	11.3
Syria	33.3	**Sub-total**	**586.4**
Colombia	22.0	Other countries	57.4
Vietnam	20.7	**Total**	**643.8**

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**. Lebanon acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 May 2026.
*States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions with cluster munition remnant contamination.

Many donors reported land release programs integrated with other activities, particularly risk education, as a combined figure. Contributions for integrated land release programs were provided across 26 affected countries, one other area, and at a regional level.[86]

Twenty donors earmarked some of their contributions specifically for clearance and survey activities (including quality management and research and innovation for clearance operations), providing a total of $218 million (34% of total land release contributions).[87]


85 States Parties that were recipients of international assistance for land release in 2025 were: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Iraq, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Serbia, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. States not party that received international assistance for land release in 2025 were: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Micronesia, Syria, and Vietnam. Lebanon acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 May 2026. The other areas that received international assistance for land release activities in 2025 were Kosovo and Western Sahara.

86 HI estimated that for programs encompassing the three pillars of land release, victim assistance, and risk education, about 65% of funding would be spent on land release, 25% on victim assistance, and 10% on risk education. Email from Eva Maria Fischer, Manager Advocacy and Development Education, HI, 14 September 2026. However, these proportions may vary according to operator and country context.

87 This included mine, ERW, and cluster munition remnant clearance. The 20 donors were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, China, the Czech Republic, Estonia, the EU, France, Germany, Japan, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.

While few donors disaggregate land release funding according to device type, available data indicates that in 2025, $282.9 million (44% of land release funding) was spent on the removal of landmines including improvised mines, $75.4 million (12%) on cluster munition clearance, and $55.8 million (9%) on clearance of both landmines and cluster munitions. The remaining $229.7 million (36%) was provided for the clearance of mixed contamination or where the device was not specified. (See also *Cluster Munition Monitor 2026* for specific information on funding for addressing the impact of cluster munitions in States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.)

Allocation of mine action land release funding by device type in 2025 (in US$ million)[88]



Note: Percentages in brackets reflect funding as a proportion of total international land release and integrated land release funding.

Land release funding to Mine Ban Treaty States Parties

About $277.2 million (43%) of international funding for land release and integrated land release programs was spent in four Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with massive landmine contamination (more than 100km²): Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, and Ukraine. Ukraine received $187.6 million (68%) of that support.


Four States Parties with large contamination (20–99km²)—Angola, BiH, Croatia, and Yemen—received a combined total of $135.3 million in land release support. Croatia was ranked as having large contamination at the end of 2024 and officially announced in March 2026 that it had completed clearance at the end of 2025. It received almost $65 million (48%) of that support.

Nine States Parties with medium contamination (5–19km²)—Colombia, Ethiopia, Palestine, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe—received a combined total of $93.5 million in land release support. Colombia was the largest recipient in the group, receiving $22 million (24%) of that support.

Four States Parties with small contamination (less than 5km²)—Peru, Senegal, Serbia, and South Sudan—received a combined total of $9.7 million in land release support. South Sudan received 84% of the total ($8.1 million).

88 Information on device type was obtained from Article 7 reports, operator annual reports, media reporting, and responses to Monitor questionnaires by donors, operators, and national mine action authorities. Data was triangulated with operator websites and reports, Monitor country profiles, and Mine Action Review questionnaire responses from country-based operators.

Land release funding by extent of mine contamination in Mine Ban Treaty States Parties: 2023–2025 (in US$ million)[89]




Note: Figures above each bar indicate the combined total of land release and integrated land release program funding.

Land release funding: 2021–2025

Between 2021 and 2025, approximately two-thirds of international funding went to land release and integrated land release projects (65%, or $2.4 billion). This is similar to the previous five-year period from 2016–2020 when land release represented 63% of international support.

Land release dedicated international funding: 2021–2025



Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate land release and integrated land release funding in US$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international funding for mine action.

89 In 2025, recipients of international funding for land release with massive contamination (more than 100km²) included: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, and Ukraine. Recipients with large contamination (20–99km²) included: Angola, BiH, Croatia, and Yemen. Recipients with medium contamination (5–19km²) included: Colombia, Ethiopia, Palestine, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. Recipients with small contamination (less than 5km²) included: Peru, Senegal, Serbia, and South Sudan.

RISK EDUCATION

In 2025, 17 donors reported contributions totaling $13.8 million for risk education across 13 states, as well as at a regional level and for activities at a global level.[90] Some of the projects were combined with capacity-building, and a few specified the provision of CPP, particularly in Gaza.[91] Japan, the UK, and the US provided the largest contributions to risk education dedicated funding with a combined contribution of $8.5 million (62% of the total). The US funding freeze in early 2025 had a severe impact on risk education programs in several countries, including Afghanistan, Colombia, the DRC, Mali, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand.[92] Activities were stalled during the suspension, and although some programs resumed, others continued at reduced capacity without US funding, or were terminated completely. Risk education programs implemented by local partners were affected, with some mine action operators reporting that capacity-building and financial support to local partners was reduced.[93]

Myanmar and Palestine received the largest amounts of risk education funding in 2025. In Myanmar, risk education is central to mine action because international organizations are not able to conduct land release. Risk education efforts also expanded in the conflict-affected areas impacted by the March 2025 earthquake. In Gaza, risk education and CPP remained essential given the urgent needs of the conflict-affected communities.

Recipients of risk education dedicated funding in 2025[94]

Recipient	Amount (US$ million)	Recipient	Amount (US$ million)
Myanmar	5.2	Lao PDR*	0.6
Palestine	1.4	Syria	0.5
Vietnam	1.0	**Nigeria**	0.4
Ukraine	0.9	**Sudan**	0.4
Iraq*	0.8	Azerbaijan	0.1
Lebanon*	0.8	Regional	<0.1
Mali*	0.8	Global	0.2
Colombia	0.7	**Total**	**13.8**

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**. Lebanon acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 May 2026.
*States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions with cluster munition remnant contamination.

90 Donors of international assistance for risk education in 2025 were: Belgium, Denmark, the EU, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, the US, the United Nations Development Programme Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UNDP MPTF), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and UNOCHA. In comparison, 13 donors reported contributing a total of $17.2 million for risk education projects in 2024. See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2025* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2025), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports.

91 In cases where it was not clear whether funding for capacity-building was related to the risk education activities, these contributions were not included within the risk education dedicated support.

92 ICBL-CMC, "Impacts of 2025 United States Funding Cuts on Humanitarian Mine Action," 1 December 2025, bit.ly/MonitorUSFundingCuts1Dec2025.

93 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by mine action operators, 14 August 2025, 18 August 2025, 29 August 2025, 3 September 2025, 25 May 2026, and 8 June 2026.

94 This table only includes recipients of funding specifically earmarked for risk education. At least 25 states (including some of those who received earmarked funding for risk education) received funding in 2025 for risk education combined with other mine action activities, such as clearance or victim assistance (the specific amount going to each sector could not be disaggregated): Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This information was not included in the table.

However, most funding for risk education is still included within broader funding for land release programs. At least 25 states received funding in 2025 for risk education combined with mine action activities such as clearance, capacity-building, or victim assistance. The specific amount going to each sector was not disaggregated.[95]


In 2025, 10 donors reported contributions totaling $12.3 million for integrated victim assistance and risk education projects in 10 states. These contributions have been included within the overall figure for victim assistance funding.[96]

Risk education funding: 2021–2025

Between 2021 and 2025, funding specifically for risk education represented 2% of all international support, totaling $59.5 million. This is an increase from the $45.1 million for risk education recorded in the previous five-year period, 2016–2020. The increase may be due to better disaggregation of funding data and the renewed focus on risk education since 2019. It also reflects the increased need for risk education for populations in conflict-affected areas.

Annual contributions for dedicated risk education have remained within the 1–2% range as a proportion of overall funding. It continues to be the case that the majority of risk education funding is not clearly disaggregated from funding for land release and other mine action activities.

Risk education dedicated international funding: 2021–2025



Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated risk education funding in US$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international funding for mine action.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

International funding earmarked, or allocated specifically, to victim assistance activities in 2025 totaled $38.3 million, a slight increase from the 2024 figure of $36.6 million. However, two countries—Ukraine and Yemen—received 43% of this funding. Nineteen donors reported

95 States where risk education was conducted as part of integrated programs included: Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

96 Donors of integrated risk education and victim assistance projects in 2025 were: Canada, the EU, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the US. Projects were implemented in Afghanistan, Colombia, Lao PDR, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Palestine, Syria, Vietnam, and Yemen.

contributing to victim assistance projects in 17 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, one State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Lao PDR), and five states not party to either treaty, as well as at a global level.[97]

In 2025, Saudi Arabia was the largest contributor to victim assistance, providing $8.8 million, or 23% of the total, with $6.2 million (70%) provided to operate rehabilitation centers in Marib, Saiyun, and Taiz in Yemen. The EU, Japan, and Switzerland also provided significant contributions to victim assistance with a combined total of $11 million, or 29% of the total.

It is likely that state not party South Korea contributed to victim assistance programs in Southeast Asia, although the annual funding figures for 2025 were not recorded.[98] In November 2025, South Korea announced the launch of an $8.8 million multi-year project to expand rehabilitation services to the north of Lao PDR in a collaboration between the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), the Lao Centre for Medical Rehabilitation, and the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE).[99] State Party Türkiye also provided funding to victim assistance projects in Lao PDR through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA).[100] The amounts dispersed in 2025 were not reported and so are not included in the total.

Most countries with responsibilities for mine/ERW survivors did not receive any direct international mine action funding for victim assistance, despite growing needs and increasing numbers of survivors. In 2025, 43% of all victim assistance funding went to just two countries—Ukraine and Yemen—for a combined total of $16.5 million. Victim assistance funding for Syria decreased from $10.9 million in 2024, to $3.4 million in 2025, although some victim assistance activities were included in integrated mine action programs. Nigeria received $1.3 million from Japan for victim assistance and risk education activities implemented by ICRC and UNMAS, and a further $2 million for a project to provide 3-D printed prosthetic technology, in collaboration with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).[101] The remaining $15.1 million went to victim assistance activities in 18 other countries and to activities at a global level.

97 Victim assistance donors in 2025 were: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the EU, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Luxembourg, Monaco, Norway, New Zealand, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the US. States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that received international funding for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, BiH, Central African Republic, Colombia, the DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Palestine, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Ukraine, and Yemen. The states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty were: Israel, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Syria, and Vietnam.

98 In 2021–2022, South Korea announced funding for clearance, risk education, and victim assistance activities in Cambodia (2021–2025), Lao PDR (2022–2026), and Vietnam (2022–2026). See, UNDP Cambodia press release, "Korea Commits $10 Million to Increase Cambodia's Mine Clearance and Victim Assistance Efforts in 2021 and Beyond," 15 March 2021, bit.ly/UNDPCambodia15Mar2021; "Laos, UNDP and KOICA sign USD11 million partnership to support UXO sector in the Lao PDR," *Lao News Agency*, 10 May 2022, bit.ly/LaoNewsAgency10May2022; UNDP Vietnam press release, "KOICA and central provinces renewed cooperation in mine action and rural development," 17 March 2022, bit.ly/UNDPVietnam17March2022; and Hannah Nguyen, "Three Provinces Benefited from Mine Action for Korea-Vietnam Peace Village Project," *Vietnam Time*s, 25 May 2024, bit.ly/VietnamTimes25May2024.

99 "South Korea, Laos Expand Rehabilitation Services with Mobile Units in Northern Provinces," *The Laotian Times*, 3 December 2025, bit.ly/LaotianTimes3Dec2025; and Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Lao PDR, "KOICA launches US$8.8 million rehabilitation project to benefit Lao people," 26 August 2025 [*sic*], bit.ly/KOICALaos26Aug2025.

100 Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), "TİKA Provides Medical Equipment and Supplies to Laos Orthotic and Prosthetic Centers," 15 September 2025, bit.ly/TIKA15Sep2025.

101 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ameya Takanobu, Deputy Director, Conventional Arms Division, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 May 2026.

Recipients of victim assistance dedicated funding in 2025[102]

Recipient	Amount (US$ million)	Recipient	Amount (US$ million)
Yemen	10.4	**Iraq***	0.4
Ukraine	6.1	**Senegal**	0.4
Myanmar	5.5	Vietnam	0.4
Syria	3.4	**Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)**	0.2
Nigeria	3.3	Israel	0.1
Afghanistan*	2.3	**Central African Republic**	<0.1
Palestine	1.4	**Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)**	<0.1
Mali*	1.4	**Jordan**	<0.1
Lao PDR*	0.7	**Sudan**	<0.1
Somalia*	0.7	**Uganda**	<0.1
Ethiopia	0.6	Global	<0.1
Colombia	0.5	**Total**	**38.3**

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**.
*States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions with cluster munition remnant contamination.

As in previous years, many States Parties with large numbers of mine victims received little or no direct victim assistance funding despite substantial needs and limited resources.[103] A 2026 factsheet by HI reported that international aid cuts are driving a global disability crisis by weakening organizations of persons with disabilities and limiting access to essential services for millions of persons with disabilities.[104]

Action 43 of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan requires States Parties in a position to do so to provide support to victim assistance through earmarked funding in the mine action budget, and/or through integrating victim assistance into broader development and humanitarian efforts.[105] However, there remains little earmarked funding for victim assistance. Many donors claim to support victim assistance more broadly through contributions to programs for development and disability rights that do not specify the portion of funding that might contribute to victim assistance. There is, however, little evidence that such funding

102 This table includes recipients of funding specifically earmarked for victim assistance and victim assistance combined with risk education. Of the recipients listed, Afghanistan, Colombia, Lao PDR, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Palestine, Syria, Vietnam, and Yemen all received funding for programs that integrated victim assistance and risk education. At least 18 states received funding in 2025 for victim assistance as part of integrated clearance programs (the specific amount going to each sector could not be disaggregated): Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, the Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Yemen. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Israel received funding from Japan for victim assistance activities. This information was not included in the table.

103 At the close of the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in June 2026, States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty reporting mine victims in areas under their jurisdiction and control were: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Victim Assistance, "General Observations: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 15–18 June 2026, p. 4, bit.ly/VACommitteeJune2026. State Party Burkina Faso has also reported hundreds of casualties on its territory; and mine/ERW victims have been reported in Lebanon, which acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 May 2026. Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 3; and ICBL-CMC, "Country Profile: Lebanon: Casualties & Victim Assistance," updated 3 February 2026, bit.ly/LebanonCountryProfile.

104 HI, "'Funding cuts turn inequalities into permanent exclusion', a regional OPD from Sub-Saharan Africa," 17 June 2026, bit.ly/HIDisabilityAidCutsJune2026.

105 Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 29 November 2024, Action 43, bit.ly/SRAAP2025-2029.

consistently reaches victims, or meets the specific needs of survivors, especially those people in rural and remote areas. Allocating earmarked victim assistance funding would help ensure that victims receive the necessary support, and that it could be effectively tracked. This aligns with sector standards, Article 6.3 of the Mine Ban Treaty, and Action 43 of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan.


Victim assistance funding: 2021–2025

Between 2021 and 2025, funding earmarked for victim assistance, totaling $184.9 million, represented 5% of the overall five-year contributions from international donors. This is a slightly lower percentage than the previous five-year period, 2016–2020, when victim assistance represented 6% of the overall five-year contributions from international donors ($169.8 million out of a total contribution of $2.9 billion).

During the five-year period 2021–2025, victim assistance funding has been unevenly distributed among affected countries, with a large proportion of the funding going to a few conflict-affected countries, particularly Ukraine and Yemen. This was also the case in the previous five-year period, 2016–2020, with victim assistance contributions supporting emergency operations in conflict-affected countries in the Middle East and Afghanistan.[106]

In the last five years, annual victim assistance contributions have remained within a range of 4–6% of overall mine action funding.

Victim assistance dedicated international funding: 2021–2025



Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated victim assistance funding in US$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international funding for mine action.

CAPACITY-BUILDING

Nineteen donors collectively provided $70.2 million for capacity-building activities in 24 countries and at a regional and global level, representing 8% of international funding in 2025.[107] Capacity-building was also included as an element in many of the integrated land release programs and risk education programs.

106 In 2020, 60% of the reported victim assistance funding went to just four countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. See ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2021*, (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2021), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports.

107 Capacity-building donors in 2025 included: Australia, Canada, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US; as well as the UNDP MPTF, UNICEF, and UNOCHA. Recipients of international assistance for capacity-building were: Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Benin, Cameroon, Colombia, the DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Palau, Palestine, Peru, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen.

While the financial support allocated to capacity-building has increased since 2019, much of the capacity-building support from 2022 to 2025 was provided to Ukraine to enhance the mine action capabilities of Ukrainian authorities given the massive increase in requirements. In 2025, Ukraine was the largest recipient of capacity-building support, receiving $33.2 million (47% of the total). Ukraine was also the largest recipient in 2024, 2023, and 2022.[108]


Canada was the largest donor of capacity-building in 2025, providing $17.9 million (25% of the total), of which $12.3 million (69%) went to capacity-building activities in Ukraine. The Netherlands, the EU, and the US also provided significant contributions to capacity-building in 2025 with a combined total of $30.7 million (44% of the overall total). Half of this ($15.3 million, or 50%) also went to capacity-building activities in Ukraine.

Funding for capacity-building: 2021–2025

Between 2021 and 2025, funding for capacity-building support fluctuated as a proportion of total international funding, representing less than 4% of overall funding in 2021, 12% in 2023, 9% in 2022 and 2024, and 8% in 2025. Funding increased over the five-year period, from a low of $20.5 million in 2021 to a high of $96.5 million in 2023.

Capacity building represented 8% of total contributions for 2021–2025, which is an increase from the previous five-year period, 2016–2020, when it represented 2% of overall contributions.

Capacity-building dedicated international funding: 2021–2025



Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated capacity-building funding in US$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international mine action funding.

ADVOCACY

In 2025, less than 1% of all reported funding for mine action went to advocacy activities ($6.6 million).[109] Nine donors reported supporting advocacy activities.[110] Funding for mine action advocacy has remained consistently low, at around 1% or less of total annual international

108 In 2024, Ukraine received $45.3 million (68% of the total contribution); in 2023, Ukraine received $59.9 million (62% of the total); and in 2022, Ukraine received $28 million (39% of the total). See, *Landmine Monitor* annual reports for 2025, 2024, and 2023 on the Monitor website, bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports.

109 Advocacy activities generally include, but are not limited to, funding for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Mine Ban Treaty implementation support units (ISUs), GICHD, Geneva Call, ICBL-CMC and its Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, NPA's Mine Action Review project, and other operators and NGOs.


110 Advocacy donors in 2025 included: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland.

funding. When considered as a proportion of the overall five-year contribution from 2021–2025, advocacy represents less than 1%, totaling $26 million.

NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2025

Action 40 of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan requires affected States Parties to report financial contributions made to their mine action programs.[111] Over the last 10 years, the Monitor has captured more national funding data reported by affected States Parties in Article 7 reports, Article 5 extension requests, and annual workplans. National funding has also occasionally been reported by some states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty in response to Monitor questionnaires. However, national contributions are still under-reported and often not reported on an annual basis.

National funding for mine action: 2016–2025 (in US$ million)



Note: Totals not adjusted for inflation.

Seven States Parties reported on their annual national financial contributions in their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency reports for 2025: Cambodia, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe. Guinea-Bissau provided a budget for the period 2024–2027 but did not state which part of the budget was covered by national finances. Ecuador, Somalia, and South Sudan reported on a lack of national funding.[112] Several States Parties, including Angola, BiH, Peru, and Thailand reported national funding contributions in their Article 5 deadline extension requests and workplans.

In 2025, the Monitor identified 22 affected states and one other area that provided a combined total of $276.9 million in contributions to mine action from their national budgets.[113]

111 Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 29 November 2024, Action 40, bit.ly/SRAAP2025-2029.

112 Afghanistan, Lao PDR, and Germany reported on national contributions in their Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports (for calendar year 2025). Lao PDR only reported in-kind assistance. See also CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2026* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2026), bit.ly/CMMonitorReports.

113 Data on national funding to mine action is based on responses to Monitor questionnaires from mine action authorities, reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, and media reporting. See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

National funding in 2025

State	Contribution (US$ million)	State	Contribution (US$ million)
Azerbaijan	101.1	**Serbia**	1.4
Croatia	37.0	**Chad***	1.0
Germany*	33.2	**Peru**	0.9
Türkiye	32.1	**Sudan**	0.9
Colombia	29.0	Armenia	0.8
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	12.4	**Jordan**	0.4
Lebanon*	7.5	**Sri Lanka**	0.2
Thailand	7.2	**Mauritania***	0.2
Cambodia	5.0	**Angola**	0.08
Zimbabwe	2.6	**Tajikistan**	0.07
Senegal	2.4	**Afghanistan***	0.05
Kosovo	1.4	**Total**	**276.9**

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated in *italics*.
Lebanon acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 May 2026.
*States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions with Article 4 obligations.

Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Peru, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Türkiye, and other area Kosovo, all reported national contributions to their demining programs.

In 2025, $0.08 million was disbursed by the government of **Angola** for the procurement of equipment and running costs of the National Mine Action Agency (Agência Nacional de Acção Contra as Minas, ANAM) and national operators.[114] Angola has also funded demining operations carried out by international operators. From 2022–2025, Angola funded demining operations carried out by The HALO Trust in protected areas along the Okavango Delta in Cuando Cubango province, to the amount of $60 million.[115] The Angolan government announced that it would provide £240 million ($316.6 million) in funding over the period 2025–2028, although annual disbursements would not be uniform. While the amount dispersed in 2025 was relatively low, Angola reported that it had approved proposals to provide state funding to APOPO, The HALO Trust, MAG, and two national demining organizations to the total amount of $63.5 million.[116]

BiH provided $12.4 million for staff and operations of the BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC), civil protection, and the BiH Armed Forces.[117] **Cambodia** provided $5 million for its mine action program in 2025, an increase on the $2 million provided in 2024, but well

114 Angola Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 5 August 2025, p. 37, bit.ly/AngolaArt5ExtRequestAug2025; and Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Analysis of the request submitted by Angola for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention," 13 October 2025, p. 6, bit.ly/AngolaArt5RequestAnalysis2025.

115 Angola Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 5 August 2025, p. 25, bit.ly/AngolaArt5ExtRequestAug2025; Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form J; and The HALO Trust, "Annual report and financial statements," 31 March 2022, bit.ly/HALOAnnualReport2022.

116 Angola Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 5 August 2025, p. 37, bit.ly/AngolaArt5ExtRequestAug2025. Average exchange rate for 2025: £1=US$1.3192. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 5 January 2026, bit.ly/FederalReserveRelease.

117 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Enis Horozovic, Director, BHMAC, 20 April 2026; and BiH Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Updated Workplan, 15 July 2025, bit.ly/BiHArt5WorkplanJuly2025.

below the $30 million it had expected to contribute in 2024 and 2025.[118] **Colombia** reported $2.4 million, which covered the operations of the Comprehensive Action Group Against Antipersonnel Mines (Grupo de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, AICMA), and an additional $26.6 million from the Ministry of National Defense for the Humanitarian Demining Brigade and Amphibious Demining and Engineer Battalion.[119]

Croatia's national contribution in 2025 was about $37 million, accounting for about 36% of its total mine action budget, with the EU providing the remainder. The funds were used for landmine clearance, while risk education and victim assistance were financed through separate budget lines across different ministries and departments.[120]

Peru reported a national contribution of $0.9 million was spent on operations in 2025, with an estimated 60% of the budget allocated to the travel time required to fly deminers to the remote work sites.[121]

Serbia reported a national contribution of $1.4 million to support the running of the Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) and for demining operations in Bujanovac.[122] The government of Kosovo provided $1.4 million to the Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) for demining and risk education.[123]

As in 2024, **Sri Lanka** allocated $0.2 million to its mine action program in 2025, with funds supporting the Sri Lankan Humanitarian Demining Unit and the national and regional mine action centers.[124] **Thailand** continued to provide most of its own mine action budget, providing around $7.2 million in 2025.[125]

Türkiye provided $32.1 million in 2025 to its mine action program, a substantial increase from the $11.2 million provided in 2024. The funds contributed to capacity development of the military demining units for humanitarian mine action.[126]

Several Mine Ban Treaty States Parties—Afghanistan, Chad, Jordan, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe—reported contributions covering the salaries and operational costs of their mine action authorities in 2025.[127] Mauritania provided approximately $0.2 million to its mine action program. The funding covered the salaries of the National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le

118 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mol Roeup Seyha, Deputy Secretary General, Cambodia Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), 2 April 2026; Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), "Revised Workplan Cambodia," 10 May 2023, p. 5, bit.ly/MBTCambodiaWorkplan10May2023; and statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023, p. 2, bit.ly/CambodiaStatementJune2023. Cambodia did contribute $30.4 million in 2023, including a contribution to the UNDP Clearing for Results Program.

119 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 37.

120 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nevan Karas, Acting Director, Civil Protection Directorate, Croatia Ministry of the Interior, 2 April 2026.

121 Response to Monitor questionnaire by David Fernández Fernández, Victim Assistance Coordinator – Humanitarian Demining, Peruvian Mine Action Center (Centro Peruano de Acción Contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS), 13 March 2026; and Peru Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2024, pp. 23, bit.ly/PeruArt5ExtRequest2024.

122 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ivana Stanišić, Advisor, Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC), 3 April 2026.

123 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmet Sallova, Director, Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC), 9 April 2026.

124 Interview with Eng. L. Kumudu Lal Bogahawatta, Director, Sri Lanka National Mine Action Centre, in Geneva, 17 June 2026; and Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form I.

125 Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 12 June 2026, pp. 26–27, bit.ly/ThailandArt5ExtRequestJune2026.

126 Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), Form D.

127 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Karimullah Danish, Chief of Analysis and Evaluation, DMAC, 1 April 2026; by Ahmat Ngartoloum, Administration and Finance Department, HCND, 14 May 2026; by Tareq Abu Alrous, Senior Accountant, National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR), 5 April 2026; by Sulafa Abdelraziq, Program Officer, Sudan National Mine Action Center, 10 April 2026; and by Cletus Maregere, Director, Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC), 2 April 2026; and Tajikistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2025), p. 8.

Développement, PNDHD) staff, risk education, and limited survey and clearance activities.[128] Ethiopia reported that the state contribution for its demining program would be 10% of the $30.9 million requested for its five-year extension from 2026–2030.[129] A national contribution for 2025 was not reported.

States not party Armenia and Azerbaijan reported funding to support the staff and operations of their mine action authorities and for survey and clearance.[130] As in 2024, Azerbaijan funded the majority of its mine action program, providing $101.1 million to mine action activities.

For information on national funding contributions by States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, see *Cluster Munition Monitor 2026*.[131]

NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS: 2021–2025

From 2021 to 2025, the combined reported amount contributed by national governments to their mine action programs on an annual basis increased from a low of $76.8 million in 2021 to a high of $306.3 million in 2024.[132] The overall rise in funding suggests that States Parties are reporting these contributions more systematically. In some cases, such as BiH, Colombia, Croatia, and Türkiye, states have increased their capacity to finance their mine action programs.

National contributions: 2021–2025

Year	Total national contributions (US$ million)	% of total contribution (national + international)
2025	276.9	25%
2024	306.3	28%
2023	227.3	22%
2022	115.1	13%
2021	76.8	12%
Total	**1,002.4**	**N/A**

Note: N/A=not applicable.

128 Email from Col. Mohamed Laghdaf Mohamedou Baham, Coordinator, PNDHD, to Mine Action Review, 17 April 2026.


129 Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 7 August 2025, p. 15, bit.ly/EthiopiaArt5ExtRequestAug2025.

130 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Arshak Manukyan, Coordinator, Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE), 30 March 2026; and by Nariman Gasimov, Deputy Head of International Relations Department, Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA), 6 May 2026.

131 CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2026* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2026), bit.ly/CMMonitorReports.

132 National contribution figures for 2021 have been updated from previous Monitor reports to include Germany's contributions to its cluster munition clearance.

INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL FUNDING FOR MINE ACTION: 2025




Note: **States Parties** to the Mine Ban Treaty are **bold**, states not party are plain text, *other areas* are *italics*.

*Includes funding from UNOCHA, UNICEF, UNMPTF, UN Foundation, UNPDF, WFP, and UN Habitat.

DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.

RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION FUNDING: 2025



MAP KEY

Total amount received (in US$)

- More than $60 million
- Between $30–59.9 million
- Between $10–29.9 million
- Between $1–9.9 million
- Less than $1 million

Note: **States Parties** to the Mine Ban Treaty are **bold**, states not party are plain text, *other areas* are *italics*.

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A clearance team heads to a hazardous area in Urrao, Antioquia department, Colombia.
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STATUS OF THE CONVENTION

1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION (MINE BAN TREATY)

Under Article 15, the Mine Ban Treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force on 1 March 1999. Since the treaty entered into force, states can no longer sign it but can join through a one-step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the Mine Ban Treaty is open for accession by any state that has not signed. In the following list of states, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Accession is indicated with (a) and succession is indicated with (s).

As of 1 November 2026, there were 162 States Parties.

STATES PARTIES

Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99
Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03

Cabo Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02
Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a)
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 May 02 (a)
Congo, Rep. 4 May 01 (a)
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99
Côte d'Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a)
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a)
Eswatini 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03
Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98
Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01
Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03
Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06
Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98
Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98
Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99
Indonesia 4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07
Iraq 15 Aug 07 (a)
Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99
Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98
Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98
Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98
Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01
Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a)
Kuwait 30 Jul 07 (a)
Lebanon 1 May 26 (a)
Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a)
Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99
Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99
Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99
Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98
Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99
Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00
Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98
Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01
Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97; 12 Mar 25
Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00
Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98
Montenegro 23 Oct 06 (s)
Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98
Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98
Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a)
Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99
New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99
Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a)
Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98
North Macedonia 9 Sep 98 (a)
Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98
Oman 20 Aug 14 (a)
Palau 18 Nov 07 (a)
Palestine 29 Dec 17 (a)
Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98
Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a)
Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98
Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98
Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00
Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99
Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98

Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00
Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98
Sao Tome and Principe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a)
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01
Slovakia 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Somalia 16 Apr 12 (a)
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98
South Sudan 11 Nov 11 (s)
Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99
Sri Lanka 13 Dec 17 (a)
Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03
Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02
Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98
Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a)
Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00
Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98
Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a)
Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00
Tonga 25 Jun 25 (a)
Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98
Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99
Türkiye 25 Sep 03 (a)
Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98
Tuvalu 13 Sep 2011 (a)
Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01
Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99
Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98
Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01
Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98

STATES NOT PARTY

Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
China
Cuba
Egypt
Estonia [withdrew on 27 Dec 25]
Finland [withdrew on 10 Jan 26]
Georgia
India
Iran
Israel
Kazakhstan
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kyrgyzstan
Lao PDR
Latvia [withdrew on 27 Dec 25]
Libya
Lithuania [withdrew on 27 Dec 25]
Micronesia
Mongolia
Morocco
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Poland [withdrew on 20 Feb 26]
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Syria
United Arab Emirates
United States
Uzbekistan
Vietnam

MINE BAN TREATY

18 SEPTEMBER 1997

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

PREAMBLE

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
   a) To use anti-personnel mines;
   b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
   c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

ARTICLE 2

Definitions

1. "Anti-personnel mine" means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
2. "Mine" means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.
3. "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.
4. "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.
5. "Mined area" means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

ARTICLE 3

Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

ARTICLE 4

Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

ARTICLE 5

Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:

   a) The duration of the proposed extension;

   b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:

      (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;

      (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and

      (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;

   c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and

   d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

ARTICLE 6

International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:

a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;

b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;

c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;

d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;

e) Assistance to mine victims;

f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

ARTICLE 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:

a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;

b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;

c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;

d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;

e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;

f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;

g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;

h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and

i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

ARTICLE 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact- finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.

10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:

a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;

b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or

c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

ARTICLE 9

National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 10

Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

ARTICLE 11

Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:

   a) The operation and status of this Convention;

   b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;

   c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;

   d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;

   e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and

   f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.

2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.

3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.

4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 12

Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties,

provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:

a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;

b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;

c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and

d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 13

Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

ARTICLE 14

Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

ARTICLE 15

Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

ARTICLE 16

Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.

2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.

3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

ARTICLE 17

Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.

2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 18

Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

ARTICLE 19

Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 20

Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the

Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six- month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

ARTICLE 21

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

ARTICLE 22

Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

GLOSSARY

Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict and that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict and is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of ERW.

Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

"All reasonable effort" – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/ERW. "All reasonable effort" has been applied when the commitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.

Antihandling device – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device "means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine."

Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine "means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons."

Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed "to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person."

Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

Battle area clearance (BAC) – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mines/ERW from a specified area to a specified depth.

Cleared land – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or the destruction of all specified mines/ERW to a specified depth.

Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a cluster munition is "a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions." Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets, from fixed dispensers) over a wide area. Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

Confirmed hazardous area (CHA) – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mines/ERW, including survey, mapping, marking, clearance, and the handover of cleared land.

Diversity – A term that refers to the different aspects that make up a person's social identity, for example: age, (dis)ability, faith, and ethnicity, among others.

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Landmines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

Gender – A term that refers to the range of characteristics, norms, behaviors, and roles associated with women, men, girls, and boys, as well as relationships with each other, and that are socially constructed. As a social construct, gender varies according to socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts, and can change over time.

Humanitarian mine action (HMA) – All activities aimed at significantly reducing or completely eliminating the threat and impact of mines/ERW upon civilians and their livelihoods. This includes the survey, mapping and marking, and clearance of contaminated areas; capacity-building and coordination; risk education; victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and ban advocacy.

Improvised explosive device (IED) – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An IED may be victim-activated or command-detonated. IEDs that can be activated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person (victim-activated) are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

Improvised mine, improvised landmine, or improvised antipersonnel landmine – An IED acting as a mine, landmine, or antipersonnel landmine.

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles, and in some cases defining international requirements and specifications.

Intersectionality – A concept that captures the consequences of two or more combined systems of discrimination, and addresses the manner in which they contribute to creating layers of inequality.

Land release – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with minimum possible risk. This involves the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of mine/ERW contaminated areas.

Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action centers also implement mine action activities.

Non-state armed group (NSAG) – For the Monitor's purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

Non-technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to better define where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

Persons with disabilities – Those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers, may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.

Reduced land – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.

Residual risk – In the context of humanitarian demining, this term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy all mines/ERW from a specified area to a specified depth.

Risk education (also known as risk reduction education and awareness in the Convention on Cluster Munitions and more broadly as Explosive Ordnance Risk Education, EORE) – Activities that seek to reduce the risk of death and injury from explosive hazards by raising the awareness of women, girls, men, and boys in accordance with the nature of the risks and their different vulnerabilities, roles, and needs and by promoting behavioral change. This includes public information dissemination, education and training, and community liaison.

Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as "bomblets," although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called "grenades."

Survivor – A person who has been directly injured by the explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and has survived the incident.

Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to better define where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

Unexploded submunitions and unexploded bomblets – Submunitions and bomblets that have failed to explode as intended at the time of use, becoming unexploded ordnance.

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

Victim – A person who has suffered physical, emotional, or psychological injury; economic loss; or substantial impairment of the realization of their rights through acts or omissions related to mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. Victims include people injured and killed (casualties), their families, and broader communities affected by mines, cluster munitions, and ERW.

Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support, socio-economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure the full inclusion and equal participation in society of mine/ERW survivors and affected families and communities.

LANDMINE MONITOR 2026



Landmine Monitor 2026 provides a global overview of efforts to universalize and fully implement the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Focusing on calendar year 2025 with information included up to October 2026 where possible, the report documents recent landmine use and covers mine ban policy, production, trade, and stockpiling globally. The report also outlines developments and challenges in addressing the impact of mine contamination and casualties through clearance of mined areas, the delivery of risk education to affected communities, and the provision of assistance to victims of these weapons, before reviewing global trends in mine action funding. Country profiles published online provide additional country-specific findings on these topics.

This report was prepared by the **Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor**, the civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). The Monitor has reported on the international community's response to the global landmine problem and its solutions since 1999.

Front Cover: After seven years of displacement, Imaan returned to Raqqa, Syria, to celebrate Eid al-Adha. Whilst she was tending to her family's flock of sheep with her mother, she stepped on a landmine which severely damaged her right lower leg. © T. Nicholson/HI, November 2025

Back Cover: Landmine survivor Aboud was injured in a mine explosion while collecting scrap metal to support his family in northern Aleppo, Syria, in January 2025. He currently lives in Shamarikh camp near Azaz. © T. Mayer/HI, October 2025

Cover Design: Michael Sherwin — Printed and bound in Switzerland

Content produced by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor is reviewed by members of the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the Governance Board of the ICBL-CMC. The committee's members include Monitor editorial team leaders, ICBL-CMC staff, and expert representatives of the following organizations: the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines, DanChurchAid, Human Rights Watch, Humanity & Inclusion, and Mines Action Canada.

Landmine & Cluster Munition MONITOR

www.the-monitor.org

ISBN 978-2-9701476-8-8